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An Alliance Reunited?
EU, NATO, ERRF, and Article V
Daniel Goure
Dr. Daniel Goure is a senior fellow at the Lexington Institute in Arlington, Va.
There is no closer security relationship among sovereign nations than that between the United States and the nations of Europe, particularly those that are members of NATO. This relationship evolved over time as new members were added to the Alliance--and one member, France, left its formal structures--and the nature of the threat to their security changed. The relationship weathered a long series of disagreements and conflicts about specific security concerns. The bond between Europe and the United States (and Canada) even survived the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the end of the Cold War.
Yet, despite a 50-year history of adjustment to change, a shudder passes across Europe each time a new administration takes office in Washington. These episodic concerns are in part a natural result of the imbalance in power between the two sides of the Atlantic. They also reflect real differences on particular matters of policy. Finally, there is the belief, strongly held by many, that no U.S. president really understands European security issues.
European anxieties regarding the attitudes and policies of each new U.S. administration did not ease with the end of the Cold War. Even Bill Clinton, whose platform became the model for Europe's so-called "Third Way," did not initially fare well in the eyes of European critics of U.S. foreign and security policies. However, no U.S. president, save perhaps Ronald Reagan, caused as much early anxiety among Europeans as did George W. Bush. Even before his inauguration Bush had raised concerns in Europe regarding security policies that the allies thought had long ago been agreed to by Washington. In addition, Europeans feared that the Bush administration would take a much more confrontational line with Moscow at a time when it was hoped that Vladimir Putin, the new Russian leader, would prove to be a stable partner. Finally, there was a commonly held view in Europe that Bush was not sufficiently internationalist in his treatment of so-called global issues.
Friends in Need
Many of those concerns have been swept away by the events of 11 September and their aftermath. Talk of a growing transatlantic split has been silenced in the wake of Europe's reaction to America's tragedy. Nothing spoke louder about the inherent strength of the bond between the two continents than the minute of silence observed all across Europe. Great Britain leapt immediately to the aid of the United States. Others--including France, Germany, and Italy--followed suit. In addition, relations between Washington and Moscow appear to have shifted from wary sparring to close cooperation.
The long-term effects of the terrorist attacks on the United States, and of the international war on terrorism, are as yet, and for some time will be, unknowable. Some observers, in both Europe and the United States, believe that the result of the Bush administration's experience in coalition-building will have profound spillover effects on its overall foreign policy. These observers believe that the United States now will be less inclined toward unilateralism and more interested in seeking cooperative solutions to global problems.
The natural corollary of this view is that the United States also will be more receptive to the concerns and ideas of others--and, therefore, also will have a greater inclination to accede to the will of the majority on such issues as global warming, arms control, and/or trade.
Still others believe that both 11 September and the international responses to it are clear and convincing evidence of the continuing international "exceptionalism" of the United States. It is the U.S. position as the world's sole superpower that makes it the target of fundamentalist rage--or so it is alleged. It is that same superpower status that enabled the United States to rapidly bring together a global coalition to fight the war on terrorism. The United States alone possesses the military capability to conduct long-range, high-intensity military operations in inhospitable theaters.
It also is evident, at least to date, that, although the United States now seems much more committed than before to consulting with its coalition partners, the war on terrorism is being conducted according to Washington's rules.
Unhappy First Impressions
The Bush administration came to Washington seemingly intent on challenging the fundamental principles that had animated the defense and security policies of the Clinton administration. During the 2000 presidential campaign, the candidate and his closest advisors had made a number of provocative statements about security issues that affected Europe. Condoleezza Rice, soon to be President Bush's national security advisor, suggested that the new administration would review U.S. military deployments in the Balkans with an eye to reducing the presence of U.S. forces in that part of Europe. That suggestion seemed part of a larger concern among Republican policymakers that the United States needed to reverse the Clinton policies on peacekeeping missions, one result of which was that U.S. forces were being increasingly bogged down in a series of "nation-building" exercises that had little prospect for success, at least in the near term.
