A Vehicle That Does It All’

As the Iraq War exposes inadequacies, Marine Corps officials ponder the service’s future tactical wheeled vehicle needs

By SUE A. LACKEY, Associate Editor

The Marine Corps is redefining its entire tactical vehicle program in response to problems experienced in Iraq with current vehicles and the need to plan for emerging operational concepts. Several Marine officials told Seapower the Corps will need a new series of tactical vehicles to address its future needs.

The Marine Corps Combat Development Command at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Va., is conducting studies on the future of tactical wheeled vehicles, armoring and ground mobility that is due to be completed by late summer. The studies will attempt to define warfighter needs and integrate them with, among other things, sea basing and distributed operations, a concept of maneuver warfare based on small unit tactics and the net-centric battlespace.

Col. Mark Gurganus, commander of Regional Combat Team-8 in Fallujah, Iraq, said, “The days of thin-skinned vehicles are probably over. A lot of people have been watching what’s happening here and realized the rules have changed. We’ve got to be able to go back and build a vehicle that does it all.”

In Iraq, the Corps fielded the HUMVEE, the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles that replaced the Army jeep and several other tactical vehicles beginning in 1985. The original unarmored HUMVEEs provided little protection from light arms fire and, especially, from the improvised explosive devices that are left along the roads of Iraq and often are the insurgents’ weapon of choice.

Later versions, such as the up-armored M1114 HUMVEE, provide limited protection against some types of armor-piercing projectiles and antitank mines. Marines say the Marine armor kit (MAK), designed to provide additional protection for unarmored HUMVEE models has been particularly effective.

The added weight of that armor on what is essentially a light tactical vehicle, and the attendant stresses on the vehicle structure, have convinced Marine officials the HUMVEE is at the end of is usefulness as the warfighter’s primary vehicle.

In addition, the Corps is committed to the Sea Basing concept, which envisions that U.S. forces sent to world trouble spots would operate their supply depots, staging areas and operational headquarters at sea, rather than on land.

Lt. Col. Thomas Doran, program management operations officer for the Motor Transport, Ground Transportation and Engineer Systems at Marine Corps Systems Command, said, “A lot of things we have right now in our medium and heavy fleet don’t really fit into the concept of sea basing, and neither does vehicle armoring.

“A vehicle that does a HUMVEE-like mission carries eight men or 2.5 tons of cargo. You now have a vehicle that meets the ballistic and blast protection requirements, but that HUMVEE that normally weighs 10,000 pounds now weighs 50,000.”

Therefore, it cannot be deployed forward by air, and a landing craft can carry only one, rather than six.

The Corps’ 3,100 HUMVEES in Iraq include 500 fully armored M1114 and M1116 versions that protect against some armor-piercing projectiles and antitank mines. HUMVEEs with the MAK, first fielded early this year, have reinforced doors with ballistic glass, flank and undercarriage protection.

However, “from a maintenance perspective, the M1114 has some trend areas that need to be worked on. Their transmissions fail at a cyclic rate and air conditioner compressors need to be worked on,” said Master Gunnery Sgt. Pamela Smith, motor transport maintenance chief for II MEF Forward, now on her fourth tour in Iraq.

“The problem is the Marine Corps is an amphibious service. You will never convince me you can ford with this turbo charger [on the M1114/M1116]. That’s one of the predominant reasons the Marine Corps didn’t buy into the program before the war,” she said. “The vehicle was demonstrated to ford in 40 inches of water, but the engine was cool at the time. … At operating temperature, splashed with water, the turbo charger would probably cause some damage; it would fissure at best.”

Today, the HUMVEE program is a joint effort managed by the Army. But at the time the M1114 was developed, it was an Army-only vehicle. It was never designed to fulfill the multipurpose mission the Corps is requiring it to do.

“The 1114 is an armored car — that’s all it does,” said Craig MacNab, spokesman for HUMVEE maker AM General. “The Marine Corps has worried about the turbo charger, and it has not been tested extensively for fording issues.”

MacNab said the additional maintenance problems are attributed to the stresses placed on the vehicles by missions for which it was never designed.

“The M1114 cannot be the light-class armored vehicle for the future, just because the HUMVEE is now at the high end of its capabilities. We’ve made it do the most it can,” Doran said.

The Corps has spent decades trying to streamline its fleet, and now faces the possibility that multiple vehicles may have to be added to the light tactical fleet in order to accommodate armoring, logistics capability, and command-and-control suites that are affected by steel armor. The weight of that steel plating will be the determining factor in future planning for the Corps’ light vehicles.

The Corps’ Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, currently in development, is one of a class of amphibious combat vehicles designed to carry first assault troops from the ship directly into battle. The HUMVEE and related tactical vehicles are designed strictly for land use as tactical, command and control, and support vehicles.

“We’re going to be thinking of something entirely different 10 years from now, because the Marine Corps is still trying to round out that concept of sea basing,” Doran said.

However, “the technology of hardening vehicles is not moving very quickly — we’re still using steel,” Doran said. “There are a lot of composites and ceramics and other things pitched to us, but they are expensive and they don’t lend themselves to long-term vehicle planning. Right now there still exists a capability gap.”

The immediate challenge is to ensure that current vehicles are “armored to the level that we ask,” he said. A second priority is “to look for something that is not just marginally better, but is that quantum leap better,” justifying investment by U.S. Forces.

The Army currently fields almost 120,000 vehicles and, by sheer numbers alone, will influence future joint acquisitions. Marine Corps Systems Command officials said they welcomed the additional resources provided by joint planning. But the Corps is looking to the future when it may have to justify to Congress a divergence from joint development of tactical vehicles.

That explains why the studies being conducted at Marine Corps Combat Development Command are critical. Col. Sue Schuler, program manager for Motor Transport, Ground Transportation and Engineer Systems at the command, said they are expected to provide “the analysis that determines where the Marine Corps’ future lies, and how to get there from here. They’ll have justification for planning and development.

“Joint planning makes sense for us, and if the interests [of the Army and the Corps] do overlap, then we have justification for joint programs.” After completion of the studies, “we’ll have a better idea of where we need to diverge from the Army or where we can work together,” she said.