Corps Combat Assessment Team Cites Need for Speed in Iraq

More Training Needed to Deal with Enemy Units that Use Women, Children as Shields

By ARTHUR P. BRILL JR.
Sea Power Correspondent

Contrary to a recent preliminary U.S. Army War College study that downgraded the importance of speed in Operation Iraqi Freedom last year, the Marine Corps strongly believes that speed was absolutely essential in the rout of Saddam Hussein’s forces. (The Marines moved almost 500 miles from the Kuwaiti border toward Tikrit, but the zig-zag Iraqi roads made it 1,200 road miles.)

Marines maintain that speed reduced overall U.S. casualties and will be vital in future conflicts despite the fact that rapid movement stretched the logistics pipeline and accidents occurred because of fatigue.

“There are many accounts of Iraqi forces simply being unable to respond to the speed which American forces advanced,” said Col. Philip J. Exner, head of the Corps’ Enduring Freedom Combat Assessment Team that is evaluating the fight. “Speed can compensate for a lot of things. It’s like a small fighter who gets a lot of punches in before the other guy can move.”

A preliminary report by the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute said that tactical speed in Operation Iraqi Freedom was far less important than other factors, and concluded that victory on the battlefield was attributable, in large part, to the technology advantages enjoyed by U.S. forces and the Iraqis’ poor leadership and dilapidated equipment (Sea Power, December 2003).

Following the end of major hostilities in Iraq, 30 Combat Assessment Team members conducted 2,000 in-depth interviews, visited all major Marine Corps installations and collected 15,000 surveys and 1.6 million documents. “We preserve information and make it available. We observed a lot of things, but it does not become a lesson learned until the system is changed,” said Exner. “We’re here because the Commandant [Gen. Michael W. Hagee] is committed to change.”

Among the team’s observations is the need for speed. Time after time, Marines found entire Iraqi units in “hide positions” cowering from U.S. air and artillery bombardments that had ceased only shortly before Marines arrived on the scene. Marines also discovered countless arms caches and demolition charges that the enemy did not have the time to detonate.

U.S. aggressiveness was the key to victory, the team noted. One on occasion, for example, Marines received intelligence that an Iraqi military meeting was under way, and the coordinates of place it was being held. Using this information, bombs were on target before the session ended.

The Iraqis resisted attack, but when they saw the Americans did not back down, many broke and ran. Even those desiring to surrender, hesitated to expose themselves because U.S. aircraft overhead reacted quickly and with deadly accuracy.

Marine battalion fighting its way to Baghdad was ordered to turn around and trudge more than 300 kilometers to check out the condition of a bypassed Iraqi division that was devastated by U.S. air power. The Marines found little but charred vehicles and discarded uniforms.

Prior to reaching Baghdad, Marine units participated in 11 urban combat battles. Working with infantry and helicopters, tanks were the vehicle of choice and D9 bulldozers were effective at eliminating urban obstacles. Snipers succeeded against enemy forces in the cities. (Though less well known than the Fedayeen, or Iraqi martyr units, the most vicious Iraqi fighters were the Bedouns — stateless persons residing in Kuwait who fought for Saddam.)

Often, Iraqi regular army and Republican Guard soldiers did not wear uniforms. They were spotted by their age, level of fitness, boots, and clean-shaven faces. The Iraqis had abundant ammunition, including effective rocket propelled grenade rounds, which continue to challenge U.S. forces.

Most Iraqi command posts and strong points were located in or next to protected targets (hospitals, schools and mosques). The most effective supporting weapons were precision urban close air support and artillery with variable time fuses, which are set to detonate about 20 meters above ground level, nd reduced collateral damage, according to information collected by the assessment team.

A problem for U.S. forces in urban areas were the huge numbers of Iraqi civilians, the assessment team reported. Training troops to handle enemy combatants who hide behind civilians is difficult. Unlike Iraqi buildings, most U.S. “combat towns” used for training do not have furniture or bars in their windows, which limit access.

“We just don’t have sufficiently large and realistic training facilities for urban operations,” said Exner. “Even the excellent joint facility at Fort Polk, La., is not big enough to integrate close air support.”

The 435 Marine aircraft flew 9,800 sorties and accumulated 25,000 flight hours without losing a single aircraft to hostile fire. (However, eight accidents killed 11 Marines.) The Corps’ 84 F/A-18 Hornets and 75 AV-8B Harriers flew 2,000 close air support missions.

A pleasant eye-opener to some skeptics who believe helicopters have seen their day was the 58 AH-1W Cobra attack helicopters that flew 1,811 close air support missions. Most were hit, but 90 percent of those damaged returned to combat in less than five days, according to the assessment team’s information.

“One of our ‘thousand weight’ questions was, are helicopters obsolete?” said Exner. “We found out how effective they can be.”

The Corps’ air-ground team closely trains together, makes quick decisions and fights with a fire support coordination line that is close to the front lines.

The Marines controlled up to 100 air missions per hour. Air Force, Navy and coalition pilots flying over Army territory often saved enough fuel to call the Marine air controllers — “Do you have anything for me?” As a result, ground Marines received abundant air support.

Similar to the Corps’ 350-mile initial landing from ships in Afghanistan, a number of helicopter refueling points were necessary in Iraq to support the Marine advance. Only the CH-53E Sea Stallion can be refueled in the air. “When we get the V-22 Osprey, three quarters of Marine air can be refueled in the air,” said Exner. “This will enable Marines to go even deeper and faster.”