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By
BRAD KAPLAN
Capt. Brad
Kaplan, USN, is the U.S. Naval Attaché to China.
When assessing
China's military potential, Western and Asian observers often tend
either to view the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) as an ominous
storm cloud on the horizon or to casually dismiss it as a "paper
tiger" faced with significant modernization and operational
problems. On the one hand, there is no shortage of commentary reporting
the PLAN's acquisition of sophisticated Russian-built military ships and
aircraft, improvements in indigenous production, and development of a
modern Marine Force. These articles point with increasing alarm to
China's drive for naval domination on both sides of the Malacca Strait,
the South China Sea, and Taiwan Strait--and for extending a menacing
naval presence far out into the Pacific. Other articles, pointing to
aging PLAN combatant aircraft, surface units, and submarines--and to
problems with indigenous production programs--maintain that China's Navy
is floundering, and that it does not pose a credible threat to
neighboring countries.
A more balanced
assessment of the PLAN's capabilities today and its potential tomorrow
may be derived from a better understanding of its mission, the present
state of its ships and aircraft, and its ongoing modernization program.
China's best military units--estimated at approximately 10 percent of
its overall forces--are being modernized at a steady pace, in keeping
with the country's ongoing economic development. As Lt. Gen. Patrick M.
Hughes, then-director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, testified to
the Senate Armed Services Committee on 2 February 1999, these select
forces will have achieved a reasonably high level of proficiency in
1980s-style maneuver warfare by 2010. They will be well equipped with
theater-range missiles, "late Cold War equivalent" tanks and
artillery, more advanced diesel and third-generation nuclear-powered
submarines, and approximately 20 new surface combatant warships.
An
Evolving Mission
Historically,
China's Navy has been responsible for seaward and coastal defense.
During the 1950s and 1960s, the PLAN focused on defending China's
mainland from amphibious assault--first from the perceived U.S. threat
and, later, from the perceived threat from the Soviet Union as its
relationship with that country soured. Naval acquisitions were almost
solely from existing Soviet systems and platforms, and defensive tactics
were largely modeled after the Soviet example. During these years, the
PLA developed a large fleet of relatively inexpensive (and thus
expendable) missile boats, diesel submarines, and conventional bombers,
which could be used in a mass attack on amphibious units and their
escorts. The few destroyer-sized combatants acquired by the PLAN during
this period were modeled primarily after World War II-era Russian
designs.
In recent
years, the PLAN's maritime mission has evolved from a role of static
coastal defense to one of "active offshore defense." In this
capacity, the PLAN can be used both as a tactical force and to support
strategic national defense. The objectives of this new strategy are to
assert China's role as a regional maritime power, to protect coastal
economic regions and maritime interests, and to optimize the Navy's
operations for national defense. The PLAN's responsibilities now include
capture and defense of islands, and protection and blockade of sea-lanes
of communication. Moreover, the PLAN is increasingly viewed by senior
PLA leadership as integral to resolution of the Taiwan issue--should
force be required--and for safeguarding China's "Xisha" and
"Nansha" islands in the South China Sea. Finally, the PLAN is
likely to be increasingly used as an instrument of overseas diplomacy
through participation in goodwill cruises and port visits.
The PLAN's
evolving strategy has been described in terms of two distinct phases.
The strategy's first phase is for the PLAN to develop a "green
water active defense strategy" capability. This "green
water" generally is described as being encompassed within an arc
swung from Vladivostok to the north, to the Strait of Malacca to the
south, and out to the "first island chain" (Aleutians, Kuriles,
Ryukyus, Taiwan, Philippines, and Greater Sunda islands) to the east.
Analysts have assessed that the PLAN is likely to attain this green
water capability early in the 21st century. Open-source writings also
suggest that the PLAN intends to develop a capability to operate in the
"second island chain" (Bonins, Guam, Marianas, and Palau
islands) by the mid-21st century. In the future, the PLAN also may
expand its operations to bases in Myanmar, Burma. These bases will
provide the PLAN with direct access to the Strait of Malacca and the Bay
of Bengal.
