"Doing It All, Doing It Well, Doing It Every Day"

Vice Adm. John J. Grossenbacher, a native of Chicago, was graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1970. Following completion of Nuclear Power School in 1971, he served for four years on the nuclear- powered attack submarine USS Queenfish. He then attended the Submarine Officer's Advanced Course, where he received the David Lloyd Award for excellence in leadership. During his submarine career he has served on both fleet ballistic-missile and attack submarines and commanded the USS Barb and Submarine Squadron Eight/Allied Submarines Mediterranean. Shore-duty assignments on the staff of the chief of naval operations (CNO) have included duty as the deputy executive assistant to the CNO; as deputy director, Submarine Warfare Division; as deputy director, Assessment Division; and as director, Programming Division. He completed the Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration Program for Management Development in 1988 and in 1992 was awarded the degree of Master of Arts in International Economics and International Relations from the Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies. As commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Vice Adm. Grossenbacher is responsible for the operations, maintenance, and training of 40 submarines and for more than 15,000 officer, enlisted, and civilian personnel.

Interview with Vice Adm. John J. Grossenbacher, Commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

Senior Editor Gordon I. Peterson interviewed Vice Adm. Grossenbacher for this issue of Sea Power.

Sea Power: Admiral, earlier this year you presented Battle Efficiency "E" awards to your command's top performers. What do they represent in terms of SUBLANT's [Submarine Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet's] overall combat readiness?

GROSSENBACHER: The "Battle E" winners are our best performers in the submarine force. They just make you proud. We say that high performance, high morale, and high standards are found on all our ships, but the Battle E boats are doing it all, doing it well, and doing it every day.

The Battle E award recognizes outstanding performance. At the same time, I think about all my submarines--winners and non-winners alike. It is important to focus on them, and that's where I start to have some concerns. I'm concerned about the reduced number of submarines we have in the Navy and the daily impact that it has on our ships and people. I'm concerned about the funding shortfalls--a broad Navy issue affecting all our communities in terms of recapitalization, maintenance, near-term readiness, and infrastructure.

The country is going to get the Navy that it pays for, and I think there are some serious issues that are worthy of national debate. Defense spending is now about 2.9 percent to 3 percent of the GDP [gross domestic product]. This is the lowest level since 1940. Sure, the Navy gets a lot of money. Our nuclear-powered submarines are not cheap--but you get what you pay for.

The United States is the only superpower. Given the breadth of our nation's leadership responsibilities, it is important to promote our national goals of free trade and democratic values. Today's high-performance, highly capable, and globally deployed world-class Navy is an important part of our nation's ability to do that--but it costs money.

Looking beyond force structure, lean defense budgets also affect a Sailor's quality of service if, for example, maintenance is not funded adequately, right?

GROSSENBACHER: There is that factor, and we have drawn some lines in the sand. In the submarine business we're certainly not going to take risks with maintenance. If we don't have enough maintenance money then we're not going to send ships to sea. And similarly, we're not going to abuse our people. In an all-volunteer Navy we can't do the kind of things that were done when we had a conscripted force.

My concern is that we are reaching the limits of our ability to squeeze things to conduct efficient operations--to be able to do what the country is asking us to do today within available resources.

Funding shortages have caused naval aviation to lose much of its resilience and capacity during the past 10 years. Is the same situation found in the submarine force--at a time when the force is down to 55 attack submarines and your operational requirements have doubled?

GROSSENBACHER: Yes. The situation can best be described as corrosive. We are going to maintain the ships right, and we're not going to abuse our people. The submarine force is being stretched to meet its commitments, and there is a limit to our resilience. I think we're there. I don't think we can stretch much more.

Several events during 2000 publicized the submarine force to good advantage. Did you see any benefits to the submarine force directly?

GROSSENBACHER: Certainly, and the most important thing that pleased me was the impact of last year's centennial on the submarine force. In the past the average submariner was not too knowledgeable about our history. Go on our ships now and you see chiefs of the boat who quiz their young Sailors undergoing qualification on who received the seven Medals of Honor awarded to submariners during World War II. On many boats, young submariners now have a tradition of reading an excerpt from a war patrol report when they are awarded their dolphins. I attribute this directly to all of the interest in the centennial of the submarine service.

