

## 2006 Navy League Sea-Air-Space Exposition

### TRANSCRIPT

Event: Professional Seminar: Supremacy in the Maritime Domain: Why It Matters  
Date: Tuesday, April 4, 2006  
Time: 10am  
Panelists: Admiral Robert F. Willard, USN, Vice Chief of Naval Operations  
General Robert Magnus, USMC, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps  
Vice Admiral Terry Cross, USCG, Vice Commandant of the Coast Guard

**John Panneton (Navy League President)**...the event from the other – across the hall from last year, because, as you know, last year, it just overflowed into the hallway. We moved it into this room. It may look like we have some empty seats, which we do, but we actually have more people in this room than we had last year. Again, I want to thank you very much for being here this morning for our first professional seminar, and we have some great speakers again this year, and I want to thank you all for being here. My name is John Panneton. I am the National President of the Navy League. Before we introduce our panel, I just want to say a few words about the Navy League. First, as you know, we have been responsible for the Sea-Air-Space now for over four decades. That's a pretty long time, and I think we know how to do it. As you can see, it's an outstanding exposition. The mission of the Navy League is to support our Sailors, Marines, Coast Guard, and Merchant Marines and to keep the public and Congress informed about the importance of sea power. We have over two hundred and seventy-five Navy League Councils worldwide that know how to do it, and they do it in many different ways. Now, I'm going to ask you a very important question. How many in the audience are Navy League members through their companies? And how many Navy League members do we have as individuals? And how many do we have that are not Navy League members? Quite a few. Well, there's a guy sitting right back there. So, when you walk out, he has an application, and we made up a special application just for the seminars this week and for expo. So, if you have an opportunity on the way out, if you have any questions, Jim can answer those questions for you, and if you want to join, you can, or you can have your wife join or your family members or coworkers and other friends. I think it's something you may want to consider, and my role here this morning is very brief. So, I think we need to get on to introducing the panel, and I want you to please join me in welcoming Rear Admiral Bill Cross. He's the Moderator of the panel this morning. Bill.

**Moderator (Bill Cross)**: Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. It's a great day to be a Sailor or a Marine, even a former Sailor or Marine. I think many of you in the audience might agree with that. Anyway, I'd like to welcome you also to the 2006 Navy League Sea-Air-Space Professional Seminar Series. As John said, I'm Bill Cross, and I'll be the Seminar Chairman for the event. For the next three days, we'll have a total of six seminars, and I think you'll find that we have a particularly good speaker lineup this year for the seminars. So, I would urge you to take a look at your exhibit schedule; that little tri-fold or foldout that you have there, and make sure that you block off some time to spend in our seminars. I think you'll also find it particularly interesting that each of our seminars will address an important concept for today's maritime forces, and that is the empowerment of individuals and groups at the edge; that critical interface

where our Sailors, Marines, and their equipment interact with the operating environment. In their book *Power to the Edge*, authors David Alberts and Richard Hayes point out that this empowerment at the edge concept enables organizations to accomplish more in less time under more adverse conditions and, very importantly, at a lower cost. Empowerment at the edge also enhances four essential capabilities for today's maritime forces; the ability to create and share situational awareness, the ability to work in a coalition environment both from a military standpoint and a non-military standpoint, possession of the appropriate means to respond, and the ability to orchestrate those means to respond in a timely manner. Our seminars are designed to address each one of those areas and provide unique insight and perspectives in each. So again, I would encourage you to attend as many as you can. The seminar format this year will be very similar to the way that we've done it in the past, for those of you that have been here. We'll have remarks from each of our speakers. At the end of those remarks, we'll have a question and answer period from the floor. You notice that we have two microphones set up on either one of the aisles. So, if you would go up to one of the microphones, please identify yourself and direct your question at the speaker or speakers that you would like. As a reminder, ladies and gentlemen, please silence any cell phones that you might have with you today before the speakers start with their remarks, and what better way to start out this seminar event than to hear the perspectives of the Vice Chiefs. To my immediate left is Admiral Bob Willard, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations. As a Flag Officer, Admiral Willard has served on the Joint Staff as Deputy Director for Operations; as Commander of Carrier Group V; as Deputy and Chief of Staff, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet; Commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet; and most recently, before his current job, as Director for Force Structure Resources and Assessment on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. To Admiral Willard's left is General Bob Magnus, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corp. General Magnus has served as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation; Commander, Marine Corp Bases Western Area; Deputy Commander, Marine Forces Pacific; Assistant Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations; and as Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources. To General Magnus' left is Vice Admiral Terry Cross, the Vice Commandant of the United States Coast Guard. Admiral Cross served as the Assistant Commandant for Operations; Commander of the Eleventh Coast Guard District; Commander, Seventeenth Coast Guard District; and Director of Operations and Policy at the Coast Guard Headquarters. Would you please join me in welcoming our three speakers, and with that, Admiral Willard, I'll turn the floor over to you sir.

**Admiral Bob Willard:** Thank you very much. Thank you Bill and thank you John from Navy League, and I would just like to express my appreciation that Navy League is once again sponsoring Sea-Air-Space, and it's wonderful to be here. Good morning. I'd like to just take a few minutes and remark. I think we would probably all be better served by getting to the questions and answers sooner rather than later, but allow me, if I may, to frame the current state-of-play as we see it in Navy. During Operation Iraqi Freedom and as a result of the lessons learned that were gathered by Joint Forces Command several years ago, there was a phrase coined termed 'overmatch.' Now, we've used it a lot in the Pentagon sense. In fact, we used it during the quadrennial defense review, and it's a phrase that is intended or a word that's intended to represent the significant advantage that this superpower military holds or should hold over an adversary, and in the case of Iraqi Freedom, it was intended to represent the significant advantage that our ground forces and air forces enjoyed over the regular Iraqi Army that they faced en route to Baghdad. Arguably, there are three key elements that result in overmatch, and I

