Schubert: A Different World Since 9/11
MARAD Confronts New Maritime-Security Challenges
Editor in Chief James D. Hessman and Senior Editor Gordon I. Peterson interviewed Capt. Schubert for this issue of Sea«Power.
The U. S. Senate unanimously confirmed Capt. Willam G. Schubert as maritime administrator on 30 November 2000. Prior to his confirmation, Schubert was president of International Trade & Transportation Inc. (IT&T) in Houston, Texas. At IT&T, he provided transportation-related consulting services to ocean carriers, project exporters, freight forwarders, and lending institutions. Schubert has served 27 years in the maritime industry, including nine years at the Maritime Administration (MARAD). A 1974 graduate of the U.S. Maritime Academy, Schubert sailed for 12 years as an officer aboard U.S.-flag vessels. He obtained a U.S. Coast Guard Unlimited Master License (Any Oceans) in 1979 and served 10 years as an officer in the Naval Reserve. Schubert was awarded the U.S. Merchant Marine Outstanding Professional Achievement Award in 1994 and the secretary of transportation's "Silver Medal" for meritorious achievement in 1989.
An agency of the U.S. Department of Transportation, MARAD administers federal laws and programs designed to promote and maintain a U.S.-flag Merchant Marine capable of meeting the nation's shipping needs for domestic and foreign commerce as well as national security. MARAD also seeks to ensure that the United States possesses adequate shipbuilding and repair services, efficient ports, effective intermodal water-and-land transportation systems, and the reserve shipping capacity needed for times of national emergency.
Sea Power: The Maritime Administration [MARAD] has always played an important role in port security, but this responsibility has assumed much greater urgency since the terrorist attacks of 11 September. How has MARAD responded to the increased terrorist threat to U.S. ports and waterways?
SCHUBERT: We have been extraordinarily busy since that terrible day, and many initiatives have been set in motion to improve security in the nation's ports and maritime industry. Soon after 9/11, the secretary of transportation [Norman Y. Mineta] formed the National Infrastructure Security Committee [NISC] to bring the modal administrators together--the Coast Guard, MARAD, the Office of Intermodalism, and others in the Department of Transportation [DOT]--to work as a team on this issue. Teamwork is critical, because responsibilities overlap.
MARAD plays a very important role in port and maritime security. It is a civilian promotional agency for the maritime industry, and we are experts within the government on how this industry works. If you are going to design or improve port and maritime security, you must know how the industry works.
Our function has been to work primarily with the Coast Guard and the Transportation Security Administration [TSA, created by Congress to oversee security at U.S. airports, seaports, and other land-transportation facilities]. MARAD has participated in the NISC meetings and the various marine direct-action groups that were formed after 9/11.
One, the Maritime Direct Action Group, quickly solicited comments from industry and all maritime stakeholders. Their recommendations helped to form the basis for the administration's position on S-1214, the Hollings Bill [The Port, Maritime, and Rail Security Act of 2001, introduced by Sen. Ernest F. Hollings (D-S.C.)]. Subsequently, we set up a working group to deal with the security challenges posed by the huge number of shipping containers that enter our country every year. This interagency group represents the first real attempt to get all the agencies working together on the container issue.
How challenging is the task of improving U.S. port security?
SCHUBERT: It is a formidable challenge. We have 361 major ports in this country. No two ports are exactly the same, but 55 to 65 ports account for 80 to 90 percent of U.S. international trade. Improving security at these ports is one of our top priorities. There is a substantial amount of infrastructure improvement that must be accomplished over the near and long term.
One hot question today is, "Who is going to pay for these improvements?" The Department of Defense supplemental appropriation in December included $93.3 million in grants to be administered by the TSA in consultation with the Maritime Administration and the Coast Guard. Admiral Loy [Coast Guard Commandant Adm. James M. Loy] and I met and developed a framework with recommendations for the TSA on how this grant program should work to allow emergency funding to flow as quickly as possible.
How will these competitive security-enhancement grants be awarded?
