On-Scene Report: Kernel Blitz (Experiment) 01
"An Incredible Level of Situational Awareness"

By DAVID VERGUN, Production Editor

David Vergun covered Kernel Blitz (Experiment) 01 aboard the Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis and the modified Austin-class command ship USS Coronado, as well as from the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command San Diego (SSC) and the Marine Corps base at Camp Pendleton, Calif.

During the Battle of Britain, German success was limited, due in large part to the British use of radar, a new system that allowed the British to detect Luftwaffe bomber formations well before they were able to reach England.

Now, more than six decades later, the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps have completed an experiment involving a futuristic concept--network-centric warfare (NCW)--that officials hope will have as big an impact on situational awareness of the battlespace of the future as radar had for the British during World War II. Third Fleet Commander Vice Adm. Toney M. "Mike" Bucchi said his goal is "to have at least 95 percent of the [NCW] solution set by Millennium Challenge [Experiment] in June 2002."

NCW is a comprehensive command-and-control system linking warfighters on the ground, on the sea, and in the air to the same real-time information. The system provides the "big picture" simultaneously to all participating units and gives commanders the tools they need to make timely and well-informed decisions on how best to strike the enemy and to position their forces safely and efficiently throughout the battlespace.

The experiment--Kernel Blitz (Experiment) 01, or KB(X)-01--ran from 18 to 28 June in, and in the waters offshore of, Southern California. It involved approximately 5,000 personnel: Sailors and Marines from Third Fleet, SSC, the Naval Research Laboratory, NWDC (Navy Warfare Development Command), I MEF (I Marine Expeditionary Force), and the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab; civilian contractors from the private sector; and a small number of Airmen and Soldiers. These joint forces rigorously tested the strengths and limitations of NCW against an enemy force projected 10 years into the future.

At the heart of KB(X)-01 was a network architecture designed and installed by NWDC as part of Fleet Battle Experiment-India (FBE-I). NCW-equipped computers were carried by aircraft-- U-2 spy planes, E-2C Hawkeyes, F/A-18C Hornets, and a variety of UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles); by ships and submarines--the John C. Stennis; the Coronado; the Ticonderoga-class cruisers USS Bunker Hill and Lake Champlain; the Wasp-class amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard; and the Los Angeles-class nuclear-powered attack submarine USS Jefferson City; and by infantrymen down to the squad level.

Bucchi was pleased with the experiment outcome. "We are finding that an integrated network empowers decision-makers at all levels. A common operational picture shared by both the senior decision-maker and the front-line commander actually strengthens the command process," he told Sea Power.

"Now," he continued, "the senior decision-maker can anticipate additional support that might be needed by the front-line warfighter. A networked force helps to eliminate confusion and misunderstanding, increases the lethality of our forces, and is far less vulnerable to fratricide."

Links, Grids, and Nodes

Here are the nuts and bolts of NCW-speak: Everyone who transmits and receives information--e.g., Sailors and Marines with access to computers aboard ships, submarines, aircraft, in the field, and in command centers--is considered to be a node. Every device, platform, or system that relays or stores digital electronic information--e.g., underwater sensors that detect and track friendly and enemy ships and submarines by their acoustic signatures--is also a node, albeit a more passive node. Also in the node category are UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) that take digital images of the battlefield; signal-relay devices aboard aircraft and ground vehicles that pass along and boost signal strength; and databases containing such information as weather, medical, and terrain features.

NWDC used current commercial technology to provide a surrogate for future systems during the experiment. Nodes were linked together via encrypted Ku-band satellite feeds in a complex network that continually moved about as forces deployed throughout the battlespace; it was something akin to a giant spider web undulating in a stiff breeze. The key feature of NCW is that all nodes are connected through a common-platform software and hardware system.

Information flows through links or "pipelines" in the form of: (a) electronic chats, resembling civilian chatroom discussions on the Internet; (b) battlespace terrain graphics overlaid by color icons representing enemy and friendly force dispositions; (c) video and still pictures; (d) drawing programs for sketching diagrams; and (e) database directories with powerful search engines.

During the experiment, there was so much information to display that some participants had three computer screens jury-rigged together and were monitoring up to eight chat rooms on one screen, watching images on another, and monitoring battlespace movements on the third.