would contend that one of those is the technological advantage that we enjoy in our military and that many of you help provide. I think second in overmatch is joint warfare and our approach to joint warfare and the synergy that results from a joint force as opposed to a match set of services approach to warfare, and thirdly, key to overmatch is the all-volunteer military, the all-volunteer joint force, that we enjoy today ideally suited to exploit the technological advantage that we have. That was true in Iraqi Freedom, when it was a force-on-force level of effort and a conventional campaign. One of the things derived from QDR was a force planning construct, and within that evolved force planning construct was an entirely different dimension of warfare termed 'irregular warfare,' which frankly, we're still struggling to finally define, but let's imagine that irregular warfare is represented today by the current operation that's ongoing in Iraq and Afghanistan where, in this new security environment or different security environment, the technological advantage, the joint advantage, and the advantage that we are served by our all-volunteer force are undermined by the adversary as he embeds himself in the urban environment and as he applies low-tech and as he avoids confrontation at all costs such that we have to track him down; we have to apply precipitating strategies to have him reveal himself out of these very challenging and difficult environments. So, the challenge facing Navy today – I would argue the challenge facing our joint force today is to make the necessary shaping adjustments in our capabilities and capacity to once again achieve overmatch, this time in irregular warfare; a different war-fighting environment, and so, the questions begged, "What technologies, what advances to the joint force, and what differences in people, if those are the elements of overmatch, would apply here?" In the quadrennial defense review, we spent a great deal of time pondering the kinds of technologies that Navy and the rest of the Department require to fight this kind of fight, and they're different, and they're not all low-tech. Riverine [sp] forces for the Navy, arguably, are, obviously, a less expensive variant of warfare that are high-end ships, but missile defense is not, and I would argue that in irregular warfare, in this uncertain world, in this current security environment, the activities that are attempting to deliver missile defense to this nation may very well come into play. So, it's both high-tech and low-tech; both, arguably, some high-cost and some low-cost options that are going to develop technologies differently for us to allow us to achieve a technological advantage in this environment. The joint force that served us so well in Iraqi Freedom, that had expanded into a coalition force, needs to now expand further into an inter-agency coalition that brings all that our government and national power can provide to bear in this current security environment. So, it's a different form of joint force; one that's evolved and one that much more greatly leverages the power of government across not only the U.S. but across the globe, and lastly, the all-volunteer force needs to evolve too. It needs to be adapted to the technologies that we're considering best applied to this security environment. We have to teach sailors to be riverine [sp] sailors once again. We have to teach sailors to exploit missile defense technologies. We have to teach sailors to exploit an intelligence environment that demands persistence and agility that's different than the way that they're exploiting the technologies today. We have to teach them language, and we have to teach them new cultures, because they are going to be operating in environments in the world where formerly we were less comfortable operating. When you think about the adversary today, it's not necessarily the Tier One engagement partners that are our closest allies, but rather, it's the sanctuaries that we find the terrorist networks to be embedded within, and you can almost turn those countries upside down, and we are forced now to entertain entering environments that are the least comfortable for the United States and the United States Military; the ones we have the least relationship with that we now have to grow as partners. So, the new security environment and the advent of

irregular warfare is different for us and is an evolution, I think, for us in the Department of Defense, and while we can't undermine our capability to conduct conventional warfare and in fact should adapt many of the technologies and approaches that I've talked about to be adaptable to conventional warfare as well, we do have to do things different. We need your help to do these, and we need to make it all affordable. So, there are a few slight challenges out there. I very much look forward to answering your questions. Thank you.

**General Bob Magnus:** I'm clapping so that you can clap for me and Terry Cross, when we get our turns. Good morning ladies and gentlemen, Sailors and Marines, and the rest of you out there in industry that support us. Thanks again, just like Admiral Willard said, to Navy League, Bill, and John, and I can kind of echo Bill here, because I am a former Sailor, but I would like to also claim to be a modern day Marine too. So, I'm part of your Navy League. As Admiral Willard has said, we are in a historically unusual time not only for the nation and the world but this is the first time we've had the all-volunteer force in a sustained long war, and so, the demands on the men and women, who are the finest we could have expected out of this generation, and on their families are unique. In other words, we have not seen this before, and how we lead them and how they react to this war and how America and the Congress continues to support them is – we are turning new pages in history here. Having said that, in terms of where we should be, in terms of evolving and transforming the force, I've got to tell you, without dancing in the end zone, that on the 10<sup>th</sup> of September, 2001, your Marine Corp was about as close to the V-Ring on the target range, that is the X that gives you a perfect score, as close as we could have possibly been, and it might have been by accident, but I don't think so. We delivered the right kind of leadership from the level of Privates to General Officers that were able to, even without the most modern equipment, even in the most unexpected and austere expeditionary environments, that they did themselves proud, because it was their lives that were on the line, and they did the nation and the coalition that is against this terrorist global war proud, and so, what we need to do is continue to improve and evolve on that model, because we don't need to change what we've done in some dramatic fashion. We're doing what the nation always does at war. We're improving upon the model that was successful at the beginning, and ours was largely successful, as technology and lessons learned inform us. Today, you have two hundred and twenty thousand Marines who are joined by tens of thousands of Sailors supporting us now globally. Particularly, we've got twenty-five thousand Marines and three thousand Sailors that are in Province. We've got another twelve hundred Marines and Sailors that are in the Eastern Provinces of Afghanistan. That is our last planned rotation. First Battalion Third Marines is there right now, and the Navy is taking over from us leadership, as of the Joint Task Force, in the corner of Africa in Djibouti. Your Navy Marine Corp Team is at war, and they are doing awesomely well under very demanding conditions, and the Navy Marine Corp Team has been there before, is there again today, and this is a long war. We expect to be there and will sustain this into the tomorrows. It's a different kind of war, but it's the same kind of war in many ways. It's coalition warfare. It's joint warfare, and quite frankly, whether it was Fallujah in 2004 or the operations that we see along the Euphrates and Tigris River Valleys today, Soldiers and Marines in large numbers, at the Battalion Combat Team, Regimental Combat Team level, are operating smoothly as a joint team, even though we don't have the kind of interoperable technology that we should have had years ago. We've figured out how to make it work, and we're going to be able to make it work better, as we're improving commander control, communications, interoperable logistics, but I've got to tell you, the joint team is working just fine today, and yes,

we've shifted from traditional major combat operations into what's now being called 'irregular warfare,' a term that we're kind of wrestling with the meaning, but I'll tell you what it means to Marines; it means small wars. We've been there. We've done this before. The enemy is different. Some of the technology is different. Some of the technology is shockingly familiar. The tactics of hiding amongst populations in built-up areas are not unfamiliar to the American Military and to your Marines. So, as we try to figure out doctrinally what we mean by this, on the battlefield, we know exactly what this means, and of course, it's the same team that goes to war whether it's on 9/11 or it's tomorrow that is able to do tsunami relief, rescue folks in mudslides and do recovery operations in the Philippines, support the Navy and our other joint partners in earthquake relief in Pakistan, do major combat operations eight hundred kilometers into Iraq from the sea, or to do stability and security operations and train our Iraqi and Afghan coalition partners in how to clean up their neighborhoods and police their streets. So, whether it's the full spectrum of operations from small wars to major combat operations to military operations other than war, same Marines, same training, same equipment, same leadership. General War; we're living it today. So, what we thought about and wrote about in the 90s we're experiencing in the first decade of this century, and we'll see this again and again and again. Our priorities are pretty clear. The most versatile weapons system in the United States inventory is the trooper; the individual Soldier, Airman, Sailor, Marine, and Coast Guardsman. So, we are going to keep – our priority number one is take care of the Marines, take care of the Sailors, take care of their families. That is job one. Quite frankly, that's sixty-three cents on the Commandant's dollar anyway. The second thing is they are our most precious resource. Moms and Dads have given us their finest treasure, not their tax dollars but their kids. So, we are going to make sure that we continue to train and educate them to a high standard, and by the way, these are not the bottom twenty-five percent of their high school class. They are the top twenty-five percent of their high school class. You can see it in their leadership, in their confidence, in their professionalism, and in their sheer heroism on the battlefield. Their fellows back in high school that wondered why they signed up will be wondering twenty years from now what did they accomplish while these young Marines, Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Coast Guardsmen are demonstrating today. They will not have to wait twenty years to figure out what they have accomplished. Our third priority is if you are going to take care of them you are going to give them good family housing. We're doing that. We are going to be over ninety-five percent PPV. We are going to give them good enlisted barracks. Our friends in the Navy, quite frankly, are five or six years ahead of us in that. We've been focused on making sure these are bright, young, tough, professional, and dedicated Marines. We owe it to them and their families to give them good housing, and the last thing, and it is really the last thing, it's the technology. It's the modernization, because as General said, "We could have beat them with their technology," referring to another Iraqi Army in another war. The truth is we owe these young men and women the finest technology that America can deliver to make their job a little easier, a little more bloody for the other guy, a little less bloody for our folks. So, the focus is going to be on command and control technologies so that we can better link jointly and with coalition partners, but more importantly, pushing the information, the intelligence, and the decision making to the lowest possible level, because right now, the fight is really at the squad and the platoon level in these distributed operations. We are going to continue to improve on our tactical mobility and with our partners in the Navy. Our mobility on the sea and from the sea will continue to improve, and we are fielding most of these systems right now, including our triad of fires, and believe it or not, the focus is on precision logistics, because if you are going to operate four

