By EDWARD H. FEEGE Jr.

Edward H. Feege Jr. is a maritime analyst with the Center for Security Strategies and Operations in the Anteon Corporation.

The year 1999 was a memorable one weather-wise for the southeastern United States. Several major hurricanes passed over or near the region, leaving flooding and devastation in their wake.

When they strike, hurricanes can cause widespread hardship and misery. They also can disrupt the operations of ports, as well as the water, rail, and road connections that lead to them. These disruptions affect the livelihood of communities throughout the region, so it is important that the duration of any disruption be kept as short as possible. This is why the U.S. Coast Guard works quickly—in cooperation with port authorities, tenants, and users—to reopen ports to commercial traffic in the aftermath of a storm.

By law, Coast Guard safety officials are the final arbiters of whether ports remain open, or close—and, if the latter, when they reopen for business. They must balance the economic demands of commerce with the demands of marine safety and environmental protection. Two 1999 examples from East Coast ports—Hampton Roads, Va., and Wilmington, N.C.—demonstrate how Coast Guard units accomplish these critical tasks.

The Coast Guard and Ports

Responsibility for the safety, efficiency, and environmental soundness of marine operations in U.S. waters and ports lies mainly with the Coast Guard. At the heart of the Coast Guard’s preventive safety efforts are 46 Marine Safety Offices (MSOs) located throughout the United States. MSO personnel, supported by a cadre of marine inspectors, conduct a host of safety patrols, foreign vessel boardings, U.S. vessel inspections, and marine facility inspections. The commanding officers of the MSOs serve as Captains of the Port (COTPs), as the Officers in Charge of Marine Inspection (OCMIs), and as Federal On-Scene Coordinators (FOSCs) during emergencies.

In practice, Coast Guard district commanders usually have the final say on port operations in the face of approaching storms. The COTPs execute the orders handed down from the district level—but they have the authority to order levels of readiness higher than those that the district directs. The COTPs also work with port users, tenants, and administrators in implementing the details involved in port readiness.

The Marine Safety Offices in Hampton Roads and Wilmington fall under the control of the Fifth Coast Guard District, which is commanded by Vice Adm. John E. Shkor. The COTPs for the two ports, Capt. John Schrinner in Hampton Roads and Capt. John Williams in Wilmington, are quite familiar with the demands and challenges of hurricane preparation and recovery, as their commands lie in an area that is a common pathway for these tropical cyclones. But, as Williams explained in an autumn 1999 interview, "Every hurricane has a different character, and we are faced with a unique set of challenges every time we deal with one of these storms."

Ports in the Bullseye

The locations of the ports of Hampton Roads and Wilmington make them important gateways for national and regional trade. According to the Department of Transportation’s 1999 report, An Assessment of the U.S. Marine Transportation System, Hampton Roads had the second highest volume of international trade of any U.S. port. Its facilities handle more than ten million tons of containerized cargo each year, plus large amounts of grain, fertilizer, and sugar. Hampton Roads also owns the nation’s largest coal exporting facilities.

The port of Wilmington has a much more regional economic impact. It, too, handles container traffic, but bulk cargo traffic such as paper and forest products comprise a large part of the commerce that passes through the port. Nevertheless, Wilmington is an important node in the trade flows between North Carolina’s burgeoning hinterland cities and industries and the rest of the world.

The same locations that make them key trade conduits also put the two ports in harm’s way when truly dangerous weather roars in. This is especially true of Wilmington, which has been struck by five hurricanes in the last four years. Hampton Roads, farther north than Wilmington, has been far more fortunate—Virginia’s relatively short coast has taken only four direct hits from hurricanes since 1899. Still, this has not spared the port from being lashed by hurricane-force winds, storm surges, and torrential rains from storms that first came ashore further south.

In 1999, the most destructive hurricane to hit the southeastern Atlantic region was Hurricane Floyd. Although it weakened before reaching the United States, Floyd still packed sustained winds of 99 miles per hour when it made landfall near Cape Fear south of Wilmington on 16 September. After flooding large swaths of the Tarheel State, Floyd plowed inland over Virginia and Maryland and points north, weakening as it went. It left 42 people dead in the United States, along with large numbers of families and individuals homeless or displaced. It closed highways and flooded rail lines throughout the Southeast and mid-Atlantic regions. And it forced the ports of Wilmington and Hampton Roads to cease operations.

However, thanks to the fast and efficient work of the U.S. Coast Guard and its partners, the closures did not last long—Wilmington was open for business approximately 48 hours after the storm’s passage; Hampton Roads fared even better, reopening in six hours.

Preparation for Hurricanes

The basic hurricane preparation procedures that the two MSOs follow are similar. At the start of each hurricane season, which normally runs from June to November, the Coast Guard sets internal Hurricane Condition 5, the lowest level of readiness (the highest being Condition 1). The setting of Condition 5 is a signal for Coast Guard units in the area to refamiliarize themselves with the details of the port’s hurricane contingency plan. Meetings also are held with port officials, shipping line representatives, and harbor pilots to reacquaint them with the plan’s requirements as well.

