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By L. EDGAR PRINA
Editor Emeritus

After every major armed conflict, the winners (and, sometimes, the losers) undertake a post-action review to identify "lessons learned" and to determine what went right, what went wrong, and why. So it is with the air war the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) powers conducted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its hated president, Slobodan Milosevic, from 24 March to 10 June 1999. The Pentagon is hard at work on its review as are the British, French, Germans, and Italians on theirs.

No one expects the allies to reach unanimous across-the-board conclusions as to the successful conduct of the war. A number of military leaders, diplomats, and media pundits, however, have already voiced their opinions, and there is not even agreement on the key factor that led to Milosevic's decision to give in to NATO demands that he withdraw his military, paramilitary, and police forces from Kosovo and permit the peaceful return of the more than one million Albanian Kosovars he had driven out of their homes and country with his infamous "ethnic cleansing" campaign.

Degrade and Damage the Military

The mission of NATO's Operation Allied Force was succinctly stated by Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen: "Our military objective is to degrade and damage the military and security structure that President Milosevic has used to depopulate and destroy the Albanian majority in Kosovo."

While this policy of degradation did damage the Serbs' army and air force, heavy bombing attacks on Yugoslavia's communications, electrical power grids, oil supplies, bridges, and other infrastructure elements also certainly affected the war's outcome and have limited Milosevic's ability to wage war in the near future.

Not surprisingly, the top NATO air commander, U.S. Lt. Gen. Michael C. Short, believes it was the destruction of major targets in Belgrade, the Yugoslav capital, and other major cities outside Kosovo that led to Milosevic's capitulation. The tough-talking Short suggested that if his bombers had been allowed "to go downtown" and hit Belgrade in a major raid early in the campaign the war would have been over in a matter of days rather than the more than two-and-a-half months it did take.

Gen. Wesley K. Clark, NATO's su-preme commander, had a different read. He told reporters that the conflict ended only when Milosevic realized that he faced an imminent ground invasion. "I think he had ample evidence to conclude that, had he not conceded when he did, that the next step would have been the long-awaited and much-talked-about NATO ground effort," he said.

Britain's Lt. Gen. Sir Michael Jackson, the initial NATO commander in Kosovo, had yet a third opinion as to the key to victory--an opinion shared by some military and diplomatic observers. "The event of June 3 [when the Russians backed the West's position and urged Milosevic to surrender] was the single event that appeared to me to have the greatest significance in ending the war," he told the London Sunday Telegraph. Jackson said he was surprised by the lack of damage in Kosovo encountered by his peacekeeping troops. "The infrastructure was, frankly, not damaged at all; it's all in one bit," he asserted. "Perhaps about 30 percent of the houses overall have real damage, but in Pristina there is no damage to speak of at all. I had thought there would be no harvest this year, but I fly a lot, and the fields are busy."

Lost Opportunities

NATO's opening strategy was to plan for two to three days of bombing Serb targets in Kosovo and then await Milosevic's surrender. No official has explained how the alliance arrived at such a miscalculation, but as a leaked briefing prepared for Adm. James O. Ellis, commander of Joint Task Force Noble Anvil during Operation Allied Force, noted in a post-action analysis: "We called this one absolutely wrong. This affected much of what followed, including the hasty activation of the joint task force, its staff, facilities, command and control, logistics and execution, lack of a coherent campaign plan, and the race to find suitable targets." Because the operation plan focused on brief single-dimension combat, deception, diversion, and feint opportunities were lost, Ellis's staff concluded.

Gen. John Jumper, commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe, told reporters that, at the time the war was launched, NATO's leaders were confident Milosevic would sue for peace after "a few demonstration sorties, a few bombs on the ground." Once it became clear that there would be no quick victory, the target list for allied air was increased. But the struggles for permission from the 19 NATO member nations to strike them became more and more burdensome for Clark, who was being pressured by Short to go after strategic targets in Yugoslavia as a higher priority than trying to kill Serb tanks and troops in Kosovo.

