Somalia, Afghanistan: A Script for Reconstruction of Iraq

Keys to Success are Long-Term Commitment and Teamwork Between Military and Civil Agencies

By FRED PECK

Col. Fred Peck, USMC (Ret.) was the Marine Corps' spokesman for Operation Restore Hope in Somalia.

White House officials planning the reconstruction in a post-war Iraq can take a page from the very different histories of U.S. nation-building efforts in Africa and South Asia. The U.S. experience of Somalia provides a searing reminder of the need for careful advance planning and a long-term commitment by the United States before U.S. military and civil agencies embark on humanitarian relief or reconstruction. Some of those lessons are being applied in Afghanistan, where the contributions of 60 countries have brought a measure of stability to the Afghan people after 25 years of conflict.

In both Somalia and Afghanistan, conditions were intractable and dangerous when U.S. forces became involved in nation-building efforts.

The U.S. forces sent to Somalia in 1992 found a country ravaged by warlords, in the throes of civil war, with millions of refugees, widespread malnutrition, drought, rampant banditry, and a destroyed infrastructure.

President George H.W. Bush ordered the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to undertake Operation Provide Relief in August 1992 to airlift food into southern Somalia to battle widespread famine caused by a civil war that had been raging since 1990. When conditions worsened and civil relief organizations were unable to distribute food to the Somalis, President Bush launched Operation Restore Hope.

A Walkover in Mogadishu

A Navy-Marine Corps task force, of which I was a part, landed in Mogadishu on 9 December 1992 with the mission to restore order in southern Somalia so that the relief organizations could do their work. An initial force of 2,000 grew into a Combined Joint Task Force of more than 40,000 troops from 23 countries. Along with the troops, food and other aid poured into the country.

Thanks to retired Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, whom President Bush appointed his Special Envoy to Somalia, the deployment of forces in Restore Hope was largely a walkover. Coalition forces, spearheaded by U.S. Marines and the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division, occupied the major Somali towns that served as distribution centers for the relief groups. Oakley, who had earlier served as ambassador to Somalia, negotiated with the warlords of the 14 principal clans and sub-clans to step aside and let the Coalition do its job. For the most part, they complied.

Restore Hope was a peace-making mission, not a humanitarian-relief operation. The commander, who reported to CENTCOM, was Marine Lt. Gen. Robert B. Johnston. He was free to take any military action necessary to accomplish the mission, including the preemptive use of force. The plan was to quickly establish order, see that the civil relief organizations were functioning, and then turn operations over to a "blue beret" force of U.N. peacekeepers.

Southern Somalia in December 1992 was in total anarchy. Cities were filled with refugees and almost all the infrastructure had been looted or vandalized. There was no electricity, water, police, fire protection, or legal system, and no authority except for the warlords.

By the end of December, Coalition forces had restored order in the region. Airlift operations continued, and relief supplies were unloaded at seaports and moved safely to points inland. The back of the famine was broken, but not before an estimated 300,000 Somalis had died. By February 1993, my instructions as the chief spokesman for Restore Hope were to take every opportunity to put pressure on the U.N. to deploy the peacekeeping force, so that most of the U.S. forces could leave.

'One Feather at a Time'

Meanwhile, Oakley, who had been re-appointed special envoy by President Bill Clinton, worked diligently with the Somalis to reconstruct some semblance of a country. While we insisted our mission did not include "nation-building," once security was established we turned to "civic-action" projects. Streets were cleaned, wells drilled, schools rebuilt, hospitals rehabilitated, and roads repaired.

Oakley's strategy was to revitalize traditional elements of Somali society and gradually marginalize the warlords. He described it as "plucking the bird, one feather at a time." Drawing upon the Marines' ill-fated experience in Lebanon a decade earlier, the United States scrupulously avoided taking sides among the feuding factions.

Oakley, who early in his State Department career served in Vietnam, tried to avoid mistakes of the past. He pressed Somali leaders to make their own decisions and find their own solutions to issues, with U.S. assistance offered only when a consensus had been reached. By April, representatives of all the warring clans were meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to plan for a constituent assembly to prepare for a national government. Oakley's diplomatic skills and personal courage were instrumental in our initial success. Unfortunately, his diplomatic mission ended in early March 1993.

