By DAVID F. WINKLER

Dr. David F. Winkler is a historian with the Naval Historical Foundation.

This spring marks the 20th anniversary of the war for the Falklands Islands between Great Britain and Argentina.

Long claimed by Argentineans, who called them the Malvinas, the South Atlantic islands situated 400 miles east of the southern end of Argentina had been continuously settled by Britons since 1832 and had the status of a crown colony. In 1982, when the war broke out, some 1,200 settlers and 600,000 sheep inhabited the remote islands.

Seeking to divert public attention away from domestic problems that had beset the country in early 1982, Argentina's military junta, led by Gen. Leopoldo Galtieri, saw the conquest of the islands as an appealing option. In addition, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's 1981 decision to approve cuts in conventional naval forces and Argentina's confidence about its improving ties with the United States also factored into the junta's decision to risk aggressive action.

On 2 April, Argentina launched an amphibious invasion that quickly captured the Falklands. The even more remote South Georgia Island fell the next day. News of Argentinean forces overwhelming the islands' few Royal Marine defenders set off rejoicing in the streets of Buenos Aires.

Britain quickly dispelled any doubts that it would react militarily as the Royal Navy made ready for sea a formidable task force centered on the aircraft carriers HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible. Hermes, the older ship, had been built as a conventional light carrier, but later was modified for Sea Harrier operations with the installation of a jump ramp on the forecastle. The recently commissioned Invincible had been built from the keel up to operate Sea Harriers and ASW (antisubmarine warfare) helicopters.

On 5 April the two carriers departed Portsmouth for a rendezvous at Ascension Island with other Royal Navy combatant and auxiliary ships. Two days later, London declared a 200-mile Falkland Island Maritime Exclusion Zone, to take effect on 12 April. By that time, the Royal Navy had positioned the nuclear-powered attack submarines Spartan, Splendid, and Conqueror within the zone to enforce the declaration against Argentinean surface combatants.

The British commander, Rear Adm. J. F. "Sandy" Woodward, faced daunting challenges. To evict the growing Argentine ground forces from the disputed islands, Woodward would have to counter an Argentine Navy that included the light aircraft carrier Veintecinco [25] de Mayo and the gun cruiser General Belgrano--the former USS Phoenix. Many of the destroyers and submarines of the Argentine Navy were American hand-me-downs of World War II vintage, but the Argentineans also operated two modern British-built Type 42 destroyers armed with Exocet missiles, three new corvettes, and two German-built Type 209 diesel submarines.

Of even greater concern, the Argentine air order of battle included Exocet-carrying Super Etendards, Mirages, and numerous A-4 Skyhawks--with American-trained pilots in the cockpits. Finally, with winter in the southern hemisphere fast approaching, Woodward knew that adverse weather might greatly affect his timetable.

The prospect of a naval war pitting two of its allies against one another horrified the Reagan administration, then in the process of rejuvenating America's military and revitalizing U.S. alliances throughout the world to counter the rapidly growing Soviet threat. Washington initially took a neutral position on the war while it tried to broker a peaceful resolution. However, the administration quietly allowed Pan American Airline employees at Ascension Island to provide services for and fuel British aircraft that were bringing in supplies and personnel to support the Royal Navy's steadily growing armada of combatants and support ships.

On 18 April the two British aircraft carriers and their escorts departed the mid-Atlantic equatorial island and headed into the South Atlantic to execute "Operation Corporate." In London, meanwhile, the Ministry of Defence continued to requisition ships from Britain's merchant marine fleet. These STUFT (Ships Taken Up From Trade) vessels would perform a wide variety of essential chores ranging from fuel and water storage, salvage duties, repair work, and transport. The famed cruise ship Queen Elizabeth II was pressed into service as a troop transport.

On 21 April, British helicopters from the frigate Antrim and the fleet auxiliary Tidespring landed reconnaissance teams on a glacier on South Georgia Island. Alerted of the British naval activity, Argentina had the submarine Santa Fe (the former USS Catfish) discharge supplies and 20 marines at the island's port village of Grytviken on the 24th. The next day, a British Wessex helicopter caught the Argentine submarine departing on the surface. Two depth charges and subsequent air attacks crippled the Santa Fe, forcing it back into port, where it later sank.

Later that same day, British warships peppered the defending garrison with gunfire, enabling a small Royal Marine assault force to land by helicopter to storm and eventually capture the Argentine positions.

With its mediation efforts yielding no fruit, Washington declared support for Britain at the end of April, and imposed military and economic sanctions against Argentina. Besides providing vital intelligence, the United States also supplied the British a number of Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, which would prove critical in the coming battles.