SCHUBERT: The process is a good example of how MARAD and the Coast Guard are working together. Past Coast Guard port-vulnerability assessments are one means of identifying key vulnerabilities. We decided to administer this grant program totally on the Internet--all applications, key questions, and answers--in a paperless application process that will allow us to award grants as quickly as possible. We hope to grant awards by the first or second week of June. I think many people were surprised that we worked that fast.
What type of projects might qualify for such grants?
SCHUBERT: A port must first fall under the category of a Critical National Seaport to be considered. There are two types of awards. One is for the development of a security assessment and mitigation strategy with recommendations on what needs to be done to improve port security. This study could cost anywhere from $25,000 for a small port all the way up to half a million dollars for a larger seaport.
The second grant is called "Enhanced Facility and Operation Security." Facility improvements in this category could range from improving access control to increasing physical security, cargo security, and passenger security. The port must first complete a security assessment before it is eligible for this grant--some type of assessment that shows that it studied the security issue in a way that led to specific recommendations for improvement.
We are going to give priority to ports that have already taken some measures to improve security. We thought it was necessary to make a statement in principle--ports that have already initiated some steps to improve security in their ports should be rewarded.
We have reserved approximately 10 percent, or about $9.2 million, of the grant's funding to target proof-of-concept projects. A grant in this area might take the form of a proven technology that has not been applied in the area of port security.
I like to use the example of putting radiation-detection devices in "spreader bars" [equipment used in moving cargo] so that when containers are loaded in a port an inspector can determine if any radiation is being emitted from a nuclear device. The reason we like this type of an application is that it doesn't slow the movement of cargo--in the 20 or 30 seconds that you're handling the container you are actually measuring for potential radiation. That is just one example.
Is the specter of a terrorist attempting to smuggle a nuclear device into the United States your most worrisome threat?
SCHUBERT: We are all very concerned about the risk that some sort of weapon of mass destruction will enter the United States. This is an area where MARAD, the Coast Guard, and the Customs Service all agree that the best way to stop or to reduce this threat is to have some form of preclearance of cargo in foreign ports, prior to its loading on a ship. Customs refers to this as "pushing borders out." We are all in agreement that we have to account for this threat.
The idea is very simple. Once a weapon of mass destruction enters a U.S. port, it is already too late. The Container Working Group--one of our interagency groups involving the Customs Service, the Coast Guard, MARAD, and other modal administrations within DOT and the TSA--formed four subgroups to address the security risks associated with shipping containers.
One group is addressing new technology. Another is addressing data collection. Obviously, if you have early information on shippers and cargo entering the United States you could provide that information to the intelligence community to develop a matrix that would help to identify containers that should be pre-inspected or to suggest which ships should not be allowed to enter port.
This sounds like a maritime counterpart to profiling airline passengers based on a readily available database of critical information.
SCHUBERT: We have to be sure that we are talking about cargo profiling. The similarity is that airline measures now employ the concept of a layered approach to security. We believe in the same approach in the maritime area. We think that layers of maritime security can be implemented without significantly disrupting the flow of commerce--and that is our objective.
What are the remaining subgroups in your Container Working Group?
SCHUBERT: I co-chair a third subgroup on business practices. We receive very good information from industry on current business practices and how they might have to be modified in the future to improve security. The fourth area involves the International Maritime Organization [IMO] and work to engage the international community in ways to enhance maritime security.
Has the Container Working Group formulated a plan of action?
SCHUBERT: We developed a comprehensive report that was signed out by DOT and the Customs Service and forwarded to the Office of Homeland Security with recommendations for both short-term and long-term measures that should be taken. I would like to be able to tell you what those measures are, but it is a classified report.
Soon after 9/11, some ports refused to allow liquefied natural gas carriers into port. Does the threat of a hijacked ship entering a U.S. port concern you?
