| Does NATO
Still Have The Will?
Alliance Plods Forward at Less-Than-Deliberate Speed
By MERRICK CAREY
Merrick Carey, a former Naval Reserve intelligence officer, is the chief
executive officer of the Lexington Institute, a public policy foundation
based in Arlington, Va.
For the first two years of the Bush administration, transatlantic relations
were colored by the feeling in much of Europe, and even in parts of America,
that Washington didn't care about Europe or its concerns. On a series
of issues ranging from the Kyoto and ABM Treaties to steel tariffs, the
International Criminal Court, U.S. policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, and what President Bush calls the "axis of evil,"
the United States and Europe clashed repeatedly and at times even publicly.
European concerns crystallized in the often-used expression "American
unilateralism," a term that referred not only to the unwillingness
of the new administration to bow to the will of the putative international
majority on social and political issues, but also to Washington's evident
willingness (and its certain ability) to employ military power to address
a set of self-defined security challenges. In that context, many in Europe
focused their attention on a single sentence in the 35-page U.S. National
Security Strategy that suggests that America might act preemptively against
the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists.
This sense of a growing fissure between the two sides of the Atlantic,
based on diverging national interests and state behaviors, was exacerbated
somewhat by the actions the United States took in the aftermath of the
11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and in the long-evolving new crisis
with Iraq. Comments by senior Bush Administration officials on the importance
of so-called coalitions of the willing seemed to many in Europe to marginalize
the value of the Alliance.
For its part, the Bush Administration was very clear about its own unhappiness
with Europe's lack of investment in its defenses and with the apparent
desire of some governments to focus on developing European security concepts
and defense capabilities at the expense of the NATO Alliance. More broadly,
Washington was concerned that many of its allies, particularly in Europe,
desired nothing more than to focus on their parochial regional political
and economic interests at the expense of a broader effort to address the
threats of a new century.
Unity and Differences
Yet, far from giving up on NATO and Europe, the Bush Administration moved
forward with two bold initiatives designed to demonstrate both a continuing
U.S. commitment to Europe and a willingness on Europe's part to acknowledge
and respond to the new threats. First, the United States championed an
expansion of NATO that brought seven new countries into the Alliance.
Second, the United States proposed the creation of a NATO Response Force
(NRF) that would be capable of operating alongside U.S. forces in out-of-area
operations. The NRF concept retains the idea of shared responsibilities
and risks so central to the original purpose of the Alliance, but extends
it to address the wider context of the new threats to the security of
both the United States and its allies.
In 2002, the ongoing war on terrorism demonstrated both the power of
a unified transatlantic community and the inherent difficulties, in the
absence of a dominant threat, of maintaining a sense of common purpose
and shared values. U.S. allies provided significant military assistance
both in the war in Afghanistan and in the global hunt for al Qaeda terrorists.
At the same time, differences over the scope of the war on terrorism,
a unified policy toward the Islamic world, and the disarming of Iraq demonstrated
the growing fault lines within the Alliance. Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's
willingness to campaign in the recent German elections on his government's
opposition to the United States over policy toward Iraq may be a harbinger
of the kinds of conflicts over values and interests that could dominate
Alliance politics in the future, --but it is perhaps not all bad that
Germany does not always rush headlong into every proposed military operation.
As Washington and its European allies strive to manage their political
differences it is increasingly clear that, for the most part, even if
Europe has the will to be an equal partner to the United States in securing
the peace of the emerging international order, it lacks the wallet. Simply
put, Europe's unwillingness to provide an adequate level of resources
for defense all but ensures that it will play an increasingly marginal
role in both regional and global security.
New NATO, New Force
Last year's focus of attention in NATO was on the so-called "headline
goals" and the announcement of the creation of the European Rapid
Reaction Force (ERRF). In 2002, the focus was both on expansion and on
a redefinition of the role that European members of the Alliance could
play in enhancing global security. The decision to expand the Alliance,
combined with the announcement at the November Prague summit of the decision
to create the NRF, signaled a renewed desire among--all parties to ensure
the continuing relevance of NATO. Barely three years after the last round
of expansion--which saw the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic--NATO decided that seven more nations were ready for entry: Romania,
Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Baltic republics of Latvia, Lithuania,
and Estonia. Although the addition of these states will add little to
NATO's military security, their entry could shift not only the political
balance of power in the Alliance but also its strategic perspective.