The
People's Liberation Army Navy
PLAN command
and control are highly centralized through its headquarters in Beijing.
The headquarters staff, led by Vice Adm. Shi Yunsheng, provides
oversight and direction through its logistics, equipment, repair, and
political departments. The PLAN consists of three major fleets, a naval
aviation arm, and marine units. Fleets are strategically located to the
north in Qingdao, to the east in Ningbo, and to the south in Zhanjiang--providing
the Chinese Navy with direct access to the Yellow Sea, Taiwan Strait,
and South China Sea respectively. Each fleet consists of a number of
major and minor bases, a naval air arm, and coastal-defense regions.
South Sea Fleet units also include the Navy's Marine Force and its
associated amphibious lift. Major surface combatant shipyards are
located in Dalian, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Hudong. The Wuhan shipyard
is responsible for conventional submarine construction, and
nuclear-powered attack and ballistic-missile submarines are built at the
Huladao shipyard.
The PLAN is
manned by approximately 268,000 officers and men, in-cluding 28,000
coastal-defense forces, 25,000 naval air forces, and some 7,000 marines.
Conscripts serve for two years. Although there are recent provisions for
sailors to remain in service for up to 30 years, a cadre of senior
enlisted personnel is not yet well developed. PLAN academic training
remains fairly basic by Western standards; however, there is an
increasing emphasis on improving the quality of training through the use
of automatic data-processing resources. Large-scale fleet exercises are
conducted several times each year, but there is little integration
between naval air and surface units, and even less integration of naval
operations with units of either the PLA Air Force or Army.
Marine
Force
The PLAN's
7,000-man Marine Force is relatively well trained and equipped. The
Marine Force's primary mission is to safeguard China's island holdings
in the South China Sea during times of peace and to seize and defend
islands in the South China Sea during times of war. The Marine Force
also may be used for amphibious raids or for establishing beachheads in
scenarios entailing a military confrontation with Taiwan. Chinese
marines are supported by amphibious tanks and armored personnel
carriers, howitzers, and multiple rocket launchers. Although the PLAN
has approximately 60 tank landing ships and medium landing
ships--including relatively capable Yuting, Yukan, and Yuliang
classes--its aggregate lift capability is only about 5,000 to 10,000
troops.
This limited
lift capability is inadequate to support any major amphibious operation.
Recent improvements in the Navy's amphibious capabilities have included
the acquisition of Jingsah-class air cushion vehicles. The PLAN also has
shown an interest in developing a wing-in-ground-effect craft. These
hybrid aircraft have the capability to cruise one meter above the water
at speeds of 120 knots or more, and in the future such craft may prove
capable of supporting amphibious operations. In the past, PLAN
amphibious exercises demonstrated an attempt to coordinate aerial
bombardment and naval gunfire support with assault waves, but this
capability has not been well developed.
Naval
Air Arm
Although the
overall numbers are impressive on paper, the PLAN's aircraft are not
considered to be first-line forces by Western analysts. Most PLAN
aircraft are modeled after 20- to 30-year-old Russian designs, and they
do not adequately support the air arm's missions in maritime patrol,
antisubmarine warfare, and antiship strikes. The venerable H-6D Badger,
with its two C-801 antiship missiles, presents the primary threat to
surface units; however, its ability to locate and successfully engage
targets independently beyond the radar horizon is questionable. Antiship-missile
capability will be enhanced when the older H-6D is replaced with more
capable FB-7 units.
A variation of
the FB-7, the FBC-1, may prove to be the aircraft of choice when the
PLAN begins to pursue development of a carrier aviation program
seriously; however, the SU-27K Flanker also is a possible candidate. The
capability to deliver iron bombs, rockets, and mines is provided by more
than 700 attack aircraft, but with the exception of the modest numbers
of newer J-8II Finback air-defense and air-superiority fighters these
aircraft are not capable of effectively engaging surface ships equipped
with modern air defense systems. Moreover, the PLAN has not yet
demonstrated the capability to integrate these strike aircraft
effectively into coordinated surface and air attacks. Maritime patrol
aircraft, such as the BE-6, lack modern radar systems and sensors, and
they do not pose a credible threat to today's submarines.
