One Certainty for Marine Corps: Constant Change

Future May Include Redeployment to Iraq and End to "Normal" Rotation Policy

ARTHUR P. BRILL JR.
Sea Power Correspondent

When Lt. Gen. Emil R. "Buck" Bedard was a colonel in Somalia, he moved 1,480 Marines 300 miles in 32 hours from Mogadishu to a starving area in the hinterlands. They arrived on Christmas Eve 1992. On Christmas morning he met with 11 tribal chiefs and 5,000 of their closest friends. Perched in the seat of honor (an old bus seat with springs sticking out), he had these words of wisdom, similar to those used by Marine commanders in the reconstruction of Iraq.

"We're here to help you, not harm you," Bedard said. "I want you to form a council that is representative of your people. If you harm any of my Marines, we will kill you."

The Somalians knew Bedard meant business, and his Marines had no trouble securing a massive food distribution effort, he said.

Bedard supports the "no better friend, no worse enemy" theme used by Maj. Gen. James N. Mattis, 1st Marine Division commander, in the reconstruction of southern Iraq. Mattis' Marines, who received praise in their dealings with the Iraqis, have since been relieved by a Polish-led division. It appears, however, that the Corps' mission in Iraq is far from over and that the conflict will have long-term effects on Marine Corps operations.

"We are looking at what the next Marine rotation will be," said Bedard, who served the last three hectic years at Marine headquarters as deputy commandant for plans, policies, and operations. "The Marine Corps never says no to anything, and we will meet the requirements."

The rotation plan depends on Marine commitments elsewhere, the success of U.S. stabilization efforts in Iraq, the contribution of coalition partners there, and the needs of the U.S. combatant commander in Iraq, Army Gen. John Abizaid.

It is quite possible that more Marine Reserves will be called up and that some recent Marine veterans of Operation Iraqi Freedom could return to Iraq fairly quickly. One thing is certain: The Corps' "normal" rotation policy has been disrupted and may never be the same.

Normally, the Corps has seven Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) with permanent command elements, one in Japan and three each on the U.S. east and west coasts that rotate constantly. When a MEU of 2,400 Marines deploys, another is training and the third has just returned. Marines deploy for six months and return home for 18 months. Operations in Iraq severely unsettled the Corp's 3 to 1 deployment ratio. Counting the Marines deployed to the Western Pacific who generally focused on North Korea, 70 percent of the Corps' operating forces were committed.

"We may not get back to the 3 to 1 ratio for quite a while, if we ever get back to it," said Bedard. "We have to be smart how we do things. Our first priority is to the war effort."

The nation is involved in three closely related combat endeavors--the global war against terrorism and the heated reconstruction frays in Iraq and Afghanistan. If those conflicts were resolved tomorrow, the Corps could still require 12 to 18 months to readjust the force.

Bedard is a big believer in the Navy-Marine team's capacity to prevent problems by being forward deployed. "If a Marine platoon is patrolling in the wilds of Wyoming, they can put out a fire immediately if lightning strikes," he said. "If they aren't there in three weeks' time, it would take a division-size force to do the same job."

Bedard is proud of how quickly the Navy and Marines deployed 60,000 Marines and their equipment to Kuwait prior to the Iraqi war. He is also excited about the potential of the Expeditionary Strike Group concept, adding a destroyer, submarine, and frigate to the amphibious ships that carry a Marine expeditionary unit, thus creating the capability to perform 23 special missions. The first six-ship task force sailed from the West Coast in September, and the second is training on the East Coast.

"The added platforms allow us to perform more missions such as interdicting ships at sea," said Bedard. "We'll capture some lessons learned from this first deployment."

Though the "official" lessons from Iraq are forthcoming, the Corps' longstanding "every Marine is a rifleman" policy was once again proven; Marines with support tasks defended themselves well. Bedard feels the war substantiated the Corps' ethos and training methods.

The war didn't go perfectly, however. Bedard said the U.S. needs to reduce fratricide, keep track of containers of equipment once they arrive in country, do better battle damage analysis, get equipment to work better with the joint force, find ways to share intelligence with coalition partners, and move bulk liquids more rapidly on the battlefield.

While Navy-Marine relations in Washington are positive, Bedard feels the friction that develops between the services is usually over money, procurement, and programs. Despite being on good terms with his Navy counterpart--Vice Adm. Kevin P. Green, deputy chief of naval operations for plans, policies, and operations--Bedard, who retired in September, has one major regret about his years in Washington. "I failed to convince enough Navy officers that the greatest striking arm of the naval forces is the Marine expeditionary force," he said. "We are the most potent of all strike ops." *