Core Competencies and Collective Readiness

The Marine Corps Aviation Campaign Plan: A Blueprint for Tomorrow

By BRUCE B. BYRUM

Brig. Gen. Bruce B. Byrum, USMC (Ret.), is the technical director for the Aviation, Expeditionary, and Undersea Warfare Division of the Ship Programs Group, Techmatics Division, of the Anteon Corporation.

Several years ago, the Marine Corps found itself using aviation resources at a rate that could not sustain long-term combat readiness. Aircraft were being flown above programmed utilization rates, and demands on Marines to maintain aging aircraft were increasing.

In 1997, Marine aviation set in action a bold plan to examine the issues involved and find solutions to some of its most pressing problems. The goals of the plan, referred to as the Marine Aviation Campaign Plan (MACP), were to:

* Maximize the combat readiness of Marine Corps aviation;

* Provide a better balance between resources and requirements; and

* Find new ways to bring together expanding technologies, improved aviation manning, and the manageable operational tempo needed to sustain Marine Corps aviation capability.

The MACP is a living document updated at least biennially. It focuses on tactical units--squadrons, battalions, and air groups--and encompasses all facets of Marine aviation from tactical aircraft to command and control to maintenance and support. It recognizes that manpower and equipment are the Corps' principal resources and concentrates on four major areas: (1) manpower (officer and enlisted); (2) operations, training, and readiness; (3) the material condition of aircraft; and (4) risk management.

Aviation Manpower (Enlisted)

Marine aviation was experiencing enlisted manning shortfalls across all aviation communities. Fewer personnel meant working harder just to sustain peacetime operations. The first goal of the MACP was to increase manning for all aviation units to ninety percent. Although this meant there would be fewer aviation-skilled Marines available for nonaviation billets, the Marine Corps as a whole stepped up to the requirement. Currently, the goal of 90 percent manning is being met across most aviation communities.

While having the total number of Marines needed is important, having the appropriate skill levels also is essential. The fact that many aviation skills require months of schooling and on-the-job experience before a Marine becomes qualified also is relevant. In order to retain appropriate experience and expertise among aviation personnel, Marine aviation needed a way to modify the enlisted rank structure so it could keep qualified personnel in aviation longer and still allow ample opportunity for increased responsibility and for higher pay and allowances. As a result of the MACP's findings, the Marine Corps manpower budget was revised to allow for an increase in the numbers of the top six enlisted ranks (E4 to E9), so that aviation could keep experienced Marines in its ranks longer.

Aviation Manpower (Officer)

High operational tempo and a thriving economy also had taken their toll on aviator retention. Although the number of aviators resigning had leveled out, retention at the squadron level was still a concern. Quality leadership is essential to the success of Marine aviation, so the Marine Corps supported increases in aviation continuation pay as a long-term incentive for aviators to make the Marine Corps a career.

Marines also understand, however, that no one factor influences an officer's decision to stay. It is more likely that intangibles like esprit de corps, camaraderie, leadership, opportunity for command, and the challenges of being skilled at one's profession have an equal, if not greater, impact. For that reason, the MACP put strong emphasis on improving the opportunities of younger aviators to remain in the cockpit, while challenging them to take on increasing roles of responsibility and leadership.

The combination of aviation continuation pay and new assignment policies has reduced resignations among first-term aviators--but officer manning in aviation units still remains below 90 percent, due largely to various time-to-train factors.

The Marine Corps estimates that it is taking nearly twice as long as it should to train new aviators. There are a number of legitimate reasons for this, but the most important ones are that new accessions are not evenly distributed throughout the year, and budgeting shortfalls affect resource availability in the training command. To assist in evening out the distribution, the MACP supported an adjustment in the maximum numbers of aviators in each Marine Corps Basic School class; that adjustment spread out the flow of aviators headed to flight school and made scheduling more manageable.

Related efforts such as the Naval Aviator Production Process Improvement (NAPPI) program also have helped in streamlining the training process, but it takes more than changing policy to affect time-to-train--it also takes a commitment of resources. For that reason, the MACP also postulated that training units must be provided the manpower, logistics, and maintenance support they need, and that instructor billets must be manned at 100 percent.

The goal of the MACP is to produce the number of aviators the Marine Corps requires within 10 percent of the programmed time-to-train schedule. While aviator production is reaching that goal, it still takes more than a year longer than it should to train a tactical fixed-wing aviator (40 percent above programmed goal). Delays in aviator time-to-train conservatively cost the Marine Corps an estimated 150 officer man-years per year.

Operations, Training and Combat Readiness

The second major area of interest is operations, training, and combat readiness. Something had to be done to reduce the demands on the Corps' scarce and overworked resources. One of the first things the MACP examined was the use of flight hours as a metric for training. Marines believe that quality and frequency of events is more important than how many flight hours are logged.

The MACP directed a transition to sortie-based training to: (1) emphasize unit mission capability; (2) train to core competencies; and (3) base training requirements on sorties rather than on flying hours. The initial goal of the MACP has been to establish an appropriate frequency for aviators (12-15 sorties per month) that is based on the experience and the skill levels needed to support training and proficiency.

