INTERVIEW

"A Balanced and Lethal Force"

Vice Adm. John B. Nathman was graduated with distinction from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1970 and received the Naval Training Command's Outstanding Pilot Graduate Award when he was designated a naval aviator in 1972. Following duty with Fighter Squadron 213, Nathman graduated with distinction from the U.S. Air Force Test Pilot School and served as the training officer at the Navy Fighter Weapons School. His operational fleet assignments include command of Strike-Fighter Squadron 132 during combat operations against Libya in 1986. Nathman also has commanded the flagship USS LaSalle in the Persian Gulf during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Nimitz. During his command of the Nimitz, the ship was recognized with three consecutive Admiral Flatley Memorial Awards for fleet operational excellence. Nathman served as the director for logistics for Allied Forces Southern Europe during NATO's first operations in Bosnia, and later commanded the Nimitz Battle Group and Task Force 50 during operations in the Persian Gulf. He served as the director for air warfare on the staff of the chief of naval operations before assuming duty as commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (AIRPAC) in August 2000. A native of San Antonio, Texas, Nathman holds a master of science degree in aeronautical engineering.

Interview with Vice Admiral John B. Nathman Commander, Naval Air Force U.S. Pacific Fleet

Senior Editor Gordon I. Peterson interviewed Vice Adm. Nathman for this issue of Sea Power.

Sea Power: When one visits your historic headquarters here at North Island, it seems impossible not to recall naval aviation's storied past in the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Do thoughts about those early days occasionally cross your mind?

NATHMAN: It is an incredible history that traces the lineage of naval aviation on the West Coast. A planned historical upgrade to the headquarters will include painted murals that will capture what has happened--all the way from our seaplane days, to the carriers that were moored here right before World War II, to the Vietnam War, and on to the present day.

While I was an instructor at Navy Fighter Weapons School I edited the Top Gun Journal and had the chance to interview Admiral John Thach. As the commanding officer of Fighter Squadron Three during World War II, he developed what came to be known as the "Thach Weave" that figured so importantly during the Battle of Midway--the tactic of having two pairs of fighters operate together for mutual protection. I learned that we shared some of the same assignments during our careers.

Our murals will depict many of the people who forged naval aviation in the Pacific--people like Admiral Arthur Radford. He finished his career as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs, but he had served earlier as a carrier commanding officer, a carrier division commander, and the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. Another naval officer who sticks out in my mind is Admiral John Towers. He grew naval aviation as a three-star here at AIRPAC during World War II to train and equip our aviation forces as they expanded so rapidly.

As a young JO [junior officer], I remember landing my F-4 here at North Island. As my squadron's line division officer, it was my job was to make sure that all 15 of our Phantoms were towed down to the pier and hooked aboard the USS Kitty Hawk.

I remember Kitty Hawk, Constellation, and Ranger--some of our real workhorses during the Vietnam War. I remember how hard they worked to sustain combat power in Southeast Asia. We want to renew these ties to our past.

You just offered a commentary on the remarkable longevity of the aircraft carrier. The Kitty Hawk still serves today with the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific.

NATHMAN: Yes, and she is in better shape today than when I made my first extended deployment on her in 1972. We rode her hard in those days. Two books that give you a real sense of who we are and where we came from as naval aviators are Fast Carriers: The Forging of an Air Navy, and Titans of the Sea. When I was N78 [director of air warfare on the Navy staff], I gave all my requirements officers a copy of Fast Carriers when they detached and left the Pentagon. That's what we were doing in N78--forging Navy air.

When you contemplate naval aviation's historical legacy in the Pacific, what are its most enduring capabilities in your vast geographic area of operational responsibility?

NATHMAN: In many ways, we represent precisely what the U.S. Third and Fifth Fleets stood for during World War II. They were essentially the same ships, aircraft, and Sailors--just led by different commanders--and they became known as "the fleet that came to stay." Well, we never left. We are still "the fleet that came to stay." Look at our contribution during the Korean War. Look at our sustained combat operations in Vietnam. Look at the Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific or the Fifth Fleet in the Persian Gulf today. The Navy was then, and is today, out there--doing its mission.

We have always found a way to go, and to stay, where we need to be. We provide two fundamental things to our nation--the presence to change people's minds about what they are about to do or not do, and projecting very real combat power that is unencumbered by diplomatic and political constraints. That translates into a great amount of influence in the world for the United States.

When you spoke at your assumption of command last year, you said that it would soon be impossible for the Navy to meet the nation's expectations in executing its operational tasks and completing the mission because of such low levels of funding. It is still early in your tour, but has your outlook changed?