An editorial in the 3 March London Daily Telegraph lamented Oakley's departure. "... it is very unlikely that a truly multinational--as opposed to an American-dominated--force will command anything like the respect accorded to the Americans. The U.N. faces, at best, sullen cooperation and, at worst, lethal opposition from a population whose initial welcoming of foreign intervention is giving way to hostility."

'Leaving Somalia in the Lurch'

"The brutal truth is that America is leaving Somalia in the lurch. Its withdrawal confirms that Washington has no stomach for a sustained and potentially costly projection of power," it concluded.

Over the next two months, the bulk of the U.S. forces were withdrawn. Command was turned over to the U.N. on 4 May and, exactly one month later, Aideed's forces ambushed a Pakistan Army patrol they thought was bent on destroying Aideed's radio station, killing 24 Pakistani troops. The death spiral of the U.N. mission to Somalia had begun.

The U.N. leadership was all military, and lacked Oakley's deft diplomacy and depth of knowledge of the Somalis. Understandably, when trouble arose, these military men reached first for the military tool in their bag. The Daily Telegraph prophetically noted the Somalis' lack of respect for some members of the U.N. force. Without the backbone of U.S. forces, U.N. peacekeepers faced a serious challenge from the warlords. U.N. forces withdrew to their compounds and the warlords took back control of the streets. When the U.N. branded Aideed a criminal and placed a reward on his head, it had done more than choose sides. The U.N. was now at war with one of Somalia's most ruthless warlords.

U.S. Army Rangers and a Delta Force team arrived in August to hunt down Aideed. Their raids netted some of Aideed's henchmen, but primarily succeeded only in uniting all of Mogadishu against the U.N. peacekeepers. When two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down during a raid in Aideed's territory on 3 October, and the bodies of two Americans were dragged through the streets and defiled by the Somalis, the end of the mission was only a matter of time.

On 25 March 1994, a Navy-Marine Corps task force completed the evacuation of the remnants of the U.N. mission to Somalia, and a sad chapter in attempted nation-building was closed.

Total Breakdown in Afghanistan

The new millennium soon brought the United States another challenge in nation-building. Afghanistan in late 2001 saw another Navy-Marine Corps task force in the vanguard of Operation Enduring Freedom, along with robust contingents of the U.S. Army and Air Force. U.S. Special Forces working with friendly Afghan militias quickly routed the Taliban government and the al Qaeda terrorists to whom it had given refuge. As in Somalia, the initial military operations were quite successful, but this time U.S. forces were fighting in support of indigenous militias.

The two countries are roughly the same size, but that is where the similarity ends. Afghanistan has a population of more than 26 million. Somalia's was about 7 million. More than 4 million Afghans were displaced during years of fighting. Somalia's civil war had lasted about 2 years. Afghanistan has been embroiled in conflict for almost 25 years. Damage and neglect of their infrastructure during decades of strife created a near total breakdown of their land-locked mountainous country.

A stunning victory for the U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan quickly yielded to the sobering realization of the magnitude of reconstruction needed, and the tragedy of September 11 had given reconstruction of Afghanistan a new imperative. The world could ill afford to have a failed state available for terrorist organizations to exploit. The United States linked the need for aid to the international war on terrorism, and began to recruit countries to help rebuild Afghanistan. At a donors' conference in Tokyo in January 2002, some 60 countries and several international institutions pledged $4.5 billion to a reconstruction trust fund. Donors also provide troops, supplies, and equipment, as well as money.

Ironically, President George W. Bush, who during his election campaign had been critical of U.S. "nation building," was now faced with an awesome task of reconstructing Afghanistan.

There are about 9,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan in Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 180, commanded by Lt. Gen. Dan K. McNeil, who recently told reporters that there are no plans to reduce that number. More than two years into Operation Enduring Freedom, there is no pressure to bring the troops home, as was the case in Somalia. The task force is headquartered at Bagram Air Base, north of Kabul, where military operations are closely integrated with civil affairs reconstruction efforts in the provinces. Unlike Somalia, their mission includes rebuilding a nation.

Stability in Kabul

Within CJTF 180 is a Civil Affairs Brigade. The task force staff also includes a new section, the J-9, a directorate focused on civil-military operations, whose director is U.S. Army Col. Kassem Salah, a veteran of service in Somalia in 1993 and in Afghanistan in the late 1980s. Among his many tasks, Salah must keep track of 255 approved civil affairs projects in 10 Afghan provinces.

