A New Naval/Military Model for the 21st Century

Sea-Based Forces and Military Transformation

By ROBBIN LAIRD and SCOTT C. TRUVER

Dr. Robbin Laird is the senior advisor for international security programs at Anteon Corporation's Center for Security Strategies and Operations (CSSO); Dr. Scott C. Truver directs the CSSO and is Anteon's group vice president, National Security Studies.

The Bush administration has developed the term "military transformation" to describe its approach to changing the U.S. defense strategy and force structure. The previous term favored, "Revolution in Military Affairs" or "RMA," which earlier administrations had borrowed from the former Soviet Union to reflect fundamental changes in the way future wars would be fought, suddenly became obsolete.

The baseline definition of transformation introduced in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) called for "rapidly deployable modular forces capable of networked, scalable, distributed, seamlessly joint and combined operations, able to defeat adversaries using anti-access, area-denial, and asymmetric capabilities." Clearly, one of the administration's principal goals has been to persuade (or force) the nation's armed services to shift from a single-service focus on military platforms and to think instead of operations in joint and combined settings with networked capabilities.

This dramatic change has generated a great deal of interest throughout all of the U.S. armed services--including the Coast Guard as it plans for its anticipated move from the Department of Transportation to a new Homeland Security Department. But it particularly resonates with, and within, the Navy and has fundamentally shaped what Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Vern Clark has termed Sea Power 21. Under his vision of "operational concepts for a new era," first publicly announced at the Naval War College's June 2002 Current Strategy Forum, the Navy will focus on three fundamental capabilities: Sea Strike, "the ability to project offensive power"; Sea Shield, "the ability to project defensive power"; and Sea Basing, "the ability to project the sovereignty of the United States and to team with and provide enhanced support for joint forces, afloat and ashore, around the world."

All of America's armed forces have embraced transformation­­albeit with varying degrees of ardor (or skepticism). But the outlines of a transformational new global military model now starting to take shape underscore the asymmetrical advantages offered by sea-based forces. Indeed, as Lt. Gen. Edward Hanlon Jr. (commanding general of the Marine Corps' Combat Development Command) and Vice Adm. Dennis V. McGinn (former deputy chief of naval operations for warfare requirements and programs) explained, in an article in the October 2002 issue of Sea Power, "A broad spectrum of technological advances and innovations has set the stage for unprecedented increases in the precision, operational reach, connectivity, and speed of decision of 21st-century sea-based forces and weapons."

A Test Bed of Change

The Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) campaign in Afghanistan served as an early test bed for transformation. The use of sea-based forces in the earliest phases of and throughout the campaign to generate strategic and tactical strikes against al Qaeda terrorists and their Taliban co-conspirators was closely correlated with U.S. Air Force assets. From their "sea bases" in the northern Arabian Sea, U.S. Navy and Marine Corps tactical aircraft flew approximately 72 percent of all of the U.S. tactical sorties flown through the end of 2001, and naval forces accounted for more than half of all of the precision weapons employed by U.S. forces.

As bases were established around Afghanistan, land-based air and ground forces could play a more dominant role; nonetheless, the Navy and Marine Corps remained on-scene. U.S. Special Forces were able to operate freely throughout Afghanistan in large part because of the assistance provided by naval and air strike forces. Instead of its normal strike air wing, the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk embarked contingents of Air Force and Army special operations forces that helped prepare the Afghan battlefield for the later introduction of regular forces.

The services also integrated new approaches to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)--not only into special-force operations, but also into the tactical aircraft strikes launched from ships at sea. "Fully 80 percent of Navy strike sorties attacked targets that were unknown to the aircrews when they left the carrier," Clark pointed out in his Naval War College speech. "They relied upon networked sensors and joint communications to swiftly respond to targets of opportunity. This was a planned warfighting approach. As a result of this impressive capability, over 90 percent of the ordnance dropped ... [was] precision-guided--a dramatic change from Desert Storm just a decade earlier."

U.S. Marine Corps units also were able to operate deep inside Afghanistan, thanks to the Corps' previous preparation for expeditionary maneuver warfare and its traditional mindset for innovative operations. The Marine Corps employed older so-called "legacy" equipment to support its new sea-based-maneuver operations. Such experimentation was the order of the day in Afghanistan, and serves as a model for future transformation efforts. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld's invocation of the image of a 21st-century warrior operating on horseback had the Marine Corps and other U.S. special forces in mind.

Relevant Questions

But the term transformation confuses as well as clarifies. What aids transformation and what does not? What is transformational and what is not? Each service is struggling to define its approach to modernization as transformational in character. Meanwhile, Rumsfeld has established a new Office of Defense Transformation, led by retired Vice Adm. Arthur K. Cebrowski, to help channel their efforts.

