SPECIAL REPORT: The Case for the Carrier

Aircraft Carriers and Sea-Based Air Power: Smaller Is Not Better ... And Numbers Do Count!

By RICHARD C. ALLEN

Vice Adm. Richard C. Allen retired from active duty in 1996 as commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, and is the immediate past president of the Association of Naval Aviation.

At the height of the recent crisis between the People's Republic of China and the United States, sparked by the midair collision of a U.S. Navy EP-3E Orion Aries signals-intelligence aircraft and a Chinese F-8 fighter in international airspace, the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) reportedly suggested three courses of action for the two-month-old administration of President George W. Bush.

All of those options depended on having flexible and effective air power at hand--in the form of the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk and its multimission air wing, the unstated "big stick" in the quiet and delicate but high-stakes diplomacy between Beijing and Washington.

The carrier was underway in the Gulf of Thailand en route to a port visit in Guam when the incident flared, resulting in the death of the Chinese pilot and forcing the damaged Orion to land on Hainan Island. There the U.S. crew of 24 men and women was detained until diplomats achieved their release.

PACOM's reported suggestions included sending the Kitty Hawk aircraft carrier battle group (CVBG) on a slow northward track through the South China Sea to signal strong U.S. interest in resolving the crisis quickly. Another option called for the carrier and its escorts to "linger" near the Philippines or, the third option, to continue on an easterly course toward the U.S. territory of Guam for its scheduled port visit. When the aircrew was finally liberated, Kitty Hawk remained in position, ready to respond if needed.

One lesson to be drawn from the incident is that having 70-plus tactical and support aircraft at sea­­ready where and when they were needed, fully sustained by underway replenishment vessels, and accompanied by multimission surface warships and attack submarines in an area in which U.S. access to land bases and facilities was at best negligible­­gave the United States political and military options that could be provided only by naval forces.

Ultimately, the Bush administration opted for a quieter diplomatic approach to resolve the crisis, but sea-based tactical air power embarked on the sovereign U.S. "territory" of a large-deck aircraft carrier was once again shown to be something the United States cannot afford to do without.

At a time when all aspects of U.S. national-defense programs are under increasing scrutiny and the review of "big-ticket" acquisition items by the Bush administration is the order of the day, would-be reformers should take heed of a salient point relating to aircraft carriers and their embarked advanced aircraft: Smaller is not better, and numbers do count.

Why Carriers?

In early 2001, work was well under way, as part of the second Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), to define a new framework for critical decisions about America's defenses when President Bush announced a parallel review that would leave no stones unturned in transforming the U.S. military to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Other calls had already been raised for a radical restructuring of the nation's forces, particularly naval forces.

A central target in some studies has been the large-deck nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs), with pundits and analysts alike offering opinions about: (a) the "real" number of carriers needed in the 21st century; (b) the alleged vulnerability (particularly to asymmetric threats) of these 96,000-ton warships; and (c) the relative attractiveness of smaller, stealthier, and more easily dispersed "air-capable" warships (some no larger than 700 tons) or even submarine "arsenal ships."

Despite real-world experiences that clearly and repeatedly underscored the value and survivability of sea-based tactical aircraft operating from large-deck carriers, their operational requirements and military worth have had to be explained at regular intervals since the end of World War II. The earliest confrontation, in 1948, was cast as a competition between the first "supercarrier," the United States, and the Air Force's B-36 bomber.

That carrier was laid down on 18 April 1949, but was canceled four days later. Scrapping of the B-36 bomber began in 1956, and by 1959 all B-36s were out of service. The changing nature of the threat and advancing technology made them obsolete--just as the carrier force began its renaissance. It is worth noting, however, that since 1954 large-deck carriers--and, since 1968, nuclear-powered large-deck carriers--have always been the preferred design for the nation's sea-based aviation forces.

