The insertion of Marines into Afghanistan's Rigestan Desert last November from ships 441 miles away represents the new wave of amphibious warfare. The beach is no longer the objective. Instead, Marines, supported by devastating air power, will hit the enemy "where they ain't." Today, a force of self-sustaining U.S. Marines can land almost anywhere in the world from the sea and stay indefinitely.

The critics were in full bloom prior to U.S. forces going 11,000 miles to battle the al Qaeda terrorist network and its Taliban hosts. There were strong misgivings about Afghanistan's forbidding geography, the approach of winter, the unstable warring factions in Afghanistan, and the defeats suffered there in the past by both Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

"Afghanistan was one of our most severe access challenges," said Lt. Gen. Emil R. Bedard, deputy commandant for plans, policy, and operations at Marine headquarters (HQMC). "This was from the sea and beyond."

Landlocked Afghanistan represented an imposing obstacle to the Navy-Marine Corps team. With the nearest Taliban target 400 miles from the North Arabian Sea, few experts expected Marine boots to touch Afghan turf. The airlift task facing the Navy and Marine Corps was roughly equivalent to carrying troops from Boston, Mass., and landing and resupplying them in Washington, D.C.

"The land battle starts out at sea and goes inland 400 miles if we have to," Gen. James L. Jones told Sea Power in 1996, prior to becoming Marine commandant.

MEUs: "Being There"

Marine expeditionary units (MEUs) have practiced long-range inserts from Navy ships for years, using the Corps' "legacy" CH-53E Sea Stallion helicopters. Primarily a raiding force, a MEU can perform 20 to 30 special missions, many of them long-range. Since the Gulf War, MEUs have executed numerous rescue, humanitarian, and peacekeeping operations.

In a daring hush-hush mission in 1991, Marines launched from 500 miles at sea to evacuate threatened U.S. embassy personnel in Mogadishu, Somalia. In 1995, Marines conducted a classic TRAP (tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel) mission to rescue Air Force Capt. Scott F. O'Grady, who had been shot down in Bosnia, 90 miles from the U.S. amphibious ships operating in the Adriatic Sea. Navy and Marine officials later said the O'Grady rescue was possible only because "we were there"--i.e., forward-deployed and already in-theater.

The same reasoning already applied to Afghanistan--"If one wants to tango, it helps to be in the dance hall." Thanks to already being forward-

deployed aboard Navy ships, two MEUs, approximately 4,400 combat-ready Marines, were poised off Pakistan when Gen. Tommy R. Franks, commander of the U.S. Central Command, sent them into action.

"The Marine Corps was committed because we were there," said Brig. Gen. Robert C. Dickerson Jr., director of logistics, plans, and policies, and head of the Strategic Mobility Division at HQMC.

Navy amphibious ships today are able to take Marines to "any clime and place"--along with the MEU's vast stocks of equipment, vehicles, food, water, petroleum, ammunition, medical supplies, and spare parts.

Agility and Flexibility

Experts believe the demand for amphibious ships will increase in the years ahead. Assuming that other sovereign nations, even "friendly" nations, "will give you basing rights in the future is a bad assumption," said Col. Ronald J. Johnson, a current operations officer at HQMC.

Regional U.S. CINCs (commanders in chief) value the forward-deployed MEUs, but it is rare when two MEUs are able to link up in a combat theater, as they did last fall. The 15th MEU sailed from California on a Gulf deployment before 11 September. It arrived off Pakistan in October with its 2,200 Marines aboard the three ships of the USS Peleliu Amphibious Ready Group (ARG). The 26th MEU, sailing from North Carolina on a Mediterranean deployment days after the terrorist attack, was diverted through the Suez Canal and joined the 15th MEU in November.

Although motivating, the 11 September attack had zero impact on the planning and training of the Marines who fought in Afghanistan. The ARG ships were manned and stocked before the terrorists struck. Fortunately, Marines train the way they expect to fight. "People think we should operate differently since 11 September. We don't see it that way," said Bedard. "We have to be a very agile, flexible expeditionary force to react to any kind of contingency."

