Some in Congress question the proliferation and costs of unmanned craft despite their prowess in battle

By OTTO KREISHER, Special Correspondent

For years, Congress has pressured the armed services to increase their use of unmanned aircraft, mandating in 2000 that by 2010 one-third of all deep-strike aircraft should be unmanned.

But during the defense authorization hearings this year, the leaders of a key House Armed Services subcommittee and the Government Accountability Office complained about the proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and the rapid movement of some new systems into operational use.

“We have at least 20 different types of operational unmanned aerial systems, ranging from small [UAVs] to Global Hawk,” U.S. Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Pa., chairman of the projection forces subcommittee, complained to service officials. “They may be terrific programs, but I don’t think that this is the way we should go about our business.”

In a similar vein, the panel’s top Democrat, Rep. Neil Abercrombie of Hawaii, said that while UAVs unquestionably “have great utility” to troops in combat, “the critical issue is avoiding unnecessary duplication, redundancy and waste in UAV programs. … I have concerns that several of the services are working in parallel and developing UAVs with very similar profiles instead of working together and developing joint systems.”

And in a report requested by the subcommittee, the Government Accountability Office said that while UAVs have contributed to “successes on the battlefield,” their development programs “have shared many of same problems of other major weapons systems,” including “changing requirements, cost growth, delays in delivery, performance shortfalls and reliability and support problems.”

Though acknowledging problems with some of their UAV programs, the services dispute the allegations of unnecessary duplication or excess haste in getting these valuable tools into the hands of commanders during a conflict that depends heavily on actionable intelligence.

“I think a lot of the talk about confusion or redundancy or no coherent plan between the services is not true,” said Capt. Steven Wright, head of Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Navy’s Air Warfare office.

Although people see more than 1,000 UAVs operating in Iraq, Wright said, “there are only about 15-18 different types. That’s not as enormous a problem as you may think.”

The military’s interest in unmanned air systems has virtually exploded since the Navy began using Pioneer UAVs for reconnaissance and to adjust naval gunfire during the first Persian Gulf War in 1991.

Due to the demands of the war on terrorism, the Air Force sent Predator and Global Hawk UAVs to support operations in Afghanistan and Iraq while officially they still were in development. Although a number of them have been lost to accidents or enemy action, ground commanders have praised their intelligence-collecting capabilities and are demanding more.

In an attempt to encourage and coordinate development of UAVs and their associated systems, the Pentagon last year produced the 214-page “Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap” that looked ahead 25 years. It used the term “unmanned aircraft systems” (UASs) to emphasize that the aerial vehicles were only a part of the needed capabilities.

The roadmap noted that while the military spent a total of about $3 billion for UAS research and development, procurement and operations through the 1990s, the six-year future defense plan projects total spending on UAS of $17.4 billion.

And the military’s inventory of unmanned aircraft was predicted to grow from 250 in 2004 to 1,400 by 2015, not counting the much more common mini- and micro-UAVs.

That rapid growth and the associated spending is what drew the complaints from Weldon and Abercrombie.

Weldon maintained money was being wasted in UAS research because of program changes. He said he did not understand why the Army needs different sets of UAVs for the Future Combat System brigades and “for the other 80 or so percent of the Army’s future force.”

And Abercrombie wondered why “the Army and the Marines need separate types of UAVs? They are both land combat forces” and are using the same tanks and other ground equipment in Iraq. “Why not share UAV programs?”

The Government Accountability Office said that while the Pentagon is requesting billions of dollars for more UASs, “it still lacks a viable strategic plan to guide UAS development and investment decisions.”

Dyke Weatherington, coordinator for UAS programs under Pentagon acquisition executive Kenneth Krieg, wrote a reply to the report, disputing most of its allegations.

And in testimony to Weldon’s panel and in interviews, senior officers argued that their UAS programs are more unified than the lawmakers and the Government Accountability Office claimed.

“The Navy has different requirements than the Air Force, Army or Marine Corps,” Wright said. Navy UAS will operate primarily over water, which “is an entirely different environment. … So you have to have sensors that are capable of surviving and performing in that environment.”

While the services’ requirements are different, he said, “that doesn’t mean there can’t be a lot of similarities and I think you’ll see there are.”

Wright noted that the Northrop Grumman Fire Scout unmanned helicopter to be deployed on the Littoral Combat Ships uses the same air vehicle the Army has chosen for one of its Future Combat Systems requirements.

“We’re not calling it a joint system, but we are working very closely with the Army,” which is saving money by using the Navy contract to buy their systems, Wright said.

Army Secretary Francis Harvey, whose service received a particularly critical review in Weldon’s hearing, touted its coordination with the Navy and the Air Force on different unmanned programs.

“I don’t think there is a proliferation of UAVs,” he said. “From our point of view, we’re trying to give our soldiers … and our leaders the situational awareness they need to be more effective in this counter-insurgency. These are very, very important developments.”

The services’ arguments must have resonated because the House’s version of the fiscal year 2007 defense authorization contained nothing to rein in UAS programs.