Exciting Times for the Surface Navy

Interview with Rear Adm. Donald P. Loren
Deputy Director, Surface Ships, Surface Warfare Division,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

As the deputy director for surface ships in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Rear Adm. Donald P. Loren is the resource sponsor for the U.S. Navy's current and future surface combatants. As such, he is responsible for warfighting requirements, maintenance, repair, modernization, and readiness of those ships. Loren was graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1974 with a Bachelor of Science degree in operations research. His initial assignments included Naval Nuclear Power Training and duty at sea on the nuclear-powered guided-missile cruiser USS Long Beach and on the staff of Destroyer Squadron 31. His career is distinguished by numerous other demanding assignments, both afloat and ashore, highlighted by service as the executive officer of the destroyer USS John Hancock and command of the guided-missile frigate USS Elrod and of Destroyer Squadron 28. He holds a Master of Science degree from Old Dominion University and served for one year as a federal executive fellow at the Harvard University Center for International Affairs.

Editor in Chief James D. Hessman and Senior Editor Gordon I. Peterson interviewed Rear Adm. Loren for this issue of Sea Power.

Sea Power: Admiral, could you begin by describing the relevance of this year's centennial of the U.S. destroyer force in terms of the Navy's 21st-century warfare missions?

LOREN: The first Navy destroyers were built as single-mission platforms to counter a very specific threat, the motor torpedo boat--they were motor torpedo-boat destroyers. They evolved into the modern multimission destroyers that we are familiar with today. Over the past 100 years, the destroyer has proved its value across a broad spectrum of operations and applications employing a wide range of combat capabilities.

Destroyers have engaged in antisubmarine warfare, surface warfare, anti-air warfare, and a number of other assignments ranging from naval shore-fire support to assistance in NEO [noncombatant evacuation operation] missions.

The important point to emphasize is that today's U.S. Navy destroyer force represents a multimission capability that many people equate to the surface Navy overall. The fact of the matter is that the strength of the destroyer force, the strength of the surface Navy, and the strength of the entire Navy is the Sailor. Sailors bring life to our platforms, and we like to think of the destroyer Sailor as a unique breed of surface warrior. We must always recognize that strength. Its melding with the capabilities and technologies that the future will bring is what we will depend upon to lead us into the remainder of this century and beyond.

Looking ahead a decade or so, what are the most significant changes you see on the horizon for the Navy's surface-combatant force?

LOREN: We are still in the process of building a very capable, technologically advanced platform in the form of the DDG 51 class [the Arleigh Burke-class Aegis guided-missile destroyer]. I think it is important to consider the genesis of that class and apply it to the future.

Since the early 1970s, when we commissioned the first Spruance-class destroyer, we installed vertical-launch systems, turned it into an Aegis platform, improved upon it, wrapped a new hull around it, and called it the DDG 51. Who would think--30 years after the genesis of this platform--that the [USS] Lake Erie would be relying on its Aegis systems to shoot down ballistic missiles in the exo-atmosphere? The Burke-class guided-missile destroyer has evolved into a formidable multifunction warship--and we're not finished!

We hope to follow this same progression with our family-of-ships approach to the future surface Navy. When we go from the DD(X) [next-generation destroyer] to the CG(X) [next-generation guided-missile cruiser] to whatever lies beyond that, we hope to derive the same type of utility and applications of technology that we did with the Aegis program. The key, of course, will be the men and women who bring those technologies and platforms to reality in the form of true combat capability.

Just over the horizon we have several exciting programs. With the restructuring of the DD 21 [land-attack destroyer] program the Navy recognized the transformational imperatives explicit in the Defense Planning Guidance and the [2001] Quadrennial Defense Review. We will provide our greatest contribution through a family of ships that will apply spiral development to take advantage of the technologies already available to us as well as the new technologies we are developing for the future Navy.

