It's part of our heritage. In 1900, the USS New York sent the first official radio message. By 1904, 24 Navy ships had radios. It led to a transformation in naval operations. Before, it had been difficult to find and defeat enemy fleets at sea. However, the radio opened up a broad network--one that could link sensors, weapons, and commanders.

Cruisers and eventually aircraft would scout the seas for enemy fleets and, once they were found, commanders were able to mass forces against them. That is the power of the network.

It is also our future. Today, the Navy is pursuing the digital network, which moves information at tremendous speeds. Ships and squadrons are being linked by means of Information Technologies for the 21st Century, or IT-21. It is also changing operations. But that's not enough. We as a global navy require a global network--one that seamlessly links forces at sea with support bases and technologies ashore. What is needed to contribute to that network is the Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI), and I have long been a proponent.

A World-Class Global Network

Networks are key to Navy warfighting. They can link a large and dispersed force, allow information and insights to be widely shared, and enable that dispersed force to mass its power with great speed. The radio network did that to a degree, and the Navy was one of the first organizations to recognize it. Today, those capabilities have been dramatically surpassed by the digital network, and that again has been recognized by the Navy. In 1997, we initiated IT-21, which is digitally linking our ships and squadrons at the tactical and operational levels.

IT-21 has revolutionized daily operations within the battle group. In the time required to process one message, a multitude of email exchanges now occur. That has enabled rapid collaboration on underway replenishments, helicopter scheduling, and other issues. It also has made warfighting faster. Tomahawk missions that once took two days to plan and execute can now be carried out in 90 minutes. In addition, IT-21 has empowered the Navy. In one instance, it allowed a small staff on a Spruance-class destroyer to coordinate missile strikes by other ships.

But the revolution has only begun. Operational effectiveness can be further enhanced if ships and squadrons are seamlessly linked to bases ashore. For example, ships conducting maritime interdiction might quickly reach back through the shore establishment to civilian agencies for information on targeted vessels and their crews, cargoes, and ports of call. Similarly, information from the CIA, FBI, or other intelligence agencies could be pushed to forces afloat.

Such an expanded network will improve combat capability. If a ship's system goes down, personnel can contact a system command and even the manufacturer. This could help diagnose the problem, assess the availability of parts, coordinate delivery, and provide online repair assistance. Distance learning also could be conducted during deployments, advancing personal capabilities as well as careers. That helps retention and ultimately readiness.

Moreover, this network could transform the Navy. That is what we found when we visited global entities like FedEx and IBM. Global networks helped them become faster, better, and more efficient. They allowed the establishment of common databases and ground truth. They also led to the use of standard approaches to problem solving. As a world-class global institution, the Navy needs this kind of network to retain our technological advantage over potential adversaries.

Technology Fiefdoms Ashore

Such a network requires a seamless highway of information. To achieve that requires centralized policy execution and centralized operation of the network in order to have it meet its full potential and ensure it is secure.

Before we pursued NMCI, that was anything but the case in our independent shore-establishment networks. As in so many other organizations, automation in the Navy was carried out by subordinate organizations. The result was a large number of fiefdoms throughout the Navy. They had their own servers, applications, and training programs. Some did a good job keeping up with technology. Some were operating in the Stone Age. Such network disparities inhibited interoperability. Some commands could not email information to and from one another.

The big concern was security. Most networks had extremely poor security. Some had none at all. Conceivably, an intruder could enter a gateway at a shore station in San Diego, Norfolk, or Monterey and affect the workings of its network all the way out to the carriers in the Arabian Gulf.

Such intrusions have already occurred. In 2001, the Navy counted some 16,000 incidents in which someone tried to access Navy or Marine Corps networks. Of these, 400 gained entry, and 40 were able to travel the networks. That is not acceptable for a military.

The challenge was how to fix the shore establishments' networks. I and others were confident that this problem could not be solved by the government itself. We as an institution could not have pulled together the entire Navy to install an organization-wide network in the same way that industry could, and had been doing with a high degree of success. Also, our government-acquisition process could come nowhere close to keeping up with commercial technology. The microchip's power doubles every 18-24 months. Some of our Navy systems have taken as long as 18 years to field.

The decision process was onerous and difficult--and, appropriately, involved a lot of the Navy's senior leaders. I and others talked to representatives of private-sector organizations who had experience in this type of situation. We studied IBM, which consolidated 31 networks into one enterprise-wide intranet, and watched J. P. Morgan successfully outsource intranet services. Users from across the Navy also were asked to submit a list of their needs. Technical experts then collaborated on the achievement of interoperability.

