Congress, President Face a Year of Decision In National Security and Homeland Defense

By JAMES D. HESSMAN, Editor in Chief

He said that the nation's "first goal" is to create and maintain an economy "that grows fast enough to employ every man and woman who seeks a job." But President George W. Bush devoted most of his 28 January State of the Union address to an impassioned discussion of international terrorism, homeland security, and a broad spectrum of national-defense and foreign-policy issues that his administration and the Congress must deal with both this year and next.

The most important and most obvious short-term issue is Iraq. Despite the lack of a "smoking gun," all evidence suggests that Saddam Hussein already possesses at least some nuclear, biological, and/or chemical weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and is seeking to build or buy more. He has used chemical weapons in the past, both against Iran and against his own people and undoubtedly would be willing to use them again. President Bush has gone to the United Nations and to the U.S. Congress to seek international support and legislative approval for military action if Iraq does not disarm. Despite some backsliding and some equivocating--on the part of certain U.N. member nations and a few American lawmakers--it seemed certain at the end of January that a second Gulf War is inevitable.

This time the goal would not be as finite, as straightforward, or as easy to accomplish as the goal set in 1991: expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait. President Bush and all of his key advisors have made clear--in statement after statement, interview after interview, speech after speech--that the task should not and would not be considered completed until: (1) Iraq has been disarmed, and all of its WMDs have been destroyed; and (2) There is a regime change in Baghdad.
Would there be U.S. and allied casualties? Probably, and perhaps on a scale much larger than in 1991. Would Saddam Hussein use nuclear, biological, and/or chemical weapons? Possibly--but the U.S. and allied response would be both immediate and devastating, and there would be absolutely no safe haven thereafter, anywhere in the world, for Saddam Hussein, his family, and his key advisors.

The fact that--after months of delay, procrastination, and prevarication--Saddam Hussein would still be permitted to go into voluntary exile is, in fact, probably the last, best, and only hope of avoiding armed conflict--and, in all probability, the stationing in Baghdad and elsewhere throughout Iraq a relatively large U.N. peacekeeping force.
President Bush mentioned Iran and North Korea--the other two member nations of the "axis of evil"--only briefly in his State of the Union speech. About Iran, he said, "We see a government that represses its people, pursues weapons of mass destruction, and supports terror." North Korea, the president said, is yet another "oppressive regime" that, throughout the 1990s, was "deceiving the world" and developing weapons of mass destruction--and is now using those weapons "to incite fear and seek [economic and other] concessions."

Several members of Congress, and a number of independent defense analysts, have argued that North Korea and Iran are at least as dangerous in the long term as Iraq, and ask why the threat to U.S. interests, and to global stability, posed by those two nations should be so consistently ignored. The answer, not always clearly or fully enunciated, seems to be that the administration understandably prefers to deal with only one major international crisis or potential conflict at a time.

North Korea, although ruled by an intemperate despot capable of the most heinous crimes against his neighbors as well as his own people, is virtually isolated and much more of a regional than a global threat. Iran, which has been a state sponsor of terrorism for many years, has been seeking to develop or build its own nuclear weapons and has been both building and testing long-range missiles as well. But Iran's theocratic leadership is slightly more temperate than it was in the past, and Tehran's political focus in recent years has been much more internal than extraterritorial.

Iraq is, in short, the most obviously clear and present danger now facing the United States and its allies. That danger is not only military and political but also economic, because Iraq's dominance over the other nations of the Middle East would give Saddam Hussein virtual control over much of the world's oil supplies. (With some rationing, perhaps, and relatively modest changes in consumption, the United States could be self-sufficient in oil. The economies of Japan and the nations of Central and Western Europe are all almost completely dependent on foreign oil, though--almost all of it from the Middle East.)

There is another obvious reason why Iraq ranks as World Enemy Number One on the Bush administration's list of hostile states: It is one of the seven leading countries on the State Department's list of nations that harbor and/or otherwise provide support for terrorists and terrorist organizations. The others, listed in alphabetical order, are Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. Except for Iran, all are ruled by leaders who are much more pragmatic and self-serving than the politically or religiously motivated terrorist groups they support. In that context, it seems clear that an overthrow of Saddam Hussein's criminal regime would not be, as some critics have alleged, a diversion of resources from the global war on terrorism but, rather, a continuation of that war.