NATHMAN: Much has changed in my view. CNO [Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Vern Clark] feels strongly that we need to properly align our forces, to understand our requirements, and to make the right investments for the right reasons. The new administration is still at a very early stage in trying to understand the funding challenges it faces and the right thing to do. They should be given the opportunity to do that without outside criticism. We are participating in the process, and that is important.

I worry that naval aviation has lost much of its resilience and capacity during the past 10 years. I feel very strongly about that. We have great capability, but we have lost much of our ability to sustain operations. Resilience comes from having people who are working at the appropriate level of effort with the right resources.

What really bothered me when I gave that speech [in August 2000] was the very high level of "consumption" of our forces that I saw without the proper level of investment. My analogy was akin to the teenage son who drives your car all night, runs it out of gas, and leaves it sitting dirty in the driveway.

The new administration has inherited a situation in which a tremendous investment is needed to restore the resilience of our forces. Our nation derives great value from its employment of naval forces: in the waters off Taiwan, Bosnia, Kosovo, the Middle East, and Korea. If one is to get great value out of something, then one ought to invest in it properly.

At current funding levels, aren't you faced with a severe challenge in balancing the costs of maintaining today's forces with needed investment in tomorrow's?

NATHMAN: We should understand that a proper investment has not been made in naval aviation for 10 years. We have already skipped a generation of aircraft by not buying them in the right numbers--an acknowledged "procurement holiday."

One of the toughest issues we face in naval aviation is an aging force. Age and obsolescence issues, in terms of supportability, have led to double-digit increases in the costs to support and operate that force. There's no way to drive operating and support costs down as long as we continue to fly airplanes this old--and they are getting older.

These costs also eat away at our ability to buy a newer force. It leads to a situation in which we're taking money at a faster rate from our recapitalization accounts to put into our sustainment accounts. You can do that only so long. If you have a flat top line, you'll simply run yourself into the ground just supporting what you have. We need to start buying new aircraft--now.

It's also very corrosive for your people's morale. How do the CNO's current efforts to define requirements better meet this challenge?

NATHMAN: It is the best kind of work we could be doing, and I'll give you some examples. We're doing a training-and-readiness [T&R] alignment review--not to take money out of flying hours, but to align the type of flying we need to do, whether it be with flight hours, simulators, or the right amount of ordnance to train to an appropriate level of combat readiness.

This will generate a credible and high-fidelity T&R document. Why? So the CNO can be confident that the money he invests is going to fund the program properly to generate the readiness that he wants for the force. We owe that to the CNO and to the naval aviation force.

He also will know the impact if the program is not fully funded.

NATHMAN: Yes. The CNO will understand exactly what we're doing, and we owe that to the system. We are making sure that we truly understand how to generate combat readiness for naval aviation. We are doing much in terms of alignment and readiness with our "Lead TYCOMs" [lead type commanders for air, surface, and submarine forces] in terms of the sustainment of near-term readiness.

It's important to execute the flying-hour program in an efficient manner. Efficient for what? Well, one requirement is to develop core competencies in your aircrews--things like landing on an aircraft carrier, landing a helicopter on the back end of a destroyer, or landing a P-3 [Orion maritime patrol aircraft] at night on a strange runway. The only way to generate many core competencies is by flying, but we also can develop many other readiness and combat skills in a flight simulator.

We must be sure we have the right balance and understand how we want to move to the future. I am very encouraged by what we are doing. It is a challenge, but we participate in the process completely. If it's wrong, I can only point a finger at myself. We will have a better ability to state our requirements properly and fund them.

You mentioned the CNO's "Lead/Follow TYCOM" initiative. How do you work this arrangement with your counterpart in the Atlantic Fleet and the Navy staff in Washington?

NATHMAN: The key term is not "lead/follow" but alignment. CNO wants one voice for aviation policy. Under the old arrangement many voices competed to speak for policy and requirements. Admiral Clark wants one aviation type commander to have the policy lead, and that's one of the things we're working on right now with Admiral Malone [Rear Adm. Michael D. Malone, commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet].

There's great work to be done on both coasts--by what I call the "waterfront staff" that is responsible for so much of the day-to-day execution of getting our forces combat-ready. I see the policy-and-requirements side residing more in the lead TYCOM, and that's the model we are headed toward. We really need to work on staff alignment and how we generate requirements so that we have an effective way to participate inside of OPNAV [the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations].

Are you aligning your priorities, activities, and command structure to focus on the goals and objectives identified by CNO?

NATHMAN: Exactly. We held an aviation flight officer conference in Pensacola [Fla.] last month to address a wide range of issues relating to our situation today. We discussed leadership challenges and how we should proceed.

We also spent time talking about an aviation strategic-business plan so that we develop a better understanding of and consensus for the way ahead. There's a lot of debate going on, and I think it's important for leadership at the top to have a strong connection right down to our captains and commanders. How we communicate information is important, and we want to make sure that people participate in areas where they can make a difference.

