By
ERIN HEATON and GREG ALAN CAIRES
In terms of European security, 1998 was
perhaps the most significant year since the Soviet empire's collapse nearly a decade ago.
NATO continued its eastward expansion; the West repeatedly threatened the warring ethnic
factions in the Balkan province of Kosovo with military intervention; intense preparations
were made for the debut of Europe's common currency--the euro--on 1 January 1999; leftist
governments continued to win European elections; and the European defense industry
continued its inevitable journey toward rationalization.
Because of these developments, Europe in
1998 moved closer to achieving its ultimate goal: the ability--through a combination of
pan-continental political, industrial, and military strength and a shared focus--to
cooperate and, if necessary (and probably in only a limited number of areas), to compete
with the United States as an equal partner. Europe's attainment of this goal should be of
significant interest to U.S. policy-makers and defense planners, because coalition warfare
will continue to displace unilateral military action. Those who believe otherwise should
consider how internationally unpopular America's missile strikes against suspected
terrorist facilities in Sudan and Afghanistan turned out to be.
With coalition warfare here to stay,
transatlantic military planning and weapons-procurement strategies cannot be made in a
vacuum. "If we are going to be fighting together, we need to be able to communicate
and we need to have equipment that is interoperable," Jacques Gansler, the Pentagon's
acquisition chief, told Jane's Defense Weekly in an interview. As a result,
Europe's future identity will directly affect both U.S. national security and America's
power-projection capabilities.
These and other factors will shape the
size, capabilities, and composition of Europe's future navies, which continued their
downsizing in 1998, while naval air forces remained strong. Following are: (a) a brief
summary of the major defense and national-security milestones and events of 1998 and their
impact on Europe's naval forces; and (b) a forecast of the challenges to intracontinental
relations, collective security, and individual European navies likely to dominate the
scene in 1999.
NATO's Year of Growth
Transatlantic relations remained
relatively positive throughout 1998. There were, however, some serious differences of
opinion on such issues as how quickly Europe's defense industry should consolidate, and
what the "revolution in military affairs" is all about. The United States and
its European allies focused primarily on internal security issues rather than on NATO's
overall health. But despite some neglect, the alliance had a busy year--related most
notably to its own expansion and its role in the Balkans.
Without the Soviet threat, NATO's current
identity and future direction have become unclear. But transatlantic politics continues to
encourage the spirit of "collective security," and, as a result, the
coalition-warfare concept has evolved from a fad to a trend. With that as its post-Cold
War foundation, the NATO alliance has endured, rather than declined, and is now expanding.
The debate about whether to bring new
countries into NATO culminated with the 1997 invitation to the Czech Republic, Hungary,
and Poland to begin the accession process. The issue of expansion became controversial,
however, when it became clear that acceptance of new members still means, for the
newcomers as well as previous members, commitment to Article V of the NATO charter, which
postulates that an attack on one member is considered an attack on all. This recognition
further exacerbated issues of parity in capabilities and interoperability among NATO
forces.
But, following the 1998 approval of this
"first wave" of NATO newcomers by the United States, which had been considered
the alliance member most likely to be opposed to expansion, the three nations will be
formally welcomed into the fold at a spring 1999 summit in Washington, D.C. NATO also has
made it clear that it will consider making other additions to the alliance in the future,
despite France's continued assertions of independence on security matters and its decision
not to integrate fully into the NATO architecture until its demands are met for a stronger
role in the alliance leadership.
NATO was by far the most significant
player in maintaining European security in 1998. While some held out hopes that the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or the Western European Union
(WEU) would rise to relieve NATO of its military responsibilities, they were disappointed
when NATO continued to hold all the cards. The alliance was called upon throughout the
year to assist in maintaining Europe's security, particularly in the Balkans, where ethnic
tensions once again caused clashes to erupt in the former Yugoslavia.
Western Europe and the United States have
long been concerned about the region, if only because of the spillover potential--the
fighting in one area expanding into regions that are directly within NATO's purview and
exacerbating tensions between such NATO members as Greece and Turkey--which, as always,
find themselves aligned against one another in the region. For these and other reasons,
NATO has tried throughout the 1990s to keep the lid on Balkan conflicts, mostly through
the mildly successful peacekeeping operations that culminated in the Richard
Holbrooke-brokered 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. Since then, the U.S. military has led a
number of multinational peace-enforcement operations in the region.