An appreciation for our historic legacy is important in our profession. Our centennial year contributed to this awareness more than any other event in my career. There also has been increased public awareness resulting from other events. The Smithsonian Institution's submarine exhibit highlighted the important role of the submarines during the Cold War, for example.

More recent events have, unfortunately, had tragic overtones.

GROSSENBACHER: Two recent tragedies have focused much attention on submarines. The loss of Russia's submarine Kursk last year raised questions about submarine-rescue capabilities. We could have helped, and President Clinton did offer assistance. We actually had a teleconference with a Russian group sent to Brussels to talk to NATO and U.S. officials about submarine rescue.

We organized the submarine rescue-and-salvage experts in the United States. We brought them here to Norfolk, and the submarine rescue vehicle that we keep in San Diego was packed up and ready to go. In the end, the Russians declined our assistance.

How do you assess the Navy's submarine-rescue capabilities?

GROSSENBACHER: Our capabilities are extremely good. We test them all the time, and that's the real proof. After the loss of Kursk we held a NATO submarine-rescue exercise off Turkey. We used Italian and Turkish submarines and vehicles, and our deep submergence rescue vehicle was there with her mother sub. We transferred people back and forth. We've got the capability, and we have a plan that will improve our capability.

This is very important. During the Cold War submarines would spend most of their time in water that was so deep that rescue was not possible. Increasingly we find ourselves operating in the shallow waters of the world. They are very crowded with many fishing boats, merchant ships, and other craft.

We've always had a very good rescue capability, and we continue to improve it. Having said that, submarine duty is a tough, dangerous business, and anybody that says we can rescue anybody, anytime, anywhere really doesn't understand the complexities involved.

And the USS Greeneville?

GROSSENBACHER: Of course the other maritime tragedy that drew attention to the submarine force was the [nuclear-powered attack submarine] Greeneville's collision with a Japanese training ship off Hawaii earlier this year

The most important thing about Greeneville is that the standards of performance on that ship on that day were not anywhere near our expectations or requirements. If you walk down to the Norfolk waterfront and ask my submariners what they think, they would tell you that they were embarrassed.

I think the impression that some people have is that Greeneville was a good ship that just had a bad day. Good ships don't have days like Greeneville did. It was a tragic collision that necessarily and rightfully resulted in a significant investigation and much introspection in the submarine force. How could that happen on one of our ships?

Should we continue to host civilian visitors on our ships? Absolutely! We need to continue to do so for the good of the country, the Navy, and, in our case, the submarine force. We are an all-volunteer military, and fewer and fewer people in government and society have military experience. It is essential for us to stay connected and show what we do and who we are.

The suggestion has been made that civilian visitors can be a distraction. They could be if not managed properly, but you have to put it in context. Civilians on a properly run ship don't interfere with operations. My opinion is that the civilian guests did not contribute to the Greeneville tragedy, but they may have played an incidental role given the personalities and the standards that were prevalent on that ship at the time of the accident.

You touched upon submarine operations during World War II. Are you seeing your missions returning to more traditional undersea-warfare areas since the end of the Cold War?

GROSSENBACHER: I think you said it very well. The Cold War was an anomaly. It resulted in our submarines being focused almost exclusively on ASW [antisubmarine warfare]. It was the right thing to do at the time, because the Soviet Union had a large, increasingly capable submarine force that outnumbered ours by more than two to one. If it came to a fight we wanted to make sure that we fought in their backyard, not ours. Our job was to attrite the Soviet submarine force so that our other naval forces wouldn't be hampered in their movements.

Since then, the demise of the Soviet Union has resulted in many forces of instability being unleashed throughout the world--the resurgence of ethnic hatreds, countries flexing their muscles as actors on a global stage, narco-trafficking in South and Central America, economic hopelessness in some regions, and an AIDS epidemic in Africa. Military capability doesn't deal directly with those forces of instability--in fact, we're powerless in the case of many of them. But we do have to deal with the results. We do have to deal with what those forces influence people to do or not to do.

How have these trends affected our missions? From the attack submarine point of view, the strike mission in World War II was done with guns with very limited range. Today it's the Tomahawk cruise missile--an enormously capable weapon with a range of close to 1,000 miles. The improved tactical Tomahawk will make us even more effective in our ability to influence events on land from the sea.

