"A Half-Century's Partnership"

Japan Maritime Self Defense Force's Enduring Relationship With the U.S. Navy

By TORU ISHIKAWA

Adm. Toru Ishikawa is chief of staff, Japan Maritime Self Defense Force.

The Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) celebrated its 50th anniversary on 26 April 2002. Its half century of operations has been a long journey--following a course sailing directly alongside the U.S. Navy. I would like to take this opportunity to salute this 50-year-long partnership and my good friends in the U.S. Navy. I also wish to express my appreciation to the U.S. Navy for its continuous support to the JMSDF.

Although Japan was completely disarmed at the end of World War II, the Self Defense Forces were established in 1952 as the result of several domestic and international developments--including the outbreak of the Cold War, the Korean War, and Japan's regained independence upon the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. This initial JMSDF consisted of approximately 6,000 personnel and a small number of ships, including four patrol frigates (PFs) and two landing craft (LSSLs) loaned by the U.S. Navy.

The Father of the JMSDF

Adm. Arleigh A. Burke, former chief of naval operations and then deputy chief of staff for U.S. Naval Forces Far East (who saw considerable combat as a destroyer squadron commander in the South Pacific during World War II), initially despised the Japanese people after the war, but he completely changed his view as a result of his association with former Imperial Japanese Navy officers when he was stationed in Japan as a member of the U.S. occupation forces.

Recognizing the importance of the relationship between Japan and the United States (in particular the Navy-to-Navy relationship), Burke gradually came to respect the Japanese. He saw the importance of creating a naval force for Japan's protection and homeland defense, and he took steps to establish the JMSDF.

For this reason, JMSDF personnel have always respected Adm. Burke as "the father of the JMSDF." When his body lay in state after his death, only a Japanese imperial decoration was displayed on his uniform-- in accordance with his last words. Clearly, the JMSDF was close to his heart, just as the JMSDF has worked closely with the U.S. Navy since its inception.

Since the establishment of the JMSDF, the defense of Japan has been, needless to say, the principal mission for the JMSDF. Because Japan is an island country, if a threat comes to Japan, it will certainly come from the sea. In addition, Japan is a maritime power in the democratic and free world--heavily dependent on sea trade for its existence and prosperity. These strategic circumstances explain why most Japanese policy makers have understood that defending Japan would be achieved by deterring or dispelling aggression and securing sea lines of communications (SLOCs).

However, the Korean War and many other global events revealed that Japan would not be able to stand by itself against possible threats posed by the mighty Soviet Union's Red Army and Navy. Tokyo clearly understood its only chance for national security would be through an alliance with a superpower that could stand against the Soviet Union. This decision was formalized in 1952 by the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

The Shield and Spear

During the Cold War, the Japan-U.S. alliance successfully contained the Soviet Union along the eastern shores of the Eurasian continent by maximizing the merits of Japan's geostrategic location, the presence of the U.S. armed forces, and the defense capability of Japan's Self Defense Forces.

The JMSDF, having no power-projection capability due to constitutional restrictions, played the role of "shield," whereas the U.S. Navy performed the role of "spear" with its strike capability of carrier battle groups. This effective role sharing between the two navies constituted a perfect deterrent. Both navies developed interoperability by conducting many combined exercises that provided them a high order of combined operational capabilities.

During the Cold War era, Japan's domestic political environment was often so unfavorable for its Self Defense Forces (SDF) that their continued existence under the constitution was seriously debated in the Diet. It was not easy for the SDF to acquire the necessary funding for modernization programs. Despite these circumstances, however, the JMSDF made efforts to develop its force levels steadily, eventually reaching its current size numbering approximately 50 modern destroyers (including four Aegis-class guided-missile ships), 16 conventionally powered submarines, and an antisubmarine air fleet of 80 P-3C Orion aircraft and 90 antisubmarine warfare (ASW) helicopters.

In order to operate these assets, the JMSDF has developed its organization into two major components. One, the Self Defense Fleet, is composed of key units such as the Fleet Escort Force (surface ships), the Fleet Air Force (including both fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft), and the Fleet Submarine Force. The Self Defense Fleet is responsible for the defense of the sea areas around Japan (including SLOCs). This mission is accomplished primarily through mobile operations.

