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January 1999 Join Now

Prepared for Any Eventuality At Sea

By JAMES H. THACH III

On the morning of 3 September 1998, the weather forecasts called for heavy rain, and winds up to 70 mph, in the anticipated path of Hurricane Earl. At Coast Guard Station Charleston (S.C.), crewmembers were just sitting down to lunch when the first alarm sounded.

A sailboat had broken free of its mooring and hit one bridge, and was now threatening another. In the rising storm, Petty Officer 3rd Class Mark Kannan worked desperately to position his 41-foot utility boat alongside the drifting sailboat so that Seaman Dale LaRose could jump aboard to secure a tow line. The wind was swiftly driving the sailboat toward the bridge. With only five feet to go before the sailboat hit the bridge, they secured the line and towed the sailboat to a local marina, then started back to the station.

But the storm had now reached full force, and calls for help swamped channels 16, 21, and 22. Kannan's crew was sent to recover another sailboat, adrift and threatening the same bridge. He positioned his 41-footer downwind of the boat to take it under tow before it could hit two large sport fishing boats and the bridge. As members of the crew prepared to leap aboard the sailboat, Group Charleston notified them of a man in the water nearby. The crew raced to the rescue.

They spotted the man, who was not wearing a life jacket, in water too shallow for their boat. Unable to approach, they watched as he grabbed the anchor line of a nearby vessel and climbed aboard. Kannan notified Group Charleston that the man was safe and returned to the drifting sailboat, which by then had wedged itself between the two sport fishing boats, its mast battering them. LaRose rigged the sailboat for towing, and it was towed to a safe mooring.

The radio crackled again. The man who had fallen into the water earlier had fallen in again, not far from his original position. LaRose and a Charleston Marine Police officer pulled him from the water and took him to the marina. After six hours underway in the hurricane, the crew finally returned to the station--cold, wet, tired, and hungry.

Cost-Effective Multimission Strategy

Almost every American knows that the Coast Guard saves lives at sea, and most know that the Coast Guard plays a critical role in the war against drugs. But few know that the Coast Guard is the only armed force of the United States that also has federal police authority or know that the Coast Guard examines and licenses all commercial U.S. mariners, inspects all commercial traffic entering U.S. ports, and is responsible for establishing the safety standards for all American-made vessels. In short, most Americans are unaware of the full spectrum of missions assigned to the U.S. Coast Guard, truly the nation's multimission service.

The Coast Guard has five primary mission areas:

Safety--Saving lives and property associated with maritime transportation, fishing, and recreational activities.

Protection of Natural Resources--Minimizing environmental damage and natural-resource degradation resulting from maritime transportation, fishing, and recreational activities.

Mobility--Facilitating maritime commerce and eliminating impediments to waterways traffic, while maximizing opportunities for recreational enjoyment of the same waterways.

Maritime Security--Protecting U.S. borders against the flow through maritime routes of illegal immigrants, illegal drugs, and other contraband; also preventing illegal fishing in waters under U.S. jurisdiction, and enforcing federal laws at sea.

National Defense--Enhancing regional stability by using appropriate maritime capabilities in support of the national security strategy.

To protect America's national interests and sovereignty along its coasts, in its ports and inland waterways, in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and on the high seas, the Coast Guard engages in activities: (a) close to shore; (b) more than 50 miles out to sea; and (c) around the world--in short, wherever America's national security demands the Coast Guard's presence. It has done so since its predecessor, the Revenue Cutter Service, came into being in 1790.

But many if not quite all of the Coast Guard's aging fleets of ships and aircraft are beginning to reach the end of their service lives. Reliance-class (210-foot) and Hamilton-class (378-foot) cutters, built in the 1960s, are obsolete. HC-130 Hercules aircraft, some of which are more than 25 years old, require extensive electrical and structural upgrades and modern sensors. The service's HU-25 Falcon jets are more than 20 years old and have major engine supportability problems.

It might seem surprising that the smallest of the nation's armed services has such a wide range of missions. But the officers and enlisted personnel of the Coast Guard remain "Semper Paratus" (always ready) to fulfill their multimission mandate. They are rigorously trained to be prepared to respond to virtually any eventuality at sea. Their vessels and aircraft are designed and built to carry out a variety of missions. Their command and control structure is designed to handle a broad spectrum of maritime events. Its flexibility, responsiveness, and multimission capabilities enable the Coast Guard to be measurably the most cost-effective agency in the federal service today. In carrying out its search-and-rescue mission alone, for example, the Coast Guard saves not only thousands of lives but also property valued at four times the service's annual operational budget.