Notably, and regrettably, the approach to global allies too often is ignored in considering transformed joint and combined operations. Changes that enhance U.S. capabilities, while collectively reducing the ability of the United States to operate worldwide with its allies, would be shortsighted, though. As Vice Adm. James C. Dawson Jr., commander, U.S. Second Fleet/NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic, wrote, "In today's increasingly complex world it is not good enough that we know how to work well with our sister services. The U.S. Navy must also be prepared to routinely operate alongside its coalition partners."

In effect, transformation is really about the development of a new global military model for the United States. This model is designed for global power projection, with a premium on evolving to a leaner, more flexible and agile, global insertion force. Among the key building blocks for a new global military model are the following:

* Crisis management and anti-terrorism efforts;

* The development of global logistics support;

* The development of global information-technology capabilities;

* Global "weaponization"--i.e., the ability to resupply forces worldwide through a coalition of U.S. and allied defense industrial firms and depots;

* Interoperability across U.S. forces and with allies and coalition partners;

* "Plug-and-Play" forces that can be used for strategic insertion on a global basis;

* Space-enablers for joint forces;

* ISR focused primarily on supporting the warfighter;

* An active defense to protect the insertion of forces;

* Strategic mobility to support the movement of Army and Marine Corps forces; and

* An expeditionary mindset and focus.

Networks and Constellations

In the last few years, the U.S. mission focus has shifted from a relatively stable and known adversary, as in the days of the Cold War, to unknown adversaries operating in diverse and sometimes unfamiliar geopolitical settings. As a result, the U.S. military has to be prepared to operate against sundry adversaries threatening U.S. national security virtually anywhere in the world. Forces need to be designed, sized, equipped, and trained to operate in a variety of geopolitical situations against a wide range of potential enemies, often­­but not always­­in concert with friends and allies. Innovation and experimentation are thus crucial to work in new settings and against variable constellations of adversaries operating in terror networks.

Hence the CNO's emphasis on "Sea Trial" as one of the cornerstones for breathing life into the Sea Power 21 operational concept: "We are talking about new force-packaging concepts ... so that we can distribute combat power over a wider number of places around the world where it is necessary for the Navy to represent the vital interests of this nation."

Because U.S. forces are operating on a flexible basis worldwide, there is a critical need to be able to support these forces in new settings, to ensure that persistent presence and power can be applied. Accordingly, a premium also is being placed on new logistics and information support structures as well as an ability to supply those forces with weapons on a worldwide basis. For example, a key aspect of change associated with the introduction of the Joint Strike Fighter is its ability to operate across the services and with key allies possessing the same logistics, weapons, and information support systems.

The United States cannot be certain it will always have the time needed to move supplies to the action; the goal, therefore, is to operate where necessary and to support as needed. The greater the U.S.-coalition interoperability­­in warfighting as well as support­­the better the chances for mission success.

A Premium on Interoperability

Strategic insertion forces require an ability to innovate and experiment. To mix local and global forces to achieve strategic objectives will require an ability to "plug and play" among forces. Interoperability for joint and combined operations is a means to this end, and the establishment of a new program office for Naval Open Architecture at the Naval Sea Systems Command is an important element in moving toward Navywide, and ultimately joint and combined, interoperability.

For strategic insertion forces to be effective, the Pentagon is enhancing its ability to support the warfighter from space. The new space-warfare structures are designed to focus upon the development and deployment of ISR systems that would enable the warfighter to operate worldwide against a variety of adversaries without predetermined and prepositioned forces.

Active defense is viewed as increasingly critical to the defense of the homeland and to ensure the effective operation of strategic forces operating in tactical settings. The CNO's emphasis upon Sea Shield as a key component of sea-based operations is a case in point. Strategic mobility is a prerequisite for future U.S. naval/military operations. Without active theater- and global-level defenses, adversaries will be able to carry out anti-access strategies against U.S. and coalition insertion forces.

In the wake of the first two QDRs, two different approaches to the new global military model are becoming evident. In effect, they pose an Air Force-centric model against a Navy-Marine Corps-Army approach­­although leaders of all four services would disavow such a competition between land-based strategic air power and aircraft carrier-centric naval forces.

Global Reconnaissance Strike

The Air Force approach focuses upon an ability to use strategically situated land bases to project power. Space-enablers and ISR assets would be provided by the Air Force to ground forces operating globally. Through tactical and strategic means, the Air Force would support U.S. ground assets.

