A Strategy of Uncertainty
QDR Report Emphasizes Homeland Defense, "Transformation," Risk Management

James D. Hessman, Editor in Chief

The Defense Department's long-awaited report on the 2001 Quad-rennial Defense Review (QDR) was finally released on 30 September, and is changed in numerous particulars from earlier drafts that had been provided to the nation's armed services and/or imaginatively speculated on in the defense press.

The principal changes to the report, sent to Capitol Hill by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, were precipitated by the 11 September terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center and reflect a remarkable rewriting effort that blends the various "transformation" initiatives advocated by Rumsfeld with a much stronger emphasis on homeland defense, the management of risk, and numerous other aspects of the new "war on terrorism."

That war, Rumsfeld emphasizes in his Foreword to the QDR report, "is not a war of America's choosing. It is a war that was brought violently and brutally to America's shores by the evil forces of terror. It is a war against America and America's way of life. It is a war against all that America holds dear. It is a war against freedom itself."

The September attacks "and the war that has been visited upon us," Rumsfeld continued, "highlight a fundamental condition of our circumstances: We cannot and will not know precisely where and when America's interests will be threatened, when America will come under attack, or when Americans might die as the result of aggression. ... We should try mightily to avoid surprise, but we must also learn to expect it. We must constantly strive to get better intelligence, but we must also remember that there will always be gaps in our intelligence. Adapting to surprise--adapting quickly and decisively--must therefore be a condition of planning."

Even before the terrorist attacks, Rumsfeld pointed out, the Department of Defense and the armed services had been going through "a crucial time of transition to a new era" that would require a new defense strategy tailored to meet the complex and uncertain national-security challenges of the 21st century. The principal goals of that strategy are as follows, he said:

* Assuring U.S. allies and friends of America's "steadiness of purpose and its capability to fulfill its security commitment";

* Dissuading adversaries "from undertaking programs or operations that could threaten U.S. interests" and/or the interests "of our allies and friends";

* Deterring aggression and coercion by the forward deployment of forces that could "swiftly defeat attacks and impose severe penalties for aggression on an adversary's military capability and supporting infrastructure"; and

* If deterrence fails, "decisively defeating any adversary."

Rumsfeld also devoted significant space in his Foreword to the somewhat abstract concept of "transformation" that has been the focus of many of his speeches since taking office. The nation's uniformed service leaders, past and present, have never opposed transformation per se. But many have said, both in congressional testimony and in various private discussions, that the nation's armed services have been in a continuous process of transformation for many years, particularly since the end of the Vietnam War.

Rumsfeld does not specifically deny that firmly held belief, but he does suggest, in various ways, that the pace of transformation has been too slow and must be accelerated. The basis of U.S. defense planning, he says in the Foreword, requires shifting from the "threat-based" model "that has dominated thinking in the past" to a "capabilities-based" model that would be more useful for the future. The shift to a capabilities-based approach, he said, will require that the United States maintain its military advantages in certain key areas "while it develops new areas of military advantage and denies assymetric advantages to adversaries.

"It entails adapting existing military capabilities to new circumstances," he continued, "while experimenting with the development of new military capabilities. In short, it requires the transformation of U.S. forces, capabilities, and institutions to extend America's assymetric advantages well into the future."

Rumsfeld concluded his Foreword with the following statement of purpose: "Our commitment to the nation will be unwavering and our purpose clear: to provide for the safety and well being of all Americans and to honor America's commitments worldwide. As in generations before, the skill of our armed forces, their devotion to duty, and their willingness to sacrifice are at the core of our nation's strength. We must provide them with the resources and support they need to safeguard peace and security not only for our generation but for generations to come."