Europe also was concerned that the new administration would undermine what many perceived to be stable military and political relationships with Russia and China. Candidate Bush had made clear his belief that the 1972 ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty was a historical anachronism and that he was committed to deployment of a national missile defense (NMD) system, even if it meant withdrawal from the Treaty.
Indeed, Bush had gone even further, arguing that the Cold War strategy of deterrence, at least as it related to Russia, was no longer relevant. He suggested that both Russia and the United States were free to find their own path to strategic stability without the necessity of entering into formal arms-control agreements.
Bush foreign policy advisors also were on record as believing that the next strategic challenge to the United States would come from China. They had criticized the Clinton administration for taking insufficient recognition of the Chinese military buildup. They also had signaled their intent to be more supportive of Taiwan's requests for advanced military hardware.
There was almost no honeymoon period in relations between the new administration and Europe. The concern among many Europeans that the new leadership in Washington was intent on taking a unilateral approach to global issues was given concrete form when Washington announced that it was abandoning the Kyoto Agreement on Global Warming. The Bush administration also made it clear that it had no intention of moving forward on other international agreements such as those on the Comprehensive Test Ban, the Protocol to the Biological Warfare Convention, the Landmine Ban, and the International Criminal Court.
Concerns and Priorities
The new administration also put Europe on early notice that it was going to take a more assertive approach to transatlantic security issues. In his first visit to NATO at the beginning of February, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld apparently stunned much of his audience by articulating a very specific set of concerns and priorities. He made it clear that the Bush administration shared its predecessor's concerns that the European Union's efforts to create a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) could undermine NATO.
Rumsfeld also told his European hosts that the United States has a "moral" duty to move ahead with NMD. Although Washington had not at the time settled on an architecture for its NMD system, any initial system would have to include upgraded early-warning radars at Flyingdales in the United Kingdom and Thule in Greenland. The Bush administration sought to reassure its NATO allies that the pursuit of NMD would not be the initial step, as at least some of those allies feared, in a process of decoupling U.S. security from that of its allies. Washington sought to address the concerns of other NATO members by introducing the concept of a global-defense system against ballistic missiles, of which national-defense systems deployed by the United States and any allies would be the principal constituent parts.
Europe also was concerned by Washington's approach to security issues in other areas of the world. There was a negative reaction to the Bush administration's initial decision to reevaluate the Framework Agreement with North Korea. Reflecting its concern, the EU (European Union) sent its own delegation to Pyongyang to discuss ways in which the nations of Europe could assist in stabilizing the situation on the Korean peninsula. Europe also reacted negatively to Washington's handling of the EP-3 "spy plane" incident and to its subsequent decision to provide Taiwan with a major arms package.
The fact that this package would include diesel-electric submarines particularly worried those European nations that design and build such systems. Some of those countries complained publicly that the United States might put pressure on them to provide support for the Taiwan submarine program, placing at risk their own relations with the mainland.
The Global War on Terrorism
The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon changed the U.S.-European relationship as no other single event had done since the founding of the NATO alliance. Within a few days of the tragedy, British Prime Minister Tony Blair confirmed Great Britain's status as the closest U.S. ally, announcing that his country would stand shoulder to shoulder with the United States against global terrorism.
Most significantly of all, perhaps, the NATO Alliance invoked Article V of the Washington Treaty--for the first time in its history. NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson made a historic declaration on 2 October when he stated that, "It has now been determined that the attack against the United States on 11 September was directed from abroad and shall therefore be regarded as an action covered by Article V of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack on one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all."
Article V, the bedrock of the transatlantic policy of common defense, had been evoked not, as had been expected, following a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, but as the result of an international terrorist attack on the United States. By its decision, the North Atlantic Council affirmed the relevance of the NATO Alliance to the security of its members for decades to come.