This view--fully considered in the 2001 QDR debates and subsequent discussions on transformation--relies on the use of new tactical fighters (the F-22 and, to a lesser extent, the Joint Strike Fighter) operating with B-2 bombers in a "system-of-systems" environment to dominate adversaries on a strategic basis.

The F-22 is essential to ensure air superiority against the capabilities of adversarial air and ground-to-air forces. The F-35 JSF would be able to operate globally with the Air Force's strategic bombers in support of ground operations. Those forces would be supported from space by both manned and unmanned ISR assets in all theaters of operations.

But at the core of this approach there would still be a need to operate from air bases in certain theaters of operation. Although initial strikes by strategic bombers based in the continental United States are possible, persistent and sustained operations in support of U.S. ground forces overseas would require tactical forces operating from bases in or close to the combat theater­­despite the numerous political and operational uncertainties that such "entangling alliances" might entail.

Political Variables

The sea-based option starts with the assumption that land bases are likely to be a variable, not a given, in the 21st century. Even if land bases might theoretically be available through agreements with allies and friends, in times of crisis the use of such bases by U.S. forces still might not be granted--as evidenced by the concern about the availability of bases in Saudi Arabia during the preparation for "regime-change" operations against Iraq.

In the Defense Planning Guidance debate last summer, one of the key issues focused on presence vs. access. If presence is guaranteed, the United States can secure bases ahead of time and move equipment and material into place for later action. If assured access is the issue, the United States must be able, on a case-by-case basis, to insert forces and move in its sea-based support forces for ensuing operations.

Sea-based forces can provide the support needed for strike and expeditionary ground forces across a range of networked platforms that can operate on a sustained and persistent basis without being tied to local infrastructures. The Navy-Marine Corps support provided for Operation Enduring Freedom missions underscored the flexibility, adaptability, effectiveness, and persistence of today's legacy systems, particularly sea-based aviation.

As the Joint Strike Fighter and long-range unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs)­­among other advanced platforms and systems­­become available in the not-too-distant future, the ability of sea-based forces to operate more efficiently at greater distances, and for longer periods of time, will be dramatically increased. Those capabilities, more than anything else, represent the essence of the Navy's Sea Power 21 vision.

The changing approach of the U.S. Army to its future­­the Objective Force and Future Combat Systems­­fits well into the sea-based Navy/Marine Corps concept. Although the Army and Marine Corps still need to sort out their respective missions in the new global model of expeditionary warfare, both will have to be able to operate from the sea without the guaranteed availability of land-based logistical support.

The decision of the Bush administration to cancel the Crusader artillery system was rooted in the system's likely inability to move quickly into theater operations. It was judged as too big, and its logistics tail too long, for use in sustained, rapid, flexible operations.

At the same time, the administration has supported a new Defense Advanced Research Project Agency initiative­­Future Combat Systems­­designed to provide networked ground-strike forces, possessing both strategic and operational flexibility, that could be inserted rapidly into future areas of crisis.

A Three-Step Transition

The planned Army transition is from today's legacy force (heavy and slow) to an interim force (light and deployable) to the notional 2030 "Objective Force 21"--which will be flexible, agile, integrated, and sustainable. The legacy force is built around heavy armor (60-70 tons, 650 cubic feet, and quickly transportable only by a large C-5 or C-17 strategic airlift aircraft) to lighter armor (20 tons, 300 cubic feet, and capable of being carried by a smaller C-130 transport aircraft). Objective Force 21 will be able to be integrated into either the air-based or the sea-based force approach to 21st-century combat operations. But maximum operational flexibility probably could be achieved more easily through links to innovations in joint and combined basing at sea.

Despite the promise and potential of airborne and spaceborne systems, the United States will not be able to meet its political-military objectives without ground forces able to dominate in local theaters of operation. There is a danger that the well-publicized successes of U.S. air power during the past decade will be confused with the sum and substance of an overall future military strategy. This is why the priority on ground forces that can be quickly inserted--then sustained with sea or air support--must be maintained.

For the president and his key national security advisors, it is important to be able to pursue any of several possible combat options in different settings and circumstances. Nonetheless, the danger of relying on access to overseas bases will continue and probably worsen. Only sea-based forces can effectively provide persistent, effective, and operationally and politically unencumbered alternatives to land-based forces and defeat the anti-access and denial efforts of regional adversaries.

As President Bush stated at West Point in June 2002, "Our security will require transforming the military ... [to] be ready to strike at a moment's notice in any dark corner of the world." Working hand-in-glove with all other joint forces, as well as with U.S. friends and allies worldwide, the 21st-century Navy that evolves from the Sea Power 21 vision may well become the new global military model for the United States.*