Safety at Sea

July 20, 5:38 p.m.: The 855-foot cruise ship Ecstasy was leaving Miami with 3,514 people aboard when fire broke out in the ship's main laundry room, on the second deck. The ship's crew began fighting the fire, and did not request any outside assistance. Coast Guard Station Miami Beach was notified of a fire, though, by the crew of a pleasure craft in the vicinity, and station crewmen could see the smoke themselves, so they contacted the Ecstasy. The captain confirmed that there was a fire, but said it was under control.

Unconvinced, the station dispatched a 41-foot utility boat. The boat's crew reported flames as well as heavy smoke. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office Miami directed the Ecstasy to return to the Miami anchorage and established a safety zone around the vessel. Ecstasy then finally radioed, "We need help, we need help."

The Coast Guard swiftly launched three more utility boats, five cutters--Chandeleur, Matagorda, Maui, Point Martin, and Point Glass--an HH-65A helicopter (from Air Station Miami), and two HH-60J helicopters (from Air Station Clearwater, Fla.). Four commercial coastal tugs also stood by to assist. CINCLANTFLT (commander in chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet) was kept informed, and the Kidd-class guided-missile destroyer USS Scott was diverted from the waters off West Palm Beach, Fla. Helicopters at Patrick Air Force Base, Fla., and elsewhere in the vicinity, were put on standby, as was the CG cutter Valiant. Virtually every potentially available resource was deployed or put on alert.

Coast Guard teams assisted in controlling the fire. Seven Ecstasy crewmembers and two tug personnel had to be medevaced due to smoke inhalation. (Between 50 and 60 passengers suffered mild smoke inhalation but did not require evacuation).

The weather was clear, the seas were only four to six feet, and the wind, coming in from the southeast, was under 10 knots. The Ecstasy was only minutes away from the dock. Military and civilian rescue and firefighting resources were nearby. The crew of the Ecstasy responded well. But change only one or two of those conditions and circumstances, and everyone aboard could have been in serious peril.

"Serious peril" accurately describes the Prinsendam incident, which started early in the morning of 4 October 1980, 120 miles southwest of Sitka, Alaska. The 427-foot cruise ship caught fire and began flooding. During the 18-hour rescue operation that followed, weather conditions rapidly degenerated: 35-foot seas, freezing rain, and 40-knot winds. The closest Coast Guard assets were 170 nautical miles away when the distress call came in. Coordinating with the U.S. Air Force, Canadian forces, and several merchant vessels in the area, Coast Guard cutters and long-range helicopters rescued 563 people from almost certain death. The liner eventually sank, but without loss of life, in what has been called the most successful large-scale marine rescue in peacetime history.

But the challenge facing the Coast Guard and its people is growing. Cruise ships that will carry 10,000 people are already on the drawing boards, and the cruise industry is forecasted to triple--to 15 million passengers annually by 2020. The Coast Guard will need far better equipment to answer the call in the 21st century.

Protection of Natural Resources

Few activities in the world pose as big a threat to America's marine interests as illegal fishing on the high seas with drift nets. The Coast Guard is responsible for most of the Pacific for preventing drift-net fishing. In late May 1998, a Coast Guard HC-130H Hercules from Air Station Kodiak, Alaska, patrolling about 360 miles south of Attu, Alaska, detected two vessels with drift nets deployed. The crew of a nearby Russian Navy vessel intercepted one and took it into custody, but only after having to fire on the vessel to stop it. Because no other U.S. Coast Guard vessel was available, the polar icebreaker USCGC Polar Sea was diverted to investigate the second fishing vessel.

The Polar Sea tracked the vessel for three days, until relieved by the cutters Boutwell and Jarvis. After a five-day, 900-mile chase, Boutwell's crew finally boarded the 150-foot fishing boat Shen Shun. But it had not been easy. The Shen Shun refused to stop and be boarded. Boutwell's resourceful crew built a special boarding ladder that could be secured from the cutter's small boat. As the official report states, "using the cutter's small boat, a boarding team maneuvered alongside the rusty trawler and secured a ladder to its side. They scrambled aboard and took control of the ship, meeting no resistance from the fishing vessel's crew."

