Evacuation 2020
New tactics and tools to quickly move Americans out of harm’s way under increasingly dangerous conditions are on the horizon
By Navy CMDR. GEORGE S. MATTHESEN and MARINE LT. COL. KELLY P. HOULGATE
The outbreak of open hostilities in mid-July between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon led to a massive evacuation of Americans and citizens of other countries. The 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, conducting exercises in Jordan, quickly deployed four long-range CH-53E Super Stallion heavy-lift helicopters with a forward command element, and began evacuating American citizens from Lebanon.
Air evacuations continued until the arrival of the first ship four days later. From July 16-24, more than 12,000 Americans were evacuated from Lebanon to Cyprus by a combination of contracted and military aircraft, and ships under the command of the Iwo Jima Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG).
The tenets of a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) have remained unchanged for several decades. However, the new Naval Operations Concept, signed in September 2006 by the commandant of the Marine Corps and chief of naval operations, provides the framework for a new and improved toolkit of operational methods for coping with events such as NEOs in an uncertain future. The elements of an ESG of 2020 will likely be spread across an entire theater of operations, and be equipped with a range of aircraft and ships able to operate more effectively under more hazardous conditions.
Throughout the 20th century, the naval services deployed task forces around the globe to protect U.S. interests in the maritime environs, work with allies and partners, provide crisis response and rapid reaction capabilities, and, when necessary, conduct major combat operations. While the types, composition and relative status of these task forces varied significantly over the century, the amphibious component of the fleet has proven its relevance time and again.
The current iteration of the amphibious force is the ESG, which combines the capabilities of a Marine Expeditionary Unit, an Amphibious Ready Group and a Surface Action Group with a robust planning and command staff. A typical ESG would comprise seven ships, 33 aircraft and 2,200 Marines.
Its extensive training package and synergistic capabilities allow the ESG to execute diverse missions ranging from disaster relief to small-scale combat operations in a wide range of threat environments. Modern combat depends largely on speed, mobility, sustainability and command and control, all strengths of the ESG.
The war in Lebanon served again to highlight the unique capabilities of our nation’s naval forces and, in particular, the ESG. The Navy-Marine Corps team performed essentially the same tasks and missions amphibious ready groups and Marine expeditionary units have since the 1980s — and with the same basic equipment.
The key premise of the new Naval Operations Concept is that, while naval missions remain essentially constant and naval principles continue to endure, the changing security environment requires innovative operating methods.
To illustrate this point, it is perhaps useful to envision a scenario in which a NEO might be conducted in 2020 under similar conditions. Whereas in 2006, the elements of the ESG were initially operating in relatively close proximity to each other, the ESG of 2020 would comprise disaggregated forces and distributed operations, which are envisioned as key elements of future naval operations. Networked forces will be able to achieve greater effect by conducting multiple, dispersed, simultaneous events in support of tasks ranging from theater security cooperation to prosecuting the “Long War” against terrorists, while maintaining the capacity to re-aggregate capabilities for an emerging crisis.
Crisis response flexibility is an essential cornerstone of the naval services. The success of future naval engagements will rely on small teams made up of culturally astute and task-focused sailors and Marines, as well as larger combat formations conducting traditional deterrence deployments. These small teams could be training partner militaries, improving local infrastructure or hunting high-value terrorist targets. In 2020, substantial numbers of U.S. Navy ships may once again have embarked Marine detachments, working closely with sailors of the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, to conduct security missions, boarding operations and ashore training missions.
The Navy-Marine Corps team of today is starting to demonstrate small but important pieces of the Naval Operations Concept. When fighting broke out in Lebanon, U.S. Central Command determined that an ESG was the logical force to support the Department of State in protecting and evacuating American citizens from the area and assisting in relief efforts.
At the start of the crisis, part of Iwo Jima ESG was located in the northern Red Sea, while the commander, Brig. Gen. Carl Jensen, and much of his core staff were ashore in Bahrain. Most of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit was ashore in Jordan conducting exercises.
When ordered to take command of the operation, Jensen and the Iwo Jima ESG command element staff deployed with a joint task force communications suite to direct the operation from Cyprus. As the ESG evacuated the Americans, Sixth Fleet destroyers attached to it escorted relief supply ships into Lebanese harbors and shepherded evacuation ships out of the danger zone.
This NEO was conducted in a chaotic but ultimately permissive environment, though it is easy to envision a scenario in which the local combatants would choose to attack U.S. forces, or simply fail to exercise responsible control of their weapons and targeting. Evacuation conditions can move along a sliding scale from permissive to completely hostile, and, as the environment moves toward hostile, military operations become the only feasible way to safely extract people from dangerous areas.
In the 2006 evacuation, for example, an increased surface-to-air missile threat might have dictated
nighttime-only helicopter operations, additional Marines for security and a significant change of plan to safely extract personnel. Increased random shelling and small arms fire would have demanded hardened transportation, perhaps armored high mobility multi-wheeled vehicles or amphibian assault vehicles.
