Change,
Innovation, Transformation
Today's Surface Force: Ready to Move at Flank Speed Into the 21st Century
By TIMOTHY W. LaFLEUR
Vice Adm. Timothy W. LaFleur is commander, Naval Surface Force.
With a total force of 201 ships, today's surface Navy is engaged and
in high demand around the world. Surface warriors are in the North Arabian
and Mediterranean Seas, supporting antiterrorism forces in Afghanistan
and working tirelessly with coalition navies to prevent al Qaeda and Taliban
leaders from escaping via the sea. They are in the Arabian Gulf, intercepting
and boarding Iraqi tankers smuggling oil in violation of United Nations
sanctions. They are in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific, working with
the Coast Guard and the DEA (Drug Enforcement Agency) to stem the flow
of drugs into the United States. Surface warriors are in numerous other
places throughout the world--e.g., East Timor, Malaysia, South America,
and the Philippines--conducting exercises and strengthening international
relationships.
We are a force in demand and, while there is certainly consensus throughout
the Navy that our overall numbers are not what they need to be, there
is no question that the superior readiness of surface ships and surface
warriors is carrying the combat power of the United States to the four
corners of the globe. As Chief of Naval Operations Vern Clark has said
numerous times, that is the sole mission of the Navy, and surface warriors
are doing it exceptionally well.
Today, as the surface community moves further into the 21st century,
it is clear there is no shortage of challenges in the four pillars of
current readiness--manpower, maintenance, training, and logistics. And,
while our vision for the surface force of 2025 is becoming clear, the
path toward that fully capable multimission force will undoubtedly have
its share of hurdles and potholes along the way. What is also plainly
evident though is this--Surface Warfare is embracing change and tackling
current and future readiness challenges with the innovative ideas and
solutions required to make our vision for the future a reality.
Two years ago, when I walked around the waterfront and talked to Sailors
about current readiness issues, the prevailing feeling seemed to be that
we were not yet where we needed to be. Our ships were not fully manned,
we were not getting the dollars needed for required maintenance, and overall
funding shortages were forcing us to bow-wave important spare parts requirements
into the following fiscal years. It was a downward spiral that damaged
both current readiness and morale. Today, I believe we have a much more
positive story to tell.
Manpower
The manning shortages that plagued our deployed forces during the late
1990s are a thing of the past. Where deploying carrier battle groups once
felt fortunate to be 85 percent manned, today's reality is that all of
our current carrier battle groups (CVBGs) and amphibious ready groups
(ARGs) have been deploying at manning levels close to 100 percent. And,
where retention rates in the 40-45 percent range used to be greeted with
enthusiasm, today's monthly rates--ranging between 60-70 percent, and
even hitting 80 percent last spring--have exceeded all expectations and
are a clear indicator that we are now winning the "war for talent."
These positive trends in manning and retention are, however, only part
of the overall manpower/personnel equation for the surface Navy. We now
need to work on shaping the force to meet our current and future technical
and personnel needs. The same data that shows we are deploying CVBGs and
ARGs 100 percent manned also tell us that in specific technical ratings--electronics
technicians and operations specialists, for example--we still face up
to a 30 percent shortage of Sailors who possess the skills and training
needed to do those jobs. Too often we are hurting our ships, and overall
force readiness, by filling billets with Sailors who don't have the right
qualifications. We are addressing this issue head-on by working with CNET
(the chief of naval education and training), CNP (the chief of naval personnel),
and other commands to change our processes and develop models to help
us pinpoint where we need to focus in the overall manpower/personnel/training
loop to eliminate these specific shortages and avoid them in the future.
Getting this right will only grow in importance as we work to more optimally
man both our current force and the force of the future--ships that will
have crew sizes of 100 Sailors or fewer.
Optimal Manning
Determining the true manning requirements for our current and future
forces is the focus of manning experiments being conducted aboard ships
on both the East and West Coasts. On the West Coast, using a combination
of technology infusion, as well as implementing a wide range of new policies
and procedures for doing business, the Arleigh Burke-class Aegis guided-missile
destroyer (DDG) USS Milius has reduced its crew size by 19 percent, and
the Ticonderoga-class Aegis guided-missile cruiser USS Mobile Bay has
cut its crew size by 11 percent. Both ships accomplished those reductions
by combining watch stations underway, by creating and relying on shore
detachments to handle routine preventive maintenance and administrative
requirements, and by developing and taking advantage of other efficiencies
such as self-service laundry and food lines.
