By JOSEPH R. CIPRIANO
Joseph R. Cipriano is
the executive director for warfare systems and the battle-force systems engineer at the
Naval Sea Systems Command.
The U.S. military,
especially its naval forces, has earned a well-deserved reputation for adapting new
technology to accomplish its many missions. The Navy's history is replete with examples of
technological innovation, and the first year of the next millennium will provide a classic
new model as "Network Centric Warfare" doctrine edges its way into the nation's
consciousness and lexicon. Network Centric Warfare (NCW) simultaneously engages and
embodies change in the world. It also represents leading-edge thinking at the Naval Sea
Systems Command (NAVSEA) as an effective way to meet the immediate need for
interoperability in naval warfare systems today and into the 21st century.
Early in the
computer-information revolution--before the proliferation of microchip technology and
powerful personal computers--data- and time-intensive programs had to rely upon the
computing power provided from a single computer. The volume of data soon grew so large,
though, that engineers needed to design and construct larger and ever more powerful
computers to meet growing requirements. This evolutionary growth produced very expensive,
extremely large, and essentially single-purpose mainframe computers capable of processing
large volumes of data at very high speeds.
Unfortunately, these
mainframe computers were available only to the lucky few. As a result, use of these highly
capable machines was restricted to matters defined as being essential to the nation's
economic or strategic interests. Researchers interested in areas requiring massive
computing power, but lacking a direct national-level application, were forced to seek
other, more affordable alternatives.
Pioneers
of Change
The situation was
comparable to that of earlier days when pioneer families lived as totally separate
entities. Each household obtained every "utility"--heating, lighting, water,
etc.--and performed every function for itself. This meant that each household cut its own
firewood, made its own candles, and drew water from its own well. It was what could be
loosely considered a "house-unit centric" system.
Eventually, urbanization,
technology, and economics led to the creation of a network to maximize the efficient
distribution of utilities as a service to homeowners. Today, almost all Americans obtain
power for light and heat, entertainment, and information from the "network." On
most days, the system works well, but when an ice storm takes the electric power lines
down for a couple of days, one longs for a wood-burning stove.
The "house-network
centric" model easily compares to a naval model for battle-force operations. NCW is a
concept aimed at increasing the Navy-Marine Corps team's warfighting capabilities. The
engineers at the Navy's systems commands who are tasked with modernizing the Navy of today
and designing the Navy of tomorrow can greatly enhance the fleet's overall capabilities at
reduced cost by viewing its fighting units (individuals, ships, submarines, aircraft) as
nodes on a network. Ships, however, unlike houses, must always retain the ability to
survive independently of the network.
Complexity
and Opportunity
Network Centric Warfare
redefines the concept of traditional combat systems by adding new complexities--as well as
new opportunities--in design. Although many Navy product-design practices remain the same,
there are significant changes required in how product requirements are specified during
the design process. Consistent with traditional design practices, the mission objectives
of the higher level system, operational and environmental stresses, user requirements, and
technology combine to drive system design. In a network-centric system, however, there is
an added complexity--namely, that warfighting functions must be allocated across the
operational network's platforms so that BMC4I (battle management command, control,
communication, computers, and intelligence) interfaces can remain stable over long periods
while the functions themselves evolve independently. The larger the network, moreover, the
greater the number of interfaces that must be defined, controlled, and tested.
Networks offer the
opportunity to provide services to a large number of users more efficiently, and
cost-effectively, than if each user generated the service individually. This
characteristic is similar to the way an individual can pull information more quickly and
cheaply from sources via the Internet than if that same person attempted to maintain his
or her own personal version of the Library of Congress.
Networks also can provide
consistent high quality service that is difficult to achieve when multiple platforms
perform common functions independently. In the network-centric warfighting model,
consistent and reliable service is mandatory if complex warfighting requirements are to be
supported properly at the battle-force level.
Increased
Capability--for a Price
The old adage,
"there is no such thing as a free lunch," holds true in naval warfare. In the
21st century it will still be true, despite many projected advances in technology.
Until recently,
individual fighting units served as the highest warfighting systems for ship, aircraft,
and weapon designers. The "fighting unit" is defined here as where people join
together with hardware and software to create the "mission system." In the past,
these fighting units (ships, submarines, aircraft, etc.) have been the highest-level
systems that the Navy's engineers designed, constructed, and maintained. The focus was on
optimizing performance of the fighting unit.
A network-centric system
can efficiently expand or contract as different fighting units, sensors, and systems enter
or exit the system. If knowledge, information, or data can be shared quickly across the
entire network, then the performance of individual units--and of the force as a whole--is
improved. In a network-centric environment, design and maintenance decisions are made to
optimize the performance of the total battle force.