SCHUBERT: That threat is primarily one that falls under the responsibility of the Coast Guard, and the Coast Guard is doing a very good job responding to the need to prevent such a possibility. They refer to such vessels as "high-interest" ships. Since 9/11, a "sea marshal" program has been instituted for high-interest vessels. Sea marshals are being deployed--much as sky marshals are in the air on passenger aircraft.
We also are responding to this and similar threats in other ways. Prior to 9/11 we rarely inspected empty shipping containers. There will be more inspections of empty containers, better documentation of their status, and proper sealing after they are unloaded. We started a pilot program last fall to test electronic container locks for this purpose.
I won't describe all its details, but this pilot project involves the installation of an electronic lock that will allow us to monitor the status of the container and tell us if it has been tampered with or disrupted in some other way. A tracking mechanism provides an early warning if the container is disturbed.
Are there similar challenges associated with monitoring the thousands of foreign merchant seamen who enter U.S. ports each year?
SCHUBERT: Yes, a problem of this nature occurred in Norfolk [Va.] recently. Four Pakistani crew members were reported missing. This is a wake-up call that told us that the sheer number of foreign mariners who are coming in and out of our ports is something that we need to take very seriously.
Security measures vary with individual ports. Some ports will allow crew members to come ashore, and some ports will not. We need to have a more consistent policy, and I am sure that we will after this latest episode.
I am also concerned about documentation--issuing credentials to seamen. This issue was raised at the IMO intercessional meeting last month, but it's the one area where we are not getting as much cooperation from our international trading partners as we would like. MARAD has taken a very active role in developing "smart-card" technology that could be used, at least on our end, for U.S. seamen.
We have another pilot project planned for some of our ships in the RRF [Ready Reserve Force] in which crew members will be issued cards with much of their personnel data recorded on it. I think that this project could provide a more secure way to verify a person's identity.
Returning to the notion that it is important for the United States to "push its borders out" to foil terrorist plots before the terrorists reach U.S. shores: Does this not suggest a stronger emphasis for the Coast Guard's law-enforcement role and a need for the recapitalization of its deepwater assets for overseas missions--working in concert with the U.S. Navy and other federal agencies?
SCHUBERT: Absolutely--that is exactly right. MARAD totally supports the Coast Guard's plan to recapitalize its cutters and aircraft to allow it to fulfill its mission. The president's proposed budget [for fiscal year 2003] recognizes that fact.
Have the events of 9/11 led to other shifts of emphasis within the Maritime Administration?
SCHUBERT: One of the other important areas where MARAD has a greater post-9/11 role involves training. At the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy we have offered graduates who do not go to sea, or who cannot find jobs at sea, opportunities to work with the TSA. The administration will likely need to hire several thousand new employees who have some familiarity with the marine environment. These midshipmen have already obtained training in important related areas such as small-arms training and antipiracy safeguards. They spend a year at sea as part of their training, so they would make good candidates for TSA, or could work with the Coast Guard as sea marshals.
The Global Maritime and Transportation School at the Merchant Marine Academy also will be considered as a training center for port personnel. This is a valuable resource that can be used to train port personnel--not necessarily the gate guards, but port managers and people in other critical specialties.
How difficult is it to strike the right balance between achieving effective port security and avoiding disruptions to the "just-in-time" delivery of maritime trade?
SCHUBERT: Together with the other agencies involved I think we are all in agreement that striking the right balance is an objective we want to achieve. My background is largely with industry. I understand the concerns of the shippers, and I also understand the concerns of the carriers in this regard. Striking the right balance is a priority that we have to address. I am 100 percent confident that we can do both at the same time.
At the end of the day there could be some benefit--e.g., if a ship is actually received with less pilferage and lost cargo. I have complete confidence that we can implement policies, regulations, and a layered cargo-security program that can accomplish the twin goals of improving port security without imposing unnecessary shipping delays.
We will try to put discipline into the system that does not exist today. A container can be loaded in Rotterdam bound for the United States, for example, and it can be more than halfway across the ocean before a bill of lading is cut on its cargo. I can cite two other worrisome practices in the maritime industry today: describing a cargo as "freight--all kinds" and another called "to order of shipper," which is used when a shipper does not know who the eventual consignee is or who the person is who will initially receive the cargo.