Clark obviously felt that he had to do what he could to stop Serb atrocities in Kosovo but despite the effort, the looting, the raping, and kill-ing continued. More than one million Albanian Kosovars were sent streaming across borders of neighboring states, mainly to Albania and Macedonia. Most of the atrocities came after NATO launched its air war. NATO was not prepared to handle such a humanitarian disaster for far too long.

Probably no military professional would dispute the view that the political environment affected every aspect of NATO planning and execution and led to "incremental war" instead of more decisive operations earlier in the conflict. Excessive concerns for collateral damage, for example, created sanctuaries and tactical opportunities for the Serbs--which they successfully exploited.

The Best of a Series Of Bad Options

There is general agreement among observers that President Clinton's decision to rule out, from the outset, the commitment of U.S. ground troops for an invasion of Kosovo was a huge relief to Milosevic and his campaign of ethnic cleansing. NATO was willing to take the first step in commencing an air war, but was unprepared initially to take--or seriously consider--the last step that might be necessary to achieve its war aims. This was a serious strategic shortcoming.

Cohen and Gen. Henry Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also opposed use of ground forces, although they and the White House apparently were easing their opposition in the weeks before Milosevic suddenly agreed to accept NATO's demands. Cohen and Shelton told Pentagon reporters on 10 June that NATO's strategy was constrained by the need for political consensus. "Under the circumstances," Cohen said, "this was the best of a series of bad options."

Clark, who finished first in his class at West Point and was a Rhodes scholar, advocated that the Pentagon and the allies to prepare in earnest for an invasion if the air war continued to drag on. He did persuade Cohen to send him 24 of the 48 Apache attack helicopters he requested. They were never used in combat, however, and two of them crashed on training flights, killing two pilots. These gunships are primarily battlefield weapons used to accompany and support ground forces.

Although Clinton and the Pentagon spokesmen deny it, there is a general feeling that the decision to relieve Clark from his post as Supreme Commander, Allied Forces, Europe (SAC-EUR) three months early (next April) was his overt pressure for an invasion the Clinton administration did not want. Pentagon spokesmen said the relief was necessary because Gen. Joseph W. Ralston--vice chairman of the JCS and Clark's designated successor--would be forced to retire, under military rules, if his reassignment were not advanced by two months.

The fact that the decision was leaked to the press within hours of the notification to Clark himself raised suspicions that its aim was to preempt any chance the general and his supporters could mount pressure for a reversal.

Nor did Clark endear himself with the Pentagon's senior leaders when he ordered Lt. Gen. Jackson to intercept Russian troops rushing to seize Kosovo's Pristina Airport in mid-June, only to have the latter refuse to do so. According to Newsweek magazine, Jackson told Clark, "I'm not going to start World War III for you." That was a real stretch, but the Pentagon nevertheless backed Jackson. In any event, Cohen publicly praised Clark's direction of the war and, during a surprise presentation in the Pentagon during a 24 September commander in chiefs' conference, awarded Clark the Defense Distinguished Service Medal. Cohen lauded Clark's "singular role in ensuring the accomplishment of the largest military and humanitarian operation in Europe since World War II."

Gradual Escalation: Past as Prologue?

While Clark and his subordinate commanders chafed under what they felt was micromanagement when it came to allowable targets and the incremental pace of the air war, the lesson to be learned here is that with the development of increasingly accurate and long-range "through-the-weather" aerial weapons, political leaders will be more inclined to follow suit during future military operations. Take it from Ralston--who said the political reality is that gradual escalation, as in Kosovo, will be the name of the game in the future.

In spite of what might indicate the success of a gradualism strategy, the U.S. Air Force no doubt will continue to maintain that the massive application of air power will be more efficient and effective than gradual escalation. "I share this view," Ralston said, "Yet when the political and tactical constraints imposed on air use are extensive and pervasive--and that trend seems more rather than less likely--then gradualism may be perceived as the only option."

Short said he was "not so naïve as to believe that politicians are ever going to turn soldiers loose to do the job they think ought to be done. I think we were constrained in this particular conflict to an extraordinary degree and were prevented from conducting an air campaign as professional airmen would have wanted to conduct it," he told Air Force Magazine.