The tightly written 71-page report is broken down into several major sections, plus a four-page closing "statement" by then Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Hugh H. Shelton (who was succeeded last month by Gen. Richard Myers). The first sections of the report focus on various "policy" aspects of the nation's new defense strategy, but include enough specifics, spelled out later in more detail, to resolve many of the uncertainties previously (but not publicly) voiced by the uniformed military, members of Congress, and others about the QDR process. Following are brief summaries of some of the key issues of special interest to the sea services discussed in the sections indicated (in boldface):

America's Security in the 21st Century: The United States plays a "unique" role in guaranteeing and protecting global security. It also "provides the basis for a network of alliances and friendships," generates "a general sense of stability and confidence ... [that] is crucial to the economic prosperity that benefits much of the world," and "warns those who would threaten the nation's welfare," or the welfare of U.S. allies and friends, that "their efforts at coercion or aggression will not succeed." Today's greatly changed security environment "involves a great deal of uncertainty" and might possibly lead to situations that "render [the] military forces and doctrine of great powers obsolescent." Geographic distance no longer guarantees greater security. Economic globalization "and the attendant increase in travel and trade across U.S. borders" have created new vulnerabilities that hostile states can exploit "by perpetrating attacks on the U.S. homeland." The "broad arc of instability" running from the Middle East to Northeast Asia "contains a volatile mix of rising and declining regional powers." Many of these states "possess the potential ... [of developing or otherwise acquiring] weapons of mass destruction," including chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced high-explosive (CBRNE) weapons. The ever-increasing diversity "in the sources and unpredictability of the locations of conflict" may well impose "demands for U.S. military intervention or activity on virtually every continent and against a wide variety of adversaries." Space and cyberspace lead the list of "new arenas of military competition." Fiscal constraints have degraded the readiness of many U.S. combat units, except for the forward-deployed and "first to fight" forces. The defense infrastructure also requires upgrading.

Defense Strategy: The United States cannot "retreat from the world" but must, rather, maintain the ability to influence "the nature of future military competitions," channel threats "in certain directions," and "complicate" the military planning of potential adversaries. The management of risks requires preparing for future challenges "over time," while "meeting extant threats at any given time." Because resources "are always finite," hard choices must be made "that take into account a wider range of risks than ... in the past." The terrorist attacks show that potential adversaries "have noted the relative vulnerability of the U.S. homeland," and for that reason the new defense strategy "restores the emphasis once placed on defending the United States and its sea, air, and space approaches." Implementing the new defense strategy also requires maintaining "favorable regional balances" and developing "a broad portfolio of military capabilities."

A Paradigm Shift in Force Planning: The new defense strategy "places new emphasis on ... the defense of the United States" and makes that "the [Defense] Department's primary mission. The focus of U.S. force planning is being shifted from concentration on "two particular regions--Northeast and Southwest Asia," to building a broader, more versatile, and more robust spectrum of capabilities, and of the forces possessing those capabilities, that would permit the projection of U.S. power virtually anywhere in the world.

Reorienting the U.S. Global Military Posture: The former U.S. "overseas presence posture," which concentrated on deterring Soviet aggression and led to the stationing of hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops in Western Europe, is no longer adequate "for the new strategic environment" and must be reoriented to take into account the numerous "new challenges, particularly anti-access and area-denial threats," likely in the first decades of the 21st century. The new defense strategy will be implemented by, among other things: (1) Developing a basing system of greater flexibility that puts increased emphasis on "additional bases and stations beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia"; (2) Seeking "temporary access to facilities in foreign countries that enable U.S. forces to conduct training and exercises" in areas where the United States does not have permanent access to ranges and bases; (3) Redistributing forces and equipment to meet "regional deterrence requirements"; and (4) Maintaining the mobility--"including the airlift and sealift, prepositioning, basing infrastructure, alternative points of debarkation, and new logistical concepts of operations"--needed to carry out expeditionary operations "in distant theaters against adversaries armed with weapons of mass destruction and other means to deny access to U.S. forces."

In his closing statement, JCS Chairman Shelton strongly endorsed the rationale underpinning the QDR report, but also voiced a few words of caution. There is still a need "for a more comprehensive roadmap," he said, "that will sustain the tenuous balance between strategy and resources. ... Considerably more warfighting analysis on a range of scenarios" also is needed, he said. He expressed satisfaction that DOD's annual procurement spending had been raised to "the $60 billion level," but noted that "some estimates point to spending $100 to $110 billion per year to sustain the force structure and arrest the aging problem." Finally, and perhaps of greatest importance, he said that the maintenance of "end strength sufficient to meet strategic requirements" at a sustainable tempo of operations is absolutely mandatory. If that end strength is not maintained, he said, "our greatest military asset--quality people--will be placed at risk." *