A year into the experiment, Mobile Bay is deployed and successfully meeting
all of her operational requirements; Milius also is performing superbly,
setting the standard for performance during the final evaluation period
at the conclusion of the basic phase of the interdeployment training cycle,
and is fully ready to deploy with the Constellation Battle Group later
this fall. Both ships completed an underway material inspection by the
Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV), receiving scores among the highest
in recent history.
We have closely watched the retention figures of both ships, as well
as their CASREP (casualty report) numbers and other "leading indicators";
in each of those key areas, Milius and Mobile Bay have performed as well
as, or better than, other fully manned Burke-class destroyers and Ticonderoga-class
cruisers. In July, we took this experiment one step further, using lessons
learned and best practices from Milius and Mobile Bay to implement optimal
manning aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Boxer.
The Fleet Manning Experiment (FME) being conducted on the East Coast
involves an entire carrier battle group. Like Boxer, Mobile Bay, and Milius,
the surface ships involved in this experiment also have reduced their
crew sizes--the amphibious assault ship USS Nassau by 24 Sailors, the
Aegis guided-missile cruiser USS Monterey by 38 Sailors, and the Burke-class
DDG USS Mahan by 18 Sailors.
The FME focuses on determining true manning requirements based on today's
missions, distribution systems, technology, and support structure. The
evaluation phase of the FME began in June and will continue through the
interdeployment training cycle (IDTC), workups, and, finally, deployment
of the USS George Washington Battle Group.
Optimal manning works. We will apply what we learn in these experiments--both
to our current force, and to sizing the force of the future--to more efficiently
man our ships and reinvest the resultant manpower savings into the type
of transformational technologies required for our 21st-century force.
Training
We are training smarter. The day is rapidly approaching when surface
ships on the East Coast will train to the same standards and requirements
as their counterparts on the West Coast. We have standardized the basic
phase of the IDTC and clearly identified the requirements for basic phase
certification in 21 different mission areas. Where before there was no
clear finish line to the IDTC's basic phase, today's surface warriors
can quickly access a web site to review exactly what is required to advance
to intermediate and/or advanced training. The afloat training groups on
both coasts are holding ships to those standards now and the result is
a force that is not only better prepared but also "more ready"
earlier in the IDTC.
We also are investing more resources in onboard integrated tactical training
systems and simulators to improve the quality and realism of training
in port. By creating an embedded system focused, for example, on navigation,
and/or engineering and damage control, and/or combat systems, we can,
with the battle force tactical trainer, enhance the quality of unit-level
training and give more watch teams the opportunity to gain needed experience.
All of this supports what I like to refer to as "soft failure."
In other words, it gives more Sailors an opportunity to make mistakes--and,
of much greater importance, of course, to learn from those mistakes.
In anticipation of these improvements, we are taking a hard look at whether
the number of underway steaming days currently budgeted per quarter (28)
is necessary for ships to meet the readiness milestones required prior
to deployment. Ships and Sailors need to train at sea. However, by tapping
into advances in training technology, the potential exists to reduce the
number of required training days at sea without sacrificing the proficiency
of underway watch teams. This in turn generates significant cost savings--in
fuel and other consumables, for example--that can be reinvested to meet
other needs. That is "the road ahead" for Surface Warfare training
"on the waterfront."
Sea Swap
As we work to train smarter and more efficiently, we also are experimenting
with new ways to deploy the force. Because our numbers will probably not
begin to grow for several years, we must consider ways to continue to
meet our global requirements without extending deployments, and without
sacrificing the quality of service for our Sailors. Swapping crews on
ships already deployed to an operational theater is a concept we are now
trying with the deployments of the Spruance-class destroyer USS Fletcher
and the Burke-class DDG USS Higgins. Both ships will essentially conduct
18-month deployments, with the crews from four other DDs and DDGs (Kinkaid,
Oldendorf, John Paul Jones, and Benfold) swapping out at six-month intervals.
Because it eliminates several transit legs, the sea-swap innovation gives
a theater commander an additional 96 days, on average, of Navy forward
presence and on-station time during each 18-month period of operations.
It also will help accelerate the planned decommissioning of the Kinkaid
and Oldendorf as well as the Spruance-class destroyer USS Paul F. Foster,
saving the Navy, and U.S. taxpayers, approximately $86 million. There
are, of course, a number of challenges associated with carrying out a
sea swap the right way but, in light of the Navy's continuing requirements
around the globe, this is a new way of operating, and of thinking, that
we need to consider for the long term as well as the short term. The current
experiment will help determine if sea swap is a viable option for helping
satisfy our forward-presence requirements on a longer-term basis.