Chatroom Warriors

An important advantage of using chat-rooms is that a "chat history" is automatically compiled. "If you can't keep up with the chats or you are relieving someone, you can go back and see what had been said," Lt. Cdr. Erik A. Burian of NWDC told Sea Power. "Every reference to a numbered target [e.g., AB1234] from all the chat rooms also is automatically written in chronological order to an electronic target folder posted on the SIPRNET [Secret Internet Protocol Router Network]. This gives everyone--from the warfighters in the battlespace to Pacific Fleet Headquarters in Oahu and the Pentagon--immediate situational awareness." He noted that chat histories also are useful for training purposes and/or to evaluate an exercise or operation. Conversations can be pulled up immediately by executing a name, target number, or timestamp search.

Current communications through the battlespace are too slow, according to Cdr. Mark Chicoine, FBE-1 director from NWDC--the organization that developed the network that supported all of KB(X). He identified four discrete grids in the present battlespace decision-making process:

(1) The sensor grid, which queues battlespace awareness--i.e., the disposition of blue (friendly) and red (enemy) forces;

(2) The collaboration grid, which helps decision-makers determine which targets to select;

(3) The engagement grid, which is used to help determine what weapons to use; and

(4) The assessment grid, where damage to targets is evaluated to determine whether to proceed to the next targets or to reengage targets that have not yet been neutralized.

Collapsing the four grids into one is NCW's solution to the decision-maker's time problem. This is a radical departure from the traditional linear military decision-making process, according to Chicoine. In NCW every person participates in a collaborative effort. In effect, the forces become self-synchronizing--taking the initiative and acting on real-time information without delay, while keeping in step with the commander's intent.

Facilitating the Process

Burian, the assistant FBE director, agreed that the current decision-making process is too slow: "Time-critical strikes have been our toughest challenge. Our enemies have developed weapons--including weapons of mass destruction--that have operational cycles on the order of 10 to 15 minutes. Therefore, our focus has been on the very short, temporal battle."

Previous fleet battle experiments--KB(X)-01 was the ninth--tested different levels of control. "During one experiment, we had a very centralized control structure but things bogged down very quickly because all information had to go through one cell and things were happening in the battlespace very quickly," Chicoine said. "In another experiment, though," he added, "we let it go completely and the joint task force commander looked at that and said, 'You are now in my decision-making process.'

"We learned from those two experiences that technology allows us either to be very centralized and too slow, or [to be more] free-wheeling and going too fast. In the current experiment, we tried to set up somewhere in the middle--the top letting go coupled with commander's intent running in the background."

Self-synchronization has not been without its problems, Burian acknowledged. "The admiral or petty officer can chat freely over the [NCW] chat room instead of going through the chain of command," he said. "You want to facilitate the process so you need to be in touch with the person providing that information regardless of rank. This has created some problems with the socialization process. Some people feel more comfortable communicating face to face or over the telephone. ... [In NCW] you are identified by your watch station and this gives you positional authority." Burian termed the socialization process "a revolution." He said that, after their initial frustration, people "got used to it and found it to be quite effective."

Experimenters found that NCW is flexible in allowing joint control of fires through joining battlespace management. Chicoine provided several examples: "Where you are doing deep interdiction of targets, maybe a joint-forces air component commander would want to call up more assets; when you are prioritizing targets on the ground, the Marines would want to be the main participants; whereas on the Navy side you might be more worried about antisubmarine warfare and in that case the joint-forces maritime component commander would take more of a leadership role." He compared the flexibility of the process to "an amoeba as it moves and changes shape--where the effort is is where the leadership goes."

Infantrymen Issued Computers

For the Marine Corps, NCW--coupled with a new generation of advanced-range guided munitions fired from ships, submarines, and aircraft--holds the exciting possibility of greatly extending the reach of joint fires inland from 20 or 30 miles to several hundred miles, according to Burian. Such weapons and programs include the Extended-Range Guided Munition (ERGM), the Land-Attack Standard Missile (LASM), the Tactical Tomahawk, and the Advanced Land-Attack Missile (ALAM).

In the future, Burian said, there might not be as great a need for organic tank and artillery support because ordnance could be delivered precisely on target from ships and/or aircraft far over the horizon. This would significantly reduce the logistics burden on an amphibious force and help improve its speed of maneuver.

During KB(X)-01, Marines and Soldiers fought a simulated enemy in Camp Pendleton and El Centro, Calif. Marines flew in CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters instead of the simulated MV-22 Ospreys--which when fully operational will have a much longer range and higher speed.