In the early morning darkness of 1 May, 1,000-pound bombs dropped by a lone Vulcan bomber cratered the Port Stanley airstrip on East Falkland Island. Later that morning, Sea Harriers from Hermes put additional ordnance on the airstrip, and on another airfield at Goose Green. Royal Navy warships contributed to the damage by carrying out a shore bombardment against Argentine positions. Reacting, the Argentine Air Force launched 56 sorties against the British. The destroyer Glamorgan and frigates Alacrity and Arrow absorbed damage from near misses and strafing. British Sea Harriers on combat air patrol splashed four of the Argentine aircraft.

With British intentions evident, Contralmirante J.J. Lombordo planned to defend the "liberated" Malvinas by attacking with sea and air forces from several directions. Approaching undetected from the northwest early on the 2nd of May, the 25 de Mayo readied to launch what would have been the world's first carrier-against-carrier attack since World War II. However, the lack of wind thwarted the launch of his aircraft, forcing Lombordo to withdraw Argentina's lone carrier to the west.

Meanwhile, an Argentine surface action group--consisting of the General Belgrano and two destroyers--was on station at the southern edge of the Maritime Exclusion Zone--its movements reported to Woodward, however, by the nuclear-powered submarine Conqueror. Concerned that the three Argentine combatants might shake the tailing R.N. submarine and make a night run against the British naval forces off the Falklands, Woodward sought and obtained permission from London to have the Conqueror attack. With her torpedo attack, the British submarine achieved what the Japanese failed to do at Pearl Harbor, and the Brooklyn-class cruiser that first went to sea in 1938 passed into the depths of the South Atlantic, taking with her more than 300 of her crew. Of note, the two torpedoes that struck the death blows were even more ancient, having first entered service in 1932.

The loss of the General Belgrano effectively defanged the Argentine Navy, as Lombordo ordered the 25 de Mayo into coastal waters, where she would be relatively safe from the British submarines.

However, the Argentine air threat remained--and on 4 May proved lethal when an Exocet missile launched from a Super Etendard slammed into the Sheffield amidships. Heroic efforts failed to contain the spreading fire, and after four hours the order was given to abandon ship. Woodward received additional bad news that same day when a Sea Harrier was lost to Argentine ground fire while on a bombing mission over East Falkland Island.

The next two weeks saw British attempts at a blockade and Argentine attempts to resupply its Falkland garrison--short engagements that took a bloody toll on both sides. The British captured the Argentinean spy ship Narwal and sank the cargo vessel Isla de Los Estados. More Argentinean aircraft fell to Royal Navy surface-to-air missiles. A raiding party flown in by helicopter from Hermes destroyed an ammunition dump on Pebble Island and 11 additional aircraft. An Argentine A-4 holed the frigate Glasgow with a 1,000-pound bomb--which, fortunately for the British, failed to detonate.

Late on 20 May, using deception and the cover of darkness, Britain began to send in special forces and marines to secure positions around Port Carlos on the northwest corner of East Falkland Island. Then, well before daylight on 21 May, the British LPDs Intrepid, Fearless, and other amphibious ships staged an assault on four beaches, meeting only slight resistance (on one). As reinforcements and equipment poured ashore, British ground forces quickly expanded the beachhead to an area of 10 square miles.

Responding to the British landings, Argentine air forces took advantage of the surrounding mountainous terrain to swarm in against the British combatants supporting the operation. The frigates Antrim and Argonaut both took bomb hits, and 30mm shells pierced the skin of the Brilliant, damaging her operations room and several weapons systems. The Ardent took several bomb hits and had to be abandoned. However, the Argentineans lost another 17 aircraft and failed to disrupt the movement of troops ashore. The next day bad weather on the mainland grounded Argentine aircraft and gave the Royal Navy a respite, allowing more materials and troops to be landed.

On the 23rd, Argentine Skyhawks punctured the Antelope with two 1,000-pound bombs--which also failed to detonate. Hours later, however, one of the bombs exploded. during a valiant disarming attempt. Further magazine detonations doomed the Type 21 frigate. The Argentine airmen shifted tactics on the 24th and scored hits on some of the British amphibious ships. Once again, though, "duds" limited the damage inflicted.