Maintenance/Logistics
We are now receiving the money we need to maintain and supply our ships
at levels that support the levels of readiness required. Today, at the
Pacific Fleet, we have almost $100 million more available for ship maintenance
than we did two years ago and $42 million more for spare parts. Our focus
is on identifying and implementing new processes that will help us make
the most of these additional resources.
In both the Pacific Fleet and Atlantic Fleet Surface Forces, we have
begun a pilot project to determine how we can better streamline the maintenance
process between the generation of work requests and completion of that
work. Emulating the business practices followed in the commercial maritime
industry, we are creating a new process designed to save time, as well
as execution and overhead costs (by as much as 75 percent), by reducing
the number of transactions or "handoffs" necessary to accomplish
work.
We also are investing in distance support technology, both to improve
force self-sufficiency and to reduce the time it takes to correct casualties.
Last year, we spent $8 million flying technical representatives around
the world to help us fix ships. That is too much. With the Internet technology
that exists today, distance support has become a powerful and increasingly
useful tool that should be among the first solutions considered in resolving
the maintenance challenges facing underway forces.
On the logistics side, we have implemented a policy of 100 percent spare
parts either on board or on order. As we peeled back the onion to best
maximize our overall supply effectiveness, we learned that, in some cases,
improvements could be made in the maritime allowancing process. On some
ships, updates to maritime allowance parts lists had not kept up with
the evolution of the ship class. We are partnering with DLA (Defense Logistics
Agency), NAVSUP (Naval Supply Systems Command), and NAVSEA (Naval Sea
Systems Command): (1)) to ensure that ships have onboard the parts they
need to be more self-sufficient; and (2) to reduce the time it takes to
get those parts not already onboard into the ships' storerooms.
Future Readiness
There is no question that we are a much healthier surface force today
than we were two years ago, and we are aggressively addressing current
readiness challenges. The initiatives developed over the past two years
have given us the solid foundation we need as we look toward the future.
What is particularly exciting about surface warfare today is that we have
a very clear and dynamic vision of what that future will be. We know what
we want the surface force of 2025 to look like, and we have already started
to move toward making that vision a reality.
It will be a force with a balanced blend of multimission, special-mission,
and optimally manned ships. At its core will be the family of ships centered
on the next-generation destroyer DD(X) and follow-on cruiser CG(X), upgraded
Aegis ships already in-service, and the littoral combat ship (LCS).
These ships will be fitted with such innovative equipment as electric
drive propulsion and integrated power systems; they will possess such
capabilities as automated damage control and precision long-range gunfire;
they will have greater survivability, thanks to the use of composite armor
in their construction; they will feature optimal manning, and will carry
with them unmanned vehicles that operate above and below the sea. The
Navy's 21st-century Surface Force will be completely netted, and will
feature such transformational technologies as FORCEnet and TBMD (Theater
Ballistic Missile Defense) systems. In many ways, it will be a force that
consists of information attack ships, outfitted with the communications
and information technology needed to exploit or destroy enemy networks
without ever firing a shot. The planning and designing of this force of
the future is now underway--with significant input from the fleet. In
the case of the littoral combat ship, waterfront representatives have
played a key role in the Characteristics Working Group that is defining
the requirements for this fast, agile, and mission-reconfigurable platform.
In outlining his Sea Power 21 vision for the 21st-century Navy, the CNO
said, "Often times, we talk about asymmetry and it's always the other
guy's asymmetries. I believe that the United States possesses asymmetric
advantages ... the advantages of information superiority, sea control,
mobility, stealth, reach, precision, firepower, and persistence."
All of those traits, and others, will define the Surface Force of 2025.
In the mid-1970s, the leaders of the Navy's Surface Warfare Community
found themselves at a crossroad. Faced with a force that was overworked
and undermaintained throughout the Vietnam War--a force facing significant
manpower, training, maintenance, and logistics challenges--they launched
an aggressive, forward-thinking renaissance. One result was a transformation
that brought the Aegis Weapons System, the Tomahawk Cruise Missile, and
the Lamps MkIII helicopter into the fleet.
Today's surface Navy is passing through a similar crossroad. We are embracing
change and developing innovative solutions to meet the challenges ahead.
Our current readiness is strong, and we are looking forward to a future
with ships and capabilities designed to address the national-security
requirements of our 21st-century world. A future, in short, in which the
Navy's Surface Force will continue to carry the sovereign power of the
United States to the four corners of the globe. *
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