| To Dissuade,
Deter, and Defeat
U.S. Naval Power in the 21st Century
By SCOTT C. TRUVER
Dr. Scott C. Truver is Group Vice President, National Security Programs,
Anteon Corporation, Arlington, Va.
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Vern Clark has articulated a compelling
vision for the U.S. Navy. His Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive Joint
Capabilities, released in October 2002, explains how sea-based operations
will use "revolutionary information superiority and dispersed networked
force capabilities to deliver unprecedented offensive power, defensive
assurance, and operational independence to joint force commanders."
The Sea Power 21 vision already is serving as a roadmap for the Navy's
future programs, plans, and operations--and, together with Marine Corps
Strategy 21, is the foundation for Naval Power 21 ... A Naval Vision,
released by then-Secretary of the Navy Gordon R. England prior to his
nomination to be deputy secretary of the new Department of Homeland Security
(DHS).
In Clark's calculus, "Future naval operations will use revolutionary
information superiority and dispersed, networked force capabilities to
deliver unprecedented offensive power, defensive assurance, and operational
independence to joint force commanders. Our Navy and its partners,"
he continued, "will dominate the continuum of warfare from the maritime
domain--deterring forward in peacetime, responding to crises, and fighting
and winning wars."
Spurred on by the administration's quest for far-reaching defense transformation,
the goal of Sea Power 21 is to employ current capabilities in new ways,
introduce innovative capabilities as quickly as possible, and achieve
unprecedented maritime power. "We need to change not only the capabilities
at our disposal," Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld said at
the National Defense University last January, "but also how we think
about war. All of the high-tech weapons in the world will not transform
the way we think, the way we train, the way we exercise, and the way we
fight." Clark clearly intends Sea Power 21 to serve as the Navy's
transformation-engine to a new way of conducting warfare from the sea.
Along with transformation, two other catalysts stimulated the Navy's
thinking, according to a senior naval officer linked to the development
of the Sea Power 21 White Paper. "The need to recapitalize the forceto
replace late Cold-War assets with technologies, systems, and platforms
attuned to 21st-century operational needs, while at the same time focusing
on near-term readinesswas a requirement that we continually
had in mind," he said in late December. "Also, the terrorist
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon woke us up to the reality
of 21st-century threats and the immediate need to protect the homeland
in ways that we had not previously understood. ...
"Coupled with transformation," he said, "readiness and
homeland defense/homeland security sharply focused our efforts."
Much is riding on the ability of the Navy to make its vision real, as
the CNO's Guidance for 2003 makes clear. "Winning the Global War
on Terrorism [GWOT] is our number-one priority," Clark emphasized
in his 2003 "Sailing Directions" for the Navy. "This will
not be quick or easy, but victory is our goal and it will be achieved.
Our Navy will play a leading role in this historic struggle by contributing
precise, persistent, and responsive striking power to the joint force,
strengthening deterrence with advanced defensive technologies, and increasing
operational independence through Sea Basing. This is the Sea Power 21
vision."
Sea Strike Defined
The draft Navy-Marine Corps Naval Operating Concept succinctly notes
that "Sea Strike" is a broadened concept for naval power projection,
and the CNO's 2003 Guidance specifically identifies "precise, persistent,
and responsive striking power" as key to the Navy's contribution
both to the GWOT and to future operations. "Projecting decisive combat
power has been critical to every commander who ever went into battle,"
Clark said in Sea Power 21, "and this will remain true in decades
ahead. Sea Strike operations are how the 21st-century Navy will exert
direct, decisive, and sustained influence in joint campaigns. Those operations,"
he continued, "will involve the dynamic application of persistent
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; time-sensitive strike;
ship-to-objective maneuver; information operations; and covert strike
to deliver devastating power and accuracy in future campaigns." Sea
Strike is--along with Sea Shield and Sea Basing--clearly one of the keys
to the Navy's success in its 21st-century operations.
Information-gathering and -management are at the heart of this revolution
in striking power. "We will integrate networked, long-dwell naval
sensors with national and joint systems to penetrate all types of cover
and weather, assembling vast amounts of information," Clark said
last December. "ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance]
data provided by Navy assets--both manned and unmanned--will be vital
to our comprehensive understanding of an adversary's military, economic,
and political vulnerabilities." New means for rapid planning and
response also will be needed--to use this knowledge to tailor joint strike
packages that deliver the right effects at the right time and place.
The emerging Sea-Strike concept of operations calls for such "knowledge
dominance," enabled by persistent ISR, to be translated into a "full
array" of options--e.g., next-generation missiles capable of in-flight
targeting and hypersonic speeds; high-performance aircraft, such as the
F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, armed with standoff
precision weapons; extended-range naval gunfire and precision ordnance;
information operations; stealthy submarines; unmanned combat vehicles;
and Marines and SEALs on the ground. "Our sovereign naval forces
will be poised to exploit strategic flexibility, operational independence,
tactical agility, and speed of command to conduct sustained operations
24 hours per day, seven days per week, 365 days per year," Clark
said.