Most fundamentally, naval forces, particularly those centered on large-deck carriers, act as the "eyes, ears, and fists" that assure immediate U.S. access to potential trouble spots with sufficient combat power to protect important U.S. interests and/or to facilitate the deployment of follow-on joint forces. Operating from international waters and airspace--and unencumbered by the need for diplomatic clearance--aircraft carriers and their multimission air wings, surface warships, and submarines constitute agile, mobile, flexible, and effective "forces of choice" that will continue to be of great strategic value to the United States.

A carrier battle group's greatest tactical advantages are endurance (now measured in months, not minutes), access-assurance, on-scene deterrence, sea-control and power-projection, and overland-defensive capabilities--all achieved without infringing upon the sovereignty of any other nation.

Enjoying freedom of movement throughout the high seas and operating from international waters in the littorals of the world, carriers and their associated combat and support forces can assure sustained access that does not depend on a foreign nation's willingness to host U.S. forces, provide supporting infrastructure, or approve overflight requests.

When called upon, sea-based air power can respond at a moment's notice to put ordnance on critical targets, accurately and precisely, 24 hours a day, in all weather, against any foe, and throughout extended periods of operation.

A Multimission Force and Ordnance on Target

The increasing value of sea-based aviation also is underscored by improvements in the lethality of a carrier air wing's weapons since the early 1990s. Indeed, "tons on target" is no longer an adequate measure of strike effectiveness. In terms of the number of "aimpoints" that can be hit each day with precision munitions, today's air wing enjoys a nearly 500 percent increase in effectiveness compared to the capabilities demonstrated during Operation Desert Storm in 1991--and with a significantly enhanced kill capability per sortie. The Navy expects an additional 200 percent increase in "aimpoint efficiency" by 2008 as newer weapons join the fleet.

Throughout a 30-day campaign, a carrier air wing in 2001 can deliver approximately 5,000 precision-guided weapons; depending upon the exact scenario, it can launch more than 200 sorties per day, and strike nearly 700 discrete aimpoints. By 2010, the air wing will be capable of some 215 sorties that can strike 1,080 aimpoints every 24 hours.

Certainly, land-attack cruise missiles are integral elements of any sea-based strike, and Tomahawks already have been used in large numbers and in a manner that nicely complements the employment of sea-based manned tactical aircraft. Similarly, the contributions of land-based air power, once introduced into an area of operations, are valuable assets during joint campaigns. But their immediate-response capabilities and flexibility are considerably less than those represented by an aircraft carrier and its multimission air wing­­on-station, ready to act.

For example, the payload of in-service Nimitz-class carriers goes well beyond the aircraft in their air wings. Each ship carries some 3,000 tons of ordnance and up to 3.5 million gallons of jet fuel. And, because ordnance and jet fuel--along with spare parts for the aircraft, and food and other consumables for the crew--can be replenished at sea, carrier-based aircraft can deliver a large volume of precision ordnance around the clock for an indefinitely sustained campaign, while also conducting numerous other vital missions.

Thus, by being there before the start of a crisis or conflict, a carrier battle group ensures that U.S. military force is immediately employable by the U.S. national command authority. A forward-deployed CVBG ensures that the "door remains open" to enable the deployment of follow-on forces from the continental United States.

Recent crises like NATO's air war in Kosovo have shown that the United States will need all the air power it can muster during the critical early days of a conflict. But today's force of 12 carriers and 10 carrier air wings (CVWs) means that a carrier may not be on-scene when a crisis breaks out, and that it may not be possible to divert additional carriers already forward-deployed for critical missions in other regions.

This lesson was forcefully (and unfortunately) illustrated in the Mediterranean Sea during the initial stages of Operation Allied Force in 1999. Because of the current "gapping" policy reluctantly imposed on U.S. unified commanders as the result of insufficient numbers of carriers, the USS Enterprise was redeployed to the Persian Gulf at precisely the wrong moment eight days prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Kosovo--notwithstanding the USCINCEUR (U.S. commander in chief, European Command) requirement for continuous carrier presence in NATO's southern region.

