By LOREN B. THOMPSON

Loren Thompson is the Chief Operating Officer of the Lexington Institute.

 
This year marks a bittersweet milestone for the Navy's EA-6B Prowler electronic-warfare aircraft. It was forty years ago, during the last days of the Eisenhower administration, that the service accepted the first prototype of the Grumman-built A-6 Intruder carrier-based attack aircraft, a version of which (with numerous and extensive modifications) would become the EA-6B. The Intruder served with distinction from Vietnam to Desert Storm, and then was gradually retired from the fleet. The Prowler just keeps on going ... and going ... and going.

Current Navy plans call for Prowlers to remain in the active force until at least 2015, a remarkably long life for an aircraft that traces its origins to the Korean War. Whether that longevity reflects the Navy's foresight in continually improving a durable design--or the persistent failure of policymakers to grasp the full importance of airborne electronic warfare--is a matter of debate.

Unique Mission

What is not debatable is that the 124 Prowlers in the Navy and Marine Corps have become an essential asset in joint and coalition warfare. In current Pentagon parlance, they are "low-density, high-demand" aircraft that, like the E-8 Joint Surveillance and Target-Attack Radar System (JSTARS) and the E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, contribute disproportionately to combat success in modern warfare. Grumman's successor, the Northrop Grumman Corporation, is a global leader in the integration and outfitting of such highly complex airborne electronic systems. But unlike the surveillance and battle-management roles of JSTARS and AWACS, which are fairly easily understood, the electronic-warfare mission of the Prowler remains somewhat arcane and mysterious.

The most prosaic way of describing what the Prowler does is to say that it jams enemy radar and communications. The Navy characterizes the mission more broadly as "command-and-control warfare" (C2W), but even that does not really capture the significance of the EA-6B. The fundamental mission of the Prowler is to seize control of key segments of the electromagnetic spectrum in wartime, assuring that they can be exploited by friendly forces while denying their use to adversaries.

Electronic warfare (EW) has been important ever since military forces first began using radios and radar. But the proliferation of new sensor and communication technologies in recent years has been so profound that it sometimes seems the concept of "full-spectrum dominance" set forth in Department of Defense (DOD) vision statements refers more to electromagnetic wavelengths and frequencies than it does to the range of potential military contingencies. "Network Centric Warfare," like the "Revolution in Military Affairs," is mostly about the application of various digital-electronic technologies to military roles and missions.

Not surprisingly, the ability to monitor, suppress, manipulate, and exploit enemy electronic transmissions in wartime has become central to the meaning of military superiority. Control of the electromagnetic spectrum has assumed a significance similar to command of the air, and that is precisely what the 19 squadrons of Prowlers--11 carrier-based (including one reserve) and four expeditionary Navy squadrons, and four Marine Corps squadrons--are designed to achieve. In fact, the EA-6B is the only dedicated tactical-jamming aircraft in the joint inventory, because the Air Force retired its last jammer (the EF-111A Raven) in 1998.

Thus, when U.S. forces become involved in overseas air campaigns, it is primarily up to the Prowler to suppress enemy air defenses. The EA-6B can suppress defenses either nonlethally--through the execution of standoff, stand-in, and escort jamming--or lethally through the employment of AGM-88 high-speed antiradiation missiles (HARMs). The Prowler's four-person crew, which includes a pilot and three electronic-warfare officers, can further sow confusion among enemy ranks by jamming various communications frequencies. The end result is that adversaries' integrated air-defense and/or command-and-control networks quickly become "disintegrated," enabling strike aircraft to hit their intended targets more safely and effectively.

Balkan Insights

Operation Allied Force, the NATO air offensive over the former Yugoslavia in spring 1999, underscored how critical airborne electronic warfare has become to Western war plans. Serbia's military forces operated an integrated and redundant air-defense system that potentially posed a huge threat to unprotected coalition aircraft. NATO planners therefore did not permit any aircraft, even stealthy ones, to enter Yugoslav air space unless supported by EA-6Bs. That strategy worked very well as long as Prowlers were reasonably close by. In the case of the Air Force F-117A "stealth fighter" that was lost in combat, the F-117A was operating too far from the Prowler supporting it to receive effective EW coverage. Lack of adequate jamming plus poor tactics at the target site resulted in the plane's destruction (the pilot was rescued).