The desperate air attacks on the 21st and 23rd cost Argentina over two dozen more aircraft. Despite their mounting losses of pilots and aircraft, the Argentineans lashed out again, hitting the British frigate Broadsword, and destroying her Lynx helicopter. The Coventry took a fatal broadside of 1,000-pound bombs dropped by a flight of Skyhawks, costing Britain another destroyer. However, the worst blow came later in the day when Argentine Super Etendards launched a pair of Exocets against the Hermes. Countermeasures diverted the missiles away from the carriers, but one of the missiles locked onto and penetrated the cargo ship Atlantic Conveyor, setting off uncontrollable fires. Eventually, she sank, along with hundreds of tons of vital supplies needed to support the forces ashore, including several helicopters needed to transport ground forces across the island to face the main body of Argentine defenders at Port Stanley. Nonetheless, and despite being deprived of air mobility, British marines and army forces set out from their beachhead on foot on the 26th.

Thinned by attrition, Argentine air forces could by this time launch only limited attacks. Ashore, the well-trained British ground units often came upon Argentinean units of greater size and armament, but repeatedly came away victorious. On 8 June, Argentine aircraft again met success, damaging the frigate Plymouth and sinking two landing ships, causing heavy casualties to the Welsh Guards. However, by that date enough ground forces were ashore to sustain the campaign, and British forces were soon entrenched on the outskirts of Port Stanley.

While the British ground forces ashore were assaulting the Argentine perimeter in a series of brutal attacks, Royal Navy warships were pounding the Argentinean ground forces with continuous naval gunfire. In a vain attempt to drive off the growing British armada, the shore defenders fired an Exocet missile that struck the destroyer Glamorgan, causing damage to her hangar and aft missile launcher. However, the missile hit could not postpone the inevitable. The defending Argentine commander, realizing the outcome could be prolonged--with needless loss of life--but not really changed, asked for a truce late on 14 June.

After a remarkable campaign, the Union Jack once again flew proudly over the Falklands. In addition to losing the islands themselves, the Argentine military also lost the cruiser General Belgrano, the submarine Santa Fe, and scores of attack jets. Approximately 650 Argentineans were killed. The country's military junta would be toppled shortly after the surrender of the last Argentine garrison at Port Stanley.

In Britain, Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government received considerable public acclaim, and the U.K. military forces became the toast of a grateful nation, but not without cost. Six British ships--including the combatants Sheffield, Antelope, Ardent, and Coventry--were sunk and 10 others damaged, with a total loss of 250 lives.

Both sides to the conflict, moreover--and other naval powers, including the United States--came away with various "lessons learned" that have influenced the conduct of naval warfare to the present day.

In Britain, a December 1982 Defence White Paper ("The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons") concluded by lauding the "superb quality and commitment of the British Serviceman." On the other side of the Atlantic, a February 1983 U.S. Navy Summary Report on the "Lessons of the Falklands" expanded on the White Paper's conclusion with the observation that, "in nearly every battle in recorded history, the performance, training, and morale of the personnel involved were the most important determinants in the outcome." Here it is worth noting that the British forces consisted entirely of volunteers who, having participated in numerous NATO exercises, had extensive experience in both offensive and defensive tactics. In contrast, although Argentine's airmen and marines performed well, its army conscripts--trained primarily for internal security and border patrol--fell short in battle.

The White Paper did not address the role played by British naval/military intelligence. In contrast, the U.S. Navy study focused on the importance of timely and accurate intelligence and argued the necessity of understanding the capabilities of weapons and sensor systems produced by allies as well as by potential adversaries. In his recent book On Seas of Glory, John Lehman echoes the findings in the Summary Report, noting that timely reports on enemy dispositions played a crucial role in the war. (The United States attempted at first to stay neutral, Lehman says, but did provide logistical support, satellite photography, and other critical intelligence to its long-time European ally.)

The British experience affirmed "defense-in-depth" principles that had served as the foundation of U.S. Navy doctrine since World War II. The White Paper and the Summary Report both faulted the British for their lack of a well-rounded carrier wing--complete with early warning aircraft and long-range fighters--and for lacking the close-in air-defense weapons that might have prevented at least some of the warship losses. Two decades later, the British are constructing a large conventional aircraft carrier capable of hosting an air wing such as that recommended. Modern, early warning aircraft will be embarked. Large amphibious assault ships suitable for expeditionary operations around the world also are planned.

The Royal Navy's Sea Harrier jets gave a good account of themselves in air-to-air action, destroying at least 20 Argentine aircraft vs. no Harrier losses. But the British jumpjets were too few in number and too limited in range to establish and maintain continuing air dominance over the battle zones. Until the last days of the war the Argentineans were able to fly logistical and medevac flights to and from Port Stanley.