Commitments and Prohibitions
The decision to invoke Article V also provided the trigger for NATO military actions in support of the United States and the war on terrorism. Within weeks of the declaration, five NATO AWACS aircraft were flying protective patrols over the United States itself. NATO forces also were committed to the war against the Taliban. Great Britain deployed a range of ships and aircraft to work with U.S. forces in the Middle East and Arabian Sea. Among its principal contributions were three nuclear-powered attack submarines, the aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious, a number of other warships and fleet auxiliary vessels, air-refueling aircraft, RAF AWACS and Nimrod surveillance aircraft, and up to 600 Royal Commandos and members of the Special Air Service (SAS). The British submarines fired Tomahawk Land-Attack Missiles on the first night of the war.
France also committed surveillance aircraft, air-refueling aircraft, and commandos. Germany, Italy, and Turkey also sent commando units to Afghanistan, to train Northern Alliance forces.
The 11 September attacks also raised new security issues for U.S. allies in Europe. It was clear in the aftermath of the attacks that, although the legal and institutional bases for European domestic counterterrorism efforts and policies were more robust than those of the United States, some countries in Europe were woefully unprepared to follow through on either threat prevention or consequence management. Nations such as Great Britain, France, and Italy, with long and sad histories of dealing with domestic terrorists, had well-established policies, procedures, and training regimes already in place for their armed forces that permits those forces to serve in a homeland-defense capacity.
Other allies had done little or no planning for the possible domestic use of their armed forces. Germany, for example, was hampered by a constitutional prohibition against the use of its armed forces for defense against threats from within. Most other European countries had little in the way of integrated homeland-defense capabilities, relying for the most part on national police to perform counterterrorism missions.
Creation of the ERRF
The EU's Capabilities Commitment Conference--held in Brussels on 2122 November 2000--was the culmination of a 10-year effort by the members of the EU to define a common foreign and security policy. A series of conferences and agreements over the years moved the EU ever closer to the creation of real autonomous capabilities with which to carry out various security missions. At the December 1999 European Council in Helsinki, the members of the EU defined a set of so-called "headline goals" for a rapid-reaction capability that would permit autonomous action. By the end of 2003, according to current plans, the EU should have the ability to deploy the equivalent of a corps of ground forces, some 15 brigades (50-60,000 men), supported by the necessary air and naval forces, on two months' notice.
Moreover, to ensure the availability at all times of an adequate number of troops and equipment, the overall ceilings for resources committed to the new European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) were set at 100,000 troops, 400 combat aircraft, and 100 ships. This force would possess the logistical infrastructure and other supporting capabilities needed to be sustainable in the field for up to a year.
The 2000 Brussels Conference laid the foundations for a European military capability based on explicit commitments of troops, aircraft, and ships by member countries. Great Britain committed 12,500 soldiers, 72 aircraft, and 18 warships. Germany pledged a similar number of aircraft and warships and 13,500 ground troops. In addition, France committed to 12,000 troops, Italy and Spain to 6,000 each; the remaining members of the EU collectively pledged another 13,000 troops.
The European countries also have continued their efforts to streamline and modernize their military organizations and structures. Germany remains committed to its military reform program, which would reduce both the overall size of the Bundeswehr and the number of conscripts in it. Greece announced its Strategic Defense Review, which calls for increased professionalization of the military and increased spending on advanced weapons systems, but a reduction in the number of combat units.
Despite the progress made to date on creating the ERRF, several policy and capability questions remain unanswered. There has been great pressure on EU members to declare the ERRF operationally ready, at least for limited deployments. But in late 2001 the EU still had not decided under what conditions such forces might be employed, the degree to which individual members would be free to opt out of an EU-sponsored deployment, or what nation would lead such a mission.
Moreover, although the EU had created a military staff and had nominated Lt. Gen. Klaus Schuwirth to direct it, it had not been staffed or equipped. Indeed, in conversations with U.S. defense officials it was agreed that the EU would rely on the staff at NATO's military headquarters for strategic planning support.
