Stillman: ‘Ruthless Execution’ Is Key To Keeping Deepwater On Course

Rear Adm. Patrick M. Stillman is program executive of the Coast Guard’s Integrated Deepwater System, the largest acquisition in the service’s history. Costing $17 billion over 20 years, Deepwater marks a fundamental turning point in the history of the service. The Coast Guard has deployed to Iraq and taken on broad new missions, such as protecting the nation’s ports, at a moment in time when much of its fleet is dilapidated.

Its HH-65A helicopters are being fitted with new engines on an emergency basis, and its 110-foot patrol boats, scheduled for major modernization beginning this year, may not be worth the time and investment needed to bring them up to par. Thus, portions of the Deepwater budget and schedule will have to be rewritten. It is Stillman’s job to right the balance between upgrading the Coast Guard’s aging assets and buying new ships and aircraft years sooner than planned.

A 1972 graduate of the Coast Guard Academy, Stillman was assistant commandant for governmental and public affairs and has held several sea commands. In April, he begins his fourth year as Deepwater chief at a time when congressional support of the program is large and growing. Congress last year added $168 million to the White House budget request for Deepwater, boosting the total to $668 million. Stillman will need every penny as he manages Deepwater, which comprises three new classes of cutters, various small boats, manned and unmanned aircraft, and intelligence and communications systems.

Stillman often speaks of the “ruthless execution” necessary to keep Deepwater on course, and he sometimes laments that the Coast Guard has done too good a job of patching together ships and planes that perhaps should have been sent to the bone yard years ago. He spoke recently with Sea Power Editor in Chief Richard C. Barnard.

What are your priorities for 2004 and 2005?

Stillman: We have to resolve a paradox, first of all. The operational tempo, post 9/11, has been taxing. We have found in the first two years of the contract that our legacy assets are, quite frankly, in far worse shape than we expected. The most recent example is the decision of the commandant to quickly re-engine the [HH-65A helicopter] based on safety and performance issues. We have no choice. That will be funded through Deepwater, but it requires a shift of priorities to a certain extent. Those types of decisions tend to impact the build out and the timeline.

We also are told that the 110-foot patrol boats, to be upgraded and extended to 123 feet, are in very sad shape.

Stillman: The condition of the hulls on those platforms was, in many respects, far worse than we had originally anticipated. The Matagorda, the first boat that is in the queue, if you will, is to be delivered on the first of March. We ended up replacing double — and then some — the hull plating that had been expected. Moreover, a hull assessment of the entire fleet indicates that 22 of the 49 boats are in significant need of hull sustainment. That’s a challenge. It forces you to step back and ask the question: Is it prudent to renovate all 49 of these vessels, or should you perhaps consider accelerating the construction of a new patrol boat?

I think it is safe to say that normally you try to do as much as you possibly can with what you have. The Coast Guard has always been predisposed in that regard, in some cases to its detriment. That fact that we are sailing boats in the Gulf of Alaska that are older than me is not something that is going to attract young men and women to this service. I’m sorry.

How far can you stretch those platforms?

Stillman: Not much further. The 110-[foot] discussion is certainly germane to that. But equally important is the fact that we were provided $20 million of the [budget] plus-up in 2004 to begin considering the design for the replacement of the medium-endurance cutter — the 210-foot cutter — as well as the 270s and [the patrol boats]. It’s a prudent thing to do from the standpoint of risk management. The reality is that the 210s are in abysmal condition. The 270s are certainly in need of significant renovation.

The scope of your decision will depend on out-year funding?

Stillman: Yes, the funding has been nothing if not volatile. Right now, we’re on the high end, but what does ’05 look like?

And you have an assessment group looking at the options on the 110s?

Stillman: I have asked for recommendations from the integrator [the industry consortium Integrated Coast Guard Systems] about the number of conversions that should be accomplished — the number of 110-foot patrol boats that should be converted to 123 feet. What is the right business case and what best serves the needs of the field? I have a draft report in hand, and we are assessing the alternatives. We also expect recommendations on the appropriate conceptual and preliminary design of the replacement patrol craft for the 110-foot fleet.

It’s a balancing act. For every dollar you invest in legacy assets, that’s one dollar less that you can invest in new construction. And you’ve got to invest in those [legacy] assets just to maintain a reasonable state of capability and readiness such that they can perform their missions.

What steps are you taking to restrain costs?