When a hurricane actually approaches the East Coast, upgrades in the Coast Guard’s internal hurricane conditions—and in the publicly announced Maritime Hurricane Condition—trigger specific sets of actions by both the Coast Guard and private industry. These actions vary slightly from port to port. On the Coast Guard side, district and MSO personnel begin to keep a detailed watch on the storm’s movements. If storm path projections indicate that a strike is likely in the port area, the local COTP sets Condition Whiskey.

The MSO uses every means at his disposal—including telephone calls, faxes, e-mails, and press releases—to notify all concerned of the change, and continues to do so each time the Maritime Hurricane Condition changes. Vessels in the area are notified directly via a Broadcast Notice to Mariners.

With the hurricane procedures in effect, the MSO initiates meetings with port authorities and industry. The participants identify ships that might have to ride out the storm in port, and those that will be asked to leave and seek safety on the open sea. "The participation of harbor pilots," Schrinner noted in an interview, "is a key part of this process."

Meanwhile, MSO personnel also step up their harbor patrols and inspections to determine whether preparations by ships, facilities, and marinas are adequate.

The pace and gravity of storm preparations increase when hurricane-force winds are estimated to be only 24 hours away and Maritime Hurricane Condition Yankee is set. The COTPs restrict inbound commercial traffic and make detailed decisions as to which, if any, vessels remaining in the port will be allowed to stay.

Waterfront facilities must apply for COTP permission to have commercial vessels or barges of greater than 200 gross tons remain moored at the facility during the storm. The MSOs establish Crisis Action Centers to deal with any or all of several types of emergencies that will invariably begin to develop with the storm’s approach. MSO Hampton Roads also sends liaison officers to the Virginia Pilot Association station to help monitor vessel status.

No True Haven

Condition Zulu is set when the hurricane’s fiercest winds are calculated to be 12 hours away. At this point the COTPs prohibit the movement of virtually all commercial traffic. The transfers of dangerous bulk liquid cargoes and bunker fuels are suspended, as is any lightering of liquids from larger to smaller vessels. Waterfront facilities are required to secure their equipment against spills and other hazards. The MSOs monitor all of these last-minute preparations.

Although Hampton Roads and Wilmington follow similar procedures, location and geography drive some differences between their preparations. In Wilmington’s case, all ships not permitted to remain in port must leave Wilmington at least 15 hours prior to the predicted onset of gale-force winds, giving these vessels time to proceed down the Cape Fear River, clear Frying Pan Shoals at the river’s mouth, and head to safety.

This is a recent change. Prior to Floyd, ships in Wilmington were required to depart the port 24 hours in advance of hurricane-force winds likely to hit the area. The rule was changed in Floyd’s aftermath because several vessels had been "trapped" in Wilmington by the storm’s approach.

In Hampton Roads, the COTP can assign hurricane anchorages to the ships that were unable to make open sea safely before the onset of hurricane conditions. MSO personnel work with the Virginia Pilot Association to identify anchorage areas that provide a buffer between other anchored ships and the shoreline. From a safety standpoint, however, the Coast Guard prefers that ships evade the hurricane by putting to sea, because no harbor in the area provides a true haven during a hurricane.

The exodus to the Atlantic by ships evading oncoming hurricanes does not mean commercial vessels only. In Hampton Roads, the port evacuation also includes approximately 80 warships and auxiliary ships of the Navy’s Second Fleet. Larger Coast Guard cutters also leave port. (Conversely, many Coast Guard small boats and craft from outlying stations seek shelter in either Hampton Roads or Wilmington during hurricanes.)

Riding Out the Storm

Moving ships out to sea is perhaps the most important safety precaution that ports can take in advance of a hurricane. But it is not always possible to get every large vessel out of danger. For instance, with Floyd approaching Wilmington, Williams placed three ships under a COTP order to leave port. However, as their departure preparations dragged on, their masters had a collective change of heart about heading south down the Cape Fear River.

"After a while, they all said they couldn’t get underway, stating that it was no longer safe," Williams recounted, "and the [harbor] pilots supported them." The long trip from Wilmington down the Cape Fear River and around Frying Pan Shoals would have put the ships squarely in Floyd’s path. After a quick analysis of the storm’s movement, Williams and his staff agreed to allow the vessels to remain in Wilmington. The ships managed to ride Floyd out safely, but the incident caused the change in policy for port departures mentioned earlier.

In general, any ship remaining in port in a storm must double up its lines, rig anchors for quick release, shift ballast (if necessary) for maximum stability, and have all of its pumps and manifolds on line. The Coast Guard also coordinates with local tugboat companies to ensure emergency-response services are available in case the advance preparations are not enough to keep vessels at their moorings during the storm.

The value of these types of preparations was proven as the still-potent Floyd passed over Hampton Roads. The 718-foot-long Chinese heavy-lift merchant vessel Zhen Hua 4—loaded down with two massive, 219-foot-high cranes—broke loose from its moorings at Norfolk International Terminal and was blown onto an adjacent pier. Reacting quickly, the Coast Guard requested assistance from four tugs, which converged on the wayward vessel along with an MSO Marine Safety Team. After some careful maneuvering, Zhen Hua 4 was again moored securely at the terminal. Damage to the ship, its cargo, and the pier was minimal.