DD(X) is central to the family of ships--a multimission destroyer designed to fight and win in any maritime environment with strong precision-strike and volume-fires capabilities as well as state-of-the-art network-centric technologies that will make it a ship built from the keel up as a netted and distributed member of the force. Its technologies will allow it to operate seamlessly with other naval, ground, and joint units. Eventually, DD(X) will provide the basis for CG(X). This multimission ship may have a common hull and HM&E [hull, mechanical, and electrical] systems with DD(X), but instead of having the DD(X)'s strong volume-fires and power-projection capabilities, it will have a greater theater-air and missile-defense focus.

How will you bridge the gap until this new family of ships enters service?

LOREN: Taking a step away from the conceptual future, the cruiser-conversion program will bridge the gap between the existing Aegis fleet and the future DD(X) family of ships. We hope to complete the first DD(X) in the 2011 time frame and the first CG(X) perhaps in the 2019 to 2020 time frame. We have a very capable Aegis force that will allow us to bridge the gap until we have a sufficient force structure based on the new family of ships. The cruiser-conversion program will allow us to get the full expected service life out of the cruisers, yet also result in upgrades to their future capabilities in such areas as ballistic-missile defense and advanced gunfire systems.

There has been much discussion of the Navy's push to design and develop the Littoral Combat Ship [LCS]--with some commentary wide of the mark. What can you tell us about this program?

LOREN: As we looked at the direction of the future surface force and conducted our analysis, it became very apparent that there would be a role for a niche player--a ship that could be of immeasurable value in more narrowly focused missions involving combat in the littorals or assuring access to allow us to project power ashore. Those missions involve the threats from mines, small boats, and diesel submarines operating in shallow waters.

We can see that, by investing in technologies and capabilities against those focused missions, there could be a very significant role for a third member of the family of ships--the Littoral Combat Ship. Will that ship have the same capabilities as one of the larger multimission platforms? No, of course not. But the LCS will be a force multiplier we can employ for leverage to allow those multimission ships to focus on their primary missions and multimission capabilities as we go about ensuring access. It will be a critical marriage.

The original torpedo-boat destroyers were a niche ship for their day, correct?

LOREN: There you go! When the battle fleets of that era operated in the littorals, the motor-torpedo boat was a real threat. We designed a ship to counter that very specific threat, and it has evolved into today's destroyer. Today, we must ensure that we have unimpeded access to the littorals to project offensive or defensive power. There is a role for a new platform--the Littoral Combat Ship.

What capabilities and specifications are you contemplating for LCS?

LOREN: Together with the program executive officer and program manager, we are exploring concepts and capabilities needed to meet warfighting requirements in the littorals. LCS is going to be a somewhat smaller ship--but not a small boat. We will not build PCs [coastal patrol ships], PGs [patrol gunboats], or experimental vessels. It will be designed to go fast--possibly 50 knots, perhaps less. As we get into the complexity of design we will consider such factors as endurance, size, payload, and capabilities.

LCS will have a relatively shallow draft--certainly less than 20 feet. I am often asked what the LCS will displace. I don't know! We are considering innovative hull forms with a shallow draft. Much of the ship may not be in the water. The important factor will be the ship's payload--what it can carry.

I think of LCS in terms of an analogy with the aircraft carrier [CV], where the CV is essentially a platform from which an airwing can operate and conduct its various missions. We will build a highly capable ship from the keel up as a fully netted and distributed member of a larger force. It may be able to leverage the capabilities of the multimission ships. It will have some organic weapons systems, but it is not going to be a mini-destroyer. LCS may well depend for protection upon the sensors and weapons of the larger, more capable, and distant multimission ships. Through force-net integration and linked sensors, I can envision the LCS being protected by a CG(X) as it operates some distance away conducting its focused mission.

Beyond netted sensors, how will the LCS differ from the PCs and PGs of past years?

LOREN: The strength of LCS will be what it carries and its netted sensors--just like an aircraft carrier. We are receiving many good recommendations from the fleet as the Navy's experimentation continues. We will design modules for different warfighting missions through the concept of open architecture in the ship's design--modules will be developed to counter the threats of small boats, diesel submarines, and naval mines. We are working to define the mission modules now. An example of one module might be an unmanned RIB [rigid inflatable boat] like Spartan Scout--a seven-meter RIB--armed with a modern rapid-fire gun. An 11-meter RIB is being developed.

