| BY STEPHEN W. WALSH Stephen W. Walsh is a naval analyst at the Center for
Security Strategy and Operations (CSSO), TECHMATICS Inc.
"Bogey inbound!"--an
announcement that gets the attention of every watchstander in every modern warship. One
suspects that, for sailors the world over, such an alarm conjures up images of ships
burning during the Falklands War, the near-sinking of the Perry-class guided-missile
frigate USS Stark, or perhaps the Iranian Airbus tragedy. The speed and lethality
of modern supersonic cruise missiles, increasingly augmented by the TBM (theater ballistic
missile) threat, means that tactical reaction and decision times have been greatly
decreased.
Faster, smaller, smarter, and stealthier
weapons once were possessed by only a few nations. Today, these weapons are ubiquitous.
When the U.S. Navy and its allies shifted their doctrine to the littoral, nominal tactical
reaction times decreased further. Additionally, traditional reliance on speed, deception,
exploitation of the ranges achieved by superior weapons, and other defensive advantages
available in the broad ocean are less effective in the high-density, electronically noisy,
and restricted maneuvering room of the near-shore arena.
Simultaneously, the proliferation to
numerous other nations of very real ballistic-missile capabilities stretches the current
threat horizon to well beyond visual range. Maintaining control of the battlespace in this
environment is a considerable challenge. To maintain situational awareness, the on-scene
commander requires voluminous tactical data--which must be organized in an understandable
way--and must be able to sift it, classify it, prioritize it, and recognize the critical
threat in enough time to act.
The future command, control,
communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) networks
envisioned by the U.S. Navy and frequently expounded upon by Vice Adm. Arthur K. Cebrowski
(the Navy's former director of space, information warfare, and command and control), will
be sophisticated and powerful enough, thanks to the advanced state of U.S. technology, to
solve this problem. The real problem may be that the same high-tech solution may cause
great difficulties for some allies. Naval forces around the world have the ability to
project power ashore through amphibious operations, and therefore remain the true
"911" service. That will continue to be true, but future naval forces will
likely be smaller, more dispersed, and more individually lethal than they are today.
Future naval surface combatants--like those envisioned in the U.S. Navy's 21st-century
land-attack destroyer (DD-21) program--promise to pack ever more capability and firepower
into a single hull. But in regional confrontations they will be increasingly dependent on
high technology and the support available from allied navies.
A Global Refocus
As the millennium approaches, the
security and geopolitical environment is changing drastically, and remains unsettled.
America refocused its national security policies from a bipolar to a regional emphasis,
and many of its allies have made the same shift. The United Kingdom's recently completed
Strategic Defence Review (SDR) emphasizes mobility, maneuver, and expeditionary-warfare
concepts much like those of the U.S. Marine Corps, the American armed force that the
British Army is most likely to mirror. But the SDR also quite plainly questions whether
closer ties to and seamless interoperability with European or American defense forces best
support Britain's own interests. The French government has emphasized mobility and power
projection. Perhaps most illustrious of this strategic sea change is the fact that German
soldiers now are routinely deployed outside Germany as NATO members of the Stabilization
Force (SFOR) operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
In the Pacific, Japan also has refocused
its strategic view. The political problems related to the status of U.S. forces in Okinawa
notwithstanding, the revised Defense Guidelines agreement signed in September 1997 signals
a continued strong U.S./Japan partnership. Japan's current financial hardships are real,
but the overtly threatening North Korean Taepo Dong-1 launch over Japan on 31 August 1998
seems to have brought the TBM threat clearly into view for Japan.
Greater Access, Fewer
Acquisitions
Several other Pacific Rim nations have
refocused their security strategies as well. A major strategic defense and security review
was initiated in South Korea following the historic election of Korean President Kim
Dae-Jung. Australia concluded its own national security review, issued the government
white paper In the National Interest (subsequently augmented by the Australian
Defense Department's Australia's Strategic Policy), and is implementing its
precepts in earnest. Singapore, long a U.S. partner in security assistance, has offered
significantly more access to the U.S. Navy, including enhanced training opportunities and
pierside berthing for aircraft carriers. But Asian financial problems remain a critical
security development that could damage economies throughout the world. With wholesale
devaluation looming, many of America's Asian allies and friends already have been forced
to scale back, in fact, or stop military acquisitions, deployments, and exercises.
