A Deployment to Remember

The Navy's Seabees in Afghanistan

By LEONARD W.W. COOKE

Lt. Cdr. Leonard W.W. "Len" Cooke, USN (CEC), was the officer in charge of Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 133 Air Detachment, which deployed to Afghanistan last year in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

On 5 September 2001 the advance party of Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB) 133 left the battalion's homeport in Gulfport, Miss., to begin a seven-month deployment to its main-body site in Guam and a dozen or so "detachment" sites around the world. What had originally been planned as a "typical" Seabee deployment, though, changed suddenly, and tragically, less than a week later--specifically, on 11 September 2001.

Nonetheless, during the first several weeks of the deployment, NMCB 133 worked on the peacetime construction projects previously scheduled. Planning efforts for potential missions in support of the war on terrorism also started, though, and received high-
priority attention from the battalion's leadership and the Third Naval Construction Brigade in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii--which is responsible for the planning and coordination of all Seabee efforts in the Pacific and Central Command areas of responsibility.

In mid-November, one of those potential missions began to take solid shape, and the approximately 450 members of the battalion in Guam (including about 75 reservists called to active duty from the battalion's Reserve Augment Unit in the New York/New England area) started preparations to launch a mission in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Task Force 58 (TF58) had been directed to establish a forward operating base in Afghanistan to build up U.S. combat power in the area and, later, conduct combat operations against the Taliban regime and al Qaeda forces. The Seabees of NMCB 133 were directed to proceed to the area to serve as the contingency engineers for TF58.

The mission was simply stated--but vague when it came to the hard data needed for detailed planning: repair and maintain a dirt runway at Forward Operating Base Rhino, then move to Kandahar to perform Rapid Runway Repair (RRR) at the coalition-bombed international airport and perform other contingency construction as required. Responding to the TF58 tasking, NMCB 133 prepared to proceed in two stages. The first stage would put 200,000 pounds of equipment, tools, and material, and 27 personnel, on the ground at Rhino. The second stage would put more gear and another 120 personnel at Kandahar--after it was taken by TF58.

Although 200,000 pounds sounds like a lot of equipment, it is not nearly enough to make Seabees feel comfortable about being responsible for more than 6,000 feet of dirt runway at a site that is being punished nightly by combat-loaded C-17 and C-130 transport aircraft. A single piece of heavy equipment such as a grader can weigh 30,000 pounds or more.

All routine construction on Guam stopped as the entire battalion pitched in to make the 150-person air detachment and all of its gear ready for its mission. All of the Navy's NMCBs have standing 89-person air detachments capable of launching anywhere in the world in 48 hours, but this mission would require a detailed task-tailoring of that group. Numerous hard decisions had to be made to determine which people would go.

Because only 200,000 pounds of equipment--including spare parts and fuel--would be brought in during the first stage of operations, it would have to be in the best shape possible. Additional mission-specific training was conducted. Intelligence was gathered and analyzed. In short, although only 150 personnel would actually be deployed to Afghanistan, the efforts of the entire battalion were critical to the mission.

The Third Naval Construction Brigade called on 27 November. Two C-5 Galaxy transports would arrive at Andersen Air Force Base at the north end of Guam that evening to take the first group of NMCB 133 personnel to an undisclosed area in-theater, where they would transload onto C-17s for the flight to Rhino. The sense of urgency that had pervaded Camp Covington, the Seabee camp on Guam, ratcheted up another notch. The other members of the battalion who played such a critical role in getting the first group ready to go lined the road leaving the Seabee camp and gave an emotional send-off to the first 27 Seabees going into action in Operation Enduring Freedom.

The flight into Rhino itself was an intense one. According to the U.S. Air Force personnel on the flight, this was not just the first time a C-17 would be landing at Rhino. It was the first time a C-17 was going to be used on any expeditionary airfield, anywhere in the world, in a true combat environment. The plane landed after nightfall; for security reasons, all fixed-wing operations at Rhino were carried out at night. Twenty-one of the 27 Seabees assigned were on that first sortie and were still moving their gear off the runway when the second sortie and the rest of the Seabee gear and personnel for the first stage of operations landed. The dust storm caused by the second C-17 gave the first indication of just how difficult it was going to be to maintain the runway.

By the end of the first night, all 27 Seabees and their gear were in the compound. At first light, the heavy equipment rolled onto the runway and began repairing the damage caused by three nights of sorties on a dry lake bed that had not had any previous maintenance. It became apparent the next night, when the nose gear of a C-130 Hercules became stuck in a pile of accumulated dust and dirt, how critical the NMCB mission would be to eventual U.S./coalition combat success. The Seabees used a small bulldozer to clear a path, after which more Seabees and other personnel worked on their hands and knees under the C-130 to free its wheels. If they had not been able to do so--or if, for any other reason, the runway could not be kept open, the U.S. forces at Rhino--400 miles from the nearest water--would be cut off from their logistics lifeline.

The Seabees worked 24 hours a day, repaired the runway nonstop during daylight hours and bringing their heavy equipment onto the runway between sorties at night to keep the runway operational. They provided their own security for the airfield work crews; several times, security alerts signaled a potential threat to the TF58 forces.