Each Marine squad carried an end-user terminal (EUT) that linked it to the NCW net. The EUT, a wireless computer, displayed topographical maps down to the 1/25,000 scale and Marines could accurately pinpoint enemy targets using a stylus. Rounds were placed on targets almost immediately; previously, several radio transmissions to the fire control center were needed to adjust fires--the more keying that was needed, the greater the chance of the enemy finding the sender's position. Fratricide is significantly reduced because with NCW blue forces can be viewed in real time on the screen.

"It was a novel experience for Marines in the field to carry laptops but it was pretty successful," said Col. Larry Brown, operations officer for the I MEF element aboard the Coronado. "On my computer screen I viewed icons representing squads moving up a draw, coming around a ridge, and then moving into position against enemy objectives. I also saw helos landing in El Centro and infantry units popping on the screen as they disembarked [from the helos].

"With just a 90-second delay in receiving location updates from the field, I call that real-time situation awareness," Brown continued. Without NCW, he said, there is a 30- to 60-minute latency that involves "a lot of phone conversation and plotting."

Marines were enthusiastic about the real-time communications capability that NCW affords, but also were skeptical about relying on it too much, so they also packed their traditional gear--maps, compasses, grease pencils, and field radios. One Marine said, "We want to be sure we can still do our mission if the lights go off."

Netting Stealthy Submarines

Bringing submarines into NCW was one of the most important achievements of the experiment, according to Chicoine, who said that the challenge was netting the submarines without giving away their positions to the enemy. Paul Schmitt, an NWDC undersea warfare specialist, said the submarines were netted on Sea Web, a system of digital acoustic modems and autonomous sensors that uses underwater magnetometers to detect submarines and passes signals up through a buoy which can then relay the signals ashore or afloat through aircraft and satellites.

The use of Sea Web involves about a one-minute delay, but provides a high 95 percent reliability when the submarine is in the right zone. The 5 percent difficulties occur primarily at periscope depth, when it is easier to use an antenna for communications, anyway. "The nice thing is that submarines can stay at speed and depth and be in the game with the rest of the battle group while on the net," Schmitt said.

When they were not in their "hunter killer" mode during the experiment, the submarines were used to launch simulated UAVs for battle-damage assessment or harbor surveillance, or to support Navy SEALs operating ashore.

Medical Uses for NCW

During KB(X), doctors aboard the ships chatted over the NCW system and shared medical images and epidemiological data with one another and with surgeons at Pacific Fleet Headquarters in Oahu. NCW-enabled computers sorted and synthesized data to get such information as: real-time updates in the battlespace by unit, time, and location of unexplained fevers and indicators of a biological or chemical attack; the availability of blood, hospital beds, and medical personnel and equipment; and the tracking of simulated casualties in refugee camps.

Capt. Jeffrey Young, a Third Fleet surgeon, said the doctors and corpsmen participating in the experiment were "positively ecstatic" about the new NCW system's medical capabilities. "We have gone from using plastic boards and grease pencils to getting instant access to medical information," he said.

NCW in the Big Picture

"One of the unique things about experiments is they never fail," said NWDC Commander Rear Adm. Robert G. Sprigg. "You test an idea and you either prove it works or you prove it doesn't. In this case we proved that it is possible to establish and maintain a wide-area relay network that links ships, aircraft, and ground units with a variety of useful data. To me, that is a great step forward.

"Now comes the important process," he continued, "of analyzing what we learned during KB(X) and using that analysis to advance the concept of network-centric warfare. It seems to me that the next logical step will be to mature and expand the network and experiment with a larger joint force."

User Acceptance Is Key

NCW alone will not be a useful tool for winning battles if the technology is not fully embraced by those who will use it. Bucchi said he thinks KB(X) has put achievement of that goal one step closer to reality. "What I have observed at all levels is that people understand we must seize the initiative when it comes to emerging information technology," he said. "The cost of ignoring new technologies ... is far too high. Everyone I have spoken with--from Marines using end-user terminals in the field to the battle-watch captains onboard Coronado--has been astounded by the incredible level of situational awareness this technology provides--to know exactly where our forces were located during all phases of the experimentation.

"Changing our service culture is probably the biggest single challenge," he continued. "The capability to network units at all levels challenges the way we think, the way we communicate, and, ultimately, the way we fight. New technology is of little value to us if we don't have the doctrine, techniques, and tactics to take advantage of that technology.

"Innovation isn't just new things," Bucchi said. "It's also about new ways of doing things. That's why dedicated experimentation venues like KB(X) are important. They allow us to develop and refine procedures to accompany new technological capabilities."