Salah feeds aid requirements to the Humanitarian Affairs Working Group in the Coalition Coordination Center at CENTCOM, where they match requirements for reconstruction to donor pledges. Typically about eight liaison officers from donor countries also are working with the CJTF at Bagram to coordinate aid and civil-military operations.

Countries also were asked to contribute forces for an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) established in Kabul to protect the interim government formed under an agreement reached in Bonn, Germany, in December 2001. On December 22, Hamid Karzai was inaugurated as chairman of the 30-member Afghan Interim Authority, with a six-month mandate to be followed by a two-year Transitional Authority, after which general elections will be held.

Today, 22 countries are contributing forces for the ISAF in Kabul, command of which is shared by Germany and the Netherlands. The security situations in many parts of the country remain tense, but conditions in Kabul are relatively stable.

Despite the initially grim situation, there has been progress. In 2001, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees estimated there were 3.5 million refugees from Afghanistan and a million more internally displaced persons. Half of those people returned home in 2002, and plans have been made to assist another 1.5 million Afghans to return this spring.

Civil affairs work continues at a steady pace in Afghanistan and President Karzai travels the world seeking aid. When Karzai took office he listed three main priorities: a new currency, a new Army, and a communication system linking the 32 provinces.

A Litany of Success

The new currency is a reality. The new Army is functioning, although still small and well short of its goal of 75,000 troops. The Army, however, has already conducted operations with the CJTF, which also assists in its training. A high-frequency digital radio system links some provinces and, for the first time in Afghan history, a half-dozen provinces are able to communicate with the ministries in Kabul; more will be online soon.

Karzai also emphasizes the construction of a "ring road" that will help the provinces coalesce around the national government. Afghanistan's topography is challenging, but a highway system, Karzai feels, will bring with it development and a greater sense of national unity--something totally lacking in Somalia.

Afghanistan's future hangs in the balance, but President Bush is firmly committed to its success. In this year's State of the Union Address Bush said, "In Afghanistan, we helped liberate an oppressed people. And we will continue helping them secure their country, rebuild their society, and educate all of their children--boys and girls."

The United States has spent nearly $750 million in aid in the past two years, and Congress plans an additional $1.45 billion over the next four years. As CENTCOM commander Gen. Tommy Franks told a Tampa, Fla., audience last November, a great deal has been accomplished.

"More than 5,500 offices and projects are ongoing in the country of Afghanistan as we speak," Franks said. "Almost 600,000 metric tons of food and humanitarian assistance have been delivered to the Afghan people. Literally thousands of unexploded ordnance [mines and pieces of mines] have been picked up and destroyed in Afghanistan. More than 140,000 civilians have been treated by coalition hospitals in that country. And more than 2 million people have returned to their homes in Afghanistan."

'For as Long as it Takes'

Warlords and bandits still pose severe problems. Drought and winter weather add to the misery, but an aggressive "winterization" program and a mild winter prevented widespread suffering this year. Food, tents, fuel, and other supplies were stockpiled before the snows arrived and were available to help the people survive the winter.

The United States appears to be committed to stay the course in Afghanistan. Had similar resolve been shown in Somalia, we might never have heard the words "Black Hawk down."

International organizations, relief organizations, and military forces are working to reconstruct a country. That task will not be easy; but with consistent diplomacy, continued aid, and security assistance, a viable nation in Afghanistan is attainable.

As Franks said during a recent visit to Afghanistan, "While an awful lot has been done in Afghanistan, this is Afghanistan. We're just going to have to stay with it for as long as it takes."

Franks should keep that thought in mind as he contemplates the possibility of being involved with nation-building efforts in Iraq, a country of 24 million people who have been brutalized by Saddam Hussein and riven by ethnic hatreds. Iraq still struggles with economic sanctions imposed after the 1991 Gulf War and is its Kurdish minority has established a semi-autonomous region in the north, protected by American and British planes that police no-fly zones in the north and south.

The challenges of a post-war Iraq would be at least as complex and vexing as those encountered in Afghanistan and Somalia. But it would be folly for the United States to triumph in war with Iraq and then fritter away its success in an ill-administered peace. The rehabilitation of post-war Iraq will require America to commit its resources and prestige to the effort--"for as long as it takes." And that could be a long, long time. *