Submarine
Force
Although it
deploys a force of more than 60 submarines, PLAN units lag behind
Western standards, and most weapons and sensor systems are based on
older Russian technology. Lack of crew proficiency and hull quieting
remain significant problems, and acoustic systems are two to three
generations behind the world's first-line navies. All units can carry
either torpedoes or mines, and the acquisition of Russian wake-homing
torpedo technology has significantly improved the PLAN's submarine
antisurface capabilities. As the PLAN modernizes, it is phasing out its
fleet of more than 30 older Romeo-class conventional diesel submarines,
replacing them with indigenously produced Ming- (19 units) and Song- (3
units) class, or Russian-built Kilo-class (type 877 and 636) submarines.
The PLAN's four
Kilo units remain the submarine force's most capable boats, although the
capability of their crews to operate them effectively in a tactical
environment is suspect. The PLAN's continuing reliance on Russian-built
hulls reflects the lack of success of indigenous Ming and Song designs,
and this situation is likely to continue as the Navy pursues acquisition
of advanced air-independent pro-pulsion systems. The PLAN is currently
building a new Type 094 class of SSBN (nuclear-powered ballistic-missile
submarine) to replace its single Xia-class unit. Analysts have assessed
that the Type 094 SSBN is likely to be operational in the early part of
the 21st century. It will be fitted with 16 launch tubes for the
expanded range JL-2 sea-launched ballistic missile.
Progress in
replacing aging Han-class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) with
the new generation Type 093 SSN has been slow. The Type 093 SSNs have
been compared in capability to the Russian Victor III SSN class. Given
its slow progress with indigenously produced submarine units, as well as
the prohibitively high construction costs, the PLAN is likely to
emphasize acquisition of cheaper, more efficient, and less complex
conventional submarines.
Surface
Force
Although it has
more than 400 fast-attack missile, patrol, and torpedo boats, the PLAN
only has about 50 units that are considered major combatants by Western
standards. Many of these obsolete small combatants are being re-placed
by more capable C-801/802 missile-configured Houjian-, Houxin-, and
Huangfen-class craft. During the 1980s, in a departure from its
traditional practice of relying on Russian Navy designs, the PLAN
aggressively sought to incorporate more advanced Western technology in
its indigenous shipbuilding program. The acquisition of these
technologies resulted in China's production of more advanced surface
combatants during the past decade-- including a single 6,000-ton Luhai-class
guided-missile destroyer (DDG), two Luhu-class DDGs (4,200 tons), and
nine Jiangwei-class frigates (2,250 tons). These units are equipped with
the HQ-7 or HQ-61 short-range air defense systems that likely will be
replaced by a longer-range vertical-launch system within the next three
to five years. These ships also have integrated tactical data systems,
an improved antisubmarine warfare suite that includes embarked
helicopters, and gas turbine propulsion.
Notwithstanding
these improvements, the backbone of the PLA surface fleet remains its 16
aging Luda-class destroyers (3,250 tons) and 30 Jianghu-class frigates
(1,425 tons) that are largely inadequate to meet the requirements of
modern warfare. The planned acquisition of two 7,940-ton Russian-built
Sovremenny-class DDGs in the 2000 to 2001 period will improve the PLAN's
surface-combatant capabilities. These units are likely to be equipped
with an advanced SAN-7 air-defense system, the KA-28 Helix Helicopter,
and SSN-22 cruise-missile technology. The PLAN's HQ-61 and HQ-7 systems
are based on the French Crotale land-based surface-to-air missile
system, and they do not provide surface units with an effective
area-defense capability. This deficiency makes PLAN surface units
extremely vulnerable to air attack.