Marines operated in many areas and significantly influenced the action in Afghanistan during Phase One of the war against international terrorism. Following are some of the highlights:

U.S. Air War Begins

7 October 2001: The United States struck Afghanistan only 27 days after the attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center buildings. Two Marine F/A-18C Hornets from Marine Fighter-Attack Squadron 251 (VMFA-251), deployed aboard the nuclear- powered aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt, were part of a four-plane attack that launched the ship's participation in the air war.

Another Marine Hornet squadron, VMFA-314, deployed aboard the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis, also participated in the around-the-clock attacks. Franks said that 50 percent of the 20,000 U.S. sorties over Afghanistan were carrier-based.

Marines Move Into Pakistan

Also on 7 October, the 15th MEU secretly inserted 350 Marines and several helicopters to provide internal security for an airfield near Jacobabad in South Central Pakistan. Initially, Pakistani soldiers, who guarded the outer perimeter, quelled the civilian demonstrations against the U.S. presence. Although the protests subsided, the U.S. presence in Pakistan was still sensitive, forcing U.S. pilots to fly at night.

Jacobabad airfield served as the staging area for search-and-rescue missions in southern Afghanistan, and as a temporary base for the six workhorse Marine KC-130 Hercules refueling aircraft that supported the MEUs. Marines conducted a TRAP mission from Jacobabad to pull out an Army Special Operations Forces MH-60 helicopter and crew that had crashed not far from the Afghanistan/Pakistan border.

Marine Corps Harriers

The Marine Corps receives more and more of its punch and mobility from Marine air. All components of the Marine aviation community contributed to the successful outcome. The performance of the AV-8B Harriers is representative.

During a visit to the combat area in late October, Jones asked why the Marine Harriers weren't flying combat missions. They were quickly added to the daily air tasking order.

Each MEU launched up to two four-plane Harrier strikes a day. The pilots flew 300 to 500 miles one-way on "airborne alert close-air-support" missions that lasted from four to six hours or more. Circling at 30,000 feet in a "sanctuary" from enemy missiles, they conserved fuel until called on to bomb trench lines, buildings, and even convoys (of enemy Toyota SUVs). The Harriers fired mostly "dumb" or laser-guided 500-pound bombs.

"The pilots flew an exceptional [number] of hours," said Lt. Col. John Scott Walsh, a Harrier expert at HQMC. Last December, the MEUs' two six-plane Harrier detachments flew a total of 1,100 hours. On a six-month deployment, each detachment normally flies 700 hours. The Harriers operated primarily off the ARG flagships, but starting in late December were flying a number of missions from Kandahar airport.

Because of engine problems, there were no Harriers operating with the forward-deployed MEUs a year earlier. Last December, though, the Corps had four MEUs, at sea, with their Harriers, aboard the ARG ships. The engines ran well, and the Harrier readiness rates were high. "We are happy with the Harrier performance and with what's coming up," said Walsh. "Deploying Harriers now are equipped with the Litening II targeting pod, which gives them an advanced capability. In 2003, they will be receiving the JDAM [joint direct attack munition]."

A Marine Corps First

Vice Adm. Charles W. Moore Jr., then Fifth Fleet commander and commander of naval forces for the U.S. Central Command, formed an expeditionary task force for the two ARGs/MEUs operating in his theater. He named Brig. Gen. James N. Mattis the commander of Task Force 58. In that post, according to a USMC spokesman, Mattis became the first Marine to head two Navy ARGs. Mattis's assignment reflects the long awaited Navy-Marine "supported-supporting" doctrine that went into effect last year. When Marines sail on Navy ships, they support the Navy commander. The roles are reversed, though, when the Marines plan and conduct missions ashore. Mattis and his staff moved aboard the Peleliu last October and immediately started to plan the intricate landing of Marines in Afghanistan.