Even before the Kosovo operation, the United States and its principal NATO allies agreed that the latter must modernize their armed forces. Kosovo underscored the point. As it is now, the Europeans are heavily dependent upon the United States for such things as electronic-intelligence gathering, airlift of troops and equipment, all-weather precision-guided munitions, secure communications equipment, aerial refueling, and unmanned aerial-reconnaissance vehicles.

NATO defense ministers met in Toronto late in September and agreed that the Europeans had to spend more money to help close the military technology gap with the United States. Whether this will require an overall increase in their defense budgets or a rearrangement of expenditures under current budgets remains to be seen.

Germany, for example, has been planning substantial reductions in its defense budget over the next few years. Additional pressure on German--and French--defense budgets could result from moves in both countries to drop conscription in favor of all-volunteer forces--a much more expensive way to maintain professional armed forces. France has already decided to adopt the volunteer-force option within the next two years, while Germany has announced it was studying plans for following suit.

It therefore still remains to be seen whether the Europeans really learned the lesson that was validated by Kosovo. U.S. officials are exhibiting impatience on this score. "NATO countries spend roughly 60 percent of what the U.S. does, and they get about 10 percent of the capability," Cohen said. "That has to change."

Deputy Defense Secretary John J. Hamre, the No. 2 Pentagon official, told news reporters last summer that "it's very clear from this air operation [Kosovo] that our allies have not invested in what it takes to fight a modern war the way we do it ... with a great deal of precision, minus collateral damage--intense operations, so you can quickly get it over with; and it is very clear that our allies have a far way to go." He added that the Europeans have to have "stronger" military budgets and need to "rationalize" their defense industries.

Navy-Marine Role Critical

The Navy-Marine Corps team played a critical role in the success of Operation Allied Force, although recognition of this may have been late in coming. Adm. Jay L. Johnson, chief of naval operations, told Sea Power that a great deal of effort was needed to prosecute the war successfully. "We had 19 democracies all working together to make that operation happen," Johnson said. "U.S. and NATO alliance airpower worked together with great precision and great care. The U.S. Navy was a fundamental part of that effort."

Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James L. Jones Jr. also had high praise for Marine air and ground units participating in NATO's first combat operation and in subsequent peacekeeping and humanitarian-assistance missions. "Marine Corps forces assigned to Operation Allied Force performed their mission as America has come to expect--professionally and competently," he told Sea Power. "In keeping with our expeditionary mission, Marines were on station at the start of operations on normal rotation as part of Landing Force Sixth Fleet. Others were able to deploy rapidly and arrive for operations."

In a three-part series wrapping up Kosovo, Dan Priest of the Washington Post noted that the Air Force had assigned a half-dozen planes to fly as "security guards" for each pair of attacking fighters and bombers, thereby complicating the script for each night's raid and preventing quick changes in missions. "So Clark often turned to the Navy, whose role in the war was much greater than previously acknowledged," Priest wrote. "According to a post-war military assessment, naval missiles and planes were responsible for nearly half the damage done to Yugoslavia's electric-power system, army headquarters, and police buildings."

A major contribution to the war effort was made by Navy and Marine EA-6B Prowler electronic-jamming and HARM missile-shooting aircraft. The U.S. Air Force would not fly without them--nor would any other NATO aircraft--on combat strikes. They were a big reason why only two planes and no pilots were lost--despite a total of more than 38,000 sorties by 900 aircraft.

Capt. (rear admiral-select) Joseph Sestak called the Prowler one of the nation's most valuable "low-demand, high-density" military units in an interview with Inside the Navy. The conclusion: The very heavy and successful employment of this aircraft dictates an increase in the Prowler force and an acceleration in the research and development effort for its successor, the F/A-18G aircraft.

