PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE

Strategic Guidelines and Eternal Verities

In an era in which "change" is so frequently described as "the only constant," there are at least two eternal verities that the Pentagon's strategic planners can fall back on as they develop the guidelines needed to ensure combat success in future conflicts involving the use of U.S. forces overseas. The first of those verities, as the Navy and its supporters like to point out, is that 70 percent of the world is covered by water.

The second verity to remember--this should be a particularly important consideration for the Bush administration as it puts the finishing touches on its strategic review of U.S. naval/defense current capabilities and future needs--is that, in every overseas conflict in which this nation has ever been involved, at least 95 percent of the weapons, equipment, ammunition, and other war consumables used by America's fighting forces in-theater has been transported to the combat zone by ships, usually U.S.-flag merchant ships.

There also is a very large, comparatively recent--but probably permanent--naval/military change that must be factored into the contingency plans: The end of the Cold War has resulted in the closure of literally hundreds of former U.S. air and ground bases overseas and the return to CONUS (the continental United States) of hundreds of thousands of American troops formerly stationed in Europe, Japan, and the Philippines. In many areas of the world today, therefore, the only fully combat-ready U.S. forces available to the national command authorities and the regional commanders in chief in times of international crisis are forward-deployed Navy aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBGs) and Navy/USMC amphibious ready groups (ARGs).

All of which means that logistics and sealift requirements must receive higher priority from now on if this nation is to prevail in the probably short-duration wars of the 21st century. Logistics, a compact word embracing a broad spectrum of capabilities, simply means having enough equipment, and the right kinds of equipment, in the hands of the fighting forces from the time a battle begins until the last shot has been fired in anger and the war is over. It also means, therefore: (a) maintaining a defense industrial base big enough and capable enough to ensure continued U.S. technological superiority; and (b) keeping that base alive economically by a steady stream of acquisition funding.

Fortunately, U.S. naval/military planners--and the nation's political leaders in the executive and legislative branches of government--have been paying more attention to logistics in recent years and, for the most part, now understand the need for industrial preparedness, for the overseas stockpiling of "first day of war" combat equipment and consumables, and for the forward deployment of prepositioned ships loaded with the supplies needed to sustain U.S. air and ground forces in the later stages of conflict. That understanding has not yet, however, translated into an appreciation of the vital defense role played by the U.S.-flag Merchant Marine.

The U.S.-flag merchant fleet is today--as it has been for the last several decades--the unseen, unsung, underappreciated, and colossally underfunded fourth arm of national defense. The Gulf War proved once again that relying on the use of foreign-flag ships to carry the supplies needed by U.S. forces overseas in time of war is military folly--and stupendously expensive as well. Today, the commercial fleet of the United States of America, the largest trading nation in all world history, carries less than 3 percent of the hundreds of millions of tons of cargo, exports and imports combined, that now enter and depart U.S. ports and harbors each year. This is not only an economic disgrace, it also suggests almost culpable negligence on the part of this nation's political leadership.

What is needed to remedy the situation? Several things. The first step should be a bipartisan commitment by Congress and the president to rebuild the U.S.-flag fleet to the size needed: (a) to meet the needs of the nation's armed forces in future times of conflict; and (b) to carry a much more reasonable share (20 percent or thereabouts, according to maritime authorities) of America's two-way foreign trade. The second step would be to provide increased financial support for the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, the state maritime academies, and the private-sector seafarer trade schools--all of which are among the best in the world. The third part of the solution would be to increase funding for the Title XI loan guarantee program and other programs already in place to help the U.S.-flag fleet--and, not incidentally, the U.S. shipbuilding industry.

Ship by ship, seafarer by seafarer, the U.S.-flag Merchant Marine is today the best in the world. But there are not enough ships, or enough seafarers, to meet all of this nation's present commercial as well as military needs, much less the considerably greater commercial needs already projected for the very near future.

Without massive, and early, remedial action, that future may be much more bleak than U.S. political leaders, and the American people, can possibly believe.