Expeditionary Warfare Today "Light, Flexible, and Maneuverable"

Interview with Maj. Gen. (Select) William A. Whitlow, Director, Expeditionary Warfare Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

Editor in Chief James D. Hessman and Senior Editor Gordon I. Peterson interviewed Maj. Gen. (Select) William A. Whitlow, USMC, for this issue of Sea Power.

Sea Power: General, you are the only Marine in charge of a warfare division on the OPNAV [office of the chief of naval operations] staff. What is the rationale for this assignment policy, and what are the advantages in terms of the Navy’s expeditionary-warfare capabilities?

WHITLOW: The policy is mandated in Title 10 [U.S. Code] which states that a Marine major general will head the Expeditionary Warfare Division [N85]—that section of the Navy staff responsible for expeditionary-warfare requirements and policy. In this capacity my staff serves as the primary linkage between the Navy and the Marine Corps for these programs. The rationale is to ensure that we have someone in charge who is not only familiar with and experienced in expeditionary warfare, but one who also brings an independent perspective to the OPNAV staff, with the ability to make more balanced and equitable resource decisions affecting our two services’ capabilities.

You bring a customer’s perspective, if you will, to the resources and requirements business, right?

WHITLOW: That’s absolutely correct. My predecessors and I have all grown up in what we used to call the amphibious community, so we were familiar with expeditionary-warfare requirements at the very lowest levels of command all the way up through the senior levels of command responsibility.

This experience goes beyond the many physical requirements of amphibious warfare. It includes command and control, command relationships, and the many delicate nuances involved in projecting large combat units and logistics from ship to shore.

It also includes a rich appreciation of the importance and the timing of actually shifting command and control of the landing force from the amphibious task force commander [afloat] to the commander of the landing force ashore. To be able to function effectively in this arena, this job needs someone who has that degree of experience—not just from the perspective of resources, but also from the full understanding of requirements, both physical and fiscal.

Secretary of the Navy [Richard] Danzig has said that the Navy and Marine Corps operate well together, but he sees room for improvement in the way you work and fight together. Along those lines, what are your top priorities in expeditionary warfare—another way of asking where do you see room for improvement?

WHITLOW: My absolute top priority is being able to foster and leverage resources to invest in the diverse expeditionary-warfare programs for the Navy and Marine Corps team so we can conduct operations globally for the next 50 years. Some of those programs include fully funding the LPD 17 [San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock] and the LHA [amphibious assault ship] replacement—the large-deck amphib [amphibious ship] that will take us beyond the mid-century in the future.

We need to continue to be very aware that we are a naval force. The Navy and Marine Corps team, the country’s naval force, has always been expeditionary in nature since its inception. We deploy from our home ports for extended periods of time, and then we return to recapitalize, replenish, resupply, and retrain. Then we deploy again. We have always been forward-deployed and able to maintain U.S. presence far from our shores. We need to retain a heightened awareness of that expeditionary nature, not only at sea, on the battlefield, and in future geopolitical situations, but also within this building [the Pentagon] and the construct of the Department of Defense.

What result would you like to see from the 2001 QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review]?

WHITLOW: My hopes for naval expeditionary forces of the future would be that decision-makers realize that naval forces, this country’s original expeditionary forces, continue to deploy globally and that naval expeditionary forces will continue to show presence and contribute to global stabilization well into this century.

Frankly, we do this at minimum cost to the taxpayer, because we haven’t had to transform or recreate ourselves. We are very much "business as usual," yet evolutionary in improving our capabilities every year. We will have to continue to recapitalize some of our equipment and platforms as they wear out, but our expeditionary forces’ contributions to global presence and engagement will help stabilize vast regions of the world. I hope our decision-makers and our elected representatives fully understand the necessity for our capabilities.

Even more than during the Cold War, our expeditionary-warfare forces are absolutely necessary for the national security of the United States.

Do you think the American people understand that forward-deployed Navy and Marine Corps forces now represent a much higher percentage of U.S. forward presence than was true when the Berlin Wall fell 10 years ago?

WHITLOW: Most people do not understand that naval forces represent a higher percentage proportionately today, mainly because our traditional continental forces, the Army and the Air Force, have drawn down their forces overseas by more than 50 percent. Naval forces were forward-deployed then as well, and they continue to be forward-deployed now. That’s the nature of our business. That’s what we do, that’s what we’ve always done, and that’s what we will continue to do.