Stillman: We are going to use commercial-off-the-shelf technologies, and we’re going to use non-developmental items in large part. And we’re going to steal shamelessly from the Navy when it makes sense to do so. And I don’t say that with a lack of virtue. Quite to the contrary, I say that with an absolute recognition that [Rear Adm. Charles S. Hamilton, the Navy’s program executive for ships], myself and [Rear Adm. Charles T. Bush, the Navy’s chief of integrated warfare systems] appreciate that we are all in the business of building maritime capability for the nation.

Are you still assessing the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) as a possibility for Deepwater?

Stillman: The LCS is of significance to Deepwater. Why is that the case? I’m not here say there will be a common hull form between the Navy and the Coast Guard, but I’ll tell you this: There are going to be a lot of common subsystems installed in the LCS and Deepwater vessels. Vertical launch unmanned air vehicle (UAV) capability is an example. It doesn’t matter what airplane you launch off the flight deck, the control system has got to be interoperable such that the Navy can take control of a [Coast Guard HV-911] Eagle Eye and do so with seamless interoperability. And I would hope that I would be able to do the same thing with any UAV the Department of Homeland Security and Department of Defense bring to the fight. If we can’t do that, I think we have let the nation down.

During your talk at a Navy League corporate breakfast several months ago, you sounded very skeptical about sharing hulls.

Stillman: In many respects, part of the art and science of acquisition boils down to money. You can’t buy what you can’t afford. The cost drivers in a modern surface combatant are not in the hull. The reality is that it’s the network, the subsystems, that truly make that surface combatant or Coast Guard cutter a node of constructive value in the network. So that’s where the intersection with LCS is. If open architecture becomes a reality and my integrators are doing their job, I ought to be able to plug and play ’til the cows come home.

Now, Adm. Hamilton appreciates the fact that there ought to be some [cost] sharing in areas. Well, there is. I’m taking a 57mm deck gun to ground as far as certification. That intermediate deck gun can then be translated to LCS if the Navy is so predisposed. And I think they are.

Look at the LCS construct: The importance of small boat operations, the importance of unmanned aerial vehicles. That’s Deepwater in every way, shape and form. I envision someday that the Spartan, the unmanned surface vehicle in [Navy] development, is going to be operated by the Navy and the Coast Guard on a daily basis. And why? Because the biggest cost driver in this entire enterprise is people. And if LCS can come to the fight with a crew of between 25 and 39, and a maximum of 50, and I can harvest that work, that is going to make the Coast Guard far more effective in the long run.

How realistic is it for anyone in Congress to hold out hope that there will be a common hull between LCS and Deepwater? Is that even on the table anymore?

Stillman: The honest answer to that question is, “I don’t know.” The guts of the business of acquisition is tradeoffs. Do I need 50 knots? Can I afford 50 knots? Do I need a scope of modularity that encompasses the entire spectrum of LCS? No.

What is the progress on the HV-911 Eagle Eye? There was some delay a couple of years ago.

Stillman: Well, we lost a year. We weren’t able to fund the 911 to the level that we had hoped. There’s $50 million on the table in ’04. We are mindful of schedule. We are pleased that Bell has chosen to invest its own money to bring that airplane to a full-scale model at the end of ’04. We are somewhat behind the initial projection as to investment in that asset. But that in no way negates the fact that we are committed to bringing vertical launched UAV capability to our customers.

What would happen if the Navy offered its older FFG 7 frigates?

Stillman: We wouldn’t take them. I would be looking at the replacement for the 378-foot [Hamilton-class high-endurance cutters] that would require me to use more people rather than less. When you begin to ask the hard questions tied to life-cycle costs, the answer boils down the number of people that are walking the deck plates. It’s how you choose to maintain that asset over its life cycle that truly defines the life-cycle costs. And that’s where I have to focus.

The real sea change here is that we are making hard decisions in terms of where to invest our dollars based on life-cycle costs. Our mental modes of thought tend to gallop to the next year because that’s the way Congress appropriates. But our wrestling match, both internal and external, is tied to life-cycle considerations. If you want to tie budgets to performance, you’ve got to start drilling on total ownership costs real hard. And if organizations don’t have the cultural courage to do that, then I think they’re going to get left on the curb. And well they should.

Is there foreign interest in the Deepwater program?

Stillman: There is interest by the French, the Germans, the Australians and the Canadians, and, in fact, we expect that perhaps we will have people from those countries assigned to the program to ensure they are able to gain information and experience from it.