The U.S. Navy took special note of the Argentineans' successful employment of antiship missiles. With three Exocet missiles scoring hits, both the Royal and U.S. Navies accelerated the acquisition of such close-in weapon systems as the Vulcan Phalanx CIWS, and also developed improved chaff and ECM (electronic countermeasures) systems.

For Argentina, which kept its fleet in port following the loss of General Belgrano, the need for competent ASW capabilities became a top priority. However, the British ASW efforts also were assessed as wanting after it was revealed that the Argentine submarine San Luis had operated in the vicinity of the British amphibious forces for an extended period of time.

The White Paper accurately described the role played by the British merchant marine and logistics infrastructure as "crucial." The Summary Report also lauded the successful ad hoc British effort to initiate and sustain a campaign more than 7,000 miles distant from British home waters. The Summary Report also observed that Argentina was able to land enough materials ashore to sustain its forces in the Falklands but lacked the distribution infrastructure to do any more than that--a flaw that proved fatal.

Retired U.S. Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Fred E. Haynes Jr., writing for Sea Power, also emphasized the importance of sealift and observed that the distance to the Persian Gulf from Norfolk is about the same as the distance from Great Britain to the Falklands. If war were to break out in the Gulf, he wondered with remarkable prescience, would the United States prove as logistically capable as the British were? The Gulf War demonstrated that at least some senior U.S. officials had taken note.

The lessons learned from the Exocet and bomb hits on British warships influenced training, tactics, clothing, and future ship design on both sides of the Atlantic for many years. In last December's Sea Power interview, First Sea Lord Adm. Sir Nigel Essenhigh recalled that, "We learned some extremely painful lessons in that campaign--lessons about ship design, about self-protection, about training ourselves for that style of warfare." In the United States, several changes immediately were made to the Fleet Refresher Training regimen, and other damage-control curricula. Hit by an Exocet missile five years later, the Perry-class guided-missile frigate USS Stark survived.

While the U.S. Navy no longer conducts its refresher training regimen in Guantanamo Bay (Cuba), the British FOST (Flag Officer Sea Training) program still puts trainees through incredibly realistic combat scenarios incorporating lessons from the Falklands. After the sinking of the Sheffield, the British immediately adjusted and improved their tactics to counter antiship missiles. Thus it was no surprise during the Gulf War that the guided-missile destroyer Gloucester's Sea Dart missiles took out a Silkworm missile that had been launched against the battleship USS Missouri.

There were other changes: Uniforms with a high synthetic-fiber content were no longer authorized for shipboard wear, and long-sleeved cotton shirts became standard. Personnel donned cloth hoods before going to General Quarters or "Action Stations" to protect them against flash burns. Damage-control teams were issued improved firefighting attire and equipment. New warships of many navies are designed with more capable damage-control systems.

Much had been reported at the time about the use of aluminum in ship superstructures, and it was alleged that this contributed to the high ship losses. However, Sheffield and Coventry were built mostly of steel, and the use of aluminum in the hulls of the other ships lost was not considered to be a major contributing factor. Still, the thin aluminum-skinned upper superstructures did expose sophisticated electronics systems and personnel to light-caliber munitions and shrapnel. Aware of this problem even before the Falklands War, the U.S. Navy specified that Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers would be built of steel.

Of note, Prime Minister Thatcher's pre-war plan to downsize the Royal Navy significantly was quietly scrapped.

In Seas of Glory, Lehman argued that the Falklands War showed that exclusive reliance on "smaller, cheaper, less well-armed combatants" could lead to false economies--implying that, had the British invested in larger combatants with more robust command-and-control systems, their losses might have been minimized. Using two carrier battle groups, battleships, and an amphibious ready group, the Summary Report theorized about how an American operation to reclaim the Falklands would have fared.

Its conclusion--that the U.S. Navy would have done much better--misses an obvious point, though. Clearly, if faced with an opponent such as the United States, Argentina would not even have considered launching an attack. Perhaps the most painful lesson learned by the British, therefore, is that any reduction in a nation's sea power inevitably brings with it the risk of increased vulnerability.

However, American observers need not be smug. Three decades before the Falklands War, continuing reductions in the size and capabilities of the U.S. Pacific Fleet presented an open invitation for North Korea to advance south. Today, North Korea still remains a threat. The lessons learned from the Falklands and other conflicts are as relevant today as they were 20 years ago.

Sources for the preceding article include David Brown's The Royal Navy and the Falklands War and Admiral Woodward's One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander. The author thanks Samuel Loring Morison for the loan of additional articles and photographs from his personal collection.