The NRF, designed to enable U.S. allies to fight alongside the United
States in high-intensity out-of-area operations, will constitute a force
of approximately 20,000 soldiers, sailors, and airmen. Its principal physical
assets will be three to five squadrons of tactical fighters plus supporting
transport, tanker, and reconnaissance aircraft, the combat equipment needed
for a brigade equivalent of ground troops, and eight to ten combat ships.
These forces will be drawn from the standing forces already committed
to NATO. Three rotating aggregations of units will be identified, each
of which will be available for deployment on a rotating basis.
The NRF forces are expected to be able to conduct sustained high-intensity
combat alongside U.S. forces for at least thirty days. For this reason,
the NRF forces would be expected to represent the bulk of European investments
in advanced weapons and C4ISR (command, control, communications, computer,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems.
The NRF proposal was a response, in part, to the insistence by the United
States that NATO refocus itself away from a traditional regional perspective
and concentrate instead on the political and operational requirements
for meeting new threats, particularly those posed by international terrorism.
Bush described his vision of the Alliance's future as follows:
"The role of NATO is different as we go into the 21st century. NATO
used to be a way to defend Europe from the Warsaw Pact. But the Warsaw
Pact no longer exists. Russia is not our enemy and we face new threats,
and the new threats are global terror. And so, one way to make sure NATO
is relevant is to focus on the true threats to freedom, address those
threats, and figure out ways we can work together to accomplish what we
want--which is a peaceful world. Which means better intelligence sharing,
the capacity to cut off money, and a military operation that reflects
the nature of the wars we will be fighting."
The NRF proposal also reflected the disheartening reality that European
defense spending has been simply inadequate to meet the goals set by the
Alliance. At its 50th-Anniversary Summit in Washington, D.C., the NATO
members committed to the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI--which was
designed to focus on 58 defense-capability areas requiring enhancements
if the European members of the Alliance are to be able to operate forces
alongside those of the United States). Despite that impressive proclamation
of good intentions, by June 2002 NATO ministers had voted to reduce the
number of objectives within the DCI to only those essential capabilities
absolutely required for the full range of NATO missions. These capabilities
focused on a few selected areas: chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear defense; command, control, communications, and intelligence; interoperability
of deployed forces and other key components of combat effectiveness; and
the rapid deployment and sustainment of combat forces.
Questions of Implementation
Taken together, the new proposals for focused investments in a set of
critical forces and programs reflect the widening capabilities gap between
the United States and its NATO allies. According to one defense expert,
the NRF proposal "acknowledges the failure of the DCI to produce
European forces compatible with American forces across the combat spectrum."
Although the NRF concept appears relatively straightforward, many questions
remain about how the concept is to be implemented. What is to be the relationship
between the NRF and the ERRF? Are the two forces to be competitors, drawing
from the same common pool of capabilities? What efforts will be taken
to ensure interoperability among the component elements of the NRF and
the deployed forces of the United States? What capabilities will the United
States be required to provide to the NRF?
Some in Europe viewed the NRF idea as a way of short-circuiting Europe's
efforts to develop an independent ERRF. But even a casual assessment of
Europe's current 2.4 million-man military suggests that it should be relatively
easy to find enough capability to support both the ERRF and the NRF.
In the view of many U.S. analysts and defense officials, the NRF concept
is the last best hope for making NATO relevant and keeping the United
States connected to NATO. If the European allies cannot muster the slim
resources needed to sustain even this minimum capability to operate alongside
the United States, a two-tiered Alliance will result, putting at risk
the fundamental principles of the Alliance: shared responsibilities and
shared risks.
NATO and the War on Terrorism
Nonetheless, as Denis Bovin, vice chairman of Bear Stearns and a well
known Wall Street defense expert, observed, "even as the members
of NATO have continued their incessant bickering over issues of strategy
and defense spending ... [they] have acted in near unison in the war on
terrorism." Throughout 2002, America's European allies made a sustained
and continuing contribution to the global war on terrorism and to the
operations in Afghanistan. More than 7,000 troops were committed by a
dozen nations to the war in Afghanistan. France deployed a light infantry
and Special Forces, Mirage reconnaissance and fighter aircraft, C-130
transports, and the Charles de Gaulle carrier battle group. Italy also
provided a carrier battle group, and has maintained a continued naval
presence in the north Arabian Sea. Germany provided the coalition with
both special operations forces and combat vessels. Canada provided a light
infantry battle group, special forces, C-130 transports, and naval forces.