For illustrative purposes, consider the operational possibilities if we deployed four LCSs capable of moving at 50 knots and with each of them outfitted with both manned and armed helicopters or UCAVs [unmanned combat-air vehicles] to operate with a force of both DD(X) and CG(X) ships. Alternatively, for purposes of discussion, some of these same LCSs could be outfitted with the RIB module--four high-speed RIBs armed with rapid-fire guns.

Under this scenario, I would say any adversary attempting to close and engage the DD(X) or CG(X) now has a different problem--survival! I could describe a similar scenario with LCSs outfitted with modules relying on a towed transducer and remote undersea vehicles to seek out and destroy enemy mines. The Navy Warfare Development Command is engaged in experimentation in these areas.

Can a single LCS or even a combination of them provide a force commander with the multimission capabilities of either a DD(X) or CG(X)? No. Would the LCS provide tremendous force-leveraging capabilities that would allow one to operate in the littorals unimpeded and with assured access? You bet!

What is the time line for moving the LCS concept forward?

LOREN: My time for having an LCS in the water was last week! We all would like to see the capabilities envisioned with LCS as soon as possible. As you can appreciate, LCS is a concept now. We do not have DOD [Department of Defense] or congressional "new-start" authority for a program. The time required to obtain this approval and move a new program forward in the programming process points toward a POM [program objective memorandum] submission in the [fiscal year] 2004 time frame. We are studying the concept now so that we can refine it and define requirements.

The Coast Guard enjoyed a good measure of success using performance-based specifications with its Integrated Deepwater System recapitalization program. Do you see similar opportunities for LCS--to allow industry to come to you to explain how they would meet the Navy's requirements?

LOREN: If we have the opportunity to jump-start a new program with new-start authority, a more formal program requirement, and some near-term funding for preliminary design, we could--conceivably--turn to industry as you suggest. I need to defer to the expert and the man responsible for that decision, Charlie Hamilton [Rear Adm. Charles S. Hamilton II, program executive officer for surface strike in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition].

So, in a best- case scenario, when might LCS move forward?

LOREN: If all of the legal, programmatic, and funding requirements come together smoothly, we could begin to build a "Flight 0" LCS in the 2005 time frame with a follow-on ship in the following year or two. The follow-on ship may have a different innovative hull form.

There are some tremendous opportunities ahead of us. I want to take advantage of the opportunities provided by spiral development. There are existing commercial and naval technologies--some not familiar to our Navy or others in the United States--being employed by other shipbuilders around the world. As we pursue early designs--a deployable, usable asset and not a test platform--we can use off-the-shelf technology and systems. The future may offer other opportunities, because the strength of this ship will be what it carries in the form of specifically tailored warfighting modules. I have a great deal of flexibility.

Closer to the present day, the Navy-Marine Corps team played a critical and highly successful role during Operation Enduring Freedom's war on terrorism in landlocked Afghanistan. How do you assess the contributions of Navy surface combatants during those operations?

LOREN: All Navy surface forces made considerable contributions. One of our missions is to maintain maritime dominance by projecting offensive and defensive power--afloat and ashore--around the world. The surface force will always play a pivotal role in any war on terrorism--whether it be through the projection of offensive power or perhaps the more mundane but nevertheless critical role in maritime-intercept operations, boardings and inspections, air-space management, or surface-strike presence. These missions occur behind the scenes and do not receive the same degree of coverage in the news media that a precision-guided weapon receives when it impacts a target, but they are critical.

The Navy-Marine Corps team's unique qualification is its ability to project this type of power and area control from the sea while forward-deployed around the world. This is the most critical capability that we bring to bear anywhere the United States chooses to apply it.

Admiral Clark [Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Vern Clark] announced a new Navy "vision" in June. Is it correct to assume that increasingly capable surface ships will play even broader roles in such mission areas as sea strike, sea shield, and sea basing?