ASW during World War II was only applicable when you could see the other submarine on the surface. Now we have very sophisticated torpedoes to attack other submarines.

Mine warfare is of great concern to me. Mines are cheap, widely available throughout the world, and can be used to deny our Navy's access in littoral regions. That's what attack submarines deliver--access. We have to be able to go where no one else can go--when no one else can be there.

We cannot afford to be excluded from an area by the presence of enemy mines. Our submarines can lay mines like we did during World War II, but we're doing much more to be able to locate and avoid them. If necessary, we may have to invest in a neutralization capability so we can continue to dominate the undersea battlespace.

Special warfare is a real growth industry for the attack-submarine force. Submarines deliver things by surprise, and that includes SEALs [Navy Sea-Air-Land special operations forces] and other special warfare troops. The big difference today is that our ability to deliver them is improving substantially. We have a new minisubmarine called the Advanced SEAL Delivery System in testing out in Hawaii. It can deliver a SEAL team to their objective area--dry, warm, well-fed, and rested--at significant ranges. That is an important capability.

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions have seen the largest growth in recent years. We now have the ability to collect information in ways that no one else can. Our submarines can stay on station for long periods of time, and our people can integrate what they collect at a level of sophistication that you just can't do with machines. Satellites don't see everything.

Your submarines also support counterdrug and law-enforcement missions, correct?

GROSSENBACHER: Yes. This is a new mission. We don't get to pick the wars that the nation needs us to fight, and submarines are extremely effective in contributing to the interdiction of drug traffic. They're clandestine--nobody knows they are there--and they can monitor surface shipping very effectively.

The other mission area that I wanted to make sure I mentioned relates to information operations. Revolutions in communications and information technology are having a profound impact worldwide, and our submarines can contribute substantially to information warfare.

So you have seen real progress in fixing past shortcomings in submarine communications?

GROSSENBACHER: Absolutely. We've spent scarce resources to improve our connectivity. One of the long poles in the tent for submarines is always the antenna. The submarine is unique because it has to go under water, and you have limitations on the size of an antenna. Many smart people have worked hard to improve our capabilities and give us greater bandwidth connectivity for Internet protocols, both in classified and unclassified environments. We are full-time players with the battle group or joint task force commander. The days of the "Silent Service" are long gone.

SUBLANT's FBMs [fleet ballistic-missile submarines] also have a continuing strategic mission, despite the end of the Cold War.

GROSSENBACHER: Yes. This is another aspect of our capabilities today that doesn't receive enough publicity. We need to remind people of the ballistic-missile submarine. That capability, along with the other forces in the strategic triad, prevented the use of nuclear weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union. I would argue that in today's era of rogue nations and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles our ballistic-missile submarines provide a foundation for national missile defense.

Do your new and evolving missions pose special challenges in the training, equipping, and maintenance of your forces?

GROSSENBACHER: The training challenge for SSNs [nuclear-powered attack submarines] is that we need them to do more. With our growing slate of new missions there are more proficiencies to demonstrate, but there are still only 24 hours in a day.

We need to improve the efficiency with which we train and develop proficiency in our crews. Fortunately, technology can help. We have two bedrock principles to protect in submarine force training, however. One is that the commanding officer is responsible for training on his ship. We can certainly help the commanding officer, but he has the responsibility. The second principle is that there is great value in learning something well enough to be able to teach it to others.

As we face an increased pace of operations and the need for more efficient training, we can't compromise these principles. Technology--simulators and the like--can help, but we must steer very carefully as we make our training more efficient.

In terms of equipment, the information revolution presents many challenges. We must modernize smartly, but we must remember that not everything important is "information technology"--building things out of steel is different! In the area of information technology, we must be more flexible and adaptable.

We must keep pace with changes in technology for our computers, sensors, and combat systems. Instead of trying to stay ahead of the fast-moving commercial market, we are buying commercial hardware and using our own software. Commercial hardware changes at such a rapid pace that it presents a different challenge. We have adopted a process that we call "build, test, build" to get things on our ships faster. There are other areas on submarines--and on nuclear-powered submarines especially--where you can't do that. You must engineer the item extremely well and test the heck out of it under all environments before you finally send it to sea.

