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Editor in
Chief James D. Hessman and Senior Editor Gordon I. Peterson interviewed
Rear Adm. Malcolm I. Fages for this issue of Sea Power.
SEA POWER:
Mindful of operational-security limitations, could you give our readers a
rough idea of where the Navy's submarine force is operating around the
world as we meet for this interview?
FAGES: Today [14
May] we are operating in all theaters--with about 12 submarines
forward-deployed. We are operating in the European theater in support of
Kosovo operations [Operation Allied Force]--where, within the Adriatic,
our submarines are launching about 25 percent of the Tomahawk missiles in
that conflict. We are operating in the Central Command [Southwest Asia].
We also have submarines operating in the Western Pacific--in fact, because
the Navy has had to pull an aircraft carrier [USS Kitty Hawk] out of the
Western Pacific to cover other missions, our submarines are keeping a
close eye on what's going on in that part of the world. We also have
submarines doing independent operations--intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance [ISR] missions. We are engaged with our allies, and we are
conducting antisubmarine-warfare [ASW] exercises.
Last week, CNN
reported on a submarine [USS Hawkbill] from the North Pole during a
scientific expedition. We also have a submarine that is participating in
counterdrug operations for the Southern Command. So, we are all over the
world!
We
understand that the number of submarine ISR missions has doubled from Cold
War levels, yet the Navy will have only 50 attack submarines by 2003. How
do you plan to cope with this imbalance between operational requirements
and force structure?
FAGES: We
basically became asset-limited when our force structure fell below 72
[attack] submarines. Innumerable studies have assessed how many submarines
we need to perform assigned missions. The fleet commanders in chief [CINCs]
have validated a requirement for 72 SSNs. Today, we are at 58. And, in
fact, there are some things we are not doing. We have had to pull
submarines out of major joint [multiple U.S. forces] NATO exercises. In
order to respond to contingencies, we have had to say "no" to
some intelligence-collection missions. We are having to back off
significantly from our commitment to Arctic operations and to counterdrug
operations.
The intelligence
community must now reprioritize submarine mission requests. In general,
the only intelligence-collection missions that come to the submarine force
are those for which there is not another national-collection capability to
achieve the desired end. Our inability to satisfy these demands due to
insufficient available assets has national implications. The thing that we
have decided not to do--absolutely--is to make up for the reduction in
submarine numbers by piling an increase on to our crews in deployment
length or by reducing the time between deployments to unacceptable levels.
Just as with the
rest of the Navy, regardless of how heavily tasked we are in peacetime, we
abide by the CNO's [chief of naval operations'] requirement to have a
suitable time between deployments and time in homeport. We have had to
reprioritize and say "no" in a number of areas where we really
wish we could say "yes."
Is it fair
to say that the Navy's attack-submarine force level should be higher than
what the QDR [quadrennial defense review] recommended?
FAGES: Yes. A
Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS] study is underway now evaluating
attack-submarine requirements in the 2015 and 2025 time frames. This study
was mandated by the QDR. The Quadrennial Defense Review force level of 50
attack submarines was not cast in stone and was, essentially,
budget-based--not requirements-driven.
I can't tell you
what the final outcome is going to be because the study is a work in
progress, but I can tell you with a high degree of optimism that the
number is going to come in significantly higher than 50. The study will be
completed this summer. An element of that study is affordability and, of
course, affordability is the wild card.
Without
prejudging the study, what are some of the options that you may consider
to respond to the need for more attack submarines?
FAGES:
Service-life extension [for currently commissioned submarines] is one that
we have already started to address. One of the great concerns we have had
with the Virginia class [new attack submarine] is that, when one looked at
the acquisition profile starting in 2008, it had to go up to three
[submarines delivered] a year to maintain our attack-submarine force
levels. Between 2008 and 2015, we were going to have five years in which
we had to acquire three a year just to remain at 50 attack submarines.
