Adm. William J. Fallon is finding new ways to lower tensions in a volatile command that spans half the globe

As commander of the Pacific Command (PACOM), Adm. William J. Fallon is head of U.S. military operations in one of the most complex regions of the world. In the Pacific, all eyes are on China , a surging economic power that is rapidly improving its military capabilities and expanding its political influence around the globe.

Some states in the region — such as the Philippines — are breeding grounds for what Fallon calls a “worldwide terror network … pretty much focused in Southeast Asia .” Other Pacific nations long have been known for anti-American sentiment stemming from the days when the United States supported dictators such as Indonesia ’s Mohammed Suharto, who limited personal freedoms, allied with the West and built a fortune for himself and his family by controlling large swaths of the nation’s economy.

Fallon is improving communications with China ’s military as a means to create a more transparent relationship and build mutual confidence. Special Operations Forces under his command provide antiterrorist training to several countries dotting the Pacific, and he’s determined to build on the goodwill generated by the U.S. forces that sped to the aid of nations devastated by the 2004 tsunami. PACOM’s hospital ship, the USNS Mercy, returns to the region this spring for an extended tour to provide medical services in Indonesia and elsewhere.

Meanwhile, Fallon and his unit commanders are engaging with countries throughout the Pacific to foster an environment less conducive to terrorists and bolster the region’s champions of democracy, such as Indonesia ’s President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who rose to power in 2004 on a platform of economic and democratic reforms.

A naval officer for 38 years — many as a flight officer with the call sign “Silver Fox” — Fallon has been vice chief of naval operations and commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command and U.S. Atlantic Fleet. He served in Riyadh , Saudi Arabia , as deputy director for operations, Joint Task Force, Southwest Asia, and has held a variety of strategic planning posts for NATO and the U.S. chief of naval operations.

Fallon says tension levels across the Taiwan Strait , one of the potential trouble spots in his domain, have diminished substantially during the past year. “The situation is much less volatile, at least on the surface,” he said, “and that’s something that we want to encourage.” Fallon discussed these and other issues with Editor in Chief Richard C. Barnard and Associate Editor Matt Hilburn. Excerpts follow.

What are your priorities as head of PACOM?

FALLON: The first is the war on terrorism. The worldwide terror network is pretty much focused in Southeast Asia in the area of southern Philippines , Indonesia , Malaysia , to some extent Thailand and then further west in Bangladesh . So the common threads here are countries with generally weak governments that are strained to provide the kind of border security to prevent folks from going back and forth, large Muslim populations in which the terrorists keep taking refuge.

Countries are realizing that within their own borders, without stability and security, unrest festers and becomes an open invitation to the bad actors that thrive in these environments. We’re trying to work with these governments generally in Southeast Asia to help them enhance their capabilities.

We’ve been working quite a while with the Philippines to help them. This is a country that has a huge amount of debt, lots of internal issues and several insurgency groups.

What kind of help, for example?

FALLON: We provide training. We provide advisers. We provide some material. We help them in trying to shape and reform their own institutions. For example, there is a major effort under way to change the Philippine defense establishment. It’s called Philippine Defense Reform. It’s been ongoing for some time, and it’s an interesting mutual investment by both the U.S. and the Philippine government to overhaul their entire way of doing business, which has not been particularly effective.

At the operational level, we have a joint task force that has been working in the Philippines for a couple of years, primarily in the south. These are mostly Special Forces types because of the nature of the topography there — lots of water. We find it advantageous to work from the maritime domain, so we have some ships that periodically go down there and act as afloat staging points, being very careful to respect the Philippine borders and territorial waters.

Since becoming PACOM commander, you’ve had a lot to say about the need to open up communications with China and build mutual confidence.

FALLON: The big picture of China is the most significant issue in the Pacific area. That’s not a negative. It’s just the reality of a country that is so big, so influential in terms of its impact on Asia and the world: 1.3 billion people, an incredibly active economic engine, staggering growth rates and engagement throughout the world. The list goes on and on.

On the flip side is the concern among people in our country about the steep pickup in China ’s military presence. They’re acquiring a lot of stuff. I don’t know exactly what they’re spending, but it appears to be very substantial. The question is: What for? What’s the threat? Why are they doing this?

The fact that China is huge and growing and has relationships with everybody is reason enough to be quite interested from my side. As I look at things now and in the future, there’s an awful lot of potential for good. We ought to be working those lanes, as opposed to those who would have us focus on the negatives. The idea is to not have a conflict between the U.S. and China , just as it is to not have a conflict between Taiwan and China . That’s a very interesting challenge for me because the U.S. is tied to both of these countries, and any movement with one will, of necessity, involve the other.

When I arrived, things were not looking particularly well. The tension levels were up, friction was up, rhetoric level was high, but I must say that in the past year there has been a decided “de-tensioning” of that rhetoric. I think the situation is much less volatile, at least on the surface, and that’s something that we want to encourage.

There are ways we can do that. First, by more engagement with the mainland. There is extensive interaction with China by many levels of our government. But the military engagement was virtually nil. It’s high time we re-engage with the Chinese military.