The Balkan air war confirmed several basic lessons about electronic warfare. First, the proliferation of advanced air-defense systems around the world has severely compromised the survivability of nonstealthy aircraft unless they receive continuous EW protection in combat. Second, stealth and EW are complementary, especially when jamming is provided by standoff platforms to stealthy penetrators that themselves emit no signals. Third, because EW support is important for both stealthy and nonstealthy aircraft, the military needs a bigger force of airborne jammers than anticipated only a few years ago. Finally, the introduction of new sensor and communications technologies, combined with the capacity of adversaries to learn from past campaigns, requires the United States to accelerate upgrades of its EW fleet.

The shortage of EW aircraft and crews during the Kosovo operation was worrisome. A third of all available Prowlers were deployed to southeastern Europe in Operation Allied Force, creating strains in the ability of the Navy and Marine Corps to meet other global commitments. At one point an expeditionary squadron based at Incirlik, Turkey--from which it supported Operation Northern Watch over Iraq--had to be shifted to the Balkans, forcing a suspension in enforcement of the no-fly zone. The Prowler squadron at Iwakuni, Japan--supposedly a permanent presence--was transferred out of theater, necessitating an alert of stateside Prowlers to cover any emergencies in northeast Asia. Even instructors from the EA-6B's home base at Whidbey Island, Wash., were deployed overseas to fill the gaps in global coverage.

Modernization Overdue

In short, Operation Allied Force proved that, at least in the case of electronic-warfare aircraft, the United States did not have the capacity to prosecute two major theater wars simultaneously. In fact, it was not so clear that even one such conflict could be supported over a long period while meeting other global commitments. There simply were not enough aircraft or crews. The shortage was spotlighted at year's end by the Navy's EA-6B Operational Advisory Group, which said the following:

"The most significant near-term challenge facing the EA-6B community is inventory shortfall. The [military services] are currently operating with an available EA-6B inventory of 82 out of a planned ... 104. Of the present total inventory of 124 aircraft, 42 (34 percent) are out-of-service, due to [depot maintenance], [modifications], validation/verification, and storage awaiting wings or [depot] slots. At the same time, EA-6B utilization is at an all-time high since assuming the role as the sole electronic attack platform within [the Department of Defense]. The combination of increased requirements and reduced repair funding has stretched the [EW component] inventory to failure."

In addition to a shortage of aircraft crews and critical components, neglect of the electronic-warfare mission during the early 1990s delayed the introduction of new technologies needed to keep the Prowler's capabilities current with military threats and requirements. For example, the EA-6B is the only tactical strike platform that lacks night vision devices; its radar-jamming transmitter is based on 1970s' technology; and it is missing communications links needed to receive various types of useful data from offboard sources such as electronic-intelligence satellites.

More fundamentally, the military services are long overdue in determining what platform or systems architecture should replace the Prowler in the airborne electronic-warfare role. When Operation Allied Force ended in mid-1999, the average EA-6B was already 17 years old. Moreover, since production ceased in 1991, the age of the active inventory is increasing in direct proportion to the passage of years. As the aircraft ages, the costs of keeping it operational are rising. Embrittled wing sections must be replaced. Engine repair is a chronic problem. It is clear that the time has come to develop a follow-on system.

Improved Capability

There is not much that can be done in the near term to remedy the shortfall in aircraft other than restoring all 124 Prowlers to operational status and fully funding maintenance requirements. The Navy has begun the effort to reactivate stored EA-6Bs, but replacement of wing sections and upgrading older airframes to a standard configuration will take years. Development of a "follow-on support jammer" based on a newer airframe or some other concept is the ultimate answer to any inadequacies in the existing fleet, but nobody expects that task to be completed for at least a decade. In the meantime, the main hope for keeping pace with the changing threat environment is a package of electronic upgrades for the Prowler called Improved Capability-3 (ICAP-3).