In fact, carrier presence in the Mediterranean dropped to a historic low in 1998--just 40 percent of the year. As Vice Adm. Daniel J. Murphy Jr., then commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, later told Congress, "There are simply not enough carrier battle groups, amphibious ready groups, and submarines to meet global requirements."

Numbers Matter

During the height of the Cold War in the mid-1980s, the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy called for 15 "deployable" CVBGs and 600 "battle-group-capable" ships to carry out sequential global operations. A minimum of 15 CVBGs was considered the "prudent-risk" force, although some defense planners knew that the "minimum-risk" force objective was 22 CVBGs­­far more than the nation allegedly "could afford." The happy coincidence was that 15 carriers and 14 air wings would satisfy regional warfighting commanders' requirements for peacetime forward-presence and crisis response in important regions of the world.

Today, the 15 CVBG/14 CVW/600-ship Navy is little more than a forlorn memory. The nation's 12 carriers and 10 air wings are still critical "nodes" in the much smaller 300-ship fleet, though--but they are under increasing operational and fiscal strain. Indeed, at a time when U.S. interests and friends both seem to be in jeopardy almost everywhere, the nation's naval forces have been busier than ever. During the Cold War, the Navy responded at the president's direction to a different international crisis every nine weeks or so, on average. By the late 1990s, the response rate had increased to one every three weeks.

Because of the shipbuilding "holiday" of the last 10 years, it has become apparent, according to recent projections, that a 10-carrier/250-ship fleet--or smaller--is increasingly likely unless dramatic changes in approach and funding are made. There are growing concerns that the current reviews may lead to ill-founded decisions about America's carriers from which there may be no easy­­or inexpensive­­way to recover.

Given the requirements of the regional warfighting commanders, no fewer than 15 large-deck carriers and 14 carrier air wings are needed to provide 100-percent CVBG "coverage" of three major areas of responsibility (AORs): the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and the Northwest/Western Pacific. Since 1993, however, the U.S. global naval force presence policy has been based on the inevitability of significant "gaps" in carrier coverage in these regions.

As a result of the combination of downsizing and the increased operating tempo, the Navy's carrier force is being stretched increasingly thin to meet even these constrained global commitments. It is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain a balance between ensuring today's combat readiness and at the same time modernizing and recapitalizing the force needed for the decades ahead. The emphasis on combat readiness for U.S rotational forces is critical; when battle groups deploy today, the odds are great that at some time during their forward-deployed operations they will engage in actual combat. All of the last 11 CVBGs to deploy have experienced this reality.

This unavoidably high operational tempo, coupled with the reality of actual combat, has caused the diversion of more and more resources toward sustaining current readiness--but at the expense of recapitalization. Operational commitments have been met, but only by the cannibalization of scarce parts and by cross-decking critically needed people, ordnance, and equipment. In both the 2001 QDR and the review being conducted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, therefore, the Navy must underscore the reality that force levels need to take into account the high usage rates expected in any future security environment. The "do more with less" posture of the 1990s can no longer be sustained.

Size and Mobility: The Keys to Survival

During the Navy League's Sea-Air-Space Exposition in April, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Vern Clark said the following about the alleged vulnerability of carriers to asymmetric threats: "Maybe in the future we will have to worry about it more than we have to worry about it today. But for now and the near term, there is no more powerful, no more capable platform anywhere in the world than an American large-deck aircraft carrier."

Just as quantity has a quality all its own, so does size. Numerous studies and analyses carried out since the mid-1950s have shown that, compared to smaller ships, large-deck carriers are much more survivable against a wide variety of threats. They will continue to be so for the foreseeable future. Any susceptibility to attack is mitigated by the carrier's mobility, organic self-defense systems, embarked air wing, and area defenses (afforded by surface warships and submarines).

