| Tense
Times on the Potomac As Iraq, Deficits Monopolize the Political Spotlight
Secretary Rumsfeld Quietly Tests the Waters
For a Realignment of the Joint Staff
By MARK E. ROSEN
In Washington, little-noticed events often reflect fundamental shifts
in the political winds. That happened recently when the bipartisan "civility"
retreat to promote better relations between Democratic and Republican
members of Congress was cancelled due to lack of interest. President George
W. Bush's approval ratings, which once soared above 80 percent, recently
dropped to about 50 percent, and some Democrats started to smell vulnerable
prey. The polls rose again in late March as much of the public rallied
around the president during wartime. Over the longer term, however, the
volatile polls results mean the president will have to fight hard with
the loyal minority in Congress for each of his priorities. What most Americans
want from Congress and the administration, according to results of a recent
Fox News poll, are new taxation and spending policies to aid the sputtering
economy. The costs of the war may make it difficult for him to achieve
consensus on his proposed tax cut or his ever-increasing budget deficits.
Debate on Iraq
The Washington debate
in recent weeks about defense and national security has been dominated
by divisions over the war with Iraq, the unrelenting mobilization of the
nation's armed forces, and the deepening rift between Washington and some
European allies. Posture statements by the service chiefs and the introduction
of a $400 billion defense budget for 2004 received only passing attention
from the major media, even though the Navy this year is retiring more
ships than it is building as a means to reduce overhead. The build rates
for aircraft are similarly anemic.
Rep. Duncan Hunter
(R-Calif.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, is leading
the charge for more money for recapitalization programs. But Rep. Roscoe
Barlett (R-Md.), chairman of the new House Subcommittee on Projection
Forces, told Sea Power that he is deeply concerned about the burgeoning
budget deficit, and the expected $80 to $90 billion supplemental funding
bill needed to pay for the Iraq buildup. In addition, the president has
made a commitment to cut taxes. Other leaders on both sides of the aisle
share those views, meaning that defense spending greater than the president's
2004 request is probably a bridge too far. The usual solution is to push
this problem into the next fiscal year. Given the many security challenges
facing U.S. forces today, however, one must seriously question whether
there will be enough assets available to fight the war after next.
Iraq Fallout
in NATO and the U.S. Congress
Sharp differences
over how to disarm Iraq led to bitter schisms with some allies that threw
NATO into turmoil. Belgium opposition to the U.S. position, French actions
in the U.N. Security Council, and the antiwar platform of German Chancellor
Gerhard Schroeder have been widely covered in the press.
But the long-term
effects of the NATO split are less understood and perhaps more meaningful
to defense planners. On 10 February 2003, the alliance was plunged into
one of its deepest crises since its formation in 1949. France, Germany,
and Belgium vetoed a U.S. request to provide limited military assistance
to Turkey in the event of a spillover conflict, onto Turkish territory,
from neighboring Iraq. The opponents argued it was inappropriate to commit
NATO forces to a conflict instigated by other NATO members. Ultimately,
Turkey invoked Article Four of the NATO Treaty, which states that alliance
members will consult "when, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial
integrity, political independence, or security of any of the parties is
threatened." The issue then was moved from NATO's political apparatus
to its Defense Planning Committee. France has no seat on that committee.
Germany and Belgium were persuaded not to block assistance to Turkey,
and on 19 February the Defense Planning Committee authorized the deployment
of Patriot missile batteries, and of NATO's Airborne Early-Warning and
Control aircraft, to protect Turkey's border with Iraq.
Though the diplomatic
impasse was resolved, the split in NATO led some commentators to declare
the alliance, the bulwark of stability in postwar Europe, as dead. Furthermore,
some members of Congress are calling for a U.S. boycott of the Paris Air
Show and are also demanding that the Defense Department sever its defense
planning and cooperative armaments programs with France but this
step would probably be more symbolic than real.
Washington also likely will seek to further limit France's role in NATO.
The alliance operates on the basis of consensus, so one country can block
any proposed action. From the U.S. viewpoint, the less heard from France
the better because there have been protracted disagreements in the past
between the United States and France over leadership of choice NATO commands.
Meanwhile, it seems
likely that the United States will mount a robust diplomatic effort to
downplay the split and reinvigorate NATO. The expansion of the alliance
in recent years means that it now plays an important role in integrating
former Soviet buffer states into the security apparatus of the Atlantic
alliance. Poland and Hungary now are NATO members, and the alliance recently
agreed to admit the three Baltic states: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
Legal Basis for
the War
Meanwhile, the United
States, Britain, and Spain abandoned their efforts to secure an explicit
U.N. resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq for its failure
to disarm. This was correctly seen as an effort by President Bush to bolster
the domestic political position of British Prime Minister Tony Blair,
who is deep in the political tar pits at home because of his support for
the Bush policy on Iraq.
There is more to
it, however. There is a question, for example, about the underlying legal
basis for taking military action to disarm the Iraqi regime, and some
believe all military actions by the United States must conform to international
law concerning the use of force--i.e., in self-defense or pursuant to
a U.N. authorization. If force is used in the absence of an authorizing
U.N. Security Council resolution, or in derogation of a U.N. resolution
that was vetoed by the Security Council, some in Congress will argue that
the president is conducting an illegal offensive war. This will rekindle
debate over the authority of the president to wage war consistent with
the Vietnam-era (1973) War Powers Resolution. That provision allows the
president to initiate military action, but for only 60 days, without a
congressional Declaration of War pursuant to Article I of the U.S. Constitution.
Depending on the outcome of the war in Iraq, some members of Congress,
such as Sen. Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.), may seek to further limit the president's
power to wage war.
U.S. Service
Members in Court?