This presence enables the United States to maintain stability in ways other than by occupation or temporary stationing of ground forces—which is extremely expensive. It is not only expensive in fiscal terms, but it is expensive in terms of our country’s relationships with foreign nations. Most countries do not desire to have a high-profile foreign military presence stationed in their country. That’s a very delicate issue.

The normal rotational nature of forward-deployed, sea-based forces is another matter, however. We can deploy and redeploy very quickly from the sea, so our appearance does not necessarily signal a long-term U.S. ground presence, yet it provides sustained reassurance and signals commitment to friend and foe alike.

This takes us to the lessons that you draw from the post-Cold War period as it relates to the roles and missions of the Navy-Marine Corps team. And this leads to a second question: Some armchair strategists claim that the Navy and the Marine Corps are simply preparing to fight the amphibious operations of World War II or Korea over again. How would you respond to that criticism?

WHITLOW: Let me respond to the second question first. The critics who say the Navy and Marine Corps are preparing to conduct amphibious operations like those at Normandy, Iwo Jima, or Inchon are absolutely missing the point of today’s expeditionary operations. They’re confusing the conventional amphibious operations of the 1940s and 1950s with today’s expeditionary-warfare doctrine. Expeditionary operations entail light, mobile, on-scene forces—projecting power from the sea and able to engage and disengage quickly at a time and place of our choosing.

We no longer have a heavy amphibious-force capability, because that force is basically a bastion-busting force geared only for high-end, forcible-entry operations. The only similarity is that we still come from the sea—today’s forces come from the sea, although in a different manner than they did more than 50 years ago.

Expeditionary warfare, however, entails the employment of light, flexible, and maneuverable forces for such missions as presence, engagement, and disengagement—all at the will of the National Command Authority [NCA], the leadership of this country. Expeditionary forces can do everything from the low end of humanitarian operations all the way to high-end combat operations. There is a significant difference between the two ends of that spectrum.

The Navy-Marine expeditionary team also serves as the enabling force for heavier follow-on joint units, correct?

WHITLOW: Yes. Take Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The first heavy combat forces on the ground there were Marines from the 7th MEB [Marine Expeditionary Brigade]. With seaborne support from the Maritime Prepositioning Force [MPF] ships based in the Indian Ocean, these Marines manned forward defensive positions and sustained another early deployer, the [U.S. Army’s] 82nd Airborne Division—providing them food and water, as well as providing a secure port and airfield lodgment for follow-on forces.

A short time later, the 1st MEB arrived by strategic airlift, joining up with its MPF seaborne support already in port in Saudi Arabia.

Our expeditionary forces are not just deployable; because they are on station they also are immediately employable by the NCA. We may be inserted and withdrawn quickly from the sea, avoiding the long-term implications of introducing heavier U.S. ground forces. I refer to this phenomenon as "the Saint to Satan syndrome." It happened in Lebanon. We came and were initially welcomed as a stabilizing force—the "Saint." We overstayed our welcome, became too deeply embroiled in a shifting political landscape, and we became "Satan" in the eyes of the local belligerents. We saw the same phenomenon occur in Somalia—Saint to Satan—because U.S. ground forces were perceived as occupation forces.

Expeditionary forces can occupy territory if that should be necessary, but with the globalization of democracy I maintain that occupation is not only not desirable in most countries around the world, it is unwelcome. Independent governments want their own sovereignty to be respected. Expeditionary forces, on the other hand, are normally welcomed for stability and engagement operations. This usually means humanitarian assistance, but it also could entail training, peacekeeping, or peacemaking.

And the first of those two questions—the lessons that you draw from the post-Cold War period?

WHITLOW: The past 10 years offer numerous examples of the utility and efficiency of our expeditionary-warfare capabilities. We seemingly take them for granted because they’re so successful in terms of our support of U.S. engagement overseas and as part of our national-security strategy. They normally don’t raise a lot of dust. For example, we’ve done numerous expeditionary operations, such as a noncombatant evacuation operation in Eritrea [bordering on the Red Sea] on short notice, but you never hear about them because they only create a small footprint.

Our forces don’t stay longer than necessary, they don’t create a large presence ashore, and they normally don’t take a lot of casualties if a peacekeeping situation goes bad.

You are responsible for mine-warfare requirements. This month marks the 50th anniversary of the Wonsan landings during the Korean War. World War II-era mines delayed the landing of the 1st Marine Division, and the Navy lost four minesweepers. The Iraqis also damaged U.S. warships during the Gulf War with relatively un-sophisticated mines. What reassurance can you offer our readers that the Navy is better prepared to deal with this threat today than we were in the past?

