Ship’s Library

By David W. Munns
Assistant Editor

INTELLIGENCE IN WAR: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda by John Keegan, New York, N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, Oct. 2003. 387 pp. $30.00 ISBN: 0-375-40053-2.

The fictional mystery of espionage continues to captivate public attention through high-tech sleuthing and steely agent provocateurs. The real-world utility of spying, however, is a more suspect topic, and one explored thoroughly by British author Sir John Keegan, long-time military historian and defense editor for The Daily Telegraph, in a fashion devoid of glamour and critical of peripheral intelligence’s ability to claim victory in war. “This book sets out to answer a simple question: How useful is intelligence in war?” Keegan writes in his introduction. His not-so-simple answer is a series of complex case studies and, ultimately, an assessment of the value of military intelligence.

Dismissing romantic accounts of intelligence procurement in fiction, Keegan admits, “Much intelligence practice is mundane and bureaucratic, unamenable to treatment in readable form. Even the most mundane, however, is essential if intelligence is to be useful.” In a chapter entitled “Chasing Napoleon,” Keegan traces the historical limitations of intelligence in the 1798 chase by English Adm. Horatio Nelson through the Mediterranean Sea in search of Napoleon’s French fleet. Although word had reached London that the French fleet was headed for Egypt, Nelson was at sea, cut off from communication other than the sparse signal system used for ships in British waters. The 73-day chase ended with Nelson destroying the French fleet through his “inspirational powers of leadership” among other notable qualities, but Keegan points out that Nelson’s lack of adequate intelligence prolonged the hunt. He provides a counterexample of “ample intelligence” in a following chapter with an almost parallel, though land-based, chase of Confederate Gen. Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson during the American Civil War. Despite Jackson’s inferior army, his “exploitation of the secrets of place and passageway in the complexity of the Shenandoah Valley” enabled him to evade Union armies who had “no accurate military maps.”

It was the invention of the radio that truly transformed the way wars are fought on sea and land, as first evidenced in World War I, according to Keegan. Looking at the intelligence used in the Battle of the Atlantic during World War II, Keegan investigates whether intelligence can win a war or whether it merely catalyzes victory. He points to the Battle of the Atlantic and Sir Winston Churchill’s claim that Allied code-breakers’ locating German U-boats, and their subsequent sinking by Allied planes, allowed convoys to safely cross the ocean, sparing Britain’s demise. Keegan observes, however, that “the Battle of the Atlantic could have been won without the assistance of code-breakers” because in 1943, the year in which the most numerous and contentious convoy battles were waged, only a fractional 139 of the more than 9,000 Allied ships that tried to cross the ocean were lost to Axis forces.

Keegan then takes issue with human intelligence, versus mechanical espionage. He looks into the effectiveness, and ineffectiveness, of counter-spy Gestapo agents in Nazi Germany, identifying the men and women of espionage and the benefits of Britain’s intelligence forces in uncovering Germany’s secret weapons program. The art, or chore, of spying was redefined post-1945, which leads the reader and Keegan back to his initial question: “How useful is intelligence in war?” Moreover, are intelligence exploits beneficial in the war on terrorism? Written before the capture of Saddam Hussein, Keegan hits the issue head on — high-tech diabolism employed in previous conflicts is futile when an enemy cannot be pinpointed. Al Qaeda is not a centralized force but rather is an adversary made up of radical factions who share only one goal: to spur a crusade against western ideology. Human intelligence, police, and undercover agents will prevail only as assistance to American armed services.

Keegan’s irreverent, circumspect prose in Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda addresses the topical issue of military intelligence with cogency and realism. Keegan does not dismiss intelligence; instead, he observes that the men and women on the battlefield, at direct conflict, are the true force behind any victory. Intelligence can facilitate their efforts, but it is soldiers’ passion, dedication, and stamina that claim triumph.

OCTOBER FURY by Peter A. Huchthausen, Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Dec. 2003. 281 pp. $15.95 ISBN: 0-471-46884-3.