"We are going to need sustained information superiority and the
ability to generate flexible strike options quickly to attack time-sensitive
targets," he continued, "with far greater speed and accuracy
than we can today. And that's saying a lot ... [because] we have already
seen a tenfold increase in our ability to put 'effects-on-target' compared
to what the Navy accomplished in Operation Desert Storm.
"When we cannot achieve operational objectives from over the horizon,
our Navy-Marine Corps team moves ashore," the CNO wrote. "Using
advanced vertical and horizontal envelopment techniques, fully netted
ground forces will maneuver throughout the battlespace, employing speed
and precision to generate combat power."
New concepts for long-duration sea basing, and for using the sea as a
maneuver space, will permit the Navy and Marine Corps to "exploit
superior situational awareness and coordinated fires to create shock,
confusion, and chaos in enemy ranks. Information superiority and networking
will act as force multipliers, allowing agile ground units to produce
the warfighting impact traditionally provided by far heavier forces, bringing
expeditionary warfare to a new level of lethality and combat effectiveness."
Joint Effects ... Not Just Ordnance
"Sea Strike capabilities will provide joint-force commanders with
a potent mix of weapons, ranging from long-range precision strike to covert
land-attack in anti-access environments, to the swift insertion of ground
forces," the CNO said in the Sea Power 21 White Paper. "We are
going to use our information superiority to dominate timelines, foreclose
adversary options, and deny enemy sanctuaries in future operations."
However, future naval forces will not rely solely on munitions to destroy
or neutralize enemy assets and capabilities. Sea Power 21 predicts that
the importance of information operations (IO) as an element of the Sea
Strike concept will only increase as high-tech weapons and systems, particularly
advanced information technologies, become more widely available. "Information
operations will mature into a major warfare area, to include electronic
warfare, psychological operations, computer network attack, computer network
defense, operations security, and military deception. Information operations
will play a key role in controlling crisis escalation and preparing the
battlefield for subsequent attack."
With an eye to the "gathering storm" potential of the U.S.
buildup in the Middle East aimed at removing Saddam Hussein from power,
Clark pointed out that Sea Strike operations will be completely integrated
into joint campaigns, "which will add the unique independence, responsiveness,
and on-scene endurance of naval forces to joint strike efforts. 'Jointness'
is thus a fundamental element of Sea Strike." In many scenarios,
Clark said, the Navy cannot "do it alone." For that reason,
he continued, "we envision closely linked sea-based and land-based
striking power producing devastating effects against enemy strategic,
operational, and tactical objectives, producing rapid, decisive operations
and the early termination of conflict."
In short, once the prerequisite strategic, operational, and/or necessary
tactical decisions are made, a full range of strike systems will be employed
to translate those decisions into immediate and effective action by integrating
the size, composition, location, and timing of joint effects.
A New Global Concept of Operations
Future Sea Strike missions will be carried out within a new concept of
operations that, if sufficient resources are allocated, will provide the
United States with widely dispersed combat power. "The global environment
and our defense strategy call for a military with the ability to respond
swiftly to a broad range of scenarios and defend the vital interests of
the United States," the CNO stated. "We must dissuade, deter,
and defeat both regional adversaries and transnational threats."
To meet those goals, Sea Power 21 explains, the new Global Concept of
Operations will "disperse combat striking power by creating additional
independent operational groups capable of responding simultaneously around
the world. This increase of combat power is possible because technological
advancements are dramatically transforming the capability of our ships,
submarines, and aircraft to act as power-projection forces, netted together
for expanded warfighting effect." Instead of today's 12 carrier battle
groups and 12 amphibious ready groups, a total of 37 independent strike
groups will be available to carry out the Navy's future operational missions
throughout the world:
* Twelve Carrier Strike Groups that can provide the full range of operational
capabilities needed for all operational environments.
* Twelve Expeditionary Strike Groups, consisting of amphibious ready
groups, augmented by strike-capable surface warships and submarines, to
carry out Sea Strike missions in lesser-threat environments. The Navy
will deploy two expeditionary strike groups (ESGs) this year to test the
concept. In August, the Tarawa-class amphibious assault ship (LHA) USS
Saipan will lead the Atlantic Fleet ESG, which will include the Whidbey
Island-class dock landing ship (LSD) USS Gunston Hall, the Ticonderoga-class
Aegis guided-missile cruiser (CG) USS Philippine Sea and Arleigh Burke-class
Aegis guided-missile destroyer (DDG) USS Gonzales, the Oliver Hazard Perry-class
guided-missile frigate (FFG) USS Nicholas, and the Los Angeles-class nuclear-powered
attack submarine (SSN) USS Miami. Two months later, the Pacific Fleet
ESG will deploy, led by the Tarawa-class LHA USS Peleliu, with the Austin-class
amphibious transport dock ships (LPDs) USS Dubuque and USS Germantown,
the Ticonderoga-class CG USS Port Royal, the Arleigh Burke-class Aegis
DDG USS Decatur, the Oliver Hazard Perry-class FFG USS Jarrett, and the
Los Angeles-class SSN USS Topeka. "What is new about this,"
said Commodore Kenneth Rome, commander of the Saipan ESG, "is that
we will take these ships all the way through the training process, building
a team that can work together to really extend our reach."