hundred miles from the sea in a place like Eastern Afghanistan or you are going to operate eight hundred kilometers from the sea in Northern Iraq, you better have it just enough and just in time and just right, because you don't want to reach into the box and not find the ammunition or the food or the communication spares that you need. We're doing distributed operations right now. We do them from the sea routinely. We've never really thought of it in that way until the last few years, but in fact, we are doing distributed operations ashore now. We've got twenty-five thousand Marines that are covering a population of five million Sunni-Arabs in countless numbers of towns and villages where we literally have had in the past Majors and Lieutenant Colonels of Battalions that were Mayors of small cities, as we finished our major combat operations. Right now, you've got Colonels in charge of very large Regimental Combat Teams that are in charge of areas where there are hundreds of thousands of non-combatants and a few thousand incredibly tough bad people who are buried amongst them and making judgment calls on a minute-to-minute and day-to-day basis that literally mean life and death, both to our folks as well as to the innocent people that they are there to protect. To be able to do this, we are going to sustain this force, quite frankly, by just taking care of those Marines and Sailors, and to our surprise, we think we can probably do this at this level relatively indefinitely. The challenge, of course, is being able to modernize the force with equipment while we're sustaining the force who are the right kind of trained and educated young Marines and Sailors, and because of that, we'll be facing some challenges, particularly in the aviation community, as we stand down squadrons of helicopters to standup to squadrons of tilt rotors. At the same time, we have extraordinarily high demands for the same capabilities on the battlefield, but I'll finish by telling you that today the Marine Corp, which is authorized at a hundred and seventy-nine thousand with another thirty-nine thousand six hundred in the Reserves, is about as close to the V-Ring as America's Moms and Dads would have wanted their kids to be, as the Congress who supports us so strongly would have wanted us to be, and as the Combatant Commanders needed us to be, and what we need to do is to be true to what brought us to those successful models that deliver bold, innovative leadership at the lowest levels of the enlisted in officer ranks and superbly trained and tough teams who are smarter, more educated, more professional, and quite frankly, tougher than the enemy. Having been out there in Eastern Afghanistan in January, when I looked a young Rifle Commander in the eye who had been in OIF and was now in OEF with his Rifle Company, he said in the first fight that they had, and this was his last month so his first fight was in the first month, they found themselves challenged when they were chasing Taliban in eight thousand foot high mountains of Afghanistan, and at the end of a multi-day operation, they found out, with all of their gear and their armor and their weapons and their communications, chasing the Mujahidine in their own mountains, they were able to run them down, and the confidence that that gave to those Marines and the shock that that gave to the Afghan Mujahidine will bear us well in the future, because you have delivered us a tremendous capability, and we continue to improve on the model that is your Marine Corp. Thank you.

***Admiral Terry Cross:*** Good morning. I'd like to add my thanks to that of my colleagues to Bill and John and may it be extended beyond that to the entire Navy League, not just for your support of the Sea and Air Exposition and not just for your support on the hill, which, by the way, we appreciate very much and we find it very valuable and useful, but maybe more importantly, for your strong support in the field for those young Sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen. I need to tell you, at least from my own experience, the support that our young kids in the field get from the Navy League is very, very much appreciated, and the appreciation exceeds the level of

support we get in the sense that these young people in uniform that they see that there are civilians, their fellow countrymen, who are willing to give of their time and their treasure to try to improve their quality of life, make life a little better for them. It's a heartfelt thing for them, and they very much appreciate it. So, thank you for that. General Magnus talked about this being a different kind of war, and of course, he's absolutely right. This is a world war in a different sense than the last two world wars we fought primarily in the sense that we have a significant threat here at home, and I and a number of my colleagues have talked about Homeland Security and in particular Maritime Homeland Security for several years now, and as we do that, we always talk about the venue of the Marine Transportation System. Of course, when I talk about that I'm not just talking about the oceans, but ports, key rivers, and the Great Lakes make up our entire Marine Transportation System. We also tend to talk about how valuable that System is and how vulnerable it is. It's valuable because virtually all of the equipment for the Defense Department that we send overseas travels on the oceans. Almost all of our imports and exports that come into this country and drive our economy travel on that Marine Transportation System. So, the Marine Transportation System itself is vital to our national security for two reasons. One is it's critical to the national defense, but it's also critical to the economic security of our country, and for that matter, it's critical to the economic security of the entire world. Now, the Marine Transportation System is vulnerable just because it's so big. I think some of you are probably familiar with the numbers by now that we talk about; three hundred and sixty-one ports, over three thousand terminals, and ninety-five thousand miles of coastline make our maritime borders our longest borders and our borders that are most difficult to defend, and you are going to hear me use that term a little bit, and I'd like for all of us to put it in our lexicon, when we talk in terms of the maritime borders. We also talk about how the Marine Transportation System is used to smuggle everything from illegal arms to drugs to people, how fish docks are being depleted, and pirates are becoming bolder. Other threats remain such as the mining of our military or economically strategic ports, but our main concern is, has been, and will remain the transportation of terrorists or weapons of mass destruction. The challenge for us remains as it has been early on, and that's to sort out the good guys from the literally millions of legal vessels that transit our waters, and I said I wanted to put this idea of a maritime border in your lexicon. Let me just, as a side, talk about that a little bit, because I think that's something that we all need to think about as our government prepares to invest literally hundreds of millions of dollars into securing our land borders. I'm not suggesting that's not something we shouldn't do, because we should. We absolutely need to do it, but we ought to think about, beforehand, the impacts of that. As we begin to secure our land borders, we shouldn't think that those who would do us harm or even your illegal migrants will simply not try to come to the country. We know that they will continue to try to come to the country, and that leaves two venues open; one by air and one by sea, and of course, they are already using the Marine Transportation System to come here, as we work that issue every day in the Florida Straits and in the Windward Pass and the Leeward Pass in the Caribbean. Last year, we interdicted roughly three hundred thousand pounds of cocaine and almost eleven thousand migrants at sea. Could we put the next slide up please? We've worked very hard over the last four and a half years to reduce risk to the Maritime Transportation System. The implementation of our strategy has been consistent, persistent, and systematic. We employ four basic tools to achieve the desired ends. Specifically, we employ our broad law enforcement authorities and regulatory authorities, and we sought additional domestic and international authorities where they were needed. Examples include the Maritime Transportation Act of 2002 and the