Frankly, we did not think that was affordable, given the Navy SCN
[shipbuilding and conversion Navy] budget. So we have been looking at ways
to maintain a force structure of at least 50 attack submarines without
having to acquire more than the two [Virginia-class submarines] per year,
which we think is achievable and affordable.
We have concluded
that we can extend the service life on some of the improved Los
Angeles-class ships that have sufficient fuel by paying very, very close
attention to [nuclear] fuel management. The service lives for selected
submarines can be extended to 33 years, and there are enough ships in that
category to allow us to maintain a force structure of 50 [attack
submarines] but not have to build more than two [Virginia-class
submarines] a year. But, of course, that doesn't get to the question you
are asking: How do we get to the higher number?
We are currently
downsizing our force structure to achieve a level of 50 attack submarines
as mandated by the QDR. We have eight Los Angeles-class submarines that
will be inactivated before they reach the end of their projected service
lives. These ships could be refueled instead of inactivated. Another
opportunity for increasing our force structure is through SSGN
[nuclear-powered guided-missile submarine] conversions.
If the decision
were made to convert four Trident SSBNs [nuclear-powered fleet ballistic
missile submarines] that are not required for their strategic mission to
SSGNs, we could achieve a force level of 62.
Two SSGNs, each
with two crews, enable "heel-to-toe" [continuous] forward
presence. With four SSGNs, each with two crews, we can forward-deploy two
submarines continuously [a 2.0 presence]. Nine single-crewed submarines
are normally required to achieve a 2.0 forward presence. So, with 58
attack submarines and four SSGNs you really get more presence than you
would with just 62 attack submarines. The SSGN does not give you all the
mission capabilities of the attack submarine, so the number is a bit of a
hybrid--but it is certainly within the realm of the "doable" to
achieve higher numbers without having to break the Navy SCN budget to do
it.
Given your
concerns for affordability and force structure, have you reconsidered the
diesel-electric submarine for the low end of Navy requirements? Is
quantity not also a quality?
FAGES: There have
been some significant developments in the conventional diesel-electric
submarine. The Germans are now building submarines that will have a 30-day
submerged capability using air-independent propulsion. The question is
asked often, and we go back and reexamine it ourselves. We feel that for
the missions that our Navy and our submarine forces are called upon to
do--to traverse two great oceans and to be forward-engaged around the
world--a diesel submarine simply does not make sense for the United
States.
Time and again,
with the low numbers in today's force structure, we roll [reassign]
submarines from theater to theater to cover gaps--and we do that at high
speeds. Take USS Miami [the Los Angeles-class nuclear-powered attack
submarine]. She was involved in strike operations [Operation Desert Fox]
in December, when she unloaded her [Tomahawk cruise-missile] inventory
against Iraqi targets. She left CENTCOM's [U.S. Central Command's] theater
by way of the Suez Canal in order to cover targets in Kosovo for EUCOM
[U.S. European Command]. We reloaded her from a submarine tender in Italy,
and then she went off and launched [Tomahawks] against Yugoslavia
[Operation Allied Force] in March. The ability to move a ship quickly and
covertly over great distances from CENTCOM to EUCOM is just not possible
with a diesel submarine.
And, of
course, many of our allies have a diesel-electric capability, correct?
FAGES: That's
right, and we work closely with them. We train against them so we have the
ability to maintain our own ASW expertise against quiet diesel submarines.
What
tactical and operational innovations does the submarine force display in
these day-to-day missions?
FAGES: A number
of the enhancements and modernizations in our submarines take advantage of
the latest developments in computer processing and new technology. Perhaps
the best example is in the area of sonar modernization. We are completely
modernizing all attack and ballistic-missile submarines with
commercial-off-the-shelf systems rather than legacy sonar systems. More
acoustic processing power is resident on one submarine with this new
system than exists currently in the legacy systems on all submarines in
the fleet! This order of magnitude enhancement will give us incredible
potential for signals processing.
We also are
working on technology to enable Network Centric Warfare as it involves
submarines--network-centric ASW. We are working with our other platform
sponsors [i.e., OPNAV program and resource sponsors] to develop common
tools to allow us to share the tactical picture and exploit the
operational environment more effectively.