WHITLOW: We are significantly better prepared today although we do not have a solution that is 100 percent effective in allowing us to go in stride from deep water across the beach. There are still some hurdles of physics to overcome. It is impossible for any one system to detect and eliminate every mine, but I estimate that we have an 80-percent solution today.

Mine warfare is one of my top priorities for this reason, and it will continue to be a top priority as we partner with industry to try to develop new solutions to overcome the problems we have—particularly inside the surf zone of very shallow water. It’s crucial that we have the ability to cross this zone safely, although it’s not necessarily a show stopper—we may have to secure the beachhead from behind the beach and then work to seaward once it’s secure.

We had a very successful advanced-technology demonstration of one of our new capabilities at the Aberdeen Proving Ground [Md.] in September. The Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System uses an airborne laser designator to locate a mine. A modified M197 gun then fires a supercavitating projectile—a special ammunition—to detonate the mine at a slant range of from 400 to 500 feet away.

With capabilities like that around the corner, we are probably within several years of solving the challenges we face. The secretary of defense [William S. Cohen] has been a huge supporter and proponent of mine and countermine warfare. We certainly welcome his initiatives and appreciate his support because he is right on target with his philosophy that we need to develop solutions for this type of warfare.

The historic examples that you cited are exactly correct. World War II-era mines can wreak havoc. For one thing, we don’t have the plethora of amphibious assault ships that we had in World War II. Any loss is tragic, but with fewer ships the impact is much greater. A much smaller force is tantamount to a football team having one great running back—you want to keep him healthy; you don’t want to keep throwing him at a brutal line all day long.

Again, one of our strategies in this effort is partnering with industry. Industry is probably the key source for finding a solution.

Are you satisfied with today’s level of funding for mine warfare programs?

WHITLOW: I am satisfied with the funding level today, mainly because the secretary of defense has fenced [i.e., protected] funding for mine warfare. We are in the R&D [research-and-development] phase in much of what we want to be able to do. We are focused and diligent in our program, and putting more money against the program would not necessarily help us stay the course. You almost reach a law of diminishing returns with additional funding.

Once we reach IOC [initial operational capability] with the capabilities that prove to be successful, I will be satisfied if the funding sustains the transition to fielding our new systems. I’m projecting that new capabilities will begin entering the fleet in the 2005 time frame.

You sponsor a number of initiatives in the mine-warfare arena; do they receive the focus and attention they deserve?

WHITLOW: There are several initiatives, some of which were started by the current commandant [Gen. James L. Jones] when he directed this division. Those initiatives continue. We do a great deal of work with various research labs, and we sponsor several symposiums that are well-attended by industry, government, and thinkers alike. The NDIA [National Defense Industrial Association] Expeditionary Warfare Symposium deals principally with the means for power-projection, counters to asymmetric threats, battlespace dominance, sustainment, and sea basing. The audiences are growing in the scientific and academic communities as well as among industry and the military.

And the fleet-engagement strategy that you sponsor?

WHITLOW: Our fleet engagement strategy is being worked with the VCNO [vice chief of naval operations] and the fleet CINCs [commanders in chief]. We plan on mainstreaming mine warfare—which means you would have a mine warfare commander in a carrier battle group, ARG [amphibious ready group], or both, just like we do for the AW [air warfare] and AEW [airborne early warning] commanders.

Our fleet-engagement strategy is very important because it will establish the doctrine, command relationships, and other elements needed to tackle mine warfare successfully. We plan to deploy organic mine countermeasures forces with carrier battle groups and other units in 2005.

Naval fires, known in the past as naval gunfire support, is another important element in expeditionary warfare. Are you satisfied with what the Navy has now and the improved capabilities projected for the future?

WHITLOW: I’m not satisfied with what we have now, but not because the Navy hasn’t done an excellent job putting the 5-inch/54 gun on many platforms. The proliferation of long-range, sophisticated weapons throughout the world has forced us to greater standoff distances. For instance, a first-generation Exocet missile can force us to stand off over the horizon. A 5-inch/54 gun no longer does us much good, because of range limitations, unless we’re in a benign situation—and a benign situation probably wouldn’t call for surface gunfire.

However, I am terribly excited about what’s coming down the line in the new 5-inch/62 gun and families of munitions like the ERGM [extended-range guided munition] that will enable naval surface fire support at ranges out to 63 miles.

The next-generation Advanced Gun System will be able to fire precision-guided munitions out to 100 nautical miles. We aren’t there yet, but we’re getting there as we explore new gun and missile technology to support expeditionary warfare.