A secondary impact
of military operations against Iraq, in the absence of U.N. Security Council
authorization, could be the selected prosecution of U.S. forces under
the new International Criminal Court (ICC) system. That court officially
opened for business on 12 March. Eighty-nine nations are party to the
ICC's Rome Treaty, which went into effect in July 2002. The United States
has not joined the ICC on the grounds that the ICC would not adequately
protect U.S. forces.
The Rome Treaty requires,
among other things, that states take action against individuals who come
into their physical custody and are responsible for war crimes such as
waging an aggressive war, or a war without proper legal justification.
The United States has been seeking, though bilateral agreements, to limit
the scope of the ICC to U.S. service members who are posted abroad on
peacekeeping missions. Those efforts have been of limited success but,
depending on the political fallout from U.S. actions against Iraq, some
countries may press charges against U.S. service members to further their
political agendas against the United States.
Rumsfeld and
the Joint Staff
While the public
spotlight has been focused on Iraq in recent weeks, there was considerable
"buzz" among defense analysts and Pentagon officials about some
proposed changes in the Department of Defense to increase the secretary
of defense's control over individual officials and curtail the independence
of the Joint Staff.
Defense officials
today are less likely to speak their minds about the administration's
budget. On 7 March 2002, Mike Parker was told to resign from his job as
assistant secretary of the Army for civil works and head of the Army Corps
of Engineers. Parker had testified before the Senate Budget Committee
that the Office of Management and Budget had shortchanged the Corps' fiscal
2003 budget request. A respected House member from Mississippi from 1989-98,
and a member of the powerful House Appropriations Committee, Parker apparently
thought that his former status gave him more latitude than most to diverge
from the president's budget line. He was mistaken.
His dismissal sent
a strong signal to senior military and civilian officials that the White
House expects individuals in positions of power to support the president's
budget. Many senior officers from the sea services now are reluctant to
give their views on the funding levels needed to meet current military
requirements. Some decline to diverge from the official line even in private.
Traditionally, military officers are free to give their best military
advice if directly asked for their personal opinion by a member of Congress.
That practice was
put to the test 27 February when a contentious exchange erupted over statements
made by Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric K. Shinseki to the Senate Armed
Services Committee about the number of troops that would be required to
secure postwar Iraq. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz labeled
Shinseki's assessment as "wildly off the mark," according to
The New York Times. Shinseki didn't budge from his declaration that several
hundred thousand troops would be needed. House Democrats now are demanding
a full accounting of the costs of the Iraq buildup and the occupation
that would follow a conflict. The dispute has subsided temporarily but
is certain to re-ignite the moment the administration sends its supplemental
defense budget request to the Hill. The budget committees then will announce
projected cuts in non-defense spending, which will surely be followed
by yowls of pain from members with domestic priorities.
Strong Concerns
on Capitol Hill
Meanwhile, Rumsfeld
is testing the waters with Congress regarding the appropriate legislation
to achieve a realignment of Pentagon hierarchies that would diminish the
independence of the Joint Staff and is certain to raise strong concerns
on Capitol Hill.
Pentagon officials
say a proposal may be sent to Congress as a "transformational"
or budget-cutting measure to change Title 10, the section of the U.S.
Code that defines the powers and functions of the Defense Department and
its various agencies. Title 10 now states that the Joint Staff is to be
"independently organized and operated" to support the chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and JCS operations. It also prohibits
the Joint Staff from being operated as an "Armed Forces General Staff."
The relationship
between the secretary of defense and the Joint Staff now is spelled out
in a 1987 DOD directive that states that the Joint Staff is the "immediate
military staff" of the secretary of defense. However, it does not
alter the command relationship between the Joint Staff and the CJCS. Directives
are administrative rules, and cannot supersede the law.
One of Rumsfeld's
reported proposals would revise Title 10 to realign the Joint Staff to
report directly to the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
In practice, the
1,000-plus member Joint Staff provides support to the geographic combatant
commanders and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and also provides analyses to
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). But, when it comes to interagency
matters, or issues that fall under the purview of the National Security
Council, the CJCS and the secretary of defense have separate statutory
responsibilities to provide military advice to the president and the National
Security Council. While an effort is made to harmonize the positions of
the secretary and the CJCS, who speaks on behalf of the JCS and the combatant
commanders, there are times when the positions are not identical and the
staffs function independently.
Rumsfeld has made
no secret of his unhappiness with the current civilian-military divide
in the Pentagon between the Office of the Secretary of Defense (civilian-run)
and the Joint Staff (military), and his legislative proposal would fuse
many of the staffs. He is also asserting additional control over the assignment
of three- and four-star positions on the Joint Staff. He also feels there
is considerable duplication of effort between OSD and the Joint Staff,
too much Joint Staff autonomy, and, according to press accounts, believes
the Joint Staff's war planning is insufficiently bold and imaginative.
A former service
chief and combatant commander told Sea Power that the Joint Staff's independent
military advice is essential to the national security process and that
Congress is unlikely to support Rumsfeld's proposal.
Consolidation will
result in efficiencies and less dissent but realignment could diminish
the value of the information available to members of Congress, who regularly
seek advice and opinion from senior military officers that is independent
of the president's politically appointed civilian leadership.
Finally, combatant
commanders are likely to be skittish about such a consolidation because
the Joint Staff now functions as their Washington "eyes and ears"
and a conduit to the military services that provides them training, equipment,
and money. Even though this process today is imbued with interservice
rivalries and politics, tying the Joint Staff closer to the political
leadership is something most field commanders would probably want to avoid.
Once the dust settles on Iraq and the Senate and House begin to mark up
the defense authorization bill for fiscal year 2004, the issue of independent
military advice is certain to be hotly debated. *
Mark E. Rosen is the General Counsel and Senior Director of Communications
of the Navy League.
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