We are developing
the capability to do very precise mapping of the ocean
bottoms--particularly in littoral areas--so that we can do mine
reconnaissance and develop the best locations for laying underwater-sensor
systems and conducting amphibious landings. We will have this capability
on our ships soon. The system will take a very high-resolution picture of
the [ocean's] bottom and then translate that into an image that can be
shared with the rest of the battle group in real time for use tactically.
The
submarine's past limitation in the C4I [command, control, communications,
computers, and information] arena was the long pole in the tent as it
relates to Network Centric Warfare doctrine. Are you comfortable with
progress in this area?
FAGES: Yes. We
think that we have swallowed that elephant now. We have a program in
place, the investments have been made, and the equipment is starting to be
delivered so that, starting in fiscal year 2001, all of our submarines
that are deploying with the [aircraft carrier] battle groups will have
full wideband [communications] capability. We will be able to transmit and
receive in the EHF [extremely high frequency] spectrum. In essence, we
will be "fully connected" with the battle group.
Are new
electric-drive propulsion systems in store for the submarine force?
FAGES: Electric
drive offers exceptional improvements from both a propulsion and systems
perspective. The propulsion plant itself will be able to be a much simpler
design, so affordability increases as acquisition and life-cycle costs are
reduced. We are absolutely convinced of that. We will have even greater
acoustic stealth with quieter electric-drive propulsion. Perhaps the
greatest leverage will come from the additional electrical power that
would be available on demand to support future generations of very
sophisticated payloads and off-board sensors.
Can you
elaborate on your planning for unmanned undersea vehicles?
FAGES: We have a
very robust development program now for unmanned undersea vehicles. We are
looking at a near-term mine reconnaissance system, a long-term mine
reconnaissance system, and mission-reconfigurable unmanned undersea
vehicles that will be capable of employing a broad array of sensor suites.
Looking
forward, how do you see the submarine's undersea-warfare missions evolving
in the 21st century?
FAGES: One of the
principal roles for the submarine in the next century will be in
battlespace preparation--both in the intelligence-gathering area and in
the ability to operate in an area in which an adversary has employed a
robust antiaccess strategy using submarines, mines, ballistic missiles,
cruise missiles, and weapons of mass destruction, to name a few.
Against these
asymmetric threats, the submarine--by virtue of its stealth and
endurance--is invulnerable. The submarine will enter early into a hostile
battlespace because it is able to deal with those kinds of threats--it is
able to launch weapons covertly with no notice against enemy coastal and
air defenses. This will enable the follow-on flow of less stealthy forces
for the true power-projection role that naval forces are designed so well
to do.
The
submarine force has always had a reputation for having top-quality
Sailors. Are you experiencing retention problems similar to the Navy's
other warfare specialties? If so, won't you encounter a greater manning
challenge if your force structure grows again to more than 50 submarines?
FAGES: We have no
silver bullet. We have our share of difficulties with junior-officer
retention and accessions, but I think we have rounded the corner. Our
nuclear submarine-officer accession percentages have risen substantially
in the past two years. Our junior-officer retention is several percentage
points below where we would like it to be, but it certainly is in a range
that is manageable. We can further improve our officer retention with
increased financial compensation. I'm optimistic that we will get the
authorization we need to do that.
I think one thing
that is helping now is a renewed sense of mission amongst our submariners.
In the early part of the 1990s, when the Soviet threat went away, we
struggled for a while. We are clearly past that now, and our submariners
understand how important their mission is today. They see that in
deployment after deployment they are being called upon to answer the
nation's call. That is a very positive thing.
On the enlisted
side, we have rounded the corner in meeting nuclear-field accession and
retention goals. Not surprisingly, the areas in which we are having the
most difficulty keeping our submarine Sailors are in the electronic and
computer fields.