The ICAP-3 initiative was designed to remedy several deficiencies in the existing EA-6B EW architecture by upgrading receivers and cockpit displays, expanding connectivity with other platforms, automating jammer responses, and integrating previous technology insertions made on a piece-meal basis. Perhaps the most important feature of ICAP-3 is the introduction of a "selective reactive" jamming capability: instead of expending energy jamming all the frequencies on which enemy radars might be functioning, the new system will automatically identify, prioritize, and jam only those frequencies actually in use.

If threat sensors are employing frequency-hopping techniques, ICAP-3 will instantly shift its transmissions to match the adversary's actions.

ICAP-3 is on schedule (and budget) to achieve initial operational capability in January 2004. But it is only the most visible feature of a broader series of initiatives gradually transforming the venerable Prowler into an airborne platform optimized for information-age warfare. When all of the initiatives are completed, the EA-6B will be able to send and receive data from a vast array of offboard sources, including AWACS, JSTARS, Air Force defense-suppression aircraft, other Navy platforms, and various space-based sensors. This greatly enhanced connectivity will make Prowler a key player in Network Centric Warfare, even as it approaches deactivation in the next decade.

Follow-On Jammer Needed

Navy officials do not believe that the remaining inventory of Prowlers will be adequate to meet the nation's airborne EW needs after 2010. ICAP-3 will provide the technological baseline for whatever follows the EA-6B, but there is at present no official consensus on what sort of platform should host next-generation jamming systems. A "Joint Airborne Electronic Attack Analysis of Alternatives" involving all the services was begun in January and is expected to continue into 2002. Whatever solution emerges from that exercise needs to be ready for low-rate initial production at the end of the decade to avoid gaps in EW coverage as the Prowler approaches the end of its service life and eventual retirement.

Despite the need for a solution that can be developed fairly quickly, the analysis of alternatives is considering a wide range of potential platforms, including tactical aircraft, widebody jets, unmanned aerial vehicles, and even space-based jammers. Perhaps the most fundamental question planners will need to address is whether the "follow-on support jammer" should consist of a relatively autonomous airframe--essentially a next-generation Prowler--or a mix of specialized systems linked by an electronic architecture. The latter option potentially has more capability, but getting the pieces to mesh reliably (and affordably) in wartime may prove to be an insurmountable challenge.

Another pressing issue is whether the Air Force will continue to rely on Navy assets for most of its support jamming needs, or seek to recover an organic EW capability. Although Air Force crews are part of the complement of the Navy's EA-6B expeditionary units, there is a spreading conviction among senior Air Force officers that the service made a mistake when it neglected its EW activities to pursue stealth. An internal review led by the RAND corporation has come to precisely that conclusion, and the service is said to be considering the feasibility of equipping older bombers (B-52s or B-1s) with the ICAP-3 system.

Within the Navy there is strong support for converting the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet into a "G" variant dubbed the "Growler." Senior leaders are confident that automation and some offloading of functions would enable them to accomplish all EW chores in the two-seat Super Hornet, and they very much favor the concept of a carrier-based aircraft that can accompany the other planes in a strike package. They are skeptical that some of the more advanced architectures being considered can be made operational for timely introduction into the fleet. But the Marine Corps has no plans to buy the Super Hornet, leaving the future disposition of its four Prowler squadrons unclear.

However these issues are resolved, a solution needs to be found soon. Airborne electronic warfare has emerged from a period of neglect to take center stage as a key U.S. warfighting skill. But the Prowlers are aging fast due to heavy use, and new digital technologies are being developed at an unprecedented rate. Because potential adversaries have access to most of these technologies, it is essential that the United States modernize its EW capabilities in order to preserve its warfighting edge. The January announcement by four congressmen that they had formed an "Electronic Warfare Working Group" in the U.S. House of Representatives underscores the fact that the Pentagon's next steps in airborne EW will be closely watched by friends and foes alike.