The Modernization Struggle
Concerns regarding policy issues arising from the creation of the ERRF pale in comparison to larger and more important questions, also still unanswered, about the ability and willingness of European nations to provide sufficient real military capability to make good on their NATO commitments, much less their commitments to the EU. In the eyes of many observers, Europe is not even making good on the commitment, arising from the experience of Kosovo, to modernize and strengthen its military forces.
U.S. Gen. Joseph Ralston, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, has warned several times that a serious imbalance continues to exist between U.S. and European military capabilities, in large part because of a continuing and still growing asymmetry in technology. "Europe's shrinking defense industrial base and limitations in production of advanced military capabilities," Ralston warned, "could lead to a future in which only the United States has the capacity to engage globally."
Recent reports suggest that overall defense research and development (R&D) spending in Europe is falling by 2 percent a year, and expenditures by European NATO members on procurement are at their lowest level in decades. Procurement spending has dropped by 6.9 percent since 1996. In the United States, meanwhile, procurement spending increased by 4.7 percent over the same period. Great Britain has managed to increase its defense spending slightly, but several other countries--e.g., France, Belgium, and the Netherlands--have increased procurement only by shifting funds from other defense accounts. The defense budgets of most other EU countries, most notably Germany, continue to fall.
Present Capabilities Gap Expected to Worsen
This already difficult situation is likely to be exacerbated by the differing national responses to the events of 11 September. The United States has been pouring billions of additional dollars into military programs, including some $40 billion extra in FY 2002 alone--and that total might be increased again. But its European allies have made virtually no changes to their previous defense budgets--in some instances, critical programs are even being cut. France's 2001 defense budget will remain flat at $35 billion. The French Defense Ministry will increase spending on missiles and aerospace capabilities, but the add-ons will be offset by spending reductions in air, land, and sea transport and in deep strike systems.
Germany may review its June 2000 Capabilities White Paper in light of the 9-11 attacks. The German government approved a $1.4 billion antiterrorism fund; half of that will go to the armed forces, quite possibly to accelerate procurement of advanced reconnaissance and surveillance assets such as the SAR-Lupe reconnaissance satellite constellation.
As of late December there was no evidence that Great Britain plans to increase defense spending. This is despite the events of 9-11 and the conclusion in the MOD (Ministry of Defence) study on Future Strategic Context for Defence that warned of the dangers of asymmetric warfare, including the possibility that critical civilian infrastructure might be the target of terrorist attacks.
Other countries--such as Greece, Spain, Italy, Poland, and the Czech Republic--also were still planning to reduce defense spending over the next few years.
Europe has made only slow progress over the past year toward fulfilling the demands of both the NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) and the ERRF. Since the DCI was announced 18 months ago, according to a report published in April 2001, only 14 of the 59 action items in the report had been nearly or fully implemented. Almost none of the action items dealing with improved mobility, deployability, and combat effectiveness on the part of European forces has been implemented. In most instances, inadequate national defense budgets are at the root of the problem.
Critical Deficiencies
A similar situation affects the ERRF. Although basic "capabilities" have been committed, there are large gaps in specific critical capabilities associated with independent out-of-area operations. These include satellite intelligence capabilities, airlift and sealift, surveillance and reconnaissance, communications, and precision munitions.
The capabilities gap between Europe and the United States is particularly pronounced in the area of advanced aerospace forces. At a meeting last year in Brussels, the European defense ministers identified a number of "critical and long-standing deficiencies." The areas mentioned most frequently and/or most emphatically were SEAD (suppression of enemy air defenses) capabilities; electronic jamming support; combat identification; reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition; all-weather day and night weapons; and air and missile defenses.
