More than 50 years ago there was "a big debate" over the size of the defense budget "and the country concluded that we could not afford more than $15 billion. ... Six months later we had ... a $48 billion defense budget, and we could afford it ... because we were in the Korean War."

That is what Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld told the House Armed Services Committee in his 6 February testimony on President Bush's $379 billion fiscal year 2003 defense budget proposal. To put that total in perspective, Secretary Rumsfeld also pointed out to the committee that--thanks primarily to the astounding growth of the U.S. economy in the past two decades--the $379 billion requested amounts to only "about 3.3 percent" of the current U.S. gross national product (GNP). "In the Kennedy and Eisenhower years," he continued, the defense budget consumed about 10 percent of GNP, and in the middle 1970s it was "around 5 or 6 percent."

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Dov S. Zakheim provided additional perspective in a 14 February interview with the American Forces Information Service when he said that the "negative economic impact" of the 11 September terrorist attacks is now estimated at "three-quarters of a trillion dollars, and climbing." The FY 2002 and FY 2003 defense budgets combined are less than three-quarters of a trillion dollars.

All of which is relevant to this year's much quieter "debate" on Capitol Hill about the president's FY 2003 budget proposal. Mr. Bush has asked for the biggest increase in defense spending in the last 20 years. As commander in chief of the nation's armed forces he has displayed bold, decisive, and inspiring leadership. He and Secretary Rumsfeld have been both eloquent and tireless in articulating the need for a major buildup of the nation's defense capabilities to continue the war against international terrorism.

The president's short- and long-term defense budget plans, though, are out of step with, and lag far behind, the clear--indeed, compelling--rationale for the defense buildup that the commander in chief and his secretary of defense have provided to Congress and the American people. That rationale starts with the premise that protection of the U.S. homeland, and of U.S. forces overseas, must now and for the foreseeable future be this nation's highest defense priority. It recognizes that the war against international terrorism will be a long and costly one--but must nonetheless be pursued vigorously, with patience and with fortitude. It also postulates, honestly and with considerable political courage, that there is a high probability--verging on certainty, according to many experts in this field--of additional terrorist attacks that might well dwarf in scale the 11 September strikes against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The vast majority of the American people--80 percent or more--and almost all members of Congress accept this rationale, according to numerous polls and surveys, and stand solidly behind the president and the wartime policies he has enunciated.

Appropriately, the FY 2003 defense budget proposal gives the highest priority to current readiness--the personnel accounts, operations and maintenance, spare parts and consumables. But it shortchanges procurement and RDT&E (research, development, test, and evaluation), the budget categories that determine future readiness.

The biggest and most obvious shortfall is in procurement: $68.7 billion is requested in this account for FY 2003, or about 10 percent more than was appropriated for the current fiscal year. But the real need, for many years to come, is closer to $100 billion annually--for combat, combat support, and airlift aircraft for all of the nation's armed services; for Army and Marine Corps helicopters, ground vehicles, and weapon systems; and, the biggest deficit area, for Navy shipbuilding.

Here, the arithmetic is simple: The Navy needs an active fleet of 375 ships, which requires an annual building rate of 12 or 13 ships a year. Because of the extended "procurement holiday" of the 1990s it is now about 60 ships short of requirements. Instead of reversing course, though, the president's future-years defense plan (FYDP) calls for funding a total of only 24 new-construction ships over the next four years, only half of what is needed. This will make the deficit even worse, and validates a statement by Rep. Ike Skelton (D-Mo.) that continuing on the present course "will soon bring the United States of America to a 200-ship Navy." Moreover, because ships take anywhere from four to eight years to build, the problem will, almost inevitably, become exponentially more difficult to resolve in the outyears of the FYDP. Meanwhile, the relatively modern ships now in the fleet will be overworked, overcommitted, and more expensive both to operate and to maintain.

That is not good management, it is not good economics, it is not even good politics. And it runs directly counter to another statement made by Secretary Rumsfeld in his testimony: "The goal is to ... invest before the fact so we deter wars, so we can contribute to peace and stability, which underpins all of the things that we want as human beings for our families, for our jobs, for our opportunities, for freedom [emphasis added]."

In this Centennial Year of the Navy League our organization could have no goal more worthy or more noble than rebuilding all of the nation's armed services, specifically including the U.S. Coast Guard--and the U.S.-flag Merchant Marine--to the end strengths and force structures required not only to protect the U.S. homeland and U.S. forces overseas, but also, working with our friends and allies throughout the world, to support global peace and stability. I pledge to you to do all that is within my power to achieve that goal, and ask all NLUS councils, and all Navy League members, to join me in this effort.

Timothy O. Fanning, National President