An Adroit Threat
But implementation of the Dayton Accords
has not ended the fighting in Kosovo. That southern Serbian prov-ince, 90 percent ethnic
Albanian and mostly Muslim, sought to reassert its self-rule against Serbia. The result
was serious ethnic clashes that started in the spring of 1998. NATO repeatedly threatened
air strikes in order to coerce Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic into more civilized
behavior. By October 1998 Milosevic had agreed with Ambassador Holbrooke to an undisclosed
level of troop withdrawals and a detailed verification-and-compliance regime--again
adroitly using the threat of a massive military assault to achieve his diplomatic
objectives. The primary U.S./NATO goal throughout was to end the conflict and allow
refugees to return safely to their homes. Despite some backing and filling, NATO appeared
stronger than ever by the end of the year.
However, the problems in the area are far
from over. Refugees from the conflict still pose a serious challenge to European security.
An estimated 250,000 refugees are technically free to return to their homes, but the
overwhelming majority are afraid to do so. Europe, led by NATO, must find a solution to
the refugee issue while maintaining peace in the conflict-ridden area.
NATO did pass another key test stemming
from the crisis in Kosovo--air-power projection was well-supported and well-coordinated
among NATO members during each of the buildups necessary to counter Serbian aggression.
NATO's naval/military successes may be
partially offset, though, by an increase in economic tensions. European defense companies
are in direct competition with U.S. industry, and, because most defense budgets around the
world are declining, lower spending levels have made competition even stiffer. Ironically,
at a time when support for coalition warfare seems to be at its peak, attention is
distracted and the defense industry's incentives to cooperate and/or focus on
interoperable systems and platforms are arguably at an all-time low. Thus, although the
transatlantic alliance remains relatively healthy, a serious challenge to peace in the
region could turn these embryonic fissures into serious rifts.
A crisis in European security is not the
only way that the fissures could widen, though. The 1998 European elections resulted in
governments continuing their tilt to the left, particularly with the ascendancy of Gerhard
Schroder in Germany. That could mean trouble for defense industries worldwide. This
leftward swing, characterized by The Economist as the "gut-anti-Americanism of
the European left, often as much cultural as ideological," has strengthened the
inter-European alliance at the expense of the transatlantic one. How this affects
transatlantic security relations will be carefully monitored throughout 1999.
Competition and
Collaboration
What of European defense industry itself
in 1998? The end of the Cold War caused almost all of the European defense budgets to
decline, some more than others. The U.K.'s defense budget was $37 billion in 1998, but
last year's Strategic Defence Review lays out a plan to save (i.e., cut) over $1.5 billion
by 2001. France, which maintained its six-year defense plan, had a 1998 defense budget of
$30 billion, but procurement funding was reduced. Germany's 1998 defense budget was $26
billion, but a modest increase through the turn of the century is projected. The combined
military budgets of the European "big three" amount in any case to barely a
third of U.S. defense spending.
Throughout the year, Europe's defense
industries struggled to consolidate in order to maintain their competitive edge against
the already consolidated and dominant U.S. defense industry. The year began with a joint
U.K.-German-French commitment to develop a plan for consolidation of Europe's defense and
aerospace industries, with a view toward creating an entirely new structure by the turn of
the century. The plan, called "European Restructuring in the Field of Aerospace and
Related Defence Industries," was delivered in mid-year. Disappointingly, not only did
it not explain how the consolidation desired could be achieved, it instead revealed
differences in opinion about the appropriate level of privatization for the European
Aerospace and Defence Company (EADC, or Euroco).
Standing in the way of success are
several serious issues--e.g., political prestige, employment, and bureaucratic resistance.
But France, as usual, has been novel--if not inconsistent--in its approach toward
defense-industry rationalization. At first, the Chirac administration appeared to
willingly accept the rationalization challenge by ordering Aerospatiale to divide into
nine affiliates to facilitate partnering with other European companies. Unfortunately,
further progress was thwarted by the French government's willingness to keep Giat
Industries afloat--but at a steep price. Giat lost hundreds of millions of dollars in the
1990s, and between 1994 and 1998 slashed its work force from 16,000 employees to about
7,000.
Thomson-CSF and several other companies
also reorganized in order to increase their competitiveness in world markets. One result
was that at the end of the year Euroco was still mired in the planning stages.