The European Defense restructuring that
so recently lagged the United States is now well underway, and seems to be accelerating.
With the economic woes of Asia affecting the whole world's financial markets, there is a
new urgency for continued defense consolidation. With the launch of the EURO around the
corner, European governments are under pressure to meet the European Union's financial
guidelines for currency integration, while still addressing stubborn unemployment,
transnational crime, illegal migration, and other societal issues.
Europe's defense industries have
responded in part by developing a partnering style that includes neighboring suppliers and
manufacturers, with governments also controlling a large industrial stake. Despite any
"Maastricht Treaty" squabbles within the membership ranks of the European Union
(EU), there is little chance that Europe will avoid financial integration. When that
integration is complete, the EU may well become a significant force in the world defense
industry. U.S. industry already has found that, to successfully compete in the world
defense market, a local partner is a requirement. That partner may be a European firm
or--sometimes now, and increasingly in the future--one of the nation's armed services.
DON and Defense
Consolidation
In August 1997, the Department of the
Navy (DON) published its security assistance "vision statement," International
Programs: Enhancing Global Security.
Working from the vision statement, the
Navy's International Programs Office (IPO) has established a strategic plan that seeks to
reorganize and reengineer how the Navy carries out its security assistance and other
cooperative international programs. The vision recognizes that, to meet the challenges of
the changing geopolitical and economic environment--and the additional complications
caused by the consolidation, commercialization, and more competitive world defense
industry--while still incorporating essential technological advances into its weapons
platforms and systems, requires a new, more flexible, and more agile Navy IPO. The
"new" IPO must be adept at partnering, and at facilitating DON programs among
its many constituents, including industry--hardly the organizational personality that IPO
had developed as a Cold War combatant and protector of U.S. military industrial secrets.
A primary element of the strategic plan
is its connection to the theater strategic goals and objectives of the nation's several
unified commanders in chief (CINCs)--the primary customers. This approach helps IPO retain
focus on the warfighter's needs, of which interoperability is primary; indeed, the CINCs
are dependent on it. A common element in the theater-engagement strategies of all of the
CINCs is the recognition that partnering and cooperation with other theater forces is
essential to strategic success. The reality of coalition warfare means that most future
contingency operations will necessarily be "come-as-you-are" affairs. Advance
planning to ensure interoperability is therefore essential for success in all but the most
basic military evolutions.
A Spectrum of Success
The most obvious and common way to ensure
interoperability is for two nations to field the same equipment. The Navy has had some
successes with this approach. A carrier air wing, tailored to accomplish a broad spectrum
of missions, is similar to the air forces of many other nations. Few U.S. allies have any
need for the massive long-range strike capabilities of the B-52 Stratofortress, the B-1
Lancer, or the B-2 Spirit. Their ruggedness, range, multimission capability, and
relatively low life-cycle costs make U.S. naval aircraft a better "fit" for most
allies. DON's two most popular Foreign Military Sales (FMS) aircraft have been the F/A-18
Hornet strike fighter and the E-2C Hawkeye early warning aircraft, closely followed by the
AH-1 SeaCobra attack helicopter and the P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft.
Among warships, perhaps the most advanced
anti-air warfare or integrated combat direction system is the Navy's Aegis weapon system.
Aegis variants are at sea today aboard Japan's Kongo-class destroyers, are being installed
in Spain's F-100 frigates, and are under consideration for several new-construction
warships, including Australia's Anzac-class frigates. German F-124 frigates are fitted
with the Mk41 vertical launch system, SWG-1A Harpoon shipboard missile-launch system, and
various command-and-control systems.
Other less visible but important FMS
weapons programs that directly affect how well U.S. forces can tactically operate with
allies include missile and torpedo systems such as the RGM/AGM-84 Harpoon antiship
missile, the SM-1 and SM-2 Standard surface-to-air missiles, and the Mk46 lightweight
torpedo.
The sale, lease, or grant of Excess
Defense Articles (EDA) to foreign governments is only slightly less controversial than the
sale of current-generation equipment. As the name implies, EDA encompasses those weapon
systems, aircraft, ships, and other types of equipment that were once in the U.S.
military's active inventory but have since been declared excess. These systems and
equipment may then become available to foreign customer governments.