International Ship and Port Facility Code. We increased the size of our force where we needed additional capacity, and that's about fourteen percent to date since 2001. We trained for new missions and for new competencies such as anti-terrorism that were required. We created new units such as our Maritime Safety and Security Teams, and lastly, we looked for opportunities to partner with the other Armed Services, with the interagency, and with the international community. We used these tools to work toward the accomplishment of four primary goals; first, to enhance maritime domain awareness; second, to create and oversee an effective domestic and international security regime; three, to increase deterrents and operational presence; and fourth, to improve our response and recovery capability should we fail to prevent an attack, and there is a long list of specific things that we've done, and those lists are presented on the slide up there, and we can provide this for you, if anyone is interested, but I'd like to take the remainder of my time to talk about three important things that haven't been talked about very much. First, and I think the most important, is the National Strategy for Maritime Security. My guess is that not everyone in the room has even heard of the National Strategy for Maritime Security, but I think it's critical to our eventual success. Since 9/11 2001, virtually all of the agencies in government that have a vested interest in the maritime have worked hard to develop their strategies, their own capabilities in order to better protect our country, but what was lacking until recently was a holistic systems approach to this problem. In September of 2005, the President approved the National Strategy for Maritime Security. This is an important document that links, in a synergistic way, the initiatives of all of the agencies that have a stake in the maritime domain. We now have a single unifying strategy. The National Strategy forms a systems perspective of the problem's scope. It recognizes our nation's maritime security as an all-threats challenge – an all-threats challenge. The strategy addresses not only terrorism but also criminal acts such as drug smuggling, illegal immigration, human trafficking, and unlawful exploitation of the marine resources; all threats to our national interest. It recognizes that terrorism will not likely come knocking at our front door. It's unlikely we're going to see the Al Qaeda Navy come steaming over the horizon. It recognizes that terrorism will likely seek to blend in with the normal course of legitimate activity in the marine domain. Countering that tactic requires strong law enforcement capabilities and a persistent presence on the waters that can identify, interdict, and disrupt them. The Strategy is guided by three important overarching principles. Of critical importance to the Navy is preserving the freedom of the seas; insuring an uninterrupted flow of shipping and commerce critical to our economy; and third, facilitating the movement of desirable goods and people across our borders while screening out dangerous people and material. It revolves around five strategic actions; enhancing international cooperation, maximizing the domain awareness, embedding security into commercial practices, deploying layered security, and five, assuring continuity of the Marine Transportation System. As we all know, aligning the 04s and the 05s in the Coast Guard Headquarters, in the Pentagon, and elsewhere around the cities is a very, very difficult thing to do. So, I think, at the end of the day, the real value of this document is that it's going to force the agency heads to work together, and ultimately, all of this is going to come together at the Cabinet level. I think it was absolutely required. The second document I'd like to talk about is the National Fleet Document. I have a little brochure here that talks about it. This is a document signed by Admiral Mullen and Admiral Collins, and we've had National Fleet Documents before, in candidly for the most part. I'm not sure they amounted to much, but I think this time it may be different for at least two reasons. First, it's more important than ever before that we have such a policy. I think it's important to the nation's security. The threat to our homeland has evolved in such a way that the Coast Guard has become

much more relevant than we were in the past to national security. The Coast Guard, with law enforcement authorities and regulatory authorities, is simply the more important member of the team. Second, both the Navy and Coast Guard are simultaneously trying to – we’re doing more than trying. We’re working night and day to recapitalize our fleets at a time when large budget deficits are crying out for fiscal constraints. It’s unlikely, in my view, that either service will get everything we want or everything we think we need. Given that, it’s critical, I believe, that we work together to build a synergistic, interoperable national fleet capable of meeting all threats from fisheries to law enforcement to major theater war. Moreover, to the extent that we can employ like equipment in our ships, we are likely to save money, and we can both acquire more than would otherwise be possible. Now, if national security and this theoretical requirement that I talked about were the only reasons for doing the National Fleet Policy, I perhaps shouldn’t be any more confident this time than I have been in the past, but I think we’ve got a little more going for us this time, and that’s that both Admiral Mullen and Admiral Collins have started up a work group to work together to identify specific actions to be taken to operationalize this Policy. That’s the first time that we’ve seen this happen, and the work that those work groups accomplish will be the key to the success or failure of the National Fleet Policy. The third issue involves two documents; both signed by the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security. The first one was actually signed several months ago, and it authorizes the Coast Guard to give tactical control of Coast Guard assets to the Navy for the conduct of homeland defense operations. Now, this isn’t a particularly unique situation. We’ve actually done that in the past, and in fact, all of the assets that we’ve sent to the Arabian Gulf are working directly for the Navy. So, that’s not necessarily all that unusual, but a second document was recently signed by the Secretary of Defense is unique, and it authorizes Navy Commanders to shift the tactical control of Navy assets to the Coast Guard for homeland security operations. Now, understand, both of these documents were written and reviewed about fifteen times by eight sets of lawyers. So, there are constraints built in and ifs, ands, and buts, but the reality is and I think the bottom line here that’s important is that both the Navy and the Coast Guard now authorize Field Commanders to shift tactical control of Navy and Coast Guard assets to that service which is either in the best position or has the most appropriate authorities to accomplish the mission at hand, and I think that’s critically important and reflects the commonsense attitude and approach to fighting this new kind of war. Let me just close by saying that every time I speak and answer questions to a group I’m asked if we believe that we’re safer now than we used to be here in the homeland, and the answer I always give is, “Absolutely we’re safer now than we used to be, and I can give you a long litany of reasons why I think that, but we’re not as safe as we need to be, and we need to continue, down the road – we need to continue down the road in the Coast Guard with things like our Deep Water Project, our Command 2010 Project, our Rescue 21 Project in order to accomplish everything we need to accomplish to be as safe as we can be. Thank you.

**Moderator** : Gentlemen, ladies, our three panelists have agreed to take a few questions. If there’s something on your mind, I’m sure we’d like to hear from you.

I guess we did good.