During the crisis, Hezbollah did attack Israeli ships with missiles, damaging one and reportedly sinking a merchant ship with an errant shot. Hezbollah clearly had at least a limited ability to threaten naval and civilian shipping. In different circumstances, countering this threat could have required additional escorting combatants and extended standoff from shore — all of which would have, at a minimum, slowed the evacuation and potentially made the risk of conducting it unacceptable.
It must be assumed that by 2020 Hezbollah and similar armed parties within a state will have an even greater capability to interfere with or contest NEOs and other operations. Such groups can be expected to have modern antiship cruise missiles, man-portable surface-to-air missiles, and effective unmanned aerial, surface and subsurface vehicles. These threats will force evacuation shipping to greater standoff distances and complicate the extraction of American citizens as the security conditions devolve.
A 2020 ESG, or similar future force package, supporting a NEO will be significantly more effective as new systems and tactical concepts mature, providing increased execution speed under more hazardous conditions. Four planned systems — MV-22 Osprey, Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, Joint High Speed Vessel and Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) — will dramatically improve Navy-Marine Corps capability in this area. These systems will, in aggregate, greatly increase the tactical reach of littoral forces and permit operations either to be launched from over-the-horizon or to extend much farther inland.
The MV-22 is scheduled to replace the Vietnam-era CH-46E Sea Knight as the ESG’s medium-lift aircraft. Its larger payload, faster speed, higher survivability and self-deployability all add to its utility in this scenario. Rather than limiting immediate evacuation to the limited number of CH-53Es assigned to the Marine expeditionary unit aviation element, its dozen self-deploying MV-22s can rapidly deliver the forward command element and security teams to the effected zone and begin initial operations. These aircraft will easily lift three times the number of evacuees on each cycle, and their greater airspeed will allow more round trips in the same time window.
The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, which will replace the AAV7A1 assault amphibian vehicle, will bring significantly improved armored protection, mobility, communication and firepower to such an operation. Its high over-water speed will permit employment as a direct connector from distributed evacuation rally points to safe-haven shipping. Its improved reliability and mobility will enable less-predictable coastal penetration points, and more protection for evacuees from intentional and unintentional fires. The EFV will be particularly useful if the security environment deteriorates.
The Joint High Speed Vessel will be optimized for flexible support operations and be stationed forward for theater support. In the context of a NEO, the 321-foot vessel can provide high-speed, high-volume outbound transportation of evacuees and rapidly return needed supplies or supporting forces to the evacuation control centers. In the Lebanese scenario, it could make twice as many round trips as traditional amphibious shipping — about two per day using Cyprus as a temporary refuge and safe haven.
Its large cargo deck allows flexibility for moving personnel, equipment, and stores. The current building plan envisions at least three Navy-controlled Joint High Speed Vessels and as many as five additional Army-controlled vessels in service by 2020, increasing the likelihood of the ship being available to support a crisis.
The Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) tentatively comprises three Mobile Landing Platforms, or “floating beaches,” along with two LHA Replacement large-deck amphibious ships, one LHD large-deck amphibious ship, three T-AKE cargo ships, three Large/Medium Speed Roll-on/Roll-off cargo ships and two legacy T-AK dense-pack ships taken from existing squadrons. It will bring a complementary capability to the ESG and receive and support significant numbers of evacuees, while conducting simultaneous surface connector and air transport operations. Additionally, the ships maintain large numbers of vehicles and supplies useful for providing mobility and humanitarian assistance within the effected area.
In addition, by 2020 the Navy and Marine Corps team will have further developed the Joint Task Force Enabler capabilities. Future capabilities will allow subordinate commanders to seamlessly communicate within the task force, and outward to the combatant commander and other agencies. However, even with our impressive use of communication technology, it is not a substitute for forward presence.
The 2006 Lebanon NEO, and 2005 relief operations for the earthquake in Pakistan, demonstrated the tremendous value of a deployable, flag officer-led ESG staff being instantly available to the combatant commander in theater. It is likely this model will be an integral part of the naval contribution to the joint force of the future.
Naval forces will continue to evolve to meet the needs of joint U.S. commanders. Creative force packaging will be an important aspect of forward deployed forces, and it seems unlikely that ESG-like force packages will be constructed and deployed as they were in the 1990s. In fact, it is possible that the ESG will evolve to a Joint Expeditionary Force with components from the Navy, Marine Corps and Special Operations Command.
In 2006, the ESG performed superbly in a tense crisis situation, much as forward-deployed naval response forces have done for more than 230 years. While we find ourselves in an era of uncertainty, America’s naval forces, properly resourced and infused with new, more capable platforms and operational concepts, will become an ever more critical component of the joint force in the 21st century and beyond.
Navy Cmdr. George S. Matthesen, a 19-year surface warfare officer who has served in cruisers, battleships, replenishment oilers and amphibious ships, is a naval analyst with the Headquarters Marine Corps’ Strategic Initiatives Group.
Marine Lt. Col. Kelly P. Houlgate has 15 years of experience as an infantry officer with the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Marine divisions, and is an analyst with the Strategic Initiatives Group.