The Chinese
Navy also is limited by other operational constraints. Although it has
some capability to conduct shallow water antisubmarine warfare along its
littoral and in the Yellow and South China Seas, the PLAN's
antisubmarine warfare capability remains modest at best. Towed-array
sonar and sono-bouy systems use technology that is more than 20 years
old. The PLAN's damage-control capability remains limited, and few units
have automatic fire-fighting or watertight door systems.
Anticontamination systems also are considered to be quite basic by
Western standards. The PLAN does field a broad spectrum of fairly
sophisticated sea-skimming cruise missiles--based either on Russian Styx
or on French Exocet technology--including the Hai Ying ("Sea
Eagle") and the "Ying Ji" ("Eagle Strike")
series. These missiles give the PLAN the capability to conduct
extended-range antishipping strikes from air and surface units, as well
as from coastal-defense sites. Despite this capability, the lack of
effective over-the-horizon targeting sensors and coordinated targeting
tactics limits the likely effectiveness of these systems.
The PLAN has
more than 300 miscellaneous support ships, a total that includes
approximately 120 mine warfare vessels, 49 replenishment ships, and a
number of other survey, research, and support units. Although virtually
all surface ships are configured for mine laying, the PLAN has a limited
mine-laying capability, and mine-hunting and sweeping capabilities are
even more basic. Nonetheless, the inventory of PLAN mines is impressive,
and it includes advanced systems using sophisticated technology. If used
in sufficient numbers, this inventory poses a significant threat to
surface and submarine units operating along China's littoral, the Yellow
Sea, Sea of Japan, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea. The Navy's
underway replenishment capability remains largely undeveloped, and the
sustainability of PLAN units is likely to be severely limited by this
shortcoming.
Modernization
Programs
The director of
the PLA's General Equipment Department, Gen. Cao Gangchuan, recently
highlighted the increasing importance of China's Navy when he stated,
"The PLAN shoulders the important mission of safeguarding the
security of the territorial sea and is placed at the forefront of
military [engagements]." Such support by senior PLA leadership has
resulted in the PLAN being allocated a higher proportion of the defense
budget in recent years, allowing it to pursue force modernization
aggressively.
The PLAN's
modernization program has consisted of three distinct aspects. First,
PLAN leadership has focused on decommissioning the large numbers of
outdated surface combatants, submarines, and aircraft acquired during
the first 30 years of the country's existence. Second, the PLAN has
aggressively sought advanced Western technology for improving its
warfighting capability and the sustainability of its ships and aircraft.
Third, the Chinese Navy has focused on improving training for both its
officer and enlisted ranks and, in consonance with overarching PLA
programs, developing a cadre of experienced noncommissioned officers.
As the PLAN
modernizes its forces, it will continue to pursue the acquisition of
advanced Western technology, while it attempts to develop indigenously
produced modern units. PLAN air force units lack an aerial-refueling
capability and modern radar systems capable of providing force
protection or supporting over-the-horizon targeting. Surface ship
requirements include acquisition of modern multiwarfare capable hulls,
antisubmarine warfare systems and weapons, medium-range air defense
systems, and electronic-warfare systems. Submarine modernization re-quirements
include acquisition of improved quieting technology and replacement of
aging conventional and nuclear-powered submarines.
The PLAN's
drive for modernization has been most dramatically reflected in its
ongoing development of the FB-7 bomber, new-generation conventional and
nuclear-powered attack and ballistic missile submarines, acquisition of
Russian-built Kilo-class diesel submarines, and the planned acquisition
of Russian-built Sovremenny guided-missile destroyers. The PLAN also has
relied heavily on Russian training for the officers and enlisted
personnel who will man these units.
In the face of
a post-Tianamen freeze on the export of U.S. weapons systems to China,
the PLAN has relied heavily on the acquisition of advanced weapons and
sensor systems from a number of other Western countries, including
Israel and France. These acquisitions notwithstanding, the PLAN's
eventual goal is to develop the indigenous capability to produce
advanced naval units, weapons, and sensor systems. The lack of success
of the PLAN's Ming- and Song-class diesel submarine programs, the slow
progress in its development of next-generation attack and
ballistic-missile nuclear-powered submarines, and the modest success of
its newest indigenously produced Luhai-class guided-missile destroyer,
suggest that China's Navy will continue to be largely dependent on
Western technology well into the next decade.