**Curt Strauss** – I would be remiss if I didn’t note, in the interest of jointness, that all three of the Service Deputies that are represented and the Chairman are all Naval Aviators. So, that’s a pretty good way to knit the force together. The question is for Admiral Willard. Admiral, if I

characterize what you said properly, you said the Navy's role in this emerging security environment, besides its traditional role, is to put some assets into a regular warfare, and the Navy has done a great job of that, at least the Department of Navy, by creating the Marines. That's a tremendous contribution, and some marginal things like riverine forces and so forth, and the other thing that you mentioned was providing missile defense. So, my question is about missile defense. The Navy has a demonstrated capability. It's deployed, but it's very thin, and so, how does the Navy move and, perhaps with MDA providing more resources and you have a little bit more fair distribution of resources that have been done in the past, turn that demonstrated capability into a war-fighting capability when we have nine thousand vertical launchers and hundreds of ships but only a few that are equipped and maybe tens of missiles and we have adversaries who have eight hundred ballistic missiles and we only have tens of missiles, how do we get to the future with MDA investment or perhaps in the future U.S. Navy investment?

**Admiral Willard:** Thank you Curt. Before I answer the specific question regarding missile defense, I would just characterize the Navy's role in irregular as perhaps a bit more robust than my description may have been or your description was, and that is even our conventional forces will now be disbursed globally, when it's appropriate, in order to fight the war on terror. So, this long war will involve all of us to one extent or another virtually all the time until we win it. So, we've got a lot of conventional forces right now that are not necessarily specifically adapted to irregular warfare that have adapted themselves to this environment that are conducting the intercept operations and all of the many other operations both in the central command and elsewhere around the globe that are participating in the long war as we speak, and at the same time, we're trying to reshape our Sailors and reshape some of our technologies to be more adaptable to that environment. To the subject of missile defense, there is a certain pace that we are developing missile defense capabilities, both ground based and sea based. The Missile Defense Agency is, obviously, central to that level of development effort right now, but I think you might be surprised how quickly Navy assets are coming online. The adaptation of the Egis [sp] Weapon System to being a viable missile defense asset has now been proven with a number of different test firings, and the missiles are in development. So now, it becomes a matter of continued development to achieve assurance and over time to achieve the capacity that you alluded to. The pace of this is relatively important that we achieve defomer. We are not hastening to missile defense at the expense of a level of assurance that when we deliver it we can truly deliver it. I say that as our first shooter that is outside the test environment is readying to forward deploy to the Forward Deploy Naval Force in Japan. So, we have technologies on the water now for purposes of very exacting missile tracking, and we have several shooters that are loaded out and equipped now to conduct missile defense. At the same time that Northern Command, Strategic Command, and the Combatant Commanders regionally are all developing the concepts of operations to employ these assets, at the same time it is too fast to deliver the technology, and there is a pace that is just right, and we're trying to find that sweet spot and the just right pace to develop and to deliver an assured missile defense system to you, and it's happening faster than you think.

**George Reeves:** My name is George Reeves. I note that there is no one on the panel representing our Merchant Marine, and I must admit that I don't even know who that person would be, but perhaps for Admiral Cross, given that such a small percentage of our international

trade is carried on U.S. flag carriers and that we outsource a considerable amount of our Merchant Marine or former Merchant Marine activities to foreign sources both in terms of crews and bottoms, do you think that's a growing concern for our country?

**Admiral Cross:** I think it's an issue that we have to – that we have to manage and we have to address, and that's part of one of the pillars that I talked about in terms of creating both a domestic and an international security regime. Part of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code for example requires foreign vessels coming into – actually, it requires all vessels to have a trained security officer. It requires vessels to have a security plan, and it requires that plan to be exercised, and it also authorizes port states, in our case the United States, to inspect those plans for their validity and to address the issue of just how well trained is the ship security officer. Those same requirements apply to foreign ports. So, is that an issue that we need to pay attention to? Yes. Are we trying to do that? Yes, and there are other things that we have done with regard to enhancing security of the regime. For example, the ninety-six hour advance notice of arrival. I don't know if you're familiar with that or not, but it's not the ninety-six hours that are so important, but it is the information we are provided. We are given the names of all of the members of the crews and passengers from vessels arriving from foreign ports. The importance of the ninety-six hours is that that gives us time to vet those names through known terrorist watch lists and criminal lists. So, this is an issue that we're not unaware of, and we're trying to address it as intelligently as possible while recognizing the reality of international commerce as it exists.

**John Morton:** Yes. I'm John Morton of DomesticPreparedness.com. A question for Admiral Cross; the instance from the MOU between DOD and DHS where you mentioned that tactical control could shift in a joint operation between the Navy and the Coast Guard, in the instance where tactical control would be with the Coast Guard, would that also mean that naval assets or personnel might have law enforcement authority individually – paired with at Strike Team?

**Admiral Cross:** No. In fact, the MOU specifically addresses the fact that law enforcement authority would continue to rest with the Coast Guard, even when – for example, even when perhaps Coast Guard units would be working for a Navy Commander. If law enforcement authority were needed, then it would be the Coast Guard people who would do that. In fact, that might be one reason – one reason to shift control, potentially, of Coast Guard assets to a Navy Commander. The real beauty of this, I think, of this agreement – first of all, it recognizes the potential urgency of a situation, and that's – Field Commanders are authorized to do this only in urgent situations, and the authority only lasts, I think, up to forty-eight hours, and at that point, the issue has to be addressed at headquarters between agency heads and potentially even Department or Cabinet level heads, but it was put in place, I think, to recognize what Field Commanders had long recognized that neither one of us has sufficient assets on either coast potentially to interdict a threat in a particular area, for example my last Field Command was on the West Coast. There is a lot of Navy in Southern California. There is a lot of Navy in Puget Sound, but there is almost no Navy in between, but there is a lot of Coast Guard in the San Francisco Bay area. So, I think it's just a commonsense approach to say, "Who's available, who has the assets, and who has the right combination of assets?" At least twice during my Pacific Area Command Tour, I requested some air support from the Third Fleet Commander, and of course, he wasn't allowed to let me actually use his airplanes, and he wasn't even allowed to

launch them for Homeland Security type operations, but he managed to schedule a training flight, and on a handshake agreement, we managed to help each other out, and I think that's what the country would have us do. So, what these MOUs did, I think, was simply reflect reality and allow our Field Commanders to do the right thing.

**Robby Harris:** Robby Harris, former Navy person. Question for Admiral Willard please. First sir, I'd like to applaud the emphasis you gave to irregular warfare in your remarks. It was very refreshing I thought, but related to irregular warfare, interestingly enough and coincidentally enough I read a fascinating article last night by Tom Barnett in a recent edition of *Esquire Magazine* entitled "*The Monks [sp] of War,*" and he talks about General Madis [sp] in the Pacific [sp], General in Fort Leavenworth, and General Wallace at Tradock [sp] and how those three General Officers and their commands are focused on bringing lessons learned back from the war in Iraq and Afghanistan and turning those lessons around very quickly and applying them in both theaters, and as I read the article, I couldn't help but notice there is absolutely no mention of the Navy, and there's no mention of the Air Force, perhaps just an oversight, but it does raise the question who is the Navy's monk [sp], if you will, of irregular warfare, and where does he or she sit? I would guess it's NECC, but if you could comment on that, I would appreciate it.