The European nations did continue, slowly, to modernize their armed forces in 2001. All of the major European nations are making what seems to be a good-faith effort to invest in precision standoff weapons capabilities. France and the United Kingdom continued development of the Storm Shadow/SCALP air-to-surface missile system. A German/Swedish consortium is developing the Taurus as a long-range precision weapons system. In addition, most European air forces were examining options for short-range precision bombs. The United Kingdom, for example, continues to evaluate the acquisition of bombs fitted with GPS (Global Positioning System) guidance systems, including both the U.S. Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) and a GPS-aided Paveway.
The major European powers also continued to invest in new air and sea platforms. Great Britain announced in July that it would purchase the first six of what is likely to be a total of 12 Type 45 air-defense destroyers. In addition, one new Type 23 frigate joined the Royal Navy's active inventory.
France's new nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN) Charles de Gaulle continued sea trials, and the French MOD ordered the initial batch of navalized Rafale fighters for the new carrier. France also ordered two of the multinational Horizon frigates. Germany began sea trials on the Sachsen, its first Type 124 destroyer. Finally, the first of four De Zeven Provincien-class command and air-defense destroyers is now undergoing sea trials in the Netherlands.
JSF and the Future
The most dramatic event of 2001 to affect the European air power environment was the U.S. decision to award, to the Lockheed Martin team, the long-awaited contract for the system development and demonstration phase of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. The United Kingdom currently plans to acquire some 150 JSFs to replace its Harrier and Sea Harrier forces. Additional JSF sales to other European countries--including Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, and others that currently fly the F-16--are anticipated.
Aircraft modernization remains one of the most important problems confronting European defense planners. Production continues on the Typhoon Eurofighters, the initial deliveries of which are expected to begin this year. In addition to the four members of the Eurofighter consortium--Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Spain--Greece has decided to buy the Typhoon. Variants of the Typhoon are likely to eventually replace British and German Tornados in the strike role. France is continuing with its plan to buy some 294 Rafale multirole fighters. These aircraft, and the Swedish Grippen, are competitors with the JSF for the future modernization programs of other European air forces.
The nations of Europe also have struggled to maintain their commitment to improve airborne combat support capabilities. In the area of airborne surveillance, testing started on the British Airborne Stand-off Radar (ASTOR) system using a specially modified Global Express business aircraft. A successful test and development program is expected to lead to the procurement of at least five ASTORs, which have a planned 2005 IOC (initial operational capability).
The possibility of an independent European airlift capability remains very much in doubt, though. The multinational A400 transport program is moving ahead despite growing concerns that Germany will be unable to fund its share of the program. Indeed, as of late November, Germany was attempting to renegotiate the price for the A400, a move that brought the program to a standstill. The only ray of light in the airlift picture was the arrival in the United Kingdom of the first of four C-17 Globemaster strategic airlifters that have been acquired in a lease arrangement with the U.S. Air Force.
European armies are seeking to transform themselves into lighter, faster, and more deployable formations--but they face many difficulties in meeting those goals. Current efforts are directed more at improving the effectiveness of existing equipment rather than replacing older, heavier, and difficult-to-move tanks and armored vehicles with newer, lighter machines.
A recent report, "Concept on Equipment and Material of the Armed Forces of the Future," issued by the chief of staff of the Bundeswehr, Gen. Harald Kujat, concluded that most of the German Army's armored fighting vehicles and older tanks no longer meet requirements. Much the same is true for the other European armies, saddled as they are with equipment designed for major armor battles on the plains of Europe.
Germany, France, and Great Britain are continuing to develop light armored reconnaissance vehicles appropriate for the kinds of peacekeeping missions now underway in the Balkans. France is proceeding with development of the Vehicule Blinde de Combat d'Infantries (VBCI), and plans to deploy it in a number of variants. Great Britain is examining options for its Tracer armored reconnaissance vehicle.
The great mass of European mechanized capability, though, will remain trapped in a Cold War mold. This will significantly limit the ability of European armies to deploy maneuverable, but survivable, ground forces in out-of-area operations. *
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