The extended battle-space capability will raise some interesting issues—air-space management, for one. You don’t want volumes of fires going out a hundred miles away where airplanes or helicopters are operating. It will take us to a new dimension where Navy ships will be able to remain over the horizon and still provide naval fires; it will amplify the capabilities inherent in our Forward … From the Sea and Operational Maneuver From the Sea concepts.

Will future amphibious-lift enhancements enable the Navy to reach the equivalent of the 12-ARG lift capability that is ostensibly capable of carrying all the equipment and supplies needed for 2.5 brigades?

WHITLOW: Yes. The combat capability will be there. One of the things we’re trying to do from this office is make sure that when the Navy-Marine team purchases something it is a more capable platform. This principle applies to everything from a truck to a helicopter or amphibious ship.

We will reach the 2.5 MEB [Marine expeditionary brigade] lift capability with the completion of 12 "Super Set ARGs," the LPD 17 class, an LHD- or LHA-replacement ship, and the LSD 41 [Whidbey Island] class.

You touched upon the LPD 17 San Antonio class, General, and that’s one program that has experienced some cost and schedule setbacks over the last year or two. Are you satisfied with the status of the program today?

WHITLOW: I’m satisfied with program performance as it stands now, and we’re working diligently with Congress to get all 12 ships in the class funded across the FYDP [future-years defense program].

I won’t be fully satisfied until the 12th ship is commissioned and Sailors and Marines are on board. I’ll tell you why. The LPD 4 class [Austin-class amphibious transport dock, in service for more than 35 years] that the LPD 17s are replacing should have been replaced 10 years ago.

The LPD 4 was a capable ship in her time, but the time for replacement is long overdue. We should not continue to ask Sailors and Marines to deploy on that class of ship. The temperature inside the skin reaches 110-plus degrees Fahrenheit in the Persian Gulf in the summer. I wouldn’t want your children—or even your pets—to deploy on those ships, yet we’re deploying and continuing to deploy Sailors and Marines on them. We say Sailors and Marines are our number one priority. They are, so we must deploy LPD 17 as soon as possible to give them the quality of life, flexible capability, and survivability they deserve.

LPD 17 will be a more capable ship to serve the expeditionary-warfare needs of this country. It will have a more robust capability to take a combat casualty. It will be not only a more capable ship but also more habitable for our Sailors and Marines. We should have had the San Antonios yesterday—all 12 in the class.

Are you satisfied with the management changes that have been made to bring that program back on track?

WHITLOW: Yes. The program is on track. The secretary of the Navy, the under secretary, and ASN RD&A [assistant secretary of the Navy for research, development, and acquisition] all have been diligent in helping to get this program on track and to align the management structure and its funding streams.

Secretary Danzig has been absolutely diligent in this regard. I think that he has put more effort into this program than any other single program. Speaking for the Marines and Sailors of the future who will sail on those ships, I truly thank Secretary Danzig for doing that. We cannot say that people are our number one priority when we continue to put them on LPD 4-class ships.

What’s your "end in mind" or vision for expeditionary warfare when you leave this post?

WHITLOW: I’m glad you asked that question. First, I’d like to see us achieve a solution across the spectrum of mine warfare—from the deep-water mine to an "across-the-beach, in-stride" capability. I’d like to see all LPD 17-class ships fully funded so our Sailors and Marines will be able to deploy and engage whatever task the country asks them to do on world-class platforms.

I also would like to see our leadership continue to address the expeditionary nature of warfare and fully understand that our geopolitical and global situation has changed to where most of our actions across the spectrum of conflict are going to be in the littoral regions of the world. We are a naval force that is expeditionary in nature, regardless of the spectrum of conflict that we cover.

The utility of our expeditionary-force capabilities in maintaining U.S. primacy and global economic stability was brought home to me when the American Expatriate Association invited me to meet with the American Club in Hong Kong and in Singapore. They said, "We appreciate you for just being here." They did not mean me personally. They meant all of our Sailors and Marines—and the ships that are a visible manifestation of U.S. interest and commitment.

What is stability? Presence equals stability.

General, you are familiar with what the Navy League does for the sea services—is there anything else you would like to say to the readers of Sea Power and the members of the Navy League?

WHITLOW: Yes. Thanks! I really appreciate what the Navy League has done for Sailors and Marines over the years. I recall several occasions, once in Hong Kong, when the local Navy League council helped a young Marine who needed to take emergency leave. The council lined him up with some emergency financial assistance so that he could return home. Many other examples come to mind. Keep up the great work!