Shipping Container Security and the Weakest-Link Scenario

By JAMES D. HESSMAN
Senior Writer & Editor Emeritus

As the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) takes steps to better protect U.S. ports and harbors, questions linger about the potential effectiveness of the Container Security Initiative (CSI) in helping to ensure that terrorists do no harm by taking advantage of security gaps in international shipping.

The end result of the still embryonic CSI, launched as an administrative initiative in January 2002 by the Customs and Border Protection agency, a part of DHS, should be a major improvement in U.S. port and harbor security, a significant reduction in the smuggling of illegal or dangerous contraband through U.S. ports, a decrease in illegal immigration, and, just possibly, a modest expansion of the U.S.-flag merchant fleet.

The threat of terrorism from the sea, probably in the form of a nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon of mass destruction, is estimated both in terms of a massive loss of life and in a cost of billions of dollars.

"Few, if any, people involved in what we now call the global war on terrorism would disagree," said Sen. Ernest F. Hollings (D-S.C.), "with what I have long believed--namely, that our seaports are now probably the most vulnerable component of the U.S. critical infrastructure.

"A single weapon of mass destruction, concealed in a container and smuggled into a major U.S. seaport, could cause untold damage to our economy, killing thousands of people and costing tens of billions of dollars in damage," said Hollings, the principal sponsor, with Sen. Bob Graham (D-Fla.), of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, which was passed after 9/11 to create a maritime security system.

The United States has a $1.8 trillion stake in safe shipping. That is the combined value of U.S. exports and imports each year, almost one-fifth of the gross domestic product, according to Harvard University researchers.

Examining "Policies to Counter Seaborne Container Terrorism" in February 2003, the researchers found that most of that cargo is carried in containers, an estimated 30,000 of which arrive in U.S. seaports every day. The overall volume of U.S. overseas trade is expected to double within the next two decades, just as the value of imports and exports "has grown exponentially over the past 30 years," the researchers found.

Under the provisions of CSI, Customs agents will work with their counterparts at foreign ports to target, identify, search, and, if necessary, detain any "high-risk" containers designated for shipment to the United States. Customs' initial goal was to create partnerships with the world's top 20 ports in terms of volume of cargo containers shipped to the United States. CSI is being implemented at 16 of those ports, according to Robert C. Bonner, Customs commissioner. The ports that have agreed to CSI inspections include Antwerp, The Netherlands; Hamburg, Germany; Hong Kong; and Yokohama, Japan. With most of the major ports on board, "we are expanding beyond the top 20 to additional ports," Bonner said during a September speech to the Heritage Foundation in Washington.

Until CSI is fully implemented, the United States and its allies must find other ways to deal with the threat of a weapon of mass destruction entering the U.S. in a cargo container, possibly at a port far inland.

But in order for it to be "truly effective," said Coast Guard Capt. Daniel McClellan, a former National Security Fellow at Harvard and a member of the research team, CSI must protect shipments "end to end," from loading overseas, say in a factory, to unloading, either in a U.S. port or at an inland destination.

The research team also included Navy Cdrs. Bruce Loveless and Claudia Risner and Army Reserve Lt. Col. John Valentine.

Efficiency--not impeding the flow of international commerce, or perhaps even expediting it--is another concern, as is the need for the program to be "self-auditing," which the team defined as allowing for the identification of known and potential vulnerabilities, for corrective actions, and for an assessment of how the system is working.

"Overall system security," the research team concluded, "is only as good as the weakest link," and there are at least eight links in the international shipment of containers bound for the United States. The trail of links begins with the exporter or freight consolidator, who loads the container for shipping and ends with the inland carrier, who moves the container from the port of entry to its final destination in the United States.

"If a terrorist can influence the behavior of key personnel," the Harvard research team noted, "or insert himself into the system of cargo handlers anywhere along the chain as a loader, driver, shipper, warehouse guard, inspector, or one who prepares manifests, that key person ... becomes the weakest link.

"If a terrorist can ... gain entry to a container, he has the potential for transforming it into a delivery vehicle for a WMD."

Kurt J. Nagle, president of the American Association of Port Authorities, told Sea Power that the total amount requested by ports for security enhancements is $987 million, but only $104 million is available. "Clearly," he said, "this illustrates how dramatic the needs are, and that the funds available are only a fraction of what is required to get the job done."

It would help to establish better-controlled areas in port to limit access to containers, using cameras and access-control devices, according to the Homeland Security Industries Association. Better communication on merchandise coming into the country also is needed, the association says, not only in how it is classified but also in how it is described on entry forms.

The cost of CSI remains an unresolved issue in both the public and private sectors. "Who will pay for it?" asked Carl J. Seiberlich, a U.S. member of the International Maritime Organization's maritime security working group. "The shippers? The federal government? State and local governments? Or will the cost be prorated among the several parties involved?"

The working group was established to help develop and implement the tighter and more effective port-security standards required in the post-9/11 era. Despite his reservations about funding, Seiberlich said he is confident that, even though "each port is different and has different requirements," the organization's 164 member nations would fully adhere to the standards.

Despite the large cost of implementing CSI and other new homeland security programs, the cost of not fully funding CSI worries many on Capitol Hill, even in a time of tight budgets. Hollings told Sea Power that he believes the Department of Homeland Security's port and maritime security account "should be increased substantially this year, as a matter of urgent national priority." It is "shameful," Hollings said, that U.S. seaports had not (as of mid-September) been provided the funds needed "to comply with the federal mandates for maritime security."

Quoting Lloyd's of London, he said, "Osama bin Laden has control of an estimated 20 merchant ships. We also know, from NATO intelligence, that he has the crews needed to man those ships. This combination represents a clear and present danger to U.S. national security.

"This is a mammoth problem that we still have not adequately addressed." *