It is not uncommon today for cargo to be traded while it is actually in shipment on the high seas. I am describing for you a situation in which cargo enters the United States under current business practices, and we do not know what the cargo is or where it's going! That is the kind of lack of discipline that has to change.
We have the technology to change these practices, and most of us in the Department feel that there is sufficient authority to start requiring many of these initiatives now. We do not need to wait for legislation. We are in a different world than we were prior to 9/11.
The need for a robust U.S.-flag merchant fleet stands out as a persistent problem over the past century--but one that is recognized as such only when we face a national emergency. What is your assessment today?
SCHUBERT: The picture does not look very good, but that is not going to stop my agency from trying to do something about it. I have said in virtually all of my speeches that we are 100 percent committed to reversing the decline of the U.S.-flag fleet. Hopefully, during the next three years, we will get the continuing decline in the U.S. share of the tonnage moving in the other direction.
We need more ships, more jobs, and more sealift in times of national emergencies. The decline of the U.S.-flag fleet is truly an issue of national security. We are going to be working very hard to devise initiatives and programs to reverse that decline.
In what ways?
SCHUBERT: We have started with reauthorization of the Maritime Security Program [MSP]. It is a high priority, and we are working very closely with all stakeholders, including the military, to develop recommendations for a new program. The administration has been very unambiguous in this area. We want to see a new program by 2005 when the old MSP expires.
Secondly, I look at MARAD's role as one of helping to create opportunities and a better environment for people to reflag ships under U.S. colors. There are actions we can take that do not require any legislative authority to put in place to allow this to happen. I recently signed a memorandum of understanding with the Coast Guard that will permit the expeditious reflagging of product tankers targeted for the international trade. Obviously, if they are reflagged, they cannot operate in Jones Act commerce [i.e., the domestic U.S. trade].
MARAD has taken initiatives with the full cooperation of the Coast Guard and U.S. Transportation Command to increase the number of ships in the U.S.-flag fleet without the need for additional legislation. That will continue.
There have been 47 vessels in the MSP program since its inception six years ago. How difficult is it to retain modern vessels in the program and to have sufficient numbers of U.S. seamen to crew them?
SCHUBERT: One of our priorities under a replacement program is to ensure that there are modern ships in the fleet. Our replacement program will ensure that there is new tonnage, but to do that we may have a phase-out period for ships as they age. There are some new ships in the program now, so if we are talking about an extended program longer than what we have now, we would have to have that provision built into the system. There is no disagreement among the ship operators or labor--or anyone else, for that matter.
With regard to having sufficient numbers of trained and certified U.S. mariners, I am very concerned about manning and retention. It does us no good to go out and say that we don't have a problem when there is a problem. So I have been very outspoken about this issue. At the same time, I also have made a commitment to do something about it.
A MARAD task force is working on our manning and retention problem. We are also working closely on it with the Military Sealift Command [MSC], which has a similar challenge in manning its civilian-crewed ships. Quite frankly, if we were to have a full breakout of the RRF--all the vessels--and we wanted to maintain the commercial Jones Act international fleet with sufficient crew, I have serious concerns that we would be able to do so beyond six months.
A manning study last year was helpful in many ways, but it did not go far enough. We started a second phase to that study that will be more detailed. We are particularly interested in the effects of STCW [Standard of Training Certification and Watchkeeping]--last year, for example, many of the participants in the survey indicated that they would get STCW-
certified. We need to develop an efficient mariner tracking system. One does not exist now. We learned last year that the Coast Guard licensing-and-documentation system is not designed to track the status of a civilian mariner's training, certification, or domicile.
We are going to work closely with the Coast Guard to develop an adequate tracking system so we at least know where the qualified mariners are if we need to call them up. We also are looking at the establishment of a civilian merchant reserve--one involving licensed individuals, different from the Merchant Marine Reserve we have today, which is a component of the Naval Reserve limited to licensed officers.