Elsewhere, nine vessels of the Navy’s Ready Reserve Force moored at the mouth of the James River north of Norfolk dragged their anchors and drifted westward. MSO Hampton Roads deployed another team to help coordinate and monitor the vessels’ eventual return to their berths. Fortunately, the ships did not run aground or drift into shipping channels, and local tugs were able to control their movements.

Aftermath of the Storm

After a hurricane has swept over and through a port, the Coast Guard’s first priority is damage assessment, including any damage done to aids to navigation (ATONs). The assessment is used to determine the condition of shipping channels, the presence of breakaway ships or barges, and any damage to port facilities that could cause a safety or pollution hazard.

Again, the port’s geography often determines many of the specific actions that MSO personnel take. According to Jerry Crooks, chief investigation officer with MSO Hampton Roads, one of the most expeditious means of finding out roadstead conditions in that port is to call state highway personnel stationed on the Chesapeake Bay Bridge Tunnel and/or other area bridges and simply ask them for visual observations.

The MSO also receives initial readings on the condition of channel navigation aids from a Coast Guardsman riding a harbor pilot boat from Cape Henry at the mouth of the Chesapeake to the piers at Portsmouth. Traffic-monitoring personnel in a pilot tower at Cape Henry also carry out visual and radar checks on buoys in Thimble Shoals channel. "We use these … checks to establish an initial ‘comfort zone,’" Crooks said.

These actions usually are accompanied by aerial and land-based inspections. A Coast Guard helicopter will fly over the main channels of the port, for example, looking for missing buoys, vessels adrift, the presence of wrecks or debris in the channel, and thin, colored sheens on the water (which indicate the possibility of oil or chemical leaks).

Meanwhile, teams from the MSO also fan out ashore in four-wheel-drive vehicles to check the integrity and safety of port facilities, as well as those of the numerous chemical plants and refineries along Hampton Roads’ waterways.

In Hampton Roads, District Five will assign buoy survey duties to cutters returning from sea. As they proceed to their piers, the cutters use their Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) systems and other methods to ensure that the buoys are still in their charted positions. Wilmington does not have cutters at its disposal for similar ATON duties. So, like its commercial brethren, the Wilmington-based cutter Diligence cannot enter the potentially treacherous Cape Fear River channel until aerial and surface surveys—augmented by the observations of river pilots—ensure that navigational aids are in place and the channel is unobstructed.

The Lessons-Learned Phase

Obstructions are always a key concern in the post-storm surveys. The initial surveys and other assessment efforts identify any barges or other watercraft that have grounded, been blown into the channel, or sunk and become hazards to other ships. The Coast Guard can rely upon contract tugs in an emergency, but for the most part the owners of wayward vessels are held responsible for corralling any of their craft that have broken loose, and for salvaging those that may have sunk.

Submerged buoys also can be major hazards to navigation. When a buoy is not where it should be the MSO will coordinate with the Army Corps of Engineers—the agency responsible for keeping the channel open—or with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to search for the buoy with side-scan sonar. In all such situations, the Coast Guard notifies mariners of the problem and marks the hazards to ensure they cause no further problems.

Once the MSOs are convinced that local waters are again safe for commercial traffic, the port will be reopened. In Hampton Roads, the first people notified are the harbor pilots, because they decide how to sort the long queue of ships waiting to enter port. Anxious port-authority personnel and shipping agents also receive quick notification, usually by fax and phone call. Ships’ crews get the word directly from the Coast Guard via marine broadcast. Wilmington follows similar reopening procedures.

Declaring a port open, however, does not mean that everything is back to normal. For the MSOs, the process of evaluating the lessons learned during the hurricane is just beginning. An important part of the evaluation process, Schrinner points out, is "meeting with the port players, who give us very valuable feedback as we refine our hurricane preparedness procedures."

Meanwhile, other Coast Guard units are engaged in restoring the damaged, destroyed, or displaced aids to navigation. Coast Guard Aid to Navigation Teams (ANTs), operating from small boats, service small buoys, lights, and fixed structures. To reset a larger buoy, however, which can weigh in at more than four tons, requires a buoy tender. This and other restoration work can continue for a month or more, depending upon the hurricane’s severity.

Just the Beginning?

"This is something we are going to have to get used to," Williams conceded when discussing Wilmington’s five hurricane strikes in four years. Indeed, some forecasters see evidence that the next few years may resemble the 1930s and 1940s, when huge storms regularly made landfall on U.S. coasts. If these fears are realized, Wilmington—and maybe even relatively sheltered Hampton Roads—will likely feel the brunt of a number of other heavy storms in the years ahead.

When a hurricane "decides" to hammer the U.S. coast, there is nothing anyone can do to prevent it. For that reason alone, it seems evident, having an agency available that can coordinate port preparation for and recovery from these life-threatening storms is essential for safety, environmental, and economic reasons.

Today, and for a very long time to come, in all probability, the Coast Guard will be that agency, serving as perhaps the most essential public or private-sector organization available to help ports weather the worst that Mother Nature can throw at them.