How does the submarine force's structure-to-requirements mismatch affect your day-to-day operations?

GROSSENBACHER: The SSN study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS] in 1999 concluded that it would be unacceptable to the CINCs [commanders in chief of U.S. unified commands] to go below 55 SSNs in 2015 because they would have to forgo critical operational missions. The study said that 68 SSNs would be needed in 2015, with 18 of that number being Virginia-class boats. The JCS said it would be unacceptable to go below a floor of 62 SSNs in 2025, and they identified a necessary force structure of 76 SSNs.

Given the current and projected program of record in the Navy POM [program objective memorandum], we can't reach the levels recommended by the JCS SSN study in either 2015 or 2025 without building more submarines faster--even if we refuel every 688 [Los Angeles-class SSN] that can be refueled as well as refuel four Tridents [SSBNs] and convert them to guided-missile submarines and count them as SSNs. That is a decision that the Navy and the country are going to have to make. As I said, the country is going to get the Navy that it wants and pays for.

The impact of not having enough submarines is significant. It reduces operational availability. I have fewer submarines to provide to the fleet CINC. We don't get as much training as we might otherwise achieve, and it means that my crews don't get as much experience in some mission areas as I might want them to have. I have to draw a line at what I think is the minimum training required to maintain proficiency, and I think we're above that minimum today. We're doing okay, but it's not as good as I would like it to be.

We are not engaging and training sufficiently with our friends and allies. Many of our allies have very, very capable diesel submarines. We need to operate with and against them. Absent a direct challenge from either Russia or China, that is the submarine we're going to have to fight.

The impact of the mismatch between operational requirements and available forces will be felt in other ways, too. We downsized the submarine force significantly following the end of the Cold War. We now are coming up on the period where we have to refuel a substantial number of our nuclear-powered attack submarines, yet shipyards both in the public and private sector have been downsized in number and capability. Management of these national assets and their workforces is complicated and difficult. It is important to us operationally because I can't afford to have one of my ships sitting in a shipyard for one month longer than it is scheduled to be there.

The USS Seawolf began her first deployment in June and the USS Connecticut recently deployed to the Arctic Ocean for an under-ice exercise. How are these two new Seawolf-class ships shaping up?

GROSSENBACHER: They're absolutely wonderful submarines--the highest-performance attack submarines we have built. I call them the "Ferraris" of attack submarines! They are fast and extraordinarily quiet, and their eight torpedo tubes provide a huge weapons capability. The first time I was on Seawolf when it shot a torpedo it was so quiet I didn't even notice. I think we're going to be extremely pleased with their performance on deployment.

There also is the prospect for the addition of Virginia-class SSNs some years down the road.

GROSSENBACHER: The first joins the fleet in 2004. The Virginia is the submarine that we need for the future. It is about the same size as the Los Angeles class. It is a little bit slower than the Seawolf, but it's just as quiet and easier to manufacture. Virginia will be less complicated and more flexible in many ways than any other nuclear-powered submarine we have built.

You've mentioned your people a number of times. Where do you stand with regard to officer and enlisted retention?

GROSSENBACHER: In terms of officer retention the critical point for us is always seven years in service. That's normally when one of our officers would go to his department-head tour. If we retain enough department heads then we'll have enough officers to provide selectivity for our XOs [executive officers] and COs [commanding officers].

It's manageable. Out of a hundred officers that come in the door in the submarine service we need to keep least 30 when they reach their department-head tour. We're keeping about 25 now. That's a shortfall we can compensate for in some ways, but it's a shortfall I'd prefer not to have.

Is it a crisis? No, but it's a serious challenge. We want to retain each and every one of those young officers. Every single one of them is very important to us.

On the enlisted side, submarine-force retention is currently the highest in the Navy. That's good--but having said that, I'd always like it to be that way in the submarine force. We need to manage retention one person at a time. And we're doing that on the enlisted side as well as the officer side. Retention is so important to us--not only for manning the force in the near term, but because recruiting is so hard.

Recruiters must contact about 100 people to get one person in the Navy, but they must get about three people in the Navy for us to get one submariner. We need to do everything we can to help them.

What image comes to your mind when I say, "Submarine Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet?"