Another fundamental change was then
introduced, courtesy of the United States. Serious discussions began in 1998 between the
Pentagon and giants of the U.S. defense industry about the possible creation of several
international superconsortia that would compete for weapons contracts. The purpose would
be to encourage collaboration and mitigate the creation of a U.S.-versus-Europe
competitive atmosphere, further supporting the transatlantic alliance.
International vs.
Indigenous
In an attempt to cement common
procurements on both sides of the Atlantic, the U.S. Department of Defense also proposed
creating a committee to coordinate the equipment requirements of all NATO members. The
Europeans were not supportive of the creation of a high-level steering committee such as
that proposed by U.S. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen in Portugal in September.
Their position was fortified by a NATO report opposed to the plan. While there was a
general recognition that a coordination problem exists, Europe interpreted the U.S.
proposals as attempts to sneak in the back door and sell U.S. defense products to NATO
members. At the same time, the Pentagon made a renewed commitment to cut the bureaucratic
red tape that engulfs, and sometimes stops, foreign military sales (FMS), reinforcing
European suspicions about U.S. intentions.
With defense dollars dwindling, certain
countries appeared to gravitate further to sectors where their special competencies give
them an edge. In the most general of terms, France turned its sights to becoming the
premier defense electronics manufacturer, Germany to land systems, and Britain to
aircraft. Marine systems seem to be the exception, perhaps because of the political
importance of indigenous maritime production capabilities--no single European country or
company has attempted to dominate marine systems.
As previously noted, future NATO military
operations will succeed only if its constituent members agree to the coalition-warfare
concept of operations, in which each participant's strengths are matched to the missions
most suitable. Coalition warfare also requires each participant's weapons, systems, and
platforms to be interoperable, though. For that reason, future European
weapons-procurement decisions will be keenly important. During the next decade, real
opportunities exist in defense procurement to meet mission requirements, strengthen the
NATO coalition, and increase transatlantic collaboration to maximize scarce defense funds.
One such opportunity nearly squandered recently related to NATO ground-surveillance
requirements; fortunately, alliance members made the acquisition of a NATO-wide
ground-surveillance system one of its highest acquisition priorities.
In order to be interoperable with the
United States and meet mission requirements, the U.S. Joint Surveillance and Target Attack
Radar System (Joint STARS), to which the U.S. Air Force is already committed, was made
available in 1997. Each of the principal European militaries looked to different
solutions, though, and--despite the system's successes in Bosnia--did not procure Joint
STARS for NATO at that time. As 1998 ended, there was some hope that the United Kingdom
would look to a Joint STARS solution in its Airborne Standoff Radar (ASTOR) procurement.
This is important because Britain's efforts at modernization play a significant part in
setting the standard for other European countries to follow.
Alliance supporters say that this is a
clear opportunity that should not be squandered. If the United States and Europe are
serious about developing a stronger NATO to meet 21st-century threats, increased attention
should be given to strengthening collaboration on programs such as Joint STARS/ASTOR.
Tomahawks and TRACERs
There already have been, it should be
noted, concrete and promising examples of existing transatlantic cooperation. One was the
competition for future combat vehicles in the United States and the United Kingdom, with
the U.S. Army's Future Scout Cavalry System (FSCS) and the British Tactical Reconnaissance
Armoured Combat Equipment Requirements (TRACER) being bid on by two teams--with American
and British partners on each team. Another example is the long-standing cooperation
between Germany and the United States on land systems.
In the maritime arena, an upgraded
British Swiftsure-class nuclear-powered attack submarine deployed in the summer of 1998
with the capability, for the first time, of launching American-made Tomahawk cruise
missiles. Moreover, Britain's 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) states explicitly that
all Royal Navy nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) now will also be equipped with Tomahawks.
In addition, Sweden conducted an international competition for constructing vessels for
its Coast Guard.
But the more prevalent model is one not
of collaboration but of competition across the Atlantic. In the aviation world, for
example, the Eurofighter consortium and the American Joint Strike Fighter, with which the
United Kingdom has been involved, are competing for coveted new aircraft procurements. The
Eurofighter team, a British-German-Spanish-Italian consortium, has commitments from those
four countries for 620 aircraft, according to Aviation Week & Space Technology.