Another key to
the retention of officer and enlisted personnel is reducing
interdeployment training-cycle requirements. My experience has been that
our Sailors and officers enjoy going to sea and deploying--that is why
they joined up. When home, they do not enjoy coming to work when it is
dark and going home when it is dark--and not being able to spend their
days fruitfully because we are lacking something needed to get the job
done efficiently. So the focus on inter-deployment training is absolutely
correct.
Turning to
building programs, the Seawolf-class attack submarine appears to be on
track with regard to cost, schedule, and performance--correct?
FAGES: That's
correct. We are well within the cost cap for the program, and the
submarine's performance has been exceptional. The SSN 21 [USS Seawolf,
lead ship in the class] is in its post-shakedown availability period right
now. The Connecticut is enjoying marvelous success, and the Jimmy Carter
is on schedule. We are very happy with them.
And is the
Virginia class also balancing affordability with warfighting capabilities?
FAGES: Yes. We
are now bending steel on the second ship of the first four that have been
approved. The first ship is the Virginia; the second ship is the Texas.
Those ships are far ahead of where we were at the same point in new
construction with the Seawolf program. The Virginia-class acoustic stealth
will be equal to Seawolf's acoustic stealth and will have greater
nonacoustic stealth. It has been specifically designed and optimized for
operations in the littorals. We are building a ship that equals or exceeds
the capabilities of its preceding class at about 2530 percent less cost.
Have you
been able to satisfy your critics with regard to future technology
insertion? That was a controversial area in the past.
FAGES: There was
some controversy last year and the year before, but we have the commitment
of the Department of Navy and the Department of Defense to maintain the
level of investment in our program that we need for advanced
submarine-technology insertion. We have been successful in portraying that
commitment to the appropriate committees in the Congress, and they
continually look closely at that--as they should. I am cautiously
optimistic that the controversy is a thing of the past. We are on the
right track with our advanced technology-insertion program.
The fleet
ballistic-missile submarine force is still a critical leg in the U.S.
strategic triad; how is it shaping up these days?
FAGES: The
Trident submarine continues to perform magnificently. Today we have 18
SSBNs. Under the nuclear posture review, we will go to a force of 14
ballistic-missile submarines--all equipped with the Trident II missile
system. They will be deployed both in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. To
reach the 14-ship all-Trident II force, we will be converting four of the
Trident I-equipped ships to the Trident II system. The first two of those
conversions will occur in fiscal years 2000 and 2001, and the other two
conversions will occur in fiscal years 2005 and 2006. For the four Trident
submarines that we will either inactivate or convert to a cruise missile
variant, the first two will come out of service in fiscal year 2003, and
two will come out of service in fiscal year 2004.
We have recently
completed studies that have confirmed that we can extend the service life
of our Trident submarines to 42 years from 30 years--which is very
significant for us because this will preclude the need to recapitalize the
ballistic-missile submarine in the foreseeable future. At about the
20-year point, these submarines will be refueled, and then they will have
essentially another 20 years of life.
Similarly, if we
are able to establish the SSGN as a program, then in fiscal year 2003 and
fiscal year 2004 we would be able to refuel and convert those four ships
with 20 years of life remaining as cruise-missile and
special-operations-force submarines.
In order to take
advantage of a 42-year total service life, we are looking at a
life-extension program for the Trident II missile. That investigation is
now in its infancy. We recently completed the 85th consecutive successful
launch of a Trident II missile from one of our ballistic-missile
submarines. It is an incredibly successful program--perhaps the most
successful program in the Department of Defense.
By way of
conclusion, how would you describe the present outlook and priorities for
the submarine force?
FAGES: We are
very optimistic about the future. The demand for submarine services
continues to grow--there is almost an insatiable demand from the
warfighting CINCs. My concern is maintaining an adequate force structure
to be able to meet the missions that the nation calls upon us to do. The
thing that continues to amaze me as I ride submarines and talk to
submariners is the quality of the people who both operate and support our
ships. I cannot imagine a higher quality group of men and women in the
country than we have in the submarine force, and it is a real honor to be
part of that group. |