At the request of the Chinese government, the Shen Shun was escorted to Shanghai for prosecution. Case closed. But over the next week, five more drift netters were spotted in the Pacific.

The world's fish harvest more than quadrupled from 1950 to 1996, when it reached 93 million tons. Last year, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations estimated that, because of massive overfishing, only 80 million tons were available for harvest. The FAO expects the demand to increase by 2010, to 115 million tons, however, as the world's population continues to grow.

The United States possesses the largest EEZ in the world, with 42,000 miles of coastline to patrol. Within the EEZ waters are some of the world's most valuable fisheries, containing fish stocks that support a $20 billion American industry. The question arises, therefore: If the Coast Guard is now so short of resources that it must send a polar icebreaker to chase illegal fishermen, what will it do in 2010?

Mobility for the Nation

The Coast Guard is responsible for the fixed and floating aids to navigation that keep the nation's maritime freight moving, and maintains more than 50,000 such aids, not only along the coasts of the United States, but on every navigable river within U.S. boundaries. The Coast Guard established and maintains the differential global positioning system that provides mariners the precise navigation information necessary for safe operation in and around U.S. ports. The Coast Guard also establishes and enforces the safety requirements for all U.S.- and foreign-flag commercial vessels operating to and from U.S. ports, and operates the vessel traffic systems that guide mariners in and out of major U.S. ports. It also licenses U.S. merchant mariners.

In short, the Coast Guard has regulatory and management responsibility for almost 90 percent of all of the freight moved across U.S. borders--another enormous responsibility. But in most years funding available to the Coast Guard for that mission is less than $500 million.

As Hurricane Georges approached the Gulf of Mexico in September, the Coast Guard began to batten down the hatches. Boaters in the Gulf of Mexico from Florida to Texas were urged to seek safe harbor. The captain of the port closed Gulfport, Miss., to all commercial traffic, pilots in the New Orleans area secured operations, and the Southwest Pass and the Mississippi River outlet were closed to all deep-draft traffic. The preparations undoubtedly helped--but nothing stops a hurricane.

29 September: Damage assessment began. The ports of Gulfport and Pascagoula, Miss., Mobile, Ala., and Pensacola and Panama City, Fla., all remained closed. There was extensive damage to aids to navigation, and potential shoaling of ship channels. Major flooding continued. New Orleans was spared, thanks to the Category 2 storm's late turn to the northeast, but damage was nonetheless sufficient to prevent area pilots from working, which meant that most commercial traffic from New Orleans to Panama City had to be halted.

Coast Guard radio traffic also was hampered because five high-level radios towers were badly damaged. Aids to navigation were severely affected, with Pascagoula the hardest hit--virtually every aid there was damaged or destroyed. In Mobile Bay, 30 miles of main-channel buoyage was lost. Coast Guard buoy tenders from all over the Gulf were brought in to repair the damage and get the marine traffic moving again. Over a dozen sailboats were sunk; 50 more were beached in Dog River, Ala., alone. Dauphin Island, Ala., was cut in two, several barges were sunk, and over 65 percent of the piers on Mobile's Eastern Shore were damaged.

Despite its comparatively low wind speeds (up to 110 mph), Hurricane Georges effectively stopped all commercial traffic not only on the Central Gulf Coast but also on the river systems into and out of the nation's heartland. All of which brings up another relevant question: What assets will the Coast Guard need to respond to a Category 5 hurricane?

Maritime Security at Risk

If the Coast Guard had not been doing its best to stop drugs short of America's coasts, there would have been more than 460 million additional "hits" of cocaine last year and 100 million more marijuana joints on the streets of America. As part of the national war on drugs, the Coast Guard's interdiction efforts are essential--but without enough resources even the best law-enforcement agencies sometimes lose.

12 September: The cutter USCGC Confidence sighted a drug suspect "go-fast" traveling north at 31 knots, 90 miles west of Martinique in the West Indies. Confidence launched its small pursuit boat, but it had no hope of intercepting a vessel capable of 60 mph. Confidence contacted a nearby French Navy ship and a Coast Guard aircraft for help. The go-fast began maneuvering erratically, obviously trying to evade pursuit. A French Customs aircraft arrived to assist with surveillance and tracking.