GROSSENBACHER: I think of a lot of the young Sailors that work for me as well as the chief petty officers with whom I've worked. They're absolutely wonderful. If you ask me what the message is that I'd like to deliver to them it is that I am very proud of what they do, and I appreciate their service. We can have the best scientists and engineers in the world, and they'll deliver a great technological product. But it is the Sailor who learns how to use it and how to make it work in the real world.

Is there anything in the way of closing that you would like to say to the members of the Navy League and other readers of Sea Power?

GROSSENBACHER: First and foremost, thanks for what you do. I have read Theodore Roosevelt's words of support about the Navy League. We need in our country and in our government people who are knowledgeable of and who are advocates for the Navy.

So keep it up. Stay involved--keep making the effort to understand the issues and expose our leaders in government and others to the sea services. Tell them what the Navy really is and what we really do.

I also encourage the Navy League to continue its support of our recruiting and retention efforts. I don't think people realize what an impact it has when civilians--like members of the Navy League--do simple things for our officers and enlisted people like saying, "Hey, I'm proud of what you do--I appreciate what you do for all of us and for our country."

One of the big factors in how our people view their profession is that they are here to serve. They are part of something that is larger than themselves.

If a member of the Navy League should see Sailors in uniform, I encourage them to pat them on the back, thank them for what they are doing, and ask them over to dinner. It makes a difference. Sailors deserve that recognition, and it's the kind of attention that has more of an influence than one might ever realize. *

Proud Members of "The Club"

The daily routine on the Norfolk-based nuclear-powered attack submarine USS Boise has returned to a familiar pace since the ship's completion of a 34-week selected restricted availability at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard in April. It is a relentless cycle of training, maintenance, and operational qualification--all geared toward returning the ship and crew to the highest state of combat readiness in preparation for its next deployment.

"One of my goals is to regain our warrior mentality," Cdr. James M. Kuzma, the Boise's commanding officer, told Sea Power. "I know only one way--play the way you train. We have to train to be ready to execute any mission we may be assigned." Kuzma, a 1983 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, assumed command in March.

Despite every effort to retain operational proficiency with frequent training sessions at shore-based facilities, warfighting and shiphandling skills unavoidably atrophy during long months in the shipyard.

The challenge to return ship and crew to fighting trim is complicated by several factors. New commercial-off-the shelf fire control and other systems--described by Kuzma as "incredible"--were installed during the submarine's modernization. More significantly, approximately 50 percent of the 140-man crew are first-tour Sailors ranging in age from 18 to 23. All must undergo the demanding task of earning the silver "dolphins" of the enlisted submarine-warfare specialty--a process that normally takes nine to 12 months. New officers and chief petty officers also must be forged into a top- performing team.

Seasoned petty officers, dubbed "sea daddies," play a critical role in supervising less-experienced Sailors by providing one-on-one leadership. Seaman Apprentice Ryan G. Underwood, a 19-year old native of Inola, Okla., reported to the Boise following graduation from Submarine School in January. His "sea daddy" is a second class petty officer assigned to his division.

"He's kind of like a dad," Underwood said. "He's the person who is making sure I am completing my qualifications and getting everything done. If I have a problem, I go see him."

Kuzma has awarded nine sets of dolphins since he assumed command, including one presented to a torpedoman's mate who qualified in just eight months, an unusual occurrence.

Beyond the exacting standards of maintenance, training, and attention to detail that characterize life aboard a nuclear-powered submarine, a sense of personal responsibility and commitment to self-improvement is manifested by every crewman.

"Everyone you work with is depending on you to do your job," said Machinist Mate 2nd Class Robert R. Rice of Morehead City, N.C., a two-year veteran of duty on Boise. "They may not be your best friends in the world, but you're willing to trust each man on board with your life." For the men who serve on the fleet's attack and fleet ballistic-missile submarines, this stark reality of service is never far from mind.

Underwood compares the submarine force to an exclusive club. "I tell most of my friends back home about it, and they say, 'Wow.'"

"Getting your dolphins is not just about becoming a proud member of the club," he reflected. "You also distinguish yourself as one who knows what you're doing. I'm going to know that all these people will go to sea and trust me with their lives, so I trust them with my life. And, in the end, it all makes sense."