Reliable and robust
fighting-unit connectivity supports the design of distributed combat- and
battle-management systems with far greater capability than could ever be economically
placed in a single fighting unit. Improving individual unit connectivity directly supports
NCW's goal of squeezing every ounce of capability out of the total force.
NCW will lead to
far-reaching changes for designers and operators alike--and with significant social,
design, and fiscal consequences as well. The social impact is perhaps the most challenging
because, to optimize the whole, each participant in the network must give up some
autonomy, and also must share accountability for operational outcomes. The aggressive ship
commanding officer, for example, anxious to install a readily available
commercial-off-the-shelf computer, must realize that the introduction of any new C4I
component will generate the risk of creating and/or compounding interoperability problems
within the entire battle force.
There also is a penalty
that must be accounted for during the network-design and mission-planning stages. The
network itself becomes mission-essential, and therefore must be protected as one of the
most valuable assets of the force. The network's vulnerabilities must be understood--and
defenses developed--to offset and/or minimize those vulnerabilities even as improved
capabilities are studied and implemented. The fiscal price imposed by NCW is that
requirements in engineering, configuration management, and system testing are much more
complex and expensive processes than in non-networked systems--but also much more
important. Because of increased commonality in support systems, increased opportunities
for automation, and decreased upgrade costs and installation times this price will be more
than offset by reduced total ownership costs over the service life of the platform.
The
Battle Force Is the System
Fighting units operate as
the subsystems of a battle force. To understand the full implications of Network Centric
Warfare, one must first understand the battle-force system itself. As required by the
mission, the battle force system performs three key functions: It must: (1) manage the
battle; (2) dominate battle space; and (3) sustain control over the battle space. These
battle-force system functions must be performed over the wide variety of natural
environmental conditions, possible threats, operational environments, and doctrine called
for in today's naval-mission tasking.
The foundation of a
battle-force system approach is identifying a common baseline for the evaluation of design
options for the battle force. To do this, design engineers need new tools capable of
accurately assessing individual unit capabilities within a battle-force context.
The Design Reference
Mission (DRM) is one innovative approach that allows greater influence and flexibility in
the early stages of battle-force design. The DRM documents the full range of
environmental, operational, and threat characteristics that can stress the design of the
battle force as it is tasked to perform warfighting or peacekeeping missions. This
methodology leads to a fuller understanding of battle-force system stress across the
spectrum of combat, including live conflict and the pre- and post-hostility phases.
Operational demands at all levels of conflict--ranging from the use of individual weapon
systems in a single engagement to exploiting the full capabilities of the entire joint
force in a major campaign--also are documented in the DRM.
The DRM becomes a
composite mission that captures all of the stresses the battle force might face as it is
tasked, thus providing a common basis for evaluating the relative merits of proposed
battle-force compositions, functional allocations, battle-management architectures, and
logistics schemes. An accurate and complete DRM plays a critical role when evaluating
complex network formations, and its importance cannot be overstressed. The single most
important factor in selecting the best technical approach for meeting battle-force mission
requirements is determining how competing technical solutions perform when operating in
accordance with the Design Reference Mission.
Battle-Management
Considerations
The three functions of
the battle-force system--battle management, volume dominance, and sustainability--must be
broken down further to develop an effective battle-force architecture. The function of
battle management can itself be partitioned into mission planning (including the
generation of force orders), maintenance of a common operational picture among force
participants, and connectivity management. In the Naval War College's analysis of the use
of Network Centric Warfare during its "Global '98" war game it was emphasized
that mission planning must consider what is actually occurring as well as projected
outcomes. Warfighters and systems engineers alike do this by analyzing potential enemy
courses of action and identifying future information needs.
The availability of a
common operational picture can provide enhanced battle-space awareness among all force
participants by showing the status of current operations in terms of resource consumption
and the time needed to accomplish specific objectives. Battle management also must be able
to project forward into the future, both to assess the probable outcomes of various
courses of action and to estimate the adversary's awareness of the evolving situation.
Connectivity management--the exchanging of information, intelligence, and sensor
data--must be in "real time" (i.e., nearly instantaneous) to support the most
demanding warfare requirements. Moreover, because Network Centric Warfare requires
superior situational awareness, sensor movement and the maintenance of sensor links become
as important as the movement of actual forces within the battle space. Connectivity
therefore must be managed to ensure that the highest- quality information and data are
provided to those who need it, when they need it.
Three-Dimensional
Volume Dominance
The battle-force system
is designed to achieve battle-space volume dominance--taking and holding the "high
ground" operationally in the fullest sense. The spatial volume required for modern
warfare may extend over land, into space, and to the bottom of the ocean. The battle force
must be composed of systems that have the collective capability of clearing the operating
volume of enemy threats and protecting it from attack. The system that performs this
function is called the warfare system, which is itself composed of combat systems that
integrate multiple weapon and sensor systems in a fighting unit.