* Nine Missile-Defense Surface Action Groups, built around Ticonderoga-
and Arleigh Burke-class Aegis CGs and DDGs, will increase international
stability by providing security to allies and joint forces ashore.
* Four Modified Trident Guided-Missile Submarines (SSGNs) will provide
covert striking power from cruise missiles and the insertion of Special
Operations Forces.
The new global concept of operations, expeditionary strike groups, and
variously configured strike forces collectively represent the Navy's future.
"We will innovate operationally by distributing striking power to
the furthest corners of the earth and sustaining fleet readiness to surge
additional warfighting power on short notice," the CNO's 2003 Guidance
notes. "The Global Concept of Operations, in concert with the U.S.
Marine Corps, packages our forces to meet 21st-century challenges. This
... [concept] requires a fleet of approximately 375 ships and procurement
of 11 ships per year."
Meeting that ambitious goal will be difficult, particularly in an era
when the Navy's shipbuilding budgets will support the construction of
only seven or eight ships per year. The conversion to SSGNs of the first
four Ohio-class Trident ballistic-missile submarines, the next-generation
CVNX aircraft carrier, and the DD(X) and LCS (littoral combat ship) elements
of the surface-warfare "family" of ships all must be funded
within very tight budgets. The mismatch between needs and resources is
both obvious and, to proponents of a larger fleet, somewhat alarming.
This Way Ahead
"Sea Power 21 is our vision to align, organize, integrate, and transform
our Navy to meet the challenges that lie ahead," Clark concluded.
"It requires us to continually and aggressively reach. It is global
in scope, fully joint in execution, and dedicated to transformation. It
reinforces and expands concepts being pursued by the other services--long-range
strike; global intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; expeditionary
maneuver warfare; and light, agile ground forces--to generate maximum
combat power from the joint team."
Some Cassandras have described Sea Power 21, especially Sea Strike, as
"old wine in a new bottle" and/or no more than the "repackaging
of traditional naval concepts to match contemporary politics and vocabulary."
But such criticisms miss the mark. What is clearly new, and a central
element of Sea Strike, is the Navy's intent to tie littoral, regional,
and, if necessary, global battlespaces together, linking offensive and
defensive operations in direct support of joint forces ashore. This takes
the littoral focus of the 1991 "... From the Sea" strategic
concept and expands it into a truly global concept of operations.
Much more than simply putting ordnance on target, Sea Strike, the Navy's
ability to mass effects against critical objectives without having to
mass sea-based platforms--and to do so at ranges and with accuracies and
precisions not previously possibleis the foundation for combat
success in future crises and conflicts.
"Sea Strike is what we are all about," Clark has stated. "It
is first and most importantly about being on the offense. It is the ultimate
reason we remain forward-deployedto impose the will of our nation
on our enemies when all else has failed." *
Naval Power 21
The Navy and Marine Corps exist to control the seas, assure access, and
project power beyond the sea, to influence events, and to advance American
interests across the full spectrum of military operations. Above all,
we defend our homeland, both through our actions overseas and by our efforts
at home. Our vision to achieve this is based on three fundamental pillars:
* We assure access. Assuring sea-based access worldwide for military
operations, diplomatic interaction, and humanitarian relief efforts. Our
nation counts on us to do this.
* We fight and win. Projecting power to influence events at sea and ashore
both at home and overseas. We project both offensive and defensive capability.
It defines who we are.
* We are continually transforming to improve. Transforming concepts,
organizations, doctrine, technology, networks, sensors, platforms, weapon
systems, training, education, and our approach to people. The ability
to continuously transform is at the heart of America's competitive advantage
and a foundation of our strength.
Naval Power 21 ... A Naval Vision
October 2002
Sea Strike Guidance, 2003
* Define ISR requirements, including specifics on the improved platform
and sensor capabilities needed, the investments in sea-based long-dwell
manned and unmanned sensors desired, and the integrated joint intelligence
efforts required.
* Develop information operations as a major warfare area; define IO requirements
and coordinate Navy IO efforts with the other U.S. services and the Department
of Defense.
* Enhance time-sensitive targeting capability by developing, acquiring,
and integrating systems with increased connectivity, reach, speed, persistence,
and lethality.
* Deploy an expeditionary strike group from each coast in 2003.
* Partner with the Marine Corps to develop force-structure recommendations
and the key metrics required to achieve ship-to-objective maneuver goals.
* Improve conventional force interoperability with Special Operations
Forces.
Sea Power 21 Operational Concepts
Sea Strike--expanded power projection that employs networked sensors,
combat systems, and warriors to amplify the offensive impact of sea-based
forces.
Sea Shield--global defensive assurance produced by extended homeland
defense, sustained access to littorals, and the projection of defensive
power deep overland.
Sea Basing--enhanced operational independence and support for joint forces
provided by networked, mobile, and secure sovereign platforms operating
in the maritime domain. |