A would-be attacker must penetrate sophisticated theater-wide and area-layered defenses--and land numerous hits--to put a carrier out of action. Carriers can withstand considerable damage, thanks to their large size, the distribution of redundant systems throughout the ship, their high-strength steel and sophisticated armor, their ballistic plating, and their underwater protective systems.

The carrier's ability to withstand severe punishment was--unfortunately and unintentionally--vividly demonstrated in 1969 when nine 500-pound bombs (the equivalent of six Soviet cruise missiles at the time) exploded on the flight deck of the USS Enterprise during a fire resulting from the detonation of a rocket's warhead. Despite the damage done, the Enterprise could have resumed flight operations within hours. Today's new carriers are even tougher and more survivable.

Before it can be hit, moreover, the carrier must first be detected. Targeting a carrier is much more difficult than finding its general operating area--which, during a 24-hour period, could encompass several thousand miles of ocean. The intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance challenges facing a would-be attacker, therefore, are both complex and resource-intensive.

Few potential adversaries possess such capabilities today, and their sensors and weapons are themselves vulnerable to operational deception and attack. "These platforms [aircraft carriers] are tough with all kinds of defensive but also powerful offensive systems," the CNO told the Navy League. "They are mobile, and they are fast ... which translates into a 700-square-mile area of uncertainty in 30 minutes. In an hour-and-a-half it grows to 6,300 miles and, friends, that presents one heck of a targeting problem."

Size also contributes significantly to seakeeping qualities and to the ability to conduct flight operations safely in severe weather around the clock. While today's larger high-performance tactical aircraft have imposed design requirements for larger flight decks--from the 81,500 tons (full load) of the first post-WWII carrier, USS Forrestal, to today's 96,000-ton Nimitz-class CVNs--so too has the demand to conduct flight operations 24 hours per day and in sea states and weather conditions that would completely shut down a much smaller ship.

Taking into consideration both the size and the capabilities of the new aircraft coming into service, the large-deck carrier and its air wing will have the ability to operate "24/7" and in virtually all weather conditions. The question that must be asked, therefore, is whether "part-time" sea-based air power staged on small "air-capable" ships is acceptable in future crises and conflicts. If past is prologue, the answer is a resounding "No!"

The tangible and intangible contributions of nuclear propulsion to operational effectiveness also must be factored into this complex equation. The endurance of today's nuclear-powered aircraft carrier is measured in millions of miles. The CVNs are capable of 25 years of operations before having to be refueled. Nuclear-powered carriers have the ability to steam at high speed from one operating area to another, without the need to replenish. They arrive on station ready for immediate action.

A Needed Investment in U.S. National Security

Despite the hopes of most Americans to transition to an era of reduced conflict and crises during the post-Cold War era, there has been no reduction in the operational and personnel tempos required to meet U.S. global commitments, and the increased pace of operations has strained the Navy's people and their equipment. In short, the delicate balance between matching strategic requirements with needed resources has been thrown off-center. But "doing much more with much less" has become the mantra and the reality of the U.S. armed forces in recent years.

If the United States expects to preserve its position of world leadership, to assure access to world regions of importance, and to have the credible military force needed to deter conflict--and/or to respond to crises and win wars--it must invest more in all elements of U.S. national security, particularly in its versatile, capable, and forward-deployed naval expeditionary forces. The Bush administration is now poised to make a dramatic course-change to make things right.

The dramatist and writer Ben Jonson once remarked, "Good fortune smiles on the audacious." It is past time for the Navy to be audacious in articulating its "real" requirements, as the chief of naval operations has emphasized. Analysis and real-world experience clearly show that any reductions below the current force structure of 12 aircraft carriers and 10 air wings would pose great risk to U.S. national security and to the well-being of this nation's allies around the world.

Moreover, the increasingly chaotic and troubled international-security environment of recent years, combined with the higher-threat scenarios projected for the future, suggests that 15 large-deck carriers and 14 air wings would really be "the right stuff" for the United States of America.