Navy Should Bolster Crisis Planning for Theater ASW

Fleet Battle Experiment Indicates Common Undersea Picture Sensors Work Well

By PATRICIA KIME
Sea Power Correspondent

The U.S. Navy's formal report on Fleet Battle Experiment Kilo (FBE Kilo) is set for a fall release, but preliminary reports indicate the venture--at least its antisubmarine warfare (ASW) portion--provided numerous insights into managing the underwater battlefield.

For example, the Navy needs a training program for theater antisubmarine warfare commanders, and should bolster their staffs for crisis planning at the operational level. Preliminary results of the experiment also indicate that waterspace management remains a slow, tedious process, but that the Navy's common undersea picture technology worked rather well.

Conducted in multiple locations between April 14 and May 5, 2003, FBE Kilo is the 11th in a series of experiments developed by the Naval Warfare Development Command in Newport R.I.

The experiments are designed to test and evaluate certain warfighting initiatives in an operational environment and are part of the Navy's Sea Trial process, which aims to use technology and innovative concepts in war games, experiments, and exercises in an effort to develop the Navy of tomorrow.

The exact war-game scenario of FBE Kilo was not made public, but the Navy combined real world and artificial scenarios to explore a number of its developing programs, including its Joint Fires Network family of systems, Area Air-Defense Commander System and undersea warfare planning, command and control procedures for anti-submarine warfare management.

FBE Kilo participants included the 7th Fleet command-and-control ship USS Blue Ridge, elements of the USS Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group, portions of the USS Essex Amphibious Ready Group, the low-frequency acoustic-test vessel Cory Chouest, several attack submarines, virtual vessels, and shore-based commands, including the commander of Task Force 74 in Yokosuka Japan; NWDC; Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, Va.; and Royal Australian Navy units.

In the area of undersea warfare and theater antisubmarine warfare, the experiment aimed to test undersea warfare planning and command and communications procedures involving local anti-submarine warfare commanders and the theater anti-submarine warfare commander.

The experiment also utilized several new technologies, including the experimental common undersea picture, low-frequency active sonar (LFAS), and data networks.

"We were really looking at a broad picture, at the coordination aspect between the theater commander and the local commander," said Capt. Kevin Morrissey, director of the Maritime Battle Center at the Naval Warfare Development Command, Newport, R.I.

Regarding theater antisubmarine warfare, the Naval Warfare Development Command wanted to accomplish several objectives with FBE Kilo:

* Examine the theater commander's ability to manage all undersea combat assets, including air, surface, subsurface, and integrated undersea surveillance systems and coordinate with local antisubmarine warfare commanders;

* Explore the way information is passed and controlled through the theater commander and local commanders;

* Investigate how to enhance undersea situational awareness by using new technologies.

With the first objective, asset management, the development command and 7th Fleet found that the participants performed well, but the Navy needs to develop a training program for theater antisubmarine warfare commanders.

According to a joint preliminary report issued by the two commands, the Navy has an established doctrine for the battle group antisubmarine warfare commander but none for the theater commander.

"While the current [commander, Task Force 74] staff provided outstanding support to the [Joint Theater Forces] commander in his effort to take the undersea fight to the enemy before the enemy subs could threaten the expeditionary strike group and commander, submarine group, the level of effort required clearly demonstrated the need for a defined [theater antisubmarine warfare command] training program and an augmentation of personnel to carry out sustained ... operations," the preliminary report stated.

The authors recommended that the Navy adapt the existing battle group commander guidance for the theater commander and add 12 personnel--three officers and nine enlisted billets--to the theater antisubmarine warfare staff for operational-level crisis planning.

Another key element in the ant-submarine warfare portion of FBE Kilo was the flow of information between the theater antisubmarine warfare commander and the local ASW commanders.

Among the tools that eased coordination between the commanders was the experimental common undersea picture, a network of systems that gave commanders a view of the developing battlefield.

"Because both the theater commander and the local commander had the same set of tools, they were able to see and execute a plan. It worked very well," Morrissey said.

Much of what the commanders needed to share included data and information about waterspace management, meaning the allocation of areas to assets in order to allow for engagement of hostile submarines and the prevention of inadvertent attacks on friendly submarines.

The analysts found that waterspace management "remains a slow, deliberate and manually intense process." The 7th Fleet command and the development command recommended that such planning eventually be automated.

Finally, the undersea portion aimed to use new technologies for antisubmarine warfare command and control. The experiment mainly focused on experimental common undersea picture technology and a variety of active and passive sonar systems, including the controversial low frequency active sonar.

Common undersea picture technology is, to some extent, already in use in the fleet, but FBE Kilo aimed to use experimental common undersea picture technology to depict the underwater battlefield to the theater and local commanders -- displays that show the location of ships, diesel-powered submarines, mines, land-based antiship missiles and other threats.

When used to its fullest potential, the common undersea picture could give undersea and maritime theater commanders situation awareness similar to that of aircraft commanders, who use technology to know the locations of nearby aircraft and pinpoint incoming threats.

In FBE Kilo, the analysts found that the experimental common undersea picture "showed promise as a tool for optimizing sensor use and planning search tracks." It was used for planning purposes aboard the Blue Ridge and Carl Vinson, but was not used to its fullest extent for coordinating between commanders "largely due to the lack of operator familiarity with the collaboration tools," the report said.

The analysts recommended that standard operating procedures be established, published, and practiced for the technology before it is used in future FBEs or in the fleet. These procedures, the analysts said, must be standardized across all operational warfighters.

During the experiment, the Navy planned and executed a series of tests of its Surveillance Towed-Array Sensor System Low-Frequency Active (SURTASS LFA) and Passive Acoustic Systems. The Navy considers the systems to be vital for detecting the next generation of quiet diesel submarines.

But the systems, especially the low-frequency active sonar, are controversial and have been the target of litigation from environmental groups and marine scientists. Opponents argue that the sonar harms marine mammals and other aquatic life by disrupting their environments. They allege that the sonar causes hemorrhaging, hearing loss, and brain damage.

Morrissey said that numerous scientific observers joined the Navy for the low frequency sonar portion of FBE Kilo and there was no evidence of injury to marine mammals. The deployment of the sonar was deemed a success by the 7th Fleet and development center analysts who wrote that it "led to successful prosecutions of opposing-force submarines."

"LFA warrants ongoing fleet use and experimentation to continue the LFA reintroduction program, build proficiency, and further develop procedures to effectively integrate SURTASS LFA with other ASW capabilities to optimize overall effectiveness," the report stated.

Honest assessments and thorough analysis are exactly what the Navy needs from fleet battle experiments, says Morrissey. FBE Kilo provided valuable lessons the service will use in future experiments and in the fleet.

"This was a very successful demonstration of technology and we have some real good feedback in the area of theater undersea warfare," Morrissey said.

As a result of FBE Kilo, the Navy will continue refining experimental common undersea picture technology and will work to resurrect low frequency active sonar as an important tool of anti-submarine warfare.

The final report, Morrissey said, will offer more information on the host of issues addressed by the experiment. The report was to be published by early September. The experiment cost about $3.5 million to conduct. *