Marine aviation also could no longer afford to put too much emphasis on training for high-risk missions that have a low probability of being flown in combat. The MACP directed units to focus on unit core capabilities, rather, and on the core skills of individual Marines. Essentially, Marine aviation shifted away from viewing combat readiness as the average of individual qualifications to one of collective unit readiness. This reduced the emphasis from qualifying everyone equally to the highest standard to a focus on having the right mix of the qualified crews needed to accomplish the unit's primary missions.

Each aircraft community has its own Training and Readiness (T&R) Manual that identifies its training requirements and establishes the currency or "re-fly" factors needed to maintain qualifications. To revalidate requirements, the MACP directed a complete and recurring review of the T&R syllabus across all of the Corps' aviation communities. Training events that did not reflect or support the squadron's mission were eliminated.

Simulation offers a cost-effective way to reduce demand on flight operations while actually improving training and decreasing the risk associated with some training scenarios. It also offers a way to train with weapons that exceed the capabilities of the training ranges available and/or that are too expensive to be expended in training, except in limited numbers.

The MACP set out to increase the use of simulators for training and readiness, to expand training capabilities by linking simulators and improving weapons simulation, and to update training based on the increased use of high-fidelity simulators.

The reviews of the T&R Manuals helped reduce the number of training events scheduled as well as the number of flight hours needed to sustain squadron combat readiness. Moreover, although the funding account for flying hours is different from the account used for simulators, the projected savings provided an incentive to put additional funding into simulators. The planned procurement of higher-quality simulators is still in progress, but when it is completed it will generate potential savings of millions of dollars in manpower, equipment, and cost of operations.

Marine aviation units could not afford to bankrupt the future by trying to sustain an operational tempo that exceeded the realistic limits of manpower and equipment. Every opportunity to reduce deployed time was examined by the MACP, therefore, and operations at home were adjusted to provide Marines more time not only to work on aircraft but also to spend with their families. In short, Marine aviation examined what missions it was flying and why those missions were being flown--and then reduced nonessential missions. Where achievable, training and support missions were combined.

The numbers of exercises and other "events" that squadrons were required to support also were reduced. Squadron commanders were directed to set and maintain reasonable limits--based on what could be legitimately supported by the unit's resources--on the number and type of activities scheduled. If an event is added to the schedule, another event must be taken out. Marine aviation set a goal to remain within a 5 percent deviation from what is planned, and is currently executing within 3.6 percent of the plan.

Aircraft Material Condition

A third major area of interest focused on maintaining the material condition of equipment on hand. In that context, it is worth pointing out that the Marine Corps several years ago adopted a strategy to reduce the number of different types of aircraft that it had to support, and to invest the savings in new programs--e.g., the MV-22 Osprey and the Joint Strike Fighter--that would provide a leap forward in technology. Unfortunately, those aircraft are not yet in Marine Corps inventories, and the recent decision to delay production of the MV-22 for further development and testing will further delay its introduction.

To ensure the Corps' long-term combat capability, the MACP directed commanders to preserve the material condition of current aircraft and systems by putting more emphasis on maintenance and less on operations. The MACP set a limit, for example, on the number of outstanding discrepancies (ten) that an aircraft could have before it had to be held down for maintenance.

Emphasis on reducing corrosion also was increased, and it was further mandated that depot-level maintenance would no longer be routinely delayed and that the "mission capable" goals set by OPNAV (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations) would be met or exceeded.

These goals put much-needed emphasis on maintenance. Unfortunately, though, the age of aircraft has a lot to do with how well commanders can meet the goals postulated. The CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter, to cite but one example, is almost 40 years old and in the past three years has been grounded several times. Despite programs designed to extend the service life of the aircraft, moreover, components are now failing that never failed before. How much longer aging airframes such as the CH-46 can be maintained without major reinvestment remains a big question, therefore.

Operational Risk Management

The fourth major area of interest seeks to improve sortie completion rates and to reduce in-flight mishaps while at the same time increasing operational efficiency and effectiveness. Risk is inherent in all military operations, and the consequences of a poor decision can be catastrophic.

When the MACP was first initiated, the Marine Corps was already in the process of adopting a program used by the U.S. Army to reduce aircraft mishap rates. That program, called Operational Risk Management (ORM), provides commanders, operators, and planners at all levels with effective methods for identifying and assessing risks. In short, it provides the tools needed to facilitate decisions that either eliminate or mitigate risks, and then provides the controls required to help manage risk where it does exist.

In every Marine Corps ready room, every brief now answers two questions: (1) "What risks are identified?" (2) "What is being done to reduce those risks to an acceptable level?" By identifying potential risks during the planning stage and then doing what can be done to lessen the impact of the risks identified, Marine aviation is not only increasing its chances for successful mission accomplishment, it also is conserving valuable resources and improving readiness. The institution of ORM has not yet reduced aviation mishaps significantly, but the number of mishaps attributed to supervisory error has declined.

To summarize: The Marine Aviation Campaign Plan sets policy, guidance, and direction. Although initially designed to assist in the management and preservation of the Marine Corps' aviation assets and to help sustain combat readiness, it is a dynamic document adaptable to change as old issues are resolved and new issues develop.

The long-term health of Marine Corps aviation ultimately rests in the hands of unit commanders, though. How they interpret and execute the guidance and objectives laid out in the MACP will determine how well Marine aviation will be able to support Marines both today and in the future.