LOREN: Without question, the vision articulated in Admiral Clark's Sea Power 21 statement will sustain--and accelerate--the Navy's transformation to meet the wide array of threats and missions that he has articulated. The mission areas of sea strike, sea shield, and sea basing are critical to us. They are at the heart of what the surface force does. We have a vital role to play in each mission area, and our capabilities will grow as we move forward with each class in our new family-of-ships program.

One probable key to extending the reach and accuracy of the surface Navy's firepower will be the development, production, and deployment of new long-range naval guns, extended-range guided munitions, and improved land-attack missiles. There have been some technical setbacks along the way in some of these development programs, but they appear to be moving forward now. Are you satisfied with their status and progress?

LOREN: I don't wish to infringe on the program manager's turf in describing the status of his gun or missile programs today. I'll let him answer your question! There is no question that the ability to deliver sustained volume fires is critical to our ability to project offensive and defensive power. It is critical to meeting the naval shore fires support requirements of the Marine Corps, the Army, and other forces ashore. The capabilities of weapons like the Advanced Gun System make this exciting concept closer and closer to reality.

The Navy must build more ships to maintain a fleet of at least 300 ships--not to mention the fleet of 375 ships that the CNO has identified as the real requirement. Navy arguments that its surface fleet is, on average, relatively young mask the reality that it is retiring ships at a faster rate than originally planned. How will the Navy build the roughly nine ships per year it needs to sustain today's fleet, stabilize the defense industrial base, and put it on the glide path necessary to build a fleet of roughly 375 ships?

LOREN: There is no question that we must recapitalize the fleet, and that is one of our top priorities. I think it is important to couch required numbers of ships in an appropriate perspective that reflects their capabilities. The CNO's analysis, based on assigned missions and operational concepts, shows that approximately 375 ships is the appropriate number needed for the future. That number is predicated on the mix of capabilities that are required to operate the Navy to meet its global contingency operations with carrier battle groups and expeditionary strike groups. There is an opportunity to achieve a balanced shipbuilding program that takes into account our needs and the ability to maintain the nation's shipbuilding capability with an equitable distribution of work. What is important is the need to provide the capability to meet the warfighting requirements for the way we are going to carry out the Navy's, and the nation's, national-security business for the future.

The LCS will give us an excellent opportunity to achieve the force structure we need. Our analysis might justify building 30 to 60 LCSs--affordable platforms. It will be a smart way to do business in a cost-effective and operationally effective manner because LCS can leverage technologies and capabilities now under development, serve as a force multiplier for tomorrow's distributed and netted force, and provide a very focused and needed capability in each of the three mission areas postulated in Sea Power 21.

What would you tell a young recruit or officer candidate who might be contemplating a career in the Surface Navy?

LOREN: Any job as a young Sailor or officer in the Navy will provide outstanding and challenging opportunities for personal growth, professional knowledge, leadership, management, and service to our country. This is an especially exciting time to be a Sailor in the Surface Navy. During the course of the past decade we have proved the tremendous capabilities that the force brings to bear everywhere the Navy is deployed. The prospect of new technology, capabilities, and future opportunities will continue to prove the worth--and the wisdom--of maintaining a strong Navy as the nation executes its national policy. I'm glad I am a surface-warfare Sailor--I only wish I was younger, but the best legacy is that, hopefully, my son, Christopher, may one day have the opportunity to reap the benefits of the programs we are planning today.

In closing, is there anything else that you would like to say to the members of the Navy League and other readers of Sea Power?

LOREN: I am grateful for the Navy League's continued and dedicated support for a strong Navy and strong sea services--yesterday, today, and in the future. We need your continued assistance if we are to realize our vision for what will be a truly transformational surface-combatant family of ships. We also need the support of those Navy League corporate members of industry to participate in the development of this family of ships and to provide the best ideas that they can offer to help us identify, evaluate, and eventually deploy transformational technologies, systems, and platforms. *