What are some of the key issues you face in meeting your responsibilities to "train, equip, and maintain" naval air forces in the Pacific?

NATHMAN: There is a first-order effect related to our aging aircraft, but the top issue in my view is the readiness of our nondeployed forces. Deployed readiness is good. In fact, it is darn good because we do a fine job of paying attention to it. We're aligned particularly well to sustain it--from parts support on aircraft carriers, to repair decisions, and to full visibility of all the readiness metrics.

Go to a naval air station, however, and it is a different story. Until recently, we had a less-than-complete picture of how well the facility was resourced to support readiness for nondeployed forces. I can describe an aircraft carrier to you in terms of aviation-readiness metrics, but a year ago you could not get that type of information for a naval air station.

We have looked at the right kind of functional alignment of our maintenance activities with our commodores to support "up" [i.e., operationally ready] aircraft. If I hold a commodore responsible for generating an air force at an air station to support his deployed operations or his nondeployed readiness, then he needs to have full visibility on the tools that allow him to do it. The commodores are now making daily repair decisions about what jets ought to be repaired and what is the best way to use the money that they're given in the flight-hour program.

If one is really going to influence the readiness of one's shore stations and the readiness of the air force, one must be businesslike in one's approach and have the right organizational alignment to support the operators. They must have the metrics for the business that we are in--which is getting airplanes up. We walked away from this issue for several years, but we're putting it back together. It is key.

Is your flying-hour program funded adequately?

NATHMAN: We are challenged in our flight-hour program, and the CNO has been very clear about the need for more money. Now is the time for supplemental funding.

We have prioritized our current funded flight hours to meet the highest sustainable level of combat readiness. It presently falls short of the CNO's goal of deploying with a fully combat-capable air wing that is able to meet all of the established warfighting requirements. With current funding we are able to deploy our forces at a readiness level that is capable of meeting most of our warfighting requirements. We are fully funding our FRSs [fleet replacement squadrons] and CNATRA [Chief Of Naval Air Training] to support our pilot and NFO [naval flight officer] training requirements for the fleet.

I am certainly not for coming off the level of flying needed for a safe and competent force. We have it now, but it is daunting to sustain it. We are not going to deploy a force that is not competent, nor will we compromise safety.

How are your officer and enlisted retention trends?

NATHMAN: Our enlisted retention trends are good this year. Admiral Ryan [Chief of Naval Personnel Vice Adm. Norbert R. Ryan Jr.] has done a world of good for the U.S. Navy in terms of retention with his visibility before Congress on important issues. The system has responded properly--be it the SRB [Selective Reenlistment Bonus program] or the realization that we have to provide a decent quality of service for our Sailors.

One of the important things we are doing on the enlisted side is to look at attrition very carefully. Our commanders need to know where we are and give retention their personal attention. We have baselined the force so we know where we stand, and we have told our commanders there are many very good tools to use to address attrition and retention.

There will be accountability. I have made it clear to leadership--not as a threat, but to explain the way we are going to do business. You baseline, you give your commanders the necessary tools, and then you hold them accountable. I think that's an important methodology.

Our officer retention is flat. On the aggregate, we're retaining about 31 to 32 percent of rated officers--our pilots and the NFOs. We need to retain around 39 percent, and it's a hell of a challenge. The marketplace is pretty good. We have reshaped bonuses, and we have tried to be fair in explaining what we are doing, exactly where the force is going, and what they are going to do.

There's a lot of work that needs to be done, and a lot of it has to do with insightful commanding officers--commanding officers working with a junior officer as a placement officer for naval aviation to support that junior officer's growth, leadership skills, and desire to stay with us.

Last year the Navy's inspector general [IG] issued a comprehensive report that said naval aviation faced a "readiness dilemma" characterized by shortages of spare parts and other deficiencies. Are you seeing improvements today as the result of Navy programming decisions that will fully fund the aviation spares account?

NATHMAN: Since POM '98 [the Program Objective Memorandum for fiscal year 1998], billions of dollars have migrated out of our recapitalization programs into our readiness accounts. It has made a difference.

AIRPAC had something like 240 engines pulled from aircraft--what we call bare firewalls--in 1998. Today we have eight. I was the commander of Carrier Group Seven in 1997, and I had an S-3 [Viking antisubmarine warfare aircraft] squadron that was down to one operationally ready jet at the start of their turnaround. Today they have seven of eight. During the height of our operations in Kosovo we had 86 EA-6Bs [Prowler] aircraft. Today we have 109. So there have been some tremendous improvements.