The Marines Have Landed

On 25 November 2001, Marines flew 441 miles at night to secure a desert airstrip and to establish forward operating base (FOB) Rhino, where Marines were in good position to influence events in Kandahar, then under Taliban control. "Nothing of this scale had been done before. We had no overland routes for resupply," said Johnson. "Marines have talked about ship-to-objective-maneuver the last few years. This is it."

Prior to the desert landing, the 15th MEU had pre-staged a reinforced rifle company in Jacobabad. The MEU's heavy equipment, including light armored vehicles (LAVs) and Humvees, were offloaded and staged at Pasni, a port in southern Pakistan. Senior officials say that Pakistan's support to the Navy and Marines cannot be overstated.

It took more than three hours for the six CH-53s, carrying a reinforced rifle company, to reach Rhino. They flew directly from the Peleliu and were refueled en route by Marine KC-130s. The AH-1W Super Cobra and UH-1N Huey helicopters accompanying them were refueled at Shamsi, also in Pakistan. Thirty minutes after Rhino was secured, four KC-130s landed on the dirt strip with the rifle company from Jacobabad, along with five interim fast-attack vehicles.

Although the well-planned maneuver was carried out flawlessly on that clear night, it was a risky operation. "We held our breath," Johnson recalls. "As you know, things can happen." To help minimize the possibility of some of those "things" actually happening, Navy SEAL (Sea, Air, Land) teams of special operations forces paved the way for the Marine landings at Kandahar by conducting covert reconnaissance missions several days in advance.

The Rhino Buildup

Once FOB Rhino was secured, a continual buildup of personnel and supplies took place, with the KC-130s and Air Force C-17s doing the heavy lifting. Rhino was the target of the highly publicized Ranger parachute mission in early October 2001. The Rangers departed soon after searching the area, though. When Franks later decided to put more pressure on the Taliban, he sent in the Marines.

The Marine Corps shapes its forces prior to each mission. Although leaving their tanks, amphibious tractors, and artillery tubes aboard ship (the artillery personnel were used as infantry), the Marines soon had a formidable force ashore with a high "tooth-to-tail" ratio. The small number of support personnel at Rhino, including women, also grabbed rifles when needed and helped man whatever positions needed reinforcement. Except for headquarters people, Marines lived in their foxholes. When visitors saw how the Marines lived, the Taliban and al Qaeda detainees (being held at Rhino and Kandahar) received less sympathy.

On the third day of Rhino operations, a USAF C-17, carrying 125 Navy Sea-bees and their heavy equipment, made the first combat landing ever on Rhino's dirt airstrip. "The Seabees had a critical mission in caring for the airfield surface," said Dickerson.

The brown hills, the weather, and the barren terrain all were similar to those at the Marine training base in Twenty-nine Palms, Calif., where warm days and chilly nights are the norm. The Rhino Marines will long remember the chocolate-colored desert dust that quickly climbed to a height of 50 feet when an aircraft would land, and then gradually settle on every building, vehicle, and human being in the area. The Corps is concerned about the long-term effect of the dust on Marine aircraft.

Beans, Bullets, and Band-Aids

Rhino was a "bare base" situation, meaning the Marines were forced to bring in (by air) everything they needed. With his sea base 441 miles away, Mattis wanted a heavy medical capability, including an extra shock trauma team. He built up a seven-day stockpile ashore that was constantly replenished (and later was repositioned to the Kandahar airport.) Prior to the start of Desert Storm the Corps had built up a similar but immensely larger six-month stockpile, which the troops called the "iron mountain." When the 120-hour ground campaign was over, the supplies were returned to CONUS.

The ability of Marines to sustain themselves ashore is a major bonus when a regional CINC needs combat-ready forces. Marines not only arrive in the combat theater with their own aircraft, they also can be sustained by their amphibious ships for at least 15 days.