In a network-centric
system, a warfare system is the set of people, computer programs, equipment, training,
logistics support, and doctrine available anywhere in the force to conduct the mission. It
may be as basic as a Marine with a rifle, or as complex as a joint battle force. NCW
systems are designed with the view that all in-theater mission-capable components of the
force are potential assets. Detect, control, and engage functions may then be distributed
to any location supported by the network. This networking of systems enables design
solutions that enhance individual-unit capability while multiplying the total capability
of the force.
For example, a
battle-force sensor on a distant unit close to a particular threat--an incoming aircraft,
for example--can, through the network, provide the entire force with information about
that threat before it is detected locally. The threat can then be engaged by the most
capable force component available.
In a fighting-unit
centric force, warfare systems are not actually designed as systems but as subsystems,
which are interfaced after the fact. Therefore, transitioning unit-centric systems to a
network-centric force--where functional allocations and interfaces must be carefully
controlled--is not a trivial consideration.
Sustaining
Control of the Battle Space
The system design of
battle-management and warfare systems is complete when functions and interfaces have been
identified and allocated to subsystems. The process of partitioning functions and defining
interfaces is the controlling process for force interoperability.
In a network-centric
design, allocated functions are integrated and then implemented so as to achieve a
fighting-unit design that is balanced in cost and performance both for the required threat
and to meet the fighting-unit construction schedule. Each network-centric fighting unit
adds support services (power, cooling, information display, computing, etc.), mobility,
survivability, and sustainability to the allocated battle-management and warfare-system
functions. It is at the fighting-unit level of design that the greatest benefits can be
obtained, both by eliminating functional redundancy and by sharing such resources as
computers, displays, transmit/receive devices, and ordnance launchers. For example,
integrating functions before they are allocated to products will support the Navy's major
long-term goals of reducing manpower requirements and increasing commonality to reduce
total ownership costs overall.
The Navy's biggest payoff
from adopting a network-centric approach to systems engineering and design will likely be
in faster and less expensive weapons system and C4I upgrades for ships. Because computers,
displays, transmit/receive devices, and ordnance launchers can be provided as a
fighting-unit service rather than as part of a mission system to be integrated, upgrades
to battle-management and warfare-system capability can be achieved largely through the
delivery of new software, training materials, and ordnance. Businesses and organizations
that routinely upgrade the capabilities of their home and office computers realize the
parallel need for frequent periodic upgrades of the underlying infrastructure. Just as
importantly, engineers must ensure that infrastructure design provides for frequent
upgrades over the life of the fighting unit--or major potential cost savings will be lost.
Interoperability
of the Force
NAVSEA engineers can
greatly simplify interoperability among units in the battle force if certain functions are
accomplished identically across the force. These include determining the precise locations
of force elements and targets, identifying targets, establishing a time reference,
correlating target and friendly tracks, establishing and maintaining the precise location
of all participants in the force, and managing connectivity. All of these functions are
essential to create and maintain a common tactical picture. In a network-centric system
these functions become services--much like the mission-support services for fighting
units. Each network-application program has both a quality-of-service requirement and a
priority that must be supported by the implementing unit. Priorities often will change
during the course of a mission, which creates an additional requirement--namely, that
processing resources and network bandwidth must be: (a) dynamically managed; and (b)
responsive to changes in mission priority.
To facilitate the
introduction of new capabilities and the certification of system safety, it is essential
to pay attention to how functions are interconnected within the system. Functions that are
part of the fire-control loop for anti-air warfare, for example, must be interconnected in
a manner sensitive to short-reaction time requirements. Other functions, which are not
part of the fire-control loop, but still necessary to support command decisions, can be
interfaced to allow their relatively independent evolution.
Navy engineers have the
ability to greatly increase the Navy's warfighting capabilities by better integration of
each unit's weapons, sensors, and systems into the greater battle-force architecture. This
can be done by applying a system-design focus to the battle force. The near-term price is
real, but up-front costs should be easily offset with long-term economies, and combat
power will be greatly enhanced in real terms.
In essence, the Navy is
making a fundamental shift in the business of warfighting--transitioning from a
fighting-unit centric focus to the Network Centric Warfare battle force. This doctrinal
shift will be nearly revolutionary in its probable impact, and it will significantly
affect ship designs, battle management, force modernization, warfare-systems architecture,
test and certification processes, and investment strategies. NAVSEA's objective is to
establish a network-system architecture that supports technology introduction as an
end-to-end capability in the fleet--at the rate the commercial market produces it.
Anything else will lead to interoperability problems between old and new platforms and
systems and, ultimately, will compromise the Navy's ability to grasp the revolutionary
warfighting advantages offered by Network Centric Warfare doctrine. |