In recent
years, open-source writings have increasingly suggested that the PLAN is
interested in the acquisition of an aircraft carrier. While acquisition
of an aircraft carrier would improve the PLAN's power-projection
capability, liaison with senior PLAN officials has indicated that the
high costs associated with acquisition and maintenance are prohibitive.
That having been said, Beijing leadership views the development of a
carrier capability as a key step in increasing China's maritime
prestige, and it is likely to exert pressure on the PLAN to acquire an
aircraft carrier. Speculation as to when the PLAN may acquire an
aircraft carrier varies from as early as 2004 to as late as 2020.
Clearly, costs notwithstanding, if it is to assume a greater role as a
regional maritime power, the PLAN must eventually make this investment.
With this in mind, there is a possibility that the PLAN will pursue a
more cost effective near-term solution through the acquisition of a
vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) platform to support helicopter or
VTOL aircraft operations.
A
Force for the Future
The PLAN is not
yet a significant naval power, even when viewed solely in a regional
context. PLAN surface ships, submarines, and aircraft continue to lack
the sophisticated weapons and sensor systems which characterize modern
first-line naval units. These shortfalls limit the PLAN's present
warfighting capabilities, and Chinese naval units are not yet up to the
standard attained by the navies of Japan, the Republic of Korea, or even
Taiwan. There also are significant tactical and doctrinal shortfalls
that the PLAN has not adequately addressed. At-sea sustainability is
modest, and the PLAN has not yet demonstrated the ability to conduct
complex coordinated air and surface operations. The training of
individual sailors remains basic by Western standards, and the PLAN
lacks a corps of experienced noncommissioned officers. From the highest
echelons of the service to individual commands, control is highly
centralized, with little flexibility and creativity in subordinate
ranks. These shortfalls will limit the ability of the PLAN to assert a
significant regional naval presence for perhaps five to ten years, and
the Navy is not likely to possess the longer reach associated with a
maritime power-projection capability until well into the 21st century.
Having noted
these shortfalls, however, the PLAN has made remarkable progress in its
drive for modernization over the last decade. It has demonstrated the
capability to deploy naval forces as far away as South America and
Australia. It has acquired modern Russian-built diesel submarines and
will receive two sophisticated Russian-built destroyers within the next
two to three years. Discounting at present the likely acquisition of an
aircraft carrier, China's Navy has improved its strike capabilities with
the introduction of more cap-able F-8II aircraft, and it will further
improve these capabilities when it places the FB-7 in service. It has
continued to develop and maintain a sophisticated inventory of
antisurface missiles and mines. The complexity and scope of fleet
training have steadily increased, as have the capabilities of the PLAN's
Marines. Further, improvements in individual training and the
development of a corps of noncommissioned officers offers the potential
to improve the sustainability and combat effectiveness of individual
units significantly. These factors point to a Navy that will become
increasingly capable of accomplishing its more prominent mission to
safeguard China's maritime economic interests, to defend and perhaps
expand interests in the South China Sea, and--ultimately, perhaps--to
support the use of force against Taiwan.
When viewed in
this context, it would be unwise to dismiss the PLAN as a "paper
tiger." In the coming de-cades, the Chinese Navy presents the real
likelihood of expanding its capabilities significantly. As it does so,
it also is likely that Beijing will increasingly view the Navy as a
mechanism to exert pressure on China's neighbors and to assert its
influence regionally.
While it is
unlikely to develop the capability to challenge the U.S. Navy for
control of the seas, it is quite possible that the PLAN will, within two
decades, develop a Navy with regional capabilities second only to
Japan's. The degree to which these developments constitute "storm
clouds on the horizon" will depend as much on U.S. diplomacy in the
coming years as on the ability of the United States and its Pacific
allies to maintain a strong regional-defense posture.
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