Your recent interview with Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Mike Mullen (March Seapower) was one of the most refreshing of late. The questions were crisp, and CNO’s answers were direct and concise. And when he didn’t have an answer, he said so candidly.

He has a vision, but it’s clearly one that will be shaped by hard analysis and careful thought.  For that reason, it’s more likely than not to become a reality. Bravo Zulu to the CNO and Seapower for sharing the progress of that vision with your subscribers.

Philip J. Katauskas
Media, Penn.

Icebreaker Mackinaw’s Secret Revealed

Interesting update [on the Coast Guard, “Cracked Ice,” February Seapower]. By the way, the Coast Guard Cutter (Icebreaker) Mackinaw is not a “small” icebreaker. It was built at the same time as the Wind Class breakers just before World War II. It was, however, somewhat larger than its sisters, not by design, but by decree of Congress.

The Mackinaw was to be identical with the Wind Class and was intended for the Great Lakes. But with war clouds on the horizon and the potential of the Coast Guard being transferred to the Navy, Congress feared it might wind up being ordered out into the Atlantic. They took care of that.

They ordered Mackinaw redesigned, and built on the Great Lakes, and its size was to be such that it could not fit through the locks [on the St. Lawrence Seaway to the Atlantic], and so was lake-bound, period. Mackinaw is still there today, though as the article stated it is to be replaced with a newer model. There was never a question about its being capable of handling polar missions, it simply was that it couldn’t get there.

And having served a bit on the West Wind and in the Canadian Arctic for over a year, I doubt there is much difference between the Arctic winter and the northern Great Lakes. Once the temperature gets to 40 below, the word cold is purely relative.

Julian Hatch
U.S. Coast Guard (Ret.)

Vietnam River Forces Had Myriad Functions

As a one-time operations officer of the River Patrol Force, I am in total agreement with Lee Wahler’s comments in the March 2006 Seapower regarding the functions performed by the River Patrol Force in Vietnam.

In 1968, the [boats] of the River Patrol Force boarded more than 708,000 watercraft on the rivers and canals of the Mekong Delta. The Gamewarden crews conducted more than 631,000 vessel inspections, detained more than 9,700 persons including Viet Cong suspects and detained 73 watercraft. This was done in addition to operations they performed in conjunction with U.S. and Vietnamese military units, psychological warfare and humanitarian efforts.

In late 1968, the River Patrol Force, in conjunction with the Coastal Surveillance Force and the Mobile Riverine Force, started coordinated operations as part of Adm. Elmo Zumwalt’s SEALORDS (Southeast Asia Lake, Ocean, River and Delta Strategy) plan while simultaneously conducting ACTOV (Accelerated Turnover to the Vietnamese).

Thomas W. Glickman
U.S. Navy (Ret.) 

Vietnam Was A Political Defeat

In one of his book reviews (December Seapower), David W. Munns refers to Vietnam as “America’s first outright military defeat.” That never happened. The last U.S ground combat forces left Vietnam in August 1972, and advisory presence ended in March 1973. The South Vietnamese were then fully responsible for their own fate.

For the next two years, until the fall of Saigon in April 1975, American military personnel assigned to Vietnam totaled no more than approximately 200, divided between logisticians, and the Defense Attaché Office and Marines securing the embassy and four regional consulates. The American defeat in Vietnam was political, not military.

Franklin Steinberg
Carson City, Nev.

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