The Theodore Roosevelt carrier battle group provided an updated lesson for Pentagon planners in the value of forward presence with its mobility and the firepower of its embarked Carrier Air Wing (CVW) Eight. Some 3,100 sorties, including 1,700 strike missions, were flown off its deck. When the Theodore Roosevelt finished dropping the last of its 800 tons of ordnance on Kosovo it rapidly headed for the Persian Gulf where its aircraft dropped another 300 tons of bombs on targets in Iraq in the continuing air war with that country.

Capt. Dale Lyle, CVW-8 commander, noted that it was one of only a few times in which a carrier air wing has flown combat missions in two different military campaigns during the same deployment. This "validated how important it is to have naval air forces," he said. As Rear Adm. John B. Nathman, director of air warfare in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, told Sea Power, the Navy dropped very few unguided weapons or low-drag general purpose bombs during Operation Allied Force. And it may not in any future conflict.

Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig has stressed the need to procure precision, all-weather Global Positioning System-guided munitions "in light of post-Kosovo weapons requirements." He also has called for more investment in UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles)--pilotless aircraft equipped with sophisticated video and electronic-surveillance hardware that greatly increases the amount of tactical intelligence obtained in the battle area.

Danzig put his finger on a development the significance of which has largely escaped the radar screens of many politicians and pundits: that the long arm of sea-based power--cruise missiles and aircraft--can reach far inland to influence events in land-locked countries as well as those bordering the oceans. He recalled the cruise-missile raid against suspected terrorist camps in Afghanistan and said: "Stop and reflect on what this means. It was the first time in history that naval forces were called upon to deal with a land-locked country.

"Kosovo has no seaports," he told Sea Power. "The initial instrument of attack in that theater was the Navy battle group and, in the end, Marines off the ARG [amphibious ready group] were brought to bear as the first on scene. The accomplishments of 1999 underscore that we are dealing with a different kind of world--one in which naval power reaches much further than its traditional domain as an instrument everywhere in the world."

Implications for the Future

While the Pentagon's formal post-action report had not been publicly released as of mid-October, Cohen has reached some conclusions.

"The United States learned of shortfalls in its forces during Kosovo, and we are working to correct them," he said at a news conference. "For example, we are buying more C-17 transport planes and additional ships for carrying heavy equipment. We are developing new precision-guided munitions and increasing supplies of others that are already in our inventory."

The defense secretary also said that the Pentagon was looking at "the increased use of commercial-off-the-shelf technology to improve our ability to detect chemical and biological attacks." He did not explain, nor was he asked, why he mentioned this in connection with the war against Milosevic.

"We won in Kosovo because NATO countries were politically united, well-commanded by General Clark, and equipped with precision all-weather weapons," he said.

What are the implications of Kosovo beyond the need for the modernization of the European armed forces and the procurements mentioned by Cohen above? Some observers wonder whether this unusual conflict, with no NATO casualties and no major collateral damage, might tempt the United States to engage in more military actions abroad. Although President Clinton has said that the United States does not intend to act as the world's policeman, he has also set down a "doctrine" that, in effect, calls for military intervention to protect peoples that are being brutalized by their own governments.

Could East Timor, where pro-Indonesia militiamen have been killing and terrorizing the natives because they voted for independence in a recent referendum, be next? Several hundred U.S. military personnel, as well as the amphibious assault ship the USS Belleau Wood, have already been committed to assist the United Nations-sponsored, Australian-led peacemaking effort there.

Spurred by the ruthless eradication of civilian populaces, international intervention in Kosovo and East Timor represent a clear break from the time when nations were held to have the right--the sovereignty--to control events within their own borders. Meanwhile, instructors in military ethics at U.S. war colleges and academies also ponder another implication of NATO's air war over Kosovo. They ask whether it is ethical to insist on the lowest absolute risk for one's own warriors--bombing at three-miles altitude to avoid being shot down, as in Kosovo--while further jeopardizing the lives of civilians on the ground?

Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper, USMC (Ret.), put it this way: "What really troubles me is that those who take an oath to defend others were held out of harm's way while the very people they were to defend were in many ways viewed as 'expendable.' What does this say for the Western warrior ethic for the future?" 

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