A British Royal Navy ship and the cutter USCGC Adak were diverted to assist in intercepting the go-fast as it headed south, this time running toward Venezuela. The French Navy ship then launched its helicopter to maintain surveillance. U.S. Coast Guard headquarters in Washington granted permission for a right-of-visit boarding and the use of nondeadly force, and Coast Guard District Seven, headquartered in Miami, authorized use of warning shots if the vessel did not stop. At one point, the French helicopter, hovering 30 feet over the go-fast, reported that the boat's crewmembers were trying to foul the helicopter rotor by throwing debris. District Seven advised Venezuela of the go-fast's intent to enter its territorial seas, and Venezuela responded by deploying one of its own naval vessels. But the go-fast still got away. After patrolling the go-fast's path in search of possible contraband that might have been jettisoned during the pursuit, all of the law-enforcement assets that had been called out returned to their normal patrol operations.

The final count of assets actively involved in the pursuit: three U.S. Coast Guard cutters, one Coast Guard aircraft, one U.S. Customs aircraft, one U.S. Navy aircraft, one French Navy warship, one French Navy aircraft, one French Customs aircraft, one British warship, and one Venezuelan patrol craft.

Only four days later, testifying before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations at a joint hearing on U.S. Anti-Drug Interdiction Efforts, Coast Guard Commandant Adm. James M. Loy stated, "It is important for this committee to know that, in my estimation, the most significant problem we have is the lack of a surface end-game capability in the transit zone and the arrival zone. We are getting brutalized at the moment by go-fast vessels." The situation described by Loy apparently has persuaded him to consider the use of force by Coast Guard aircraft. He has directed that the use of nondeadly force be evaluated, and that the results of the evaluation be available early this year.

Another major threat facing the United States is the migration of illegal aliens. It is the Coast Guard's job to keep illegal migrants from reaching U.S. soil. An estimated 15,000 to 20,000 people illegally migrate to the Western Hemisphere every year. Many are smuggled in aboard ship. Most are from island countries with little or no ability to absorb their population growth and no economy to support it. The overall situation is expected to get worse. For instance, the populations of the Dominican Republic and Haiti are expected to rise 17 and 18 percent, respectively, by 2010.

Mass migrations, such as those in 1994 from Haiti and Cuba, can result in tens of thousands of migrants being intercepted, or rescued, in a very short period. If interdiction efforts are unsuccessful, the average cost to return a single migrant to his or her home country is $10,000 to $30,000. Without the tools to effectively combat these threats to U.S. national sovereignty, the Coast Guard's continued success is in question.

National Defense

The Coast Guard is an armed force with a long history of courageous defense of the nation alongside its sister services. Its contributions are being recognized more and more not only by U.S. leaders but also by foreign governments. Coast Guard forces have deployed in support of diplomatic sanctions against Haiti, and in support of the restoration of democracy in that same country. Coast Guard forces also were deployed to the Arabian Gulf in support of Operation Desert Storm, and USCG cutters were operating in the Gulf as recently as the summer of 1998 to help enforce the U.N. sanctions against Iraq.

April 1998, the Arabian Gulf: Under cover of darkness, the CG cutter Chase is carrying out maritime-interception operations as part of a U.S. Navy surface action group (SAG). Chase spots a potential smuggler sneaking out of the Khawr Abd Allah River. The master maneuvers to stay within waters claimed by Iran, where U.S. warships cannot go. For almost six hours, Chase's combat watchstanders track the suspect vessel as it hugs the Iranian coast.

There is a short distance on the eastern side of the Arabian Gulf where Iran's territorial waters do not extend far enough for a ship to maintain a straight course and avoid international waters. The Chase's commanding officer hopes that this master will follow the usual practice, which is to take the chance and maintain a straight course. Chase matches the vessel's every move, being careful to remain covert through the use of deceptive lighting and varying speeds. Its boarding team stands by to launch, with the cutter's rigid-hull inflatable boat (RHIB) swung out in the davits, ready for pursuit. Chase's opportunity finally comes: The vessel's master decides to risk cutting across international waters with his lights out.

