Marine Corps Studies Lessons Learned In Iraq to Plan for Future Conflicts

By ARTHUR P. BRILL JR.

On the road to Baghdad, some Marine units had more guests traveling along than embedded news reporters. They also had Marine observers taking notes for the postwar lessons-learned report that will help the Corps prepare for the next conflict.

"Like any assessment process, it's figuring out what we did right and why," said Lt. Gen. Edward Hanlon Jr., commander, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Va. "I'm particularly interested in what didn't go right and fixing it."

As the Corps' combat developer, Hanlon oversees Marine training and the complicated process of getting new equipment. His command can change things that are not working, ranging from ill-fitting combat boots and defective combat vehicles to outdated tactics and training methods.

Embedded in key Marine air, ground, and logistics units, members of the Corps' assessment team observed the prewar planning, the battles, and the reconstruction efforts. Armed with laptop computers and Iridium phones, they were able to instantly call in their comments to a tabulation office at Quantico. Their job was to collect information, not to grade units.

Hanlon also gave the team numerous top-priority issues to report on, such as the Corps' new 7-ton truck, new bridging equipment, a sophisticated command-and-control program called the Blue Force Tracking System, and 5,000 Personal Role Radios distributed to small-unit leaders prior to deploying.

"We got to Baghdad, but did the equipment really hold up?" asked Hanlon. "Could we have done something better?"

Shortly after 9/11, when the Marines were preparing for Afghanistan, then-Commandant Gen. James L. Jones tasked Hanlon to do the lessons-learned process differently than in Desert Storm. In 1991, the Corps began collecting data after hostilities ceased, when units were packing up and Marines had other priorities.

Hanlon sent a 28-Marine assessment team into the Afghanistan theater of operations. Headed by Col. Philip J. Exner, the team worked mainly out of Bahrain and covered the Marine units in the area. It sent data to a 36-person analytical cell, working in the basement of Hanlon's headquarters building, that collated the material. Hanlon issued the final report late last summer.

What a difference a war makes! In Afghanistan, Marines did not have a single unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) at their disposal. In Iraq, Marines used their Pioneer and backpack-sized Dragon Eye UAVs and had better access to data from the Predator and other theater assets.

"My team will tell me how much we used UAVs and how important they were," said Hanlon. "It will help point the way for us regarding the next generation of UAVs."

Unlike Afghanistan, when Marines couldn't take artillery ashore, the Corps had at least five artillery battalions in Iraq that shot often. On some days, the 11th Marine (artillery) Regiment fired 300 short tons of ammunition, mostly from its M 198 towed 155mm howitzers.

"I think it was a good war for artillerymen," said Hanlon, who credited U.S. commanders for their planning and skilled use of air and ground fire support in defeating the Iraqi army so quickly.

Some experts were surprised by the Corps' mobility in keeping up with the Army in Iraq, but Marines often push their units great distances during training exercises at Marine Corps Air Station Twentynine Palms (Calif.). Their aging amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs) kept up with the speed of advance because the Corps upgraded the AAVs with new engines, transmissions, and suspension systems.

"With that much equipment on the move, you never know what will hold up," said Hanlon. "We'll see what the reports say, but it appears the AAV did what it's supposed to do. It got to Baghdad as fast as anybody."
Afghanistan proved once again the value of organic aviation, and Marine Air did not disappoint in Iraq. Apparently, the AV-8B Harrier jumpjet and the AH-1W Cobra attack helicopter deserved special close-air-support plaudits. The Cobra continually knocked out enemy tanks in front of advancing Marine units, which at times experienced the most intense USMC combat since Vietnam. Despite some prewar jitters about a Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC), Marine ground commanders got every Marine airplane they needed--and they could call the JFACC for additional support.

"I have not heard one negative thing about aviation, except that we have some old helos that need to be replaced," said Hanlon.

When Iraq loomed, Hanlon went to Jones and the incoming (33rd) commandant, Gen. Michael W. Hagee. Both agreed that reconstituting the assessment team was the right thing to do. Exner ran the main operation in Bahrain, sitting near Lt. Gen. Earl B. Hailston, commander, U.S. Marine Forces Central Command.

"The team collected info and called us along the way. Now that the combat ops have ceased, they're still doing it," said Hanlon. "The units have re-postured and we're sitting down with lieutenant colonel battalion commanders and lance corporals to get their views."

Hanlon expects to give the first cut of lessons-learned to Hagee in late summer. Public release is not expected until U.S. Central Command reviews the assessments provided by the various services and briefs Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld. The services are also working closely with the Joint Forces Command's lessons-learned staff, which is looking at things that impact the joint force, such as the optimum ways to deploy people to the fight.

Apparently, Marines deserve good marks in that area. Iraq once again validated the Corps' ability to rapidly deploy into a combat zone with large numbers of Marines and their equipment. At the peak of the conflict, 70,000 Marines served in Iraq. Two squadrons of maritime prepositioning force ships were downloaded in 16 days, and the Navy quickly moved two groups of amphibious ships from both coasts.
"I don't see anything right now looming from Iraq that will cause any major muscle movements in the Marine Corps," predicted Hanlon. "We're going more joint, not less. We'll continue to see more special forces-Marine interaction in the future. Hagee has also asked us to look at more joint training on the battalion and company levels."

The Marine Corps expected to be involved in sustained urban combat in Iraq and trained accordingly. A few years ago, the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory developed a realistic basic urban skills training (BUST) package for Marine units.

"We provided BUST to certain battalions before they went to Iraq. I'd be interested to know if it was useful," said Hanlon. "We didn't have as much urban combat as we thought, but we had some. Now we want to know if the Marines were prepared properly."

Hanlon is getting positive feedback about Marine training in general from the wounded Marines he visits at the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, Md. When he asks them about their experiences, they all say they were prepared. One young Marine told him, "I often wondered why my drill instructor at boot camp yelled at me as much as he did. Now I know why. In that firefight I reacted the way I'd been trained."

While Hanlon is pleased that Marines think their training is solid, the lessons learned will point out things that can be done better. "I don't know what they are yet, but I'm going to find out," he said. *

Arthur P. Brill Jr. is a frequent contributor to Sea Power.