**Admiral Willard :** Yes. It's an excellent question. Commander Fleet Forces come in, and their new subordinate Command Naval Expeditionary Combat Command is where that is intended to reside. The Naval Expeditionary Combat Command is brand new, stood up with a Commander at the head, but forming now and in fact forming with both the Officers and the enlisted personnel, the Sailors that will make it up, and frankly, it has some elements to it that are new and different for the Navy. So, there will be a developmental period before NECC is completed and an up-round for us in irregular warfare. So, currently, at the operational level, it's Commander Fleet Forces Command, Admiral and his staff in Norfolk, and from a policy and viewing into strategy something to align with standpoint, it is resident in the staff currently with a new Navy strategy and a new naval operational concept. We in fact team with the Marines and Army. We are very much immersed in a joint improvised explosive device, joint IED defeat levels of effort and other levels of effort that are lessons learned coming out of theater, and we are very responsive, I think, to the Naval Central Command Commander, who is involved in all ranges of operations in the Persian Gulf and in North Africa. In fact, just recently, he executed a counter-piracy event off of the coast of Somalia, and the technologies that we're applying and the tactics, techniques, and procedures that we're applying to accomplish that are being staffed through the staff and generally managed at Fleet Forces Command in support of that Naval Central Command Commander. So, I think, while Naval Expeditionary Combat Command stands out, we have the necessary lines of communication in place to accomplish some of these rapid-action turnabout lessons learned that the Marine Corp and Army have become particularly adept at in their teaming arrangement with this current operation ongoing.

[Inaudible question].

Deep Blue is assisting in that on the Navy staff. Deep Blue is probably a counterpart, but Deep Blue is kind of special projects on behalf of Chief of Naval Operations. They have exchanged in

theater and have been a source of providing lessons learned back and some adaptive solutions, frankly, to what we've encountered in the AOR. So, they're helping.

**Alan (NLM):** Good morning. My name is Alan . I work at the Naval Service Warfare Center. My question is for Admiral Willard. First of, I'd like to thank you for your explaining overmatch. I had never heard of that term, but I appreciate that, and it made perfect sense. With respect to that, we have an evolving fleet array [sp] changing fleet for structure. I wonder if you could comment a little bit on – actually, we are going to decommission some MHCs, that's a class of twelve, but we are going to be commissioning a lot of LCSs coming online. So, with respect to overmatching, I wonder if you could talk about how we are evolving into that, I think.

**Admiral Willard:** Thank you. It's a challenging question that you pose. As was mentioned earlier by I think a couple of my colleagues, we are all attempting to recapitalize our fleets in this environment. The Marine Corp is attempting to recapitalize its equipment as well as it's dealing with the wear and tear issues that it encounters in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere in the world. It's a very, very difficult time. In fact, Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chief of Naval Operations, as he took over as Chief, characterized our ship building program as a crisis, and it was an affordability crisis and, frankly, a numbers crisis, which demanded that we go back into analysis and reveal to him the minimum acceptable number of ships of each type/model/series across our fleet that could actually perform to the global demands that we have today, and at the same time, we were in the midst characterizing irregular warfare and the long war. In fact, we are in the midst right now of collecting Regional Combatant Commander inputs on O Plan 7500, which is the long war specifics, and how that will affect the overarching force structure for Navy to include our ship building plan. Fortunately, with ships like Combat Ship as part of that force structure, we were headed in a direction that makes our fleet, I think, particularly adaptable to the current environment. The program of record builds Combat Ships relatively quickly and delivers them in numbers, and we need them, and frankly, we need them sooner rather than later. So, we think we have the force structure now about right. Remember that we are trying to strike the balance between our irregular warfare demand signal and our need to retain our capability to fight the conventional fight. We've already demonstrated that you can take our high-end platforms and, when necessary, disaggregate and adapt them to the current operating environment and have them perform well. After all, it was an Egis [sp] Cruiser and Destroyer that engaged pirates off of Somalia several days ago. So, they are out and about the world executing irregular warfare now. So, we think the force structure, the program of record that calls for DDX and CVN21, eventually CGX in the out years, the Virginia Class Submarine are all viable and necessary programs. Affordability is a separate that should be addressed, and it will be addressed; in fact, by me, as directed by Chief of Naval Operations, and we will tackle the affordability issues with these systems, and we need industry's help to do this. It's exceedingly challenging. We know that we have a road to climb here between our aviation accounts and ship building accounts and our manpower accounts, all of which are under a good deal of pressure right now, while we try to maintain readiness and attempt to continue to be effective in this operating environment, which is becoming ever demanding. So, the Navy has a lot of work to do, but we think we have a program of record that will deliver the capabilities that the American people expect and need, and we're very enthused about some of our new technologies like LCS. Thank you.

**Moderator:** Other questions? Gentlemen? Ladies?

I notice that the Vice Chief has been getting all of the heavy fire so I figured I would bracket a little bit to the right. I think one of the most interesting things that we've seen the last week on CSPAN and a couple of other places has been General Zinni's book on the battle for peace in Iraq, and there's a great contingent that says we should bring our forces home sooner rather than later, and we should precipitantly drawn down in advance of a solution in Iraq; failure of the government to foster a solution that allows the United States to pull out in a more honorable way, and I think, from a defense standpoint, that would be a serious error, but I wonder if the Marine Corp has come up with a policy on the Zinni book, or what do you feel about one of your former major men speaking out in such a manner?

**General Magnus:** I think my wife, the educator, would say reading is fundamental. The Marine Corp is not going to have a policy on what people should write or what people should read, and I know you didn't mean that. I saw the Tim Russert interview with General Zinni, who everyday is probably questioning his wisdom as a Major when he helped me get back into active duty when I was a Captain in the Reserves. I think – and I'm not going to try to put words in General Zinni's mouth, but it's very clear that he realizes that the fight that we are in now, in particular talking about Iraq, is not one that the nation should walk away from. So, a precipitous withdraw of our forces would be as bereft of strategic thinking as some people accuse now. So, we could all have a large discussion about how we got where we are right now, but the truth is the nation is at war. There is a tremendous amount of terrorism and insurgency and instability in Iraq right now, and walking that cat back in history from that is not going to be very useful, either to the Iraqis or to our coalition partners in the Middle East and elsewhere, nor to our standing as a reliable nation with some strategic thinking. So, rather than try to – I know General Zinni's had some strong views on this every since he left active duty. He is a very well-informed and battle-hardened Marine, and he's a lot more articulate than I am, but what I would say about this is that strategic thinking is an important thing, not about where we are now but where we expect to be in Iraq or Afghanistan or in the Middle East, a generation from now, instead of trying to figure out where we should be at the end of this calendar year, because there are a lot of folks that are very concerned, as they should be, about the amount casualties and the cost of this war, but this is all about what is the price of not investing in this, and the investment isn't in blood as much as it is in treasure, especially if you happen to be the families of those who are being killed and wounded, and quite frankly, when we are ready to leave Iraq is when the Iraqi people will be asking us to leave Iraq with their government. They are having some, obviously, pretty big challenges now forming a government. It's rather easy for us, after two hundred and thirty years, to criticize this, but last time I checked, between 1775 and 1787, it took us about twelve years to come up with a Constitution. We figured they should have done that in about a year. We managed to have our Civil War about eighty years later on killing about three hundred and fifty thousand Americans. We figure they should get over that over a weekend. We had a lot more homogenous population in 1861 than they happen to have in 2006. So, we need to be a little bit more – have reasonable expectations as our politicians do, and I know Secretary Rice is over there right now pressuring them to do what they must do in the war, because time is not necessarily on their side. Insurgencies historically fail, but this is not some average insurgency. This is a specific case where you have a large number of coalition partners in a country in the middle of Arab Islam, and the situation will change as – and we're seeing it in Afghanistan now.