Turbines spring to life and, at 27 knots, Chase maneuvers to intercept. The cutter hails the vessel by radio. No response. "Try again," says the commanding officer. The response is less than polite, and the vessel turns north, back toward Iran. Running dark, Chase's boarding team approaches the vessel from the opposite side in the RHIB. Because the tanker is running very low in the water, the boarding team is able to easily step aboard. Finding no one on deck, members of the boarding team stealthily enter the pilothouse. They surprise the master, first mate, and helmsman. The master is politely asked to reverse course, and the remainder of the nine-man crew is awakened and mustered on deck. Time elapsed from the moment the Chase kicks into high gear to the encounter in the pilothouse: 20 minutes.

The Coast Guard's unique capabilities in interdiction, night boarding, inspection, and shiphandling made this particular arrest--and three more like it--possible for Chase in its one month in the Gulf. In the future, the need for such operations, both overseas and along the U.S. coasts, is expected to increase, necessitating additional Coast Guard resources.

The Coast Guard's military-engagement responsibilities continue to increase even in the peacetime arena. The service operates like the navies of many emerging nations do and is therefore frequently invited by these nations to train them to protect their own sovereignty--so that U.S. forces will not have to.

The CG also has been steadily strengthening and expanding its ties and its working relationships with the U.S. Navy. The new "National Fleet Concept" demands a closer USN/USCG alliance as the ships and systems that will be used by both services are built to protect 21st-century America. It already is apparent that the Navy will be experiencing a "low-end" shortage of frigates, and that the Coast Guard represents the most cost-effective short-term solution to the problem.

An Uncertain Future

"Since fiscal year 1992, the Coast Guard has assumed increased responsibility while shrinking its workforce by nearly 10 percent and operating with a budget that has risen about 1 percent a year in actual dollars. The commandant of the Coast Guard told the Congress in 1996 that funding was no longer sufficient to sustain the normal pace of operations." So states the May 1997 GAO (General Accounting Office) report Coast Guard: Challenges for Addressing Budget Constraints. Two years later, more personnel cuts have been made, no additional dollars have been authorized, and several new responsibilities have been added to the Coast Guard's burden. Its equipment now has reached the point where it can only be described as, at best, operationally and technologically "challenged." The Coast Guard lacks the people it needs, the equipment it needs, and the funding it needs, yet is continually expected to do more with less.

In the last decade the Coast Guard has been unable to invest for the future. Its AC&I (acquisition, construction, and improvements) funding actually has decreased, in constant 1999 dollars, and the average AC&I level in recent years has been less than one-third of what is required to keep the Coast Guard modernized and fully capable of carrying out its range of missions.

Enter the Coast Guard's Deepwater Capabilities Replacement Acquisition program (Deepwater for short). The Coast Guard needs independent, long-range operating capabilities and the ability for sustained operations in severe weather and sea conditions. The goal of the Deepwater project is to modernize the service's aircraft, ships, and command-and-control infrastructure with an integrated system of afloat, aviation, and information-technology systems that will fill those needs.

The first phase of the project is devoted primarily to capability analysis and concept development. Its goal is to identify existing commercial and military technologies that can be used to develop an operating system at the lowest possible price to U.S. taxpayers. The system can then be scaled to meet any Deepwater need.

Simultaneously, the Coast Guard is reviewing all of its current roles and missions--and those likely to be imposed in the foreseeable future. This first comprehensive review in 17 years will validate the Deepwater requirements and identify possible opportunities for the Coast Guard to be more effective and efficient in its operations. With its typical resourcefulness, the Coast Guard already has launched an innovative approach to solve its current equipment shortfall: Deepwater. As Coast Guard officials describe it, Deepwater is both:

(a) A mission that requires extended on-scene capability and flexibility, ranging from the U.S. coastline to the Arabian Gulf; and

(b) The largest and most important acquisition project in Coast Guard history--a project, moreover, that is being approached from a mission-based set of building standards (the recapitalization of the entire Deepwater fleet), and not simply a cutter-replacement program.

But most of all, it is the future, not just of the Coast Guard, but of America's inherent capability to assert its national sovereignty and defend its own territory and citizens--and protect its overseas interests as well. Deep-water is, in short, a unique and cost-conscious procurement concept and project, that, if and when approved by the administration and funded by Congress, will provide the Coast Guard the capability it needs to meet the demands of the 21st century.


JAMES H. THACH III, director of search-and-rescue requirements at Sikorsky Aircraft, is chairman of the Navy League's Coast Guard Active and Reserve Affairs Committee.

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