When the crews were not on the runway or on security duty, they made whatever improvements they could to the compound--building four-hole burnout heads, for example, to improve the sanitation conditions. They also built better fighting positions for the Marines of the 15th MEU (Marine Expeditionary Unit) on the perimeter, improved the reliability of the base's generators and electrical distribution system, developed dust-control measures for the air combat element helicopters, and did whatever else was asked of them.

The main focus of their attention, though--always--was the runway. Senior Chief Petty Officer John Lemmond developed a runway stabilization process in which earth with a slight moist clay content (taken from about four feet below the surface) was laid in six-inch lifts, watered, and rolled to improve the durability of the landing, braking, and turning areas on the runway. That method of maintaining the runway allowed operations to continue at Rhino for nearly six weeks, well past the originally projected time the dirt runway would be used.

The move to Kandahar came in the middle of December, when TF58 and the coalition partners began carrying the fight to the enemy. Restrictions on the strategic lift available, combined with the need for speed in the operation, meant that the full remainder of the air detachment gear and personnel left behind in Guam would not be able to move into theater en masse. Instead, graders, loaders, and bulldozers pre-staged in Bahrain were flown up into the area, and personnel from NMCB 133 in both Guam and Bahrain were moved forward. At the peak of activity, a group of about 50 Seabees were performing runway maintenance and other missions simultaneously at both Rhino and Kandahar.

Initially, a small reconnaissance team of Seabees accompanied the advance elements of the 26th MEU into Kandahar to assess the condition of the runway there. As the focus of effort began to shift from Rhino to Kandahar, additional personnel and equipment were moved in as needed. The crater damage caused by coalition bombing was severe but not devastating. With expeditious field repairs, it was determined, the Seabees could open the runway for C-130 and C-17 flights within 48 hours. After that initial requirement was met--with temporary, compacted-earth expedient repairs--the Seabees systematically started repairing all craters in the runways, taxiways, and aprons to make the airfield capable of handling the aircraft load necessary to maintain operations.

Two more tasks were given to the Seabees in late December. The first was to build a short-term holding facility (STHF) to house Taliban and al Qaeda detainees. The second was to upgrade the runway temporary repairs--to permanent repairs--so that other types of aircraft, including the C-141 needed to transport the detainees from Afghanistan to the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, would be able to use the airfield at Kandahar. Once again, restrictions on the strategic airlift available forced the Seabees to make do with forces already in-theater, supplemented by just a few more individuals with the special skills needed to carry out this important mission.

These two tasks brought another problem to the forefront. The lack of Class IV construction material needed for the concrete repairs to the runway--and of the lumber, fencing, and other materials necessary to construct the STHF--posed a significant impediment to success.

A series of small solutions were used to overcome the problem: Naval Central Command engineers in Bahrain made local purchases of key materials for C-130 transport to Kandahar; a local contracting agent from Central Command made cash purchases for what little material was available in town; the TF58 logistics personnel moved more material into the theater; and the Seabees themselves devised a number of creative solutions to overcome some of the material shortfalls.

Chief Petty Officer Tony Williams, for example, directed a high-priority scavenging operation to find anything that might help. Guard towers were built on top of vehicles and container storage boxes to give them extra height, trees were felled that could be used as raw lumber, engineering stakes were used in lieu of reinforcing steel for the repairs to the concrete runway, and old Soviet, Czech, and Chinese equipment was resurrected from the airport's junkyards to expand the equipment inventory available to the Seabees.

As at Rhino, the Seabees also performed a variety of other contingency engineering tasks to improve the overall effectiveness of TF58 and coalition personnel. They redeveloped several well sites to ensure a larger supply of water, leveled obstructions to improve fields of fire, built fuel and ammo berms, shored up and/or realigned fighting positions, and completed huge amounts of site preparation to accommodate the rapid buildup of U.S. and coalition forces.

NMCB 133's mission ended when the Seabees had completed the STHF, made the permanent repairs to the Kandahar runway, closed Rhino, and performed a wide variety of other contingency-
engineering tasks. When TF58 turned the Kandahar base over to elements of the U.S. Army's 101st Airborne Division, the Seabees left Afghanistan.

Throughout the operation the "can do" spirit of the Seabees never faltered. Their ability to integrate with the Marines of TF58, to adapt to constantly changing working as well as combat conditions and requirements, to almost literally "make something out of nothing," to keep a constant focus on the mission before them, and to always remember why they were there were the keys to their success. In addition to the original mission in Guam, the members of NMCB 133 also were building the detainee facility in Cuba and carrying out other construction tasking at more than 15 sites around the globe--all in the course of one memorable seven-month deployment.

In April 2002, NMCB 133 wrapped up its deployment and returned to Gulfport with a deep sense of satisfaction for a job well done. All of those involved knew why they had done what they had done, and how important the battalion's mission had been to the freedom and way of life the United States represents. If anyone were to ask if they would do it again there would be no hesitation and no doubt about their answer: Seabees "can do," and would. *