Colonel Barney Barnum and I just came back in January from Afghanistan where I would say the glass is a much more attractive picture in terms of stability – still challenging – than it is in Iraq right now where you have three very different groups, both sectarian and cultural and tribal, in a struggle for power that was there before Saddam took power and is there now. So, I think, as far as battle for peace, I think we need to be able to give peace a chance. First off, if you don't have stability and security in your neighborhoods, if the policemen are afraid that their wives are going to get raped or get their heads cut off, if in fact the government building in Remade is the registration point for insurgent weapons, it is rather difficult to expect people to calmly go and consider who they should vote for and to pick up the phone and dial 911 when there is no working telephone system and there is not a 911 system. So, we have to be able to build a confidence level of the Iraqi people in their own neighborhood governments as they are also working very hard on forming a national government, and so, this is well out of the ability of the military to fix. I will finish by saying your U.S. Soldiers and Marines, Sailors and Airmen and Coast Guards that are in the Gulf right now they cannot and will not lose this war. On the other hand, they can't win it either. This is a war that the Afghan people and the Iraqi people have to win, because they are the ones who have to create the confidence on the street corners so that somebody will pick up the phone or tell their local officials who is building bombs in the garage around the corner. There are more Iraqi security forces being wounded and killed every day by a factor of two or three than every tragic U.S. loss. There are more innocent Iraqi civilians being killed every day by a factor of two or three over the Iraqi security forces, and when you take a look at – just like crime in our cities. Who pays the penalty? It's not the police. It's the local residents, and there is some point at which they have to be able to get control of their neighborhoods, and we're there to help them do it.

**Moderator:** Other questions? Yes sir.

**Jim Miller:** Good morning. I'm Jim Miller, former Navy. The question I guess is for Admiral Cross. Admiral, to what extent are we getting an international effort on this whole area of maritime domain security from ports, the economic ramifications of origin inspection, and finally, profiling ship tracks, commercial ship tracks, to possibly discriminate, for example, between point-to-point Rotterdam to New York, two ports that are probably fairly well thought to be secure, but profiling routes of other ships that make ten, twenty stops in maybe some not so secure smaller ports?

**Admiral Cross :** The way you asked your question it becomes a very complex one. In terms of overall international cooperation for things like the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, the cooperation level is high, in terms of member nations signing up to be a part of the Code and to abide by the Code, and maybe one measure of that would be – the Coast Guard has teams of individuals that go overseas to inspect foreign ports to see if they are in compliance with the Code. Thus far, we've inspected forty-four ports overseas, and thirty-eight were found in substantial compliance with the Code, and some of those that failed – all of those that failed were in third world countries where means were an issue, but even they are making progress. So, in that sense, I think you could say that participation is high, but then, you also mentioned maritime domain, and I think you were actually talking about what maybe we call maritime domain awareness in terms of ship tracks and information on ships and people transiting, and I'd invite Admiral Willard maybe to comment on this later as well, but my sense is we're not doing

as well there. There are a number of international groups that are making an effort to get together, and I would applaud the International Sea Power Symposium that the Naval War College holds for helping us socialize this idea internationally, but it was interesting for me to listen to the CNOs and Chiefs of Coast Guard from other countries when they talked about their efforts, and their efforts, in some ways, are fundamentally different from ours, and it's going to be hampered until they can evolve it a little bit. The efforts that are ongoing typically involve only the Navies. For example, there's an ongoing effort in the Mediterranean to do some of this work, and the problem with that is – I mean, it's not a problem that the Navies are engaged. That's absolutely essential, but the problem with that is that the Navies don't have all of the important information, and you have to involve relevant customs services and relevant immigration services and other elements of the interagency and intelligence services before, I think, they are going to be able to provide particularly useful information to us. Now, in terms of the tracking that goes on now, once again, I'd defer much of this to Admiral Willard, but we are doing much of that ourselves. The problem that we have is similar to what I talked about in my remarks is that simply knowing that there are people out there is a marginal usefulness. The trick is to know who they are, where they're going, what's on board, who's on board, and we're working very diligently with Northcom and the other services and the interagency to develop a system that will allow us to be much, much better at that than we are now, but the development of that system is in the very early stages, and even more importantly, we don't, except for a few places around the country, we are also not very good at making those kinds of determinations, even in ports and close to our shores. One of the things that I also mentioned in my remarks was a project called Command 2010, and that's part of what that's all about. Now, in some major ports like New York and San Francisco and Seattle and others, we have what are called vessel traffic systems, which gives us good visibility of the large vessels that are moving in ports, but we know from the coal [sp] event that the major threat may actually involve a small recreational vessel of which there are millions in the United States. So, we are still working on a port security regime that will allow us to identify who's who, who's going where, and for what purposes, and I think, eventually, we may see something not a whole lot different – interesting, we're all aviators up here, but in our major ports, we may see something not a whole lot different from an air traffic control system in the sense that if you want to take your sixteen foot bass boat and fish down by the nuclear power plant, well, you may be required to have some sort of a transponder on that boat, and you may need to have permission to enter that particular zone. We actually have authorities now to implement that type of a regime in terms excluding people from certain areas, but I guess the future the way we would see it is people could enter those areas, if they had the proper clearance and then we were able to identify who they were and where they were, but that's probably going to be down the road a little bit.