The other main JMSDF grouping consists of five Regional Districts that primarily guard their assigned areas of operations and provide both operational and logistic support to the Self Defense Fleet. The combination of the Self Defense Fleet and the Regional Districts has provided the U.S. Navy considerable operational assistance, especially in the ASW arena and logistic support in the western reaches of the Pacific theater near Japan.

Historic Operations

During the Cold War, this highly capable maritime force controlled the strategically important Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima international straits and protected SLOCs, assuring continued deployments of U.S. carrier battle groups in the region in the event of a crisis or contingency. This is a good example of the JMSDF contribution to the successful strategy of containment and support of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy.

However, the end of the Cold War brought the SDF new challenges, and Japan's defense planners understood that they needed capabilities for both "war fighting" and "maritime operations other than war" (MOOTW) to meet them. Shifts in Japan's public opinion also led to new roles for the SDF, since the Japanese people understood the SDF's versatile capability also should contribute to responses to large-scale disasters and other crises, just as they would continue to contribute to the regional and global stability that is essential for free sea trade.

The first hurdle for providing the security of Japan in the post-Cold War era was the Persian Gulf War. Although Japan contributed $130 billion ($100 per capita) to the war effort, it was criticized in some quarters of the coalition for its "too little and too late" reaction.

During the Gulf War, the government of Japan also deployed minesweeper forces to eliminate mines in the Gulf--a not inconsiderable operation given the domestic legal and political constraints at the time. Although the JMSDF had deployed training squadron to many places in the world since the 1950s, it had no experience operating in the Persian Gulf region. Furthermore, JMSDF minesweeper forces, although highly capable, had never deployed overseas beyond Japan's home waters. The cruise from Japan to the Persian Gulf was a very difficult undertaking for 500-ton minesweepers.

Fortunately, the U.S. Navy provided full-scale support to the JMSDF ranging from intelligence and logistics assistance to essential on-scene operational planning. This support enabled the JMSDF to successfully accomplish its mission. The minesweeping operation also was historic in that it led to the beginning of the Self Defense Forces' work to shape the peace and secure stability in the 1990s, including participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations.

The Global War on Terrorism

Ten years later, on the occasion of al Qaeda's 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi promptly decided to dispatch JMSDF ships to the Indian Ocean. The Japanese Diet enacted a new law to enable these ships to provide logistic support to coalition maritime forces conducting Operation Enduring Freedom. Since December 2001, a JMSDF task force, including two fast combat-support ships (AOEs), has been deployed in the Northern Arabian Sea and provided roughly 40 percent of the fuel that has been consumed by U.S. naval forces in the area. How could Burke, 50 years ago, imagine that the JMSDF and the U.S. Navy would cope in tandem with the global threat of international terrorism?

In the future, the Japan-U.S. alliance will be more important in the common quest to maintain peace and stability--not only in the Asia-Pacific region, but also in the global arena. Naval forces, in particular, can stand as a firm foundation in the face of unstable and unpredictable strategic circumstances. Therefore, further efforts will be needed to enhance the credibility of the alliance, and close security cooperation between our two countries should be maintained even under normal circumstances.

In addition, the JMSDF must meet new challenges for its future defense buildup. The SDF is executing a phased transformation in accordance with the National Defense Program Outline adopted in 1995. Under this program, the JMSDF continues to build more streamlined, effective, and compact defense forces so that it will be able to contribute to regional and global security issues with steady improvements in warfighting technologies, such as network-centric warfare.

This challenge of modernizing its inventory is real for the JMSDF given the considerable budget restraints it faces, but it must be overcome if the JMSDF is to maintain effective defense capabilities in the future. These efforts also will require collaboration with the United States in many respects. For instance, given the concern about the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction in the Pacific Northwest region, ballistic missile defense (BMD) has become an important issue in Japan's defense policy. For this reason, the study and research associated with the BMD program are good examples of the healthy state of collaboration between Japan and the United States. Japan has actively participated in the BMD research program and made extensive contributions.

As I reflect on the past 50 years, I am impressed by how the JMSDF and the U.S. Navy have cooperated hand in hand as a cornerstone of the Japan-U.S. alliance--an alliance that successive U.S. presidents have called "the most important bilateral relationship" maintained by the United States. While the nature of the military threat has changed from the days of the Cold War to the new Global War on Terrorism, I am firmly determined that on the occasion of our 50th anniversary we will sustain our JMSDF inheritance--a 50-year partnership with the U.S. Navy--well into the next half-century. *