CNO is moving about $2 billion into what I call the sustained-readiness accounts, so the situation is getting better. I don't know if we can ever meet everyone's expectations, but we are going to generate a combat-ready force that supports a level of readiness to meet the challenges of the interdeployment training cycle and deployments that meet the expectations of our operational commanders.

How serious are your problems with the maintenance and upkeep of shore installations?

NATHMAN: The infrastructure problem is serious--just drive around our bases and you can see the problems. The real-property maintenance of facilities has been systemically underfunded--not because we didn't care, but simply because the money wasn't there. Many of our facilities are old and wearing out. For our air stations we need better electronics support, whether it's radios for ground control, instrument systems for ground-controlled approaches, or lighting systems. Again, CNO has made it very clear that we need to move forward to fix them.

The Navy IG also concluded last year that "acceptable levels of risk" had been exceeded in naval aviation. Is that still the case today?

NATHMAN: Almost all our accidents this year have had some measure of skill-based errors. In other words, there was an aircrew error associated with the accident.

Does this mean we have a bad aircrew? No. One of the things that has happened to us in the last six years has been an under-execution--I use these words carefully--or underfunding of the flying-hour account. We under-executed for many years because we didn't have the airplanes or the parts to do it.

As a result, we have created an experience gap in our force, and I believe that it was this experience gap that the Navy IG identified. If you compare lieutenant commanders with 12 years of service today to one maybe 10 years ago, they probably have an average of about 400 hours less flying time than the officer of a decade ago. That experience gap troubles me because these lieutenant commanders are your mission commanders--the people who lead strikes and lead the JOs.

There are only two ways to attack the experience gap. One way is to fly--and that means a flying-hour account with the right requirements and level of investment. The other way is to migrate some of our training and experience into flight simulators.

Naval aviation is committed to a plan that will enable simulators to contribute to and enhance fleet readiness by providing high-fidelity, realistic training to improve preparation prior to flight, and improve combat readiness by simulating complex environments not easily replicated regularly in flight. Simulators will enhance and supplement training. They will never replace the requirement to have the core competency in terms of flying on and off aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers and from remote fields. But they do provide an enormous opportunity to sustain and improve combat readiness in a much more fundamental way for naval aviation than they do now. We need to move there as an aviation force.

Naval aviation's capabilities have been improved continuously during the past decade--even as some people in Washington talk of the need to transform the force for the future. What is your take on this issue?

NATHMAN: Our forward-deployed naval forces provide incredible value to the nation. We need to educate the American public and Congress on this one. Our carriers have access, and we are putting sensors, links, and aircraft in place that will change our power-projection capability by an order of magnitude compared to what we had during Desert Storm.

That's what I think is really important for everyone to understand--the American public, the president, and the secretary of defense. An aircraft carrier can move 720 miles in one day. It deploys as part of a carrier battle group that provides a great amount of offensive and defensive capability--possessing an incredible amount of survivability and combat efficiency.

We as a nation should clearly understand the value provided by our carrier battle groups before we ever think about trying to substitute something else for them. Virtual presence is actual absence. Our country needs to think carefully about how we're going to influence events ashore if, suddenly, we reduce our carrier force. The logic--or lack of it--defies me right now.

One anecdote making the rounds in Washington today is that when Vice President Cheney was the secretary of defense he kept a copy of the carrier battle groups' operating schedule on his desk--he wanted to know where they were every day.

NATHMAN: I'll add one more thing as it relates to network-centric warfare and our ability to share information in the battle space, whether it is for striking a target or maritime dominance. When you combine this information and know-ledge revolution with the ongoing revolution in our striking capabilities, these revolutions will dramatically change the ability of our naval force to influence events ashore.

Do you have any final message for the members of the Navy League and other readers of Sea Power?

NATHMAN: The challenges our naval aviation force faces today are great. The current global situation requires an aggressive tempo of forward presence, constant vigilance, and--if needed--rapid response. Our deployed readiness is good. Our aircraft carriers and air wings, maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft, and helo detachments are forward-deployed. We are engaged to make a difference. We contribute to stability in regions of the world that our country believes are vital to its economic health and security. Our forward naval forces set the conditions for success politically and strategically.

However, the current readiness of our nondeployed forces is the most challenging issue we face. We spend a great amount of time at AIRPAC making sure that we work hard during the interdeployment training cycle to get the aviation force ready. We work hard to ensure we satisfy the requirement for parts, that ready airplanes are available on the ramp, that maintenance capability rates are high enough, and that the alignment of ranges and flight hours are there to bolster nondeployed readiness. It's a tough challenge.

Looking at the way ahead, we must recapitalize our aging fleet of aircraft. We need to buy real airplanes now. We must also maintain the unmatched combat power of our large-deck aircraft carriers and multimission-capable air wings. We are currently a very balanced and lethal force. We must sustain that capability.