**Admiral Willard** : I might just add, again, a very – it's a complex question in the sense that there are a great many initiatives ongoing to try and get our arms around; maritime domain awareness, tagging, tracking, locating. Some initiatives that would have us be able to track targets of interest with an unblinking eye, for all intent and purposes. So, there are some investments that Navy is making into technologies that currently exist that will expand our ability to identify and track shipping over a long geographic route, but there is a whole host of initiatives that Admiral Cross alludes to here. CNO talks about a thousand ship Navy, and that's partner building with the other nations' Navies and Coast Guards that would facilitate sharing of intelligence information, general unclassified information, and to be cooperative in our efforts; in counter

proliferation and other efforts around the globe. There is a container security initiative that is attempting to get at container security on commercial ships in and out of the large global ports of call. There is a proliferation security initiative that was initiated by President Bush and has gained a great deal of traction in nations around the world. All of the numbered Fleet Commanders are currently exercising PSI, proliferation security initiative, which is tracking and interception of targets of interest in bilateral and multilateral arrangements around the world. There is a transponder system that currently exists on ships greater than three hundred tons termed 'AIS,' which we are now learning to exploit in a big way to where we can put now our surveillance aircraft in the air and have, over the horizon, tracking and combined pictures now of shipping and understand the white shipping environment better than we have in the past, and while it doesn't necessarily focus us on the target, it at least focuses us on the sort; what targets out there we are not interested in. So, it's helping, but it doesn't get to the point that Admiral Cross made regarding small boats and craft that are below the legal limit to carry that transponder system. So, there are a lot of things in the offing. We are working with the Coast Guard to develop the command and control regimes up and down the East and West Coast of the United States, and we've already had – we were talking this morning in fact about a joint initiative for operation centers in the major ports and the linkage of those and their access to ready intelligence. Within Navy, we have a Navy Component Commander that's associated with every regional Combatant Commander across the globe, and we are netting those Navy Component Commanders together in an information sharing regime to help us with operational pictures throughout all of the geographic regions. So, we are sharing information component-to-component and across the joint force with our Coast Guard brethren. We have some authorities to get at in terms of information sharing where typically the Coast Guard has access to information because of their legal status that Navy cannot have under Title X, and we are trying to work our way through some of those authorities' regimes now. So, there are many, many things in work; trying to get at a holistic picture and an ability to tag, track, and locate to at will across the globe and the maritime domain.

**Admiral Cross:** If I could offer maybe just one more comment; boy, you really did kind of hit on one of the key issues of the day here, and maybe just to point out, earlier I talked a lot about the National Strategy for Maritime Security. What's going on now is that there are actually eight supporting plans under development mandated by the Strategy, and one of those plans is maritime domain awareness in an effort to knit together all of the interagency and the Department of Defense to work together to solve this problem in a holistic, systematic way. So, that's the level of importance that we, in the administration of the Coast Guard and the Navy, put on maritime domain awareness.

**Moderator:** We have time for one or two more.

I thought I was talking loud enough. A new operations center stood up in Norfolk, I was wondering if that was part of the partnership, and does that use the AIS, and if that all works properly sir, will you still have to board all of the ships coming into a port like Norfolk?

Go ahead.

I was going to let Admiral Willard talk about Norfolk, because I haven't visited that one yet, but the answer is yes. I think it's fair to say that – actually, that's been stood up for Navy in a different venue but for a few years now. There's another one very similar, although maybe even more joint, in San Diego, which I think many people think is the real model, and you have to understand, I think Admiral Willard talked about it a little bit, the real usefulness for AIS also, when you associate that with our ability to look at vessels from other means and the ninety-six hour of advanced notice, it gives us different data points on vessels that are approaching our shores. That along with another initiative that the Coast Guard is working on as we speak through the IMO called Long Range AIS, and currently, the AIS that's required on vessels greater than three hundred gross tons is a relatively short range operation. Obviously, if you can get an aircraft over the top, then you can exploit that, but you can't really detect it very easily from the shore. So, the Long Range AIS piece will be upwards of two thousand miles offshore we'll be able to detect that, but where that's useful is you take this whole menu of data that you have and you are able to, with some degree of confidence, decide that this guy is a good guy, and you can quit worrying about him, and then, you can focus on those targets that you are not able to identify. I don't know if Admiral Willard wants to add something or not.

**Admiral Willard:** I would just comment that your question is a relevant one. Without adequate command and control through our operations centers and, frankly, across the interagency – it's both the Coast Guard, Navy, local harbor police, local police activities in the region. Sometimes the FBI, CIA, and other agencies can be involved. So, the model operations centers thus far that are being created and networked up and down the East and West Coast involve more than Navy and Coast Guard and, frankly, information sharing across activities that have much more localized responsibility. At the end of the day, when we have a contact of interest and we do have to board or we do have to conduct an operation, it's the command and control activity that is necessary to initiate those orders and to field the assets to do that. So, it's very, very important, and if there's a sense of urgency right now in addition to the maritime domain awareness activities that are ongoing, it's trying to finalize our operations center and command and control network for purposes of homeland security and homeland defense so that these great institutions can work together every day.

**Moderator:** One more please. Yes sir.

**Deon Garner:** My name is Deon Garner with the Naval Service Warfare Center, and my question is for Admiral Willard. You had mentioned the need to manage the cost of future Navy platforms including DDX and CGX. Can you expand on that a little bit and talk about what kinds of strategies you might employ to affect that?

**Admiral Willard ;** Thanks. I will, and we have not drawn a final answer yet. In fact, I think at lunch today the Secretary of Navy – and I would almost predict that he will address the affordability issue, because he knows he'll have industry in the room, and he'll have an opportunity to share his views on this, because it's a crisis that he has now, obviously, taken on as has CNO. CNO, as he was approaching the challenge of affordability across all our accounts, and it's not just ship building but ship building is pretty dramatic because of the cost – high cost of these platforms and the numbers crisis that we were involved in and our inability to grow the fleet, felt that the number one responsibility he had was to try to stabilize the demand signal from

the Navy, that we don't help industry and we don't help the ship building efforts on the hill or in our shipyards by constantly iterating the requirement, and so, he wanted to stabilize the requirement, try and stabilize the approximate number of ships that we felt we needed in the fleet by type/model/series so that industry could now concentrate on delivering to schedule performance and cost for a change, because every time we slip it a year or slip it two years or draw it back to the left, you can imagine how we are design and advanced procurement of materials and all of the things associated with building a ship. So, he wanted to stabilize it and define the requirement as best he could, and he feels he has done that. We are viewing into industry and its ability to deliver on that demand signal now, and that's, again, a challenge, and then, probably closest to home, is our ability to control our own appetite with regard to what capabilities those ships would deliver, and that is a configuration management piece that we in the staff are responsible for, and in working with acquisition and insuring that we are not driving the capability demand signal up over the life of the program. So, there's an appetite suppression piece that we're responsible for that I think will help get at the affordability issue, and then, there are some real – some longer term ideas. I think LCS is delivering on one in the modular approach to the capabilities that adapt to it. So, mine warfare, anti-submarine warfare, special operations modules are being adapted to the variant LCS ship in a way that makes the creation of the module and the adaptation to the platform more affordable in the long run. So again, the cost of varying designs, the use of composite materials in our ships – I mean, there are lots and lots of ideas about how to save money in the out years. In the near years and across the program is where we are mostly challenged, and we think we'll get at this principally through predictability, a fixed requirement in terms of numbers demand, and appetite suppression in terms of what we are delivering on those platforms.

**Moderator:** Well ladies and gentlemen, I trust you enjoyed the comments of our speakers as much as I, and would you join me in thanking them for their time? And also, as a small token of the Navy League, we'd like to present each one of the speakers with a book of the history of the Navy League, which probably some of us, and the speakers that have been around for awhile, will probably see some events that probably affected their careers as well as others. So, thank you very much for joining us. The next seminar will be at fourteen hundred this afternoon. Thank you.