The Eurofighter is being aggressively marketed elsewhere in Europe. It is in direct
competition against Lockheed-Martin's updated F-16 both in Norway, where a decision is
expected in early 1999, and in the United Arab Emirates.
The Eurofighter consortium also is
competing against another American product, Boeing's F/A-18, in Australia. The F/A-18 and
the F-16 should have a competitive edge because both are well-tested and already in the
hardware inventories of many countries throughout the Free World. Nonetheless, the pull to
have a common fighter among Europeans may win out over these battle-proven aircraft.
Another aircraft option for the future
(even though questions exist about its exportability, because of its highly advanced
stealth technology) is the Lockheed Martin/Boeing F-22 Raptor.
An Upgrading Of
Professionalism
If the goal is, as Gansler said, to make
Europe an equal partner with the United States when it comes to transatlantic defense
cooperation, it is worth pointing out that in some cases Europe seems to be doing well all
by itself--i.e., with minimal or no assistance from the United States. Inter-European
alliances--like those, for example, in which certain countries purchase licenses to
produce systems developed by other countries--appear to be thriving. That is the case,
certainly, with armored fighting vehicles like Germany's Leopard 2--which has been or will
be manufactured in Switzerland, Sweden, and Spain.
There also are excellent collaboration
opportunities for the countries recently joining NATO. The need for greater
professionalization of their forces has generated considerable defense-industry interest
as companies look to capitalize on the upgrades that the three newcomers will need. But
much work remains, and the financial resources may not exist to support the kinds of
weapons that the United States and European members of NATO want to sell.
In mid-1998, the Czech Republic began to
develop and implement a long-term military reform initiative. Under this plan, the Czech
government hopes to strengthen the fairness of its arms-acquisition process,
professionalize its military cadre, and modernize its forces, especially its aircraft and
tanks, so that it will be better aligned with and benefit from NATO's warfighting
doctrine. The Czech defense budget will be at 2 percent GDP by 2000. This will not fund
all of the modernization necessary, but represents a significant improvement over a
defense budget that previously had been declining.
Poland also is actively restructuring its
armed forces in preparation for joining NATO, while also working toward membership in the
European Union. In Poland's aerospace market, a new combat aircraft is needed. The
short-listed competitors are Sweden's Gripen and the U.S. F/A-18C/D. Poland has shown its
commitment in other ways--it has more troops engaged in U.N. peacekeeping operations, for
example, than any other participant.
There also are several non-NATO countries
that have procurement dollars available. Turkey, for example, has drafted a 1999 defense
budget of nearly $9 billion, with procurement taking up $3.4 billion--including $1 billion
for four locally produced submarines. Slovenia, not yet invited to be a NATO member,
demonstrated its interest in joining the alliance by committing to increase its defense
budget--from the current 2.3 percent of GDP to 3.2 percent of GDP--over the next five
years.
A New Role for Naval
Power
All of these changes in the security
environment have not left naval power unaffected. If anything, an interesting
transformation has taken place with the world's premier maritime force--the U.S. Navy. As
the Cold War becomes a more distant memory, the Navy's role has become more diverse--and
more important--than ever before. But its importance comes from a different emphasis. Far
from relinquishing its old responsibilities in undersea and surface warfare, it has
now--despite having the lowest number of commissioned combat ships in six decades--added
to its missions several duties in the littoral battlespace and the requirement to support
the land battle ashore (and sometimes far inland).
The Russian Navy, once America's most
formidable enemy, has foundered under monumental budget shortfalls in the post-Cold War
era, leaving many vessels rotting in their shipyards. Most of Russia's submarine
construction is now consolidated near Murmansk and St. Petersburg. Despite its current
state of disrepair, the submarine fleet currently carries one-third of Russia's nuclear
warheads, a share expected to increase to nearly two-thirds by 2010. Where the Russian
surface fleet is headed is unclear, but with less than one-fifth of the active force
actually ready for extended sea duty, the outlook is bleak.
At the same time, the Indian Navy has
received the first of two expected Russian Kilo-class submarines, and Pakistan is working
with France for three new Agosta 90B submarines. The United States must therefore continue
to maintain, and improve, its world-class Navy in order to defend against the 21st-century
threats posed by Chinese strategic missiles and by rogue states and terrorist groups with
access to weapons of mass destruction.