And the United Kingdom provided elements of 40 commandos, a battle group
of Royal Marines, Nimrod reconnaissance aircraft, TLAMarmed submarines,
and a variety of surface combatants.
The European members of NATO also continue to operate alongside U.S.
forces as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
In addition to forces from the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Canada,
combat and support units from Norway, Spain, and the Netherlands were
participating in peacekeeping and nation-building activities in Afghanistan.
Turkey assumed leadership of the ISAF and contributed significant ground-force
elements to provide security for the interim government in Kabul.
Elsewhere around the globe, and at home, the nations of Europe conducted
military and other security operations to help burn out the terror nests.
Ships from Spain, Germany, Italy, France, the Netherlands, and Turkey
conducted maritime surveillance and interdiction operations in the Mediterranean,
Arabian, and Red Seas. On 10 December, Spanish naval vessels patrolling
off Yemen intercepted a North Korean cargo ship carrying SCUD missiles.
In Europe, more than 300 al Qaeda suspects were arrested and some $35
million in terrorist assets have been frozen.
At the Prague Summit, NATO endorsed a new military concept for combating
terrorism and improving cyber security. In addition, the members identified
a number of other initiatives to address the threat posed by weapons of
mass destruction, including: (a) the creation of a deployable nuclear,
biological, and chemical analysis laboratory; (b) funding a NATO biological
and chemical defense stockpile; and (c) developing a NATO-wide disease
surveillance system.
Continuing Modernization Problems
European defense modernization in 2002 was marked by two trends. The
first was the continuing decline in levels of defense spending, and a
resulting erosion of both readiness and overall capabilities. The second
was the pursuit of selective acquisitions and R&D (research and development)
efforts in areas intended to enhance those capabilities identified by
NATO and the European Union as critical to the continuing relevance of
European forces to the security of the Continent.
On 5 December, German Defense Minister Peter Struck announced that, in
accordance with his government's new plan for restructuring and modernizing
the Bundeswehr, he was cutting procurement of a number of advanced weapons
systems about to enter production or advanced development. He then reduced
the number of A400M medium-range air transports that Germany intended
to procure. Struck also announced reductions in purchases of the Meteor
and IRIS-T air-to-air missiles. Those decisions came on top of persistent
rumors that Germany's Defense Ministry also was planning to delay acquisition
or development of a number of other systems, including the Multirole Armored
Vehicle, the NH-90 multirole helicopter, the German variant of the Tiger
armed helicopter, a replacement maritime patrol aircraft, and even the
Medium Extended-Range Air Defense System (MEADS), in which Germany and
Italy are partnered with the United States.
Germany's decision reflects a chronic European problem: a consistent
unwillingness to spend enough on defense. In 1985, at the peak of the
Cold War, the overall defense expenditures of the Federal Republic of
Germany consumed approximately 3.2 percent of gross domestic product.
It is now estimated that Germany's defense budget will decline this year
to less than 1.4 percent of GDP. As a result, Germany's defense expenditures
will be approximately 6 percent below the average for NATO members. Another
problem is that the purchasing power of the defense budget continues to
decline as inflation takes its toll.
Rhetoric Wins Again
The situation is largely the same elsewhere in Europe. The Netherlands
recently announced its intention to reduce defense spending by approximately
5 percent over the next four years. Only France, Italy, Norway, and the
United Kingdom have pursued programs of defense reform and approved relatively
modest defense budget increases that should permit additional investments
in high technology. Even in the case of France, though, a recent parliamentary
report judged the state of availability of military equipment to be insufficient
across all three services.
A proposed 5 percent increase in the new six-year French defense budget
is expected to face strong opposition from Parliament overall. Therefore,
the landscape of European defense is rather bleak. According to Alexander
Vershbow, the U.S. ambassador to NATO, "rhetoric has far outstripped
action when it comes to enhancing capabilities and, with respect to defense
investments, NATO as a whole gets a failing grade."