EDA has been viewed both as a U.S.
government "hand-me-down" (by partners) and as a "giveaway" (by U.S.
taxpayers). Neither view is completely accurate. Until recently, the negative view was
reinforced by the U.S. government practice of transferring out-of-inventory equipment
without logistic or parts support. When U.S. production lines were not operating, partners
accepting older U.S. ships and aircraft were forced to scavenge or cannibalize parts from
other platforms to keep the "castoffs" operating.
The reality today is somewhat different.
Although DON is reducing overhead by offering up out-of-inventory equipment, the
advantages to the nation's CINCs, and to U.S. partners, are more than budgetary. Navy IPO
has instituted a "package" approach to EDA and ship transfers that provides full
life-cycle logistics and support through the FMS Reserve Program. This program earmarks
existing parts and supplies already in U.S. government possession and "reserves"
them for FMS customers operating specific systems. In this way, EDA programs provide
tested, proven, systems at an affordable price, with interoperability guaranteed but
without the early and costly research and development (R&D) associated with the
purchase of new systems.
A uniquely Navy element of EDA involves
the transfer of warships--a program that Congress reviews and authorizes yearly. Although
not as common as aircraft EDA programs, the transfer of U.S. Navy and Coast Guard ships is
growing. Navy IPO transferred only five vessels in 1995, but will transfer up to 18 this
year, and perhaps twice as many in 1999. With significant service life left in many Cold
War-era hulls, C4ISR and weapon system upgrades will ensure interoperability and utility
for these vessels well into the next century. (See related article beginning on page 35.)
Cost-Effective Training
Dollars
The transfer of platforms and systems is
only half the battle. The receiving navies must be able to operate the equipment
transferred. For that reason, the Coast Guard, Marine Corps, and Navy also train over
15,000 international students, from more than 150 countries, annually under DON's security
assistance training programs. Dollar for dollar, senior Navy officials say, the most
leveraged and cost-effective DON international program investment is in the International
Military Education and Training (IMET) and Extended IMET (E-IMET) programs. Rear Adm.
Robert Sutton, former director of Navy IPO, said that IMET provides the highest return of
any DON security assistance program. The IMET program also assists partner countries in
developing the skills to manage their own defense, security, and military training
establishments. Congress has directed that the extended IMET program include
professional-level management training that emphasizes civilian control of the military,
resource management, the protection of human rights, and the development and
implementation of military justice systems and codes of conduct.
The range of skills that IMET training
programs provide is a broad one, and addresses more than simply "big Navy"
concerns. For instance, the U.S. Coast Guard's experience as the world's premier
interdict-at-sea, board, and search armed force is highly valued--and imitated. Port
control, maritime safety, fisheries security, smuggling, and illegal migration are issues
in many parts of the world where multiagency cooperative engagement is the key to success.
The unified CINCs are unanimous in their praise for IMET and E-IMET not only as the tools
needed to achieve essential operational and maintenance training (which ensures equipment
interoperability in a tactical sense), but also because both programs reflect and embody
the doctrine, operational concepts, and strategic education provided at the U.S. war
colleges and Naval Postgraduate School.
Many foreign chiefs of service and other
senior military leaders are, in fact, graduates of U.S. service schools. The long-term
understanding and one-on-one personal relationships that E-IMET and IMET provide,
facilitate, and enhance are the true interoperability intangibles and can overcome many
issues resulting from the incompatibility of equipment.
Definitions and
Assumptions
Today, DON's international partners
insist on more cooperative programs. Typically, such programs require participation by the
technologically sophisticated industries of close allies. Interoperability as a specific
design criterion for a jointly conceived and produced weapon system is now an a priori
assumption. In actual practice, however, achieving the joint design and production of a
successful, complex, cutting-edge system is far harder to accomplish. Nonetheless, Navy
IPO has enjoyed some notable successes that not only returned major programmatic savings
but enhanced interoperability as well.
The definition of "cooperative
programs" includes negotiated joint research as well as development and/or
manufacturing programs established between countries under protocols known as
international