"Marines could have stayed in Afghanistan indefinitely. We were tied in to many distribution pipelines," said Dickerson. "When Marines redeploy on the ships, we reconstitute their initial sustainment so they can perform another mission."

Unlike the Army, which has assigned much of its combat support structure to its Reserve components (or put it under contract), the Marines made a conscious decision to keep their combat support in the active forces. The active-duty Marine Corps, in fact, "owns" 33 percent of the Defense Department's active ground combat service support units.

The Marine Corps did not have to mobilize to go to Afghanistan, nor use its maritime prepositioning force (MPF). Each of its three MPF squadrons carries enough supplies and equipment to sustain 15,000 Marines for 30 days. "We support MEUs 10,000 miles away from their home ports. It's how we do business," said Dickerson. "If we see a critical need, we push it out there. If the MEU needs something, they reach back."

Task Force Sledgehammer

In early December, the Marines at Rhino were ordered to seal off Route 1, a beltway-type road that circles Afghanistan, to the west and south of Kandahar. At that time, one vehicle per minute was using the road. To carry out the mission, Task Force Sledgehammer--which consisted of 22 LAVs and heavily armored Humvees from the two MEUs--was formed.

Protected by Marine air, the task force moved about 90 miles from Rhino. The Marines established a well-guarded patrol base and at night sent out interdiction patrols in various directions. The media called them "hunter-killer" teams. After one engagement, when Marines destroyed seven enemy vehicles and killed 40 personnel, traffic virtually stopped on Route 1.

Kandahar Airfield Secured

On 20 December, Mattis was ordered to secure the Kandahar airport, ten miles southwest of that city. After coordinating his mission with the governor of Kandahar, he moved Task Force Sledgehammer to a position in close proximity to the anti-Taliban forces outside the city. Covered by friendly air, the Marines made a night mechanized movement through Kandahar and secured the airfield.

Up to that point, the 15th MEU had done most of the Corps' work ashore. Once the Marines were in Kandahar, the 26th MEU started arriving, via KC-130s, and took over the airstrip. The 15th MEU then closed Rhino and returned to its ships prepared to take on another mission. At peak strength, the Marines had about 2,200 people ashore.

Shortly before Christmas, 80 infantry Marines from the 26th MEU flew into Kabul to secure the U.S. embassy there. The embassy reopened shortly thereafter and is now guarded by 88 Marines from the Corps' new antiterrorist (AT) brigade--the AT brigade's first engagement since its formation last fall.

USMC and SOCOM

Last fall, Jones signed an agreement developed to bring the Marines and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) closer in their planning, doctrine, and field operations. "We will train, share ideas, and do things together," said Bedard.

The real-world relationship between SOCOM and the Marines began in Afghanistan. Before being relieved by the Army and redeploying to their ARG ships in February, the 26th MEU at Kandahar worked closely with U.S. special operations personnel in a support role. While a 25-Marine reaction force and a CH-53 stood by, 50 Marines accompanied special forces to the rugged Zhawar Kili cave complex in a planned 12-hour operation that actually took several days. The primary mission of the Marines was to provide security. "We will do more work in concert with the special operations community," Johnson predicted.

Bottom Line Summary

The operations in Afghanistan are guaranteed a special place in Marine Corps history as the Corps' first major combat mission of the 21st century. The performance of the two MEUs opened more than a few eyes, and--after promising new ships and weapons systems enter the Corps' hardware inventory later this decade--future Marines will be even better equipped and more mobile. Experts say that, if it had been available, the MV-22 tiltrotor Osprey could have accomplished twice the mission in Afghanistan in half the time. "We could have used the Osprey, or something like it," Franks said.

In retrospect, it seems that the Marines had been planning and training for years as if they knew Afghanistan was coming. "This is a piece of cake," said Lt. Gen. Gary S. McKissock, deputy commandant for installations and logistics, shortly after the Marines landed. "We do this all the time."