Modernizations and
Reductions
Several of America's NATO allies are
working to modernize their own submarine fleets during the coming decade. In the fall of
1998, France's Defense Minister, Alain Richard, announced a $4.6 billion program to
construct six SSNs, commissioning one every two years until 2020. France reportedly has
two SSBNs (nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines) on patrol at all times; the
United Kingdom is expected, however, to reduce to only one SSBN on patrol at any given
time. In fact, Britain and France have held discussions about the possibility of joint
patrols being conducted by their strategic submarines.
The United Kingdom has in any case
decided to cut back the overall size of the Royal Navy. Despite recommitting, in the SDR,
to acquire five Astute-class submarines, the total number of submarines in the Royal Navy
will drop from 12 to 10, and the RN's destroyers and frigates will be reduced by three
ships--from 35 to 32.
Europe's naval air power, on the other
hand, received a major boost in 1998. France's new aircraft carrier, Charles de Gaulle,
scheduled to be deployed in 1999, is expecting to carry a mix of Dassault Rafale M
fighters and Northrop Grumman E-2C Hawkeyes (to be delivered after the turn of the
century). The United Kingdom postulated in the Strategic Defence Review that it would look
to fulfill eight primary missions, among them regional conflict outside of NATO,
regional conflict inside NATO, attacks on NATO itself, and peacetime security.
The British government determined that
those missions could best be carried out (beginning in 2012) by large-deck aircraft
carriers and by combining the aviation assets of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force
(possibly by acquiring Joint Strike Fighters, despite the British commitment to acquire
over 200 Eurofighters). The United Kingdom also will augment its airlift abilities by the
addition of four C-17s to augment its C-130s. The Strategic Defence Review also emphasized
the critical importance of close cooperation with the United States.
Other procurements were closely followed,
such as the much-anticipated $1.6 billion sale of frigates to Norway. That plan is now
under fire, though. Norway's 1999 proposed defense budget includes a reduction for the
Norwegian Defense Ministry that, if passed, is likely to result in the frigates
procurement competing with the procurement of modern fighter aircraft. The frigate
competition is all-European; the fighter competition is U.S. and European. The outcome of
this battle could be an important indicator of the future direction of naval power in
Europe.
Other cooperative ventures included one
between Spain and the Netherlands, which commissioned similar landing platform dock (LPD)
ships, the project definition for which was jointly funded.
The Challenge for the
Future
But, despite the calls for further
defense collaboration in general, maritime power remains the specific province of each
country. Despite cooperative programs like the JSF and FSCS, there are no efforts underway
for the development of a collaborative submarine or surface combatant. And, although
American shipbuilding is going through a period of rationalization, America's marine
systems are specific to American needs and it is unlikely that any alliance input would
change the U.S. Navy's procurement schedule. Europe probably will continue to defend its
waters with ships built with European technology, therefore. That may be less the case in
the years ahead in the area of naval aviation, though, where the superiority of U.S.
aircraft over European systems is formidable.
Europe's security has been of primary
interest to the United States throughout the 20th century, and European security and
America's fate undoubtedly will be even more closely linked during the 21st century.
However, as NATO enters its 50th year, the alliance continues to journey into an uncharted
territory characterized by the need for
coalition-warfare capabilities, lower defense budgets, rationalized defense industries,
and new threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Europe's repeated attempts to strengthen
its internal unity through economic and monetary union will have a dramatic impact on how
the allies do business. These trends suggest broader opportunities for transatlantic
cooperation and collaboration, particularly as the alliance's navies are challenged by new
missions that will require either increased resources or (what is more likely) the more
cost-effective use of current resources.
Despite predictions of decline, NATO will
remain central to transatlantic security. But NATO cannot remain robust unless the new
European governments agree to develop interoperable weapons, systems, and platforms that
are both compatible with coalition warfare and able to keep indigenous defense industrial
bases reasonably healthy.
If Europe continues to work toward equal
partnership with the United States elsewhere on the world stage, collaboration is one way
to ensure that growing European strength does not adversely affect U.S. interests. This is
NATO's challenge. The difficulty of that challenge should not be underestimated, and it cannot
be ignored.
ERIN HEATON is a research
fellow with the Lexington Institute, a nonprofit public-policy think tank located in
Arlington, Va. GREG ALAN CAIRES is a senior fellow with the Institute.
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