We are working with labor organizations, and we will be consulting with MSC on this issue. If we go forward with it, it would be something new that we have never had before.
During the Gulf War, many mariners left retirement to ensure that the bulk of U.S. war material and supplies would reach the war zone. Would the United States be able to avail itself of their talent and experience today?
SCHUBERT: That is the problem we face given the new international requirements to maintain certification standards and qualifications to go to sea. We have a smaller manpower base today than we had 10 years ago. That is why I felt completely confident in announcing that the maritime administrator does not believe we have sufficient manning today. I was around during Desert Storm, and I remember how tough it was to break out more than 70 ships. We had a much larger manpower pool back then.
With a smaller manpower base and fewer jobs supporting the critical mass of seamen that you need for mobilization, it is only logical to assume that if we had problems 10 years ago we are going to have many more problems today. We don't want to just talk about the problem--we want to do something about it.
In addition to the civilian Merchant Marine Reserve, we also are going to develop a contingency plan that will enable us to take mariners with expired licenses and give them the training needed for recertification in the event of a national emergency.
This contingency plan could be pulled off the shelf anytime we need it. If we get into a full-mobilization scenario, we could start contacting these people, put groups together, and put them through a training course to bring their certificates up to date. We also could look at graduating classes from the federal and state maritime academies earlier, as we did during the Vietnam War.
I think there are many good Americans who, for some reason, decided not to go to sea anymore, but who would be willing to sign up for a short-term program like this. We formed a task force that meets weekly to devise a plan. We are working with the NDTA [National Defense Transportation Association] to obtain its ideas on the manning issues. The Coast Guard also is working on the retention issue, and we consider them partners in this endeavor.
The United States also has the NDRF [National Defense Reserve Fleet] and the RRF to meet national security sealift requirements in times of a national emergency. How do you evaluate their readiness and reliability today?
SCHUBERT: The Ready Reserve Force ships have never been as ready as they are today. In fact, there are some who say that they are too ready! One of the lessons we learned from Desert Storm was that some of the ships in the RRF were not ready when they were needed. Some ships had been laid up for 12 years or longer.
We started the ROS [Reduced Operating Status] program in response. We conducted 19 turbo activations last year to test the material condition of the ships, and we scored 100 percent. The ships were taken out to operate for around 24 hours. That is still not a good test for the viability of the ship over a long haul, but it does say that we are a heck of a lot better today than we were ten years ago.
The program has been very successful, and it has actually saved money to have crews on the ships in an ROS status. The alternative was to have the ships sit there for 12 years with no maintenance except DH [dehumidification] machines running--only to break the ship out, run it to the shipyard, have everything in the world go wrong with it, and then spend a lot of money to repair it. ROS is a more cost-efficient system, and it assures a higher degree of readiness than what we did ten years ago.
It also helps us to address one of our other problems, which is to maintain a certain number of active-duty mariners on the books.
As you know, the Navy League is observing its Centennial this year, so in closing is there anything that you would care to say to its members and other readers of Sea Power?
SCHUBERT: Yes. One of the biggest problems we have in America today is the lack of public understanding of the importance of the U.S.-flag Merchant Marine. There is a tremendous lack of knowledge about what the U.S.-flag fleet contributes to our economy in peacetime and what its vital sealift capabilities represent during declared national emergencies.
I could live in a major metropolitan city like the Port of Houston, drive 30 miles north, and find that a majority of people there do not realize that Houston is the second largest port in the United States! The average U.S. citizen does not understand that the United States is a maritime nation. We need a U.S.-flag Merchant Marine, and we need to continue to support policies that at least maintain our fleet at its current levels--if not build on the tonnage that we have today.
I recognize what the Navy League has done to take up the call for a strong U.S. Merchant Marine in the past. Whatever we can do working together now to get that word out to the American public would be very much appreciated.
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