I was a strong proponent of industry providing this network to the Navy as a service--i.e., the Navy would buy it like a utility. If the Navy outsourced, industry would build, maintain, and upgrade the network. That is what many corporations have done, and what some government agencies are starting to do--the Department of Commerce, for example; also NASA, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, and the state of Connecticut.

Once the decision was made, we as an institution got behind it and provided the funding. In October 2001, the Department of the Navy awarded the Navy Marine Corps Intranet contract--the biggest information-technology project ever funded by the federal government. Under that contract, NMCI is consolidating nearly 200 incompatible and unsecured shore-based networks into one secure network that delivers voice, video, and data across the Department of the Navy.

This service is being provided by the Electronic Data Systems Corporation. I have visited its headquarters in Plano, Texas, and have had a number of meetings with EDS leadership. I am convinced that they are committed--and I am committed to ensuring that they remain committed.

Where We Are Today

Today, we are in the early stages of installing and implementing the Navy Marine Corps Intranet. Here at the Atlantic Fleet Headquarters, we have made good progress. The contractor has assumed responsibility for the network and is actually running it. I can get on the network and call up chat rooms for Fifth Fleet in the Arabian Gulf and Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. Those with a need to know can find out such information as the DNA or blood type of al Qaeda and Taliban detainees at Guantanamo Bay--within 30 minutes.

Security also is improving. Network Operations Centers have been established in fleet areas such as Norfolk and San Diego. They govern traffic between the network and the Internet. Further monitoring is conducted at regional and command levels, and even at the individual workstation level. In addition, we have established how we control the security of our network, as well as our firewall policy, and how we will report any problems within the network.

If there is an intrusion, we can immediately isolate the segment of the network where the intrusion occurred, making certain that the intrusion is stopped and doesn't spread. We then can ensure that any damage gets cleaned up and move forward from there. Heretofore, we never had the ability to do that.

The security measures are constantly being tested. Reportedly, National Security Agency "red teams" have penetrated existing defense networks, with some 99 percent of the penetrations undetected. Similarly, red teams, absent contractors, are attempting to penetrate the Navy Marine Corps Intranet. If they do, the contractor could pay a $10 million penalty. So far, that has not happened.

We also are determining what type of information goes on the network. The goal is to provide certain functionalities across the Department of the Navy. That can be hugely transformational because it will be different from how we operate today. Applications are key to achieving that. And the private-sector market place has numerous applications worth studying and, perhaps, emulating.

Task Force Web is setting the standards. Essentially, those standards will say "these are the appropriate applications for use on NMCI, and those are not." The task force is examining applications from a common-sense perspective, determining the value added for Navy-wide use. They also are looking at the applications from a technical perspective. Putting certain applications on a server could create nightmares for both security and for data flow. Task Force Web balances the value added against such technical concerns.

We are doing something else of perhaps even greater importance. We are blazing a trail for the rest of government. Cyber threats are a major concern, particularly after September 11th. Many are now talking about "Govnet," a secure government-wide network. In many ways, the Navy Marine Corps Intranet is serving as a prototype for larger networking initiatives likely to come.

Rocks and Shoals Ahead

Although progress is being made, several challenges remain. The biggest ones might be ourselves. The greatest problem in organizational change is usually more cultural than technical. Not all saw the potential of shipboard radios, and some viewed them as interfering with the "independent actions of fleet commanders," as one individual wrote in 1908.

The same is true today. I have talked to the leaders of many corporations who have gone through what the Navy is now going through and all have said that implementing such a network is very difficult. There is always going to be some opposition--and many people who want to stick to the way they already know. One way of failing is to drag our feet so long that it becomes a failure because of a lack of momentum.

The key is to recognize what we can be--not hold on to the way we are. We need to move ahead, and we need to move now. In addition, we as a government must have the courage to step away from the way we have always done business. Technology is providing us some unprecedented new opportunities, and that is precisely what the Navy Marine Corps Intranet is doing. We are confident we can make it work. However, bureaucratic hurdles drive up the cost, reduce the institution's commitment, create doubt in people's minds, and make a tough transition even tougher. We want the opportunity to make this work. If we can't, fire us.

It's What We Do

Writing about the post-World War II era, historian Michael T. Isenberg stated, "The Navy was one of the greatest communicators anywhere. ... Radio linked every element within the Navy to every other element, a worldwide network of communications."

Now, the digital network is king. In keeping with our heritage, we must pursue today's link technology for the entire naval establishment--and the Navy Marine Corps Intranet is it.

So the next time someone asks "Why NMCI?", tell them the answer is: "It's what we do."