We have put forward a pretty aggressive military-to-military engagement proposal to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and had a meeting just before the end of the year with the Chinese to lay out our way ahead for this. Our objective is to get more contact, get more exposure, to show the Chinese that we are not interested in, as some seem to think, containing them or inhibiting them or shackling them to some lower growth rate, or to limit their engagement to our country. We want them to be more engaged.

Engagement between countries can mean a lot of things. What is your meaning?

FALLON: We want more interaction at many levels. We want to expose their people, their leaders, to ours and vice-versa. Probably one of the most useful activities that’s taken place recently is that the Chinese sent a delegation of mid-range officers, mostly one-star equivalents, from the Chinese armed forces and some related enterprises in China. They spent a couple days in Hawaii with us. We discovered that their people are very, very good at a tactical level, less knowledgeable at the operational levels and very lacking in strategic understanding. And this is one of the problems because there are policy statements made or accusations made that, for example, the U.S. is now unhappy with China ’s growth, and we’re going to box them in.

We said, “Wait a minute. Let’s look at this. Take a look at the force structure, for example. The U.S. military is down about 50 percent from where it was 10 years ago. Central Asia ? We’re in Central Asia because these former Soviet Republics invited us to come to Central Asia and to help them engage in an opportunity to grow in the future. And, by the way, we have this terrorist problem in South Asia , and you have similar problems,” which they recognize within their borders.

They haven’t been exposed to an alternative rationale for why things happen. So there is an opportunity for us to expand the horizon and encourage them to engage with us in new areas.

What about tsunami relief? Where were [they] back on Dec. 26 of [2004]? It took them a while [to respond]. They realized they were behind the power curve. It’s interesting, I was in China when we had the hurricane disaster in the Gulf, and within hours the Chinese foreign minister let me know that they had two 747s filled with relief supplies on the runway, ready to move to New Orleans . It was very quick.

The Quadrennial Defense Review mentions carriers and submarines being shifted to the Pacific. What about surface forces?

FALLON: We’re looking at this very hard with OSD. There are a lot of pieces that are on the board and if you move one it affects the others. For example, we had negotiations with the Japanese regarding a strategic alliance — where do we want to go in the future? Japan recognizes that things are different in Asia . There are changes going on within their security establishment. They’re concerned with what’s going on in North Korea , so they’re interested in missile defense.

We’re also addressing our posture in view of changes on the Korean Peninsula . The South Koreans are increasing their military capabilities substantially. I was very impressed with what I saw there, so we have begun a drawdown of some of our forces as the Republic of Korea builds up theirs.

One area that’s particularly touchy is Okinawa . … We have a very visible presence in Okinawa ; it is very important … extremely strategically important to us, and yet there’s a continuing tension. And as we look at a lot of things from different angles, we’re trying to figure out what the best way forward is going to be.

Guam is going to be built up to accommodate a larger presence from the Marine Corps. Guam is another very strategic place. We had a lot of facilities there for years. We are assessing how these might be adapted and modified to accommodate future potential use. It’s going to require significant investment, and the key challenge that I see is we have got to do this coherently and in a joint manner.

Regarding naval forces specifically, we’ve moved several submarines forward to Guam because we think the forward basing there will give us some leverage in transit time and the ability to be on-station. Several issues the Navy has undertaken in recent years are to provide more forward presence to enable us to meet our commitments to our allies and friends and provide that engagement we think is so important with a reduced fleet. We have had a pretty even split between the Atlantic and Pacific fleets. Is that really appropriate today? What is the likelihood of challenge in the Atlantic as opposed to the Pacific?

Trying to maintain six [carriers] all the time in the Pacific is a high priority. So you’ll see moves along these lines. If we have a carrier out there, we’re certainly going to want to have its escorts with it, so I think you’ll see a pretty robust presence in the Pacific.

When you look at all forces of the Pacific Command, are we going to see a substantially larger force in five years?

FALLON: I don’t think you’re going to see a substantially larger force but certainly a more capable force. At the same time we’re trying to work the other end of the spectrum, too. It’s not just with military force. You’ve got to get the hearts and minds of the people.

We had tremendous benefit last year, for example, in having the hospital ship USNS Mercy go out and operate off Indonesia and in some other areas. Our intent is to deploy Mercy again this year [in April] to Southeast Asia and to South Asia to go back and show them our desire … to make lives better for people. We also want to make the environment more stable and more receptive to our message as opposed to terrorist messages.

The other side of that is in our operations. It’s been quite a while since we have really done anything at a robust level in the Pacific because of the demands on resources going to the Middle East . We have been working to put a substantially larger amount of the force structure in the Pacific for a period of months so that we can actually get the experience with these larger-size groups, several aircraft carriers and their strikers, significant Air Force units falling in on top of them. It’s one thing to operate a single carrier; it’s yet another to have several together, and sharpen our command and control and our logistics support structure.

What are you telling the Chinese about the activities planned for the months ahead?

FALLON: We are trying to tell them and show them by daily activity that we are interested in cooperating in many areas, and that we regularly exercise with most nations around the world. We engage in multiple levels, be it with Singapore , Japan , Australia .

One of my long-term goals is to have [the Chinese] come out and participate in some fashion in these exercises. I want to get them to engage because the more they engage, the more likely they are to see that there are a lot of things we ought to be doing together. There are all manner of things that could be beneficial. We want to get them into it. We’ll press on and hopefully make some progress.