The Challenge Ahead for a Vital Agency

DHS: A Department Born in Crisis

By JAMES D. HESSMAN
Senior Writer & Editor Emeritus

The long-term political, military, and economic consequences of the U.S.-led attack against Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and his brutal regime may well not be known for many months, even years. But if 11 September 2001 was "the day that changed the world," as it has frequently been called, a reasonable case can be made that March 2003 will be remembered as the month that changed the world.

The prewar military buildup in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere in the Middle East continued through the first three weeks of the month. The acrimonious prelude to the war saw a perhaps irreparable sundering of NATO unity, another demonstration of U.N. ineffectiveness in times of crisis, and the creation of deep divisions within and among the American people similar to those that caused such turmoil toward the end of the Vietnam War.

Thanks to the arrest of Khalid Sheik Mohammed, a key lieutenant to Osama bin Laden and alleged "mastermind" of the 11 September terrorist attacks, March 2003 may also be remembered as the beginning of the end for the al Qaeda terrorist organization.

The Second Gulf War itself was the first in which U.S. forces were sent into battle under the "preemptive action" policy announced last June by President George W. Bush in his speech to the graduating class at West Point. That policy, which might also be described as "proactive deterrence," was formulated in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks when Bush addressed the nation, and the world, to announce the beginning of an open-ended global war on terrorism.

Departing from the sometimes ambiguous foreign and national-defense policies of his predecessor, Bush made it clear that not only the perpetrators, but any nation that harbors, aids and abets, or in any other way supports terrorists or terrorist groups would be held just as accountable as those committing terrorist acts.

The start of the Second Gulf War was preceded at home by: (1) the raising of the "terrorist threat level" to Orange ("high risk"); and (2) the deployment of National Guard units, state police, and other law-enforcement personnel to protect such "critical infrastructure" assets as airports and seaports, bridges and tunnels, and chemical and hazardous materials plants and storage facilities.

All agencies of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) also were in action or on alert in the first full-scale test of the new department's readiness and capabilities. Many of the 180,000 DHS employees were still relatively new at their jobs. Most security screeners at U.S. airports are recent hires, for example. But others, such as Customs Service and Coast Guard personnel, were doing the same jobs they have been doing for years, albeit with a much greater sense of urgency.

That urgency is not likely to diminish for the foreseeable future, no matter what happens in Iraq, and no matter how long it takes to track down, kill, or capture the remaining al Qaeda leaders. There still will be thousands of al Qaeda rank and file left, and there are dozens of other terrorist groups throughout the world, many of them sworn enemies of the United States. For that reason, last month's Orange alert may be just the first in a long series; it served in any case as a much-needed baptism of fire for DHS and its senior leadership.

Thanks to the global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in recent years it is now possible for any reasonably well financed terrorist group to wreak unimaginable havoc on a city or nation, kill thousands--perhaps tens of thousands--of people in one WMD attack, destroy a transportation hub or financial center, or create a global economic crisis. The 9/11 terrorists transformed three civilian passenger aircraft into a new class of WMDs and used them to kill more than 3,000 people. The total might well have been more than ten times that number. DOD (Department of Defense) officials have estimated that the short- and long-term financial costs of the 9/11 attacks are more than $750 billion, and still growing.

The creation of the Department of Homeland Security, headed by former Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge, was seen as a political triumph for President Bush. It is much more than that, though. It also is explicit recognition, by both the legislative and executive branches of government, that future wars in which American interests are at peril will be fought not only overseas by forward-deployed U.S. forces--the preferred strategy of the 20th century--but also at home: by National Guard and Reserve units, by "first responders" (police and fire department personnel, FEMA (the Federal Emergency Management Agency) and the Coast Guard, medical professionals, etc.), and by the American people at large.

Not since the War of 1812 had a foreign enemy launched a major attack against the continental United States. And not since the 7 December 1941 Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor (Hawaii was not a state at that time) had so many Americans, civilians as well as military, been killed on the first day of war. It is now not just the young men and women in uniform who are being sent into harm's way, but ordinary citizens as well.

Whether the American people are ready for this new type of war remains to be seen. The "greatest generation" won World War II, defeating Nazi fascism in Europe and Japanese imperialism in the Pacific. The United States and NATO also prevailed in the Cold War against the Soviet Union. But the Korean War ended in stalemate, and the United States lost the Vietnam War, though many Vietnam veterans contend it was a political loss rather than a battlefield defeat. The quick coalition victories in the 1991 Gulf War, and last year in Afghanistan, were hopeful signs that the American people were once again united and capable of working with other freedom-loving peoples to meet the complex new challenges of the 21st century. Last month's antiwar protests, both at home and overseas, may have shattered that unity.

As a department, though, DHS certainly seems to be as ready as might reasonably be expected for a major new agency born in crisis and still in the throes of transition. Most of its senior leadership is in place, Congress has provided generous initial funding, and the personnel transferred to DHS from other federal offices and agencies are, for the most part, experienced and highly qualified professionals in their respective fields of expertise.

All of which is a good beginning, but there are some major obstacles facing the new department. Significant additional funding above and beyond that already provided is needed. The Coast Guard's Deepwater recapitalization program should be fully funded, for example. The drawing up of a new and efficient-looking organization chart does not automatically erase the many differences in operating procedures, organizational "cultures," and person-to-person relationships that previously existed. There also are certain jurisdictional relationships with various committees and subcommittees of Congress that must be recognized and reconciled.
The post-WWII history of the U.S. armed services is not overly comforting in this regard, and perhaps should not be used as a template. Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947, which created the Department of Defense, thinking it had ensured that the armed services would be speaking with one voice from that day forward. Almost four decades later, Congress had to pass the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 to resolve, insofar as possible, the numerous interservice differences that still remained.

The DHS leaders knew well in advance they would not have the luxury of time to study the fine print, and could not "work out the details" later. Their first goal, therefore, was to make the department combat-ready from Day One. Again, only time will tell whether they met that goal or not. *