Nevertheless, the European military forces continue to press forward,
adding to their inventories and capabilities where and when they can.
Several are beginning to purchase selected new equipment items that would
allow some compatibility with U.S. forces and also meet the new "slimmed
down" set of DCI objectives. One area where there has been increased
investment is in strategic lift. Notwithstanding the German announcement
of 5 December, eight European nations have committed to purchasing more
than 180 A400M transports. However, anticipating delays in fully funding
this program, the European members of NATO are considering the possibility
of leasing up to 20 C-17 Globemaster IIs to fill the anticipated capabilities
gap. The United Kingdom has already signed a deal to acquire four C-17s
as an interim solution to its strategic lift requirement.
Another area receiving new attention, and increased resources, is standoff
precision strike. Until now, only the United Kingdom had deployed long-range
precision weapons--the Tomahawk cruise missile now carried on British
submarines. According to European sources, contracts have been signed
for thousands of air-to-surface cruise missiles. These include the Storm
Shadow/Scalp for the air forces of France, Italy, Greece, and the United
Kingdom; the Taurus for the German Air Force; and the Apache for both
the French Air Force and naval air arm.
At the Prague Summit the United States, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
and Spain signed a statement of intent on the joint development of an
Alliance Ground Surveillance Radar. Airborne ground surveillance (AGS)
is viewed as one of the critical capabilities that Europe must have in
order to support the NRF. The United States has tried for years to convince
NATO to move forward with a collaborative AGS based on the highly successful
E-8 J-STARS. Competition from European systems means that a mixed solution,
involving elements of different systems, is now more likely. The United
Kingdom seems determined to continue with its independent ASTER program.
The Essential Ingredient: A New Sense of Purpose
As demonstrated by their various deployments to the Arabian Sea, European
naval forces can be an effective means of projecting power. The future
of European naval power will depend, though, on the acquisition of sufficient
modern platforms, particularly aircraft carriers and surface combatants.
France has its one modern aircraft carrier and desires a second, but has
yet to make a final decision on procurement. The United Kingdom is close
to making a decision on a prime contractor for its two new aircraft carriers,
which are intended to serve as high-powered platforms for the Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF). Italy is building a new aircraft carrier, the Andrea Doria.
The U.S. and allied experience with the operation of aircraft carriers
in the campaign against Afghanistan naturally underscores the value of
these platforms in the new security environment.
Europe also continues to pursue the modernization of surface-combatant
forces. In 2002, the first Saschsen-class frigate entered service with
the German Navy. Italy and France agreed to build up to 27 Horizon-class
frigates for their navies. France also has started construction of the
first of a new class of long-range amphibious vessels. The United Kingdom
has signed contracts for the first two of its Type 45 air-defense destroyers.
The year also was marked by progress in several transatlantic collaborative
programs. The most significant of these is clearly the JSF program, in
which seven NATO allies--the United Kingdom, Italy, Canada, Norway, Turkey,
the Netherlands, and Denmark--are participating. The United Kingdom, Italy,
and Spain intend to deploy the vertical takeoff and landing version of
the JSF on their aircraft carriers. On 22 October, Congress approved the
granting of the first global licensing framework for the JSF, allowing
companies to share technology and information with other companies in
participating countries that have signed memoranda of understanding.
The success of the JSF collaboration effort could serve as a template
for similar initiatives in other areas. The U.S. Missile Defense Agency
is reported to be considering offering a global license to European defense
companies for participation in the U.S. program. The possibility exists,
therefore, for similar arrangements in the development of UAV/UCAV (unmanned
aerial vehicle/unmanned combat aerial vehicle) technology, the U.S. Army's
Future Combat System (FCS), the U.S. Navy's Littoral Combat Ship (LCS),
and the NATO-wide chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense
initiative.
To summarize, the year past was one of a few plodding improvements, a
unified but not overly vigorous restatement of commitment, and of modest
but important expansion. Certain rifts and fissures remain, but none of
crippling dimensions. The question now is whether the unique NATO Alliance,
having already bested the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies in the
greatest war never fought, can muster the will, determination, resources,
and public support needed to win the war on global terrorism as well.
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