It may be, of course, that a forced change of regime in Iraq would create more anti-American resentment on the Arab "street." Just as credible a case could be made, though, that Saddam's overthrow would be viewed, eventually if not immediately, in the context of the principal result it would achieve: the liberation of the Iraqi people.
Despite certain philosophical and political differences, the administration and Congress start the year united in several respects: Both agree that the war against international terrorism must be pursued relentlessly for many years to come, that security of the U.S. homeland, formerly taken for granted, is now quite possibly the nation's highest economic and political priority, and--for precisely that reason--major additional increases in defense spending will be necessary for at least the next several years.

All of which makes 2003 probably the most important "year of decision" the United States has faced since the end of the Cold War--and, perhaps, since the end of World War II. The budget decisions made this year will put numerous new national-defense and homeland-security programs in place, move the nation half a league closer to a true wartime footing, and signal friends and foes alike that the nation's political leadership, and the American people as a whole, are in the war "for the duration."

Homeland security and national defense are joined by birth. Until the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center towers, the U.S. homeland seemed to be, and usually was, almost invulnerable to attack by foreign enemies. Soviet submarines certainly posed a viable threat during the Cold War, but two vast oceans protected the U.S. mainland from any other military attacks.

That situation has now changed--dramatically. Every U.S. port and harbor is now vulnerable. So are the nation's inland waterways, U.S. airports, and the remainder of the nation's transportation infrastructure. Bridges, tunnels, dams, high-rise office and apartment buildings, power plants, factories, and naval and military bases all are potential targets for terrorists. Gov. Tom Ridge, confirmed last month as the first secretary of the new Department of Homeland Security, said that the President planned to request more than $41 billion for homeland security in his fiscal year 2004 budget plan, including $36 billion for DHS, and about $5 billion for homeland-defense operations and activities of other departments. Those sums are substantial--but may represent, in President Bush's words, only "a good start."

It used to be said that U.S. domestic politics "stops at the water's edge." The new axiom is that homeland defense starts overseas--as was robustly demonstrated in Afghanistan in Phase One of the war against terrorism. The Taliban are no longer in power in Kabul, and many of the al Qaeda leaders have been killed or captured, or are in hiding.
Again, that is no more than a good start. Al Qaeda still operates in more than 60 countries around the world, and--as the 9/11 attacks demonstrated--it takes only a handful of terrorists to wreak absolute havoc on a city or a nation. The U.S. Coast Guard moved front and center on Day One of the war against terrorism, protecting New York City and other major metropolitan areas from additional attacks.

The nation's other armed services took the initiative immediately thereafter, preparing and executing the highly effective joint and multinational operations in Afghanistan, launching precision, lethal, and exceptionally well coordinated strikes from the air, from the sea, and on the land. There were certain communications difficulties and some technological problems, but not many--and few of any lasting duration. The second war against Iraq, if and when it starts, will be even more devastating, waged at a much higher tempo, and, if all goes well, less likely to result in civilian casualties.

To achieve such results in Iraq, though, or in later phases of the war on terrorism, requires additional funding for combat readiness, for personnel, for spare parts and the quick replenishment of weapons inventories, for airlift and sealift, and for the advanced technologies needed for the continued "transformation" of the U.S. military.

Early reports suggest that some but by no means all of that additional funding will be included in the President's FY 2004 defense budget request and future-years defense plan (FYDP). How, and how much, the FY 2004 budget, and the FYDP, will be changed by Congress this year is uncertain. It seems almost inevitable, though, that at least some changes will be made--and probably for the better. The members of Congress--particularly those serving on the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and Defense Appropriations Subcommittees--take very seriously the Constitutional obligation they share with the commander in chief: To provide for the common defense. *

"This Legislation Is Essential"-- Davis Bill Seeks 375-Ship Fleet

Rep. Jo Ann Davis (R-Va.) has reintroduced legislation that, if approved by Congress and fully implemented by the Bush and future administrations, would rebuild the U.S. Navy to an active fleet of "at least" 375 ships and give the United States and its allies the power-projection capabilities needed "to ensure peace through strength ... throughout the 21st century."