Tension between the U.S. and communist nations during the Cold War era brought rise to several potentially severe tangible conflicts. In 1962, President John F. Kennedy handled one of the most daunting confrontations when the Soviet Union sought to establish missile bases in Fidel Castro’s Cuba. This danger threatened U.S. borders with possible nuclear devastation. Peter Huchthausen, a junior ensign aboard a U.S. Navy destroyer at odds with Soviet submarines in the Atlantic during that time, reveals jarring information about this nascent catastrophe: “the showdown with the Soviet Union nearly led to an exchange of tactical nuclear weapons at sea between ships and submarines of the opposing navies.” The American public was shielded from knowledge that nuclear weapons were present in Soviet submarines surrounding the island. This diplomatic contest between two countries was on the verge of being played out in microcosm at sea, and Huchthausen provides readers with an immediate account of what may have been a trigger-pull away from becoming the most calamitous conflict in global history. He parallels his experiences as a junior ensign with publicly known historical events of the time, providing perspective about the secrecy and immediacy of the contest. October Fury is an exposé of a previously hidden Cold War exploit. Nobody is better suited to relay the tale than Huchthausen, a sailor whose life was entangled in the drama.

THE LAST STAND OF THE TIN CAN SAILORS: The Extraordinary World War II Story of the Navy’s Finest Hour by James D. Hornfischer, New York, N.Y.: Bantam Dell Publishing Group, Feb. 2004. 496 pp. $24.95 ISBN: 0-553-80257-7.

Nearly 60 years after the fact, The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors is surprisingly the first book to detail the Navy’s astonishing achievement in the World War II Battle off Samar. Rear Adm. Clifton Sprague’s escort carriers and destroyer screen in the Philippine Sea defeated the Yamato and the rest of the Japanese Center Force in the early hours of Oct. 25, 1944. This was an unlikely triumph because the flotilla, a U.S. naval force comprised of ships so scantily armored they were called “tin cans,” outflanked the Japanese naval force heralding some of the most powerful warships ever built. Hornfischer bases his book on previously classified materials and interviews with sailors who participated in the battle to put the reader aboard the tiny ships beside the inexperienced Americans whose spirit prevailed against all odds to defeat the Japanese in this crucial and unexpected battle. The book is a valuable tribute to the heart of several brave sailors, airmen, and naval officers who fought that morning and also a reverent eulogy to the lives lost during the battle.

Also Received:

OVER THE EDGE OF THE WORLD: Magellan’s Terrifying Circumnavigation of the Globe by Laurence Bergreen, New York, N.Y.: William Morrow, Oct. 2003. 458 pp. $27.95 ISBN: 0-06-621173-5.

Ferdinand Magellan’s bold 16th-century circumnavigation of the globe has historical ramifications perhaps more significant than any other discovery of that century. It altered Europe’s commonly accepted perception of the world’s limits. The journey itself was a three-year expedition, spanning more than 41,000 miles. In Over the Edge of the World, Laurence Bergreen, a prize-winning biographer and journalist, details the lives of Magellan and his crew as they experienced this execrable odyssey. The book is filled with wild tales of torture, starvation, disease, foreboding sailing conditions, and, ultimately, the collapse of Magellan’s sanity.

ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF WORLD MILITARY AIRCRAFT by Norman Polmar and Dana Bell, Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, Dec. 2003. 456 pp. $32.95 ISBN: 1-59114-686-0.

Norman Polmar, a naval and aviation historian, and Dana Bell, an archivist for the National Air and Space Museum, offer this almanac of world military aircraft in perfect time for a centennial tribute to the Wright brothers’ historic 1903 flight. The book is a showcase for the authors’ selected 100 most significant military aircraft. It features 122 photographs of these magnificent aircraft with accompanying statistics and explanations of their significance.

NELSON’S NAVY: The Ships, Men and Organisation 1793-1815 by Brian Lavery, Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, Sept. 2003. 352 pp. $37.50 ISBN: 1-59114-611-9.

Adm. Horatio Nelson’s British naval force was more dominant than any before it. This book looks closely at the design and construction of the ships, the administration, training, crew members, and life at sea for Nelson’s Royal Navy.

RISING TIDE: The Untold Story of the Russian Submarines that Fought the Cold War by Gary E. Weir and Walter J. Boyne, New York, N.Y.: Basic Books, Oct. 2003. 354 pp. $26.00 ISBN: 0-465-09112-1.

Drawing on newly available archives and interviews with former Soviet submarine operators, Rising Tide is the first book available to Westerners revealing the secrets of Soviet submarines during the Cold War.

ON HALLOWED GROUND: The Last Battle for Pork Chop Hill by Bill McWilliams, Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, Nov. 2003. 520 pp. $29.95 ISBN: 1-59114-480-9.

Bill McWilliams combines official documents, personal letters, interviews, oral histories, and other sources of information to give the history of the Battle for Pork Chop Hill and the three years of prior history leading to this last battle of the Korean War.