Citing what she described as "the urgent need to increase our current naval force structure," Davis said that her bill (HR 375--The National Naval Force Structure Policy Act) already has been endorsed by several shipbuilding and labor groups, and has received strong support from many members of Congress as well.

HR 375 "would put in place specific parameters to rebuild our naval forces," Davis said, and--in terms of ship numbers--"would require the U.S. Navy to have no fewer than 375 vessels in active service, including 15 aircraft carrier battle groups [CVBGs] and 15 amphibious ready groups [ARGs]."

Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Vern Clark told Sea Power last year that he believes a fleet of 375 ships is needed for the Navy to carry out all of the requirements imposed on it by the commander in chief and the unified commanders. The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have validated the 15 CVBG and 15 ARG numbers several times in their testimony before Congress.

To build and sustain a fleet of 375 ships, Clark also said, would require a building rate of approximately 11 ships per year for the foreseeable future. Last year, the Bush administration requested funding for only five new-construction ships. That level is less than half what the Navy needs, warned Cynthia L. Brown, president of the American Shipbuilding Association, and if continued for several more years would "perpetuate" the decline of the fleet--to only about 200 ships, if not fewer.

The administration's future-years defense plan (FYDP) projects an increase in ship-construction numbers in the outyears of the FYDP. However, as Ronald O'Rourke of the Congressional Research Service pointed out, Congress has seen "that sort of 'get well' [numbers] in the final years [of previous FYDPs] before, and ... [they] have not materialized. When I see plans like that I am reminded of what a member of Congress said a year or two ago: 'I have never lived in an outyear.'"

Achieving a significant increase in the FY 2004 SCN (shipbuilding and conversion, Navy) account will be extremely difficult, if only because there are so many other defense and domestic budget priorities that must be satisfied. Nonetheless, Davis and other supporters of HR 375 have several substantive arguments on their side that might well persuade other members of Congress that the Navy's real need is probably closer to 400 ships than 375, and that any additional extension of the so-called "procurement holiday" that began during the Clinton presidency poses a clear and present danger to the U.S. homeland and to the American people.

The first and most obvious argument is that a forward-deployed Navy is probably the best deterrent to international terrorism, both at home and overseas. The war on global terrorism, President Bush has said many times, is an open-ended one that will continue for many years, and perhaps decades.

The second argument is both political and practical. As has been demonstrated by the reluctance of several longtime U.S. allies (e.g., France, Germany, and Turkey) to join in--during the initial stages, at least--the buildup for a possible war with Iraq, the United States can no longer take for granted that air and ground bases will be available overseas for U.S. forces in future times of conflict. In many areas of the world, therefore, forward-deployed Navy CVBGs and Navy/Marine Corps ARGs would be not only the closest but also the only combat-ready forces immediately available to the commander in chief.

There are several additional arguments favoring major increases in SCN funding--starting this year, and continuing for the foreseeable future: (1) the probable need, within the next decade and perhaps earlier, for the Sea-Basing of U.S. forces in international waters inaccessible to terrorists; (2) the potential use of the Navy's Aegis air-defense cruisers and destroyers as the foundation of the sea-based segment of the National Missile Defense system that is a high priority of the Bush administration; and (3) the flexibility offered by dual-use "National Fleet" ships that could be used either by the Coast Guard to carry out its high-priority homeland-defense missions or, in future times of conflict, by the Navy to augment the naval forces already deployed overseas.

Correction: Because of a printer's error affecting a large number of copies of the 2003 Almanac of Seapower, a photo of former Secretary of the Navy Gordon R. England was substituted for a photo of Charles L. Robinson, national executive director of the Navy League, in the Navy League section of the Almanac. Apologies are hereby extended to both of these gentlemen.

Note: A full report on the FY 2004 defense budget will be included in the March issue of Sea Power. Also scheduled for that issue are an interview with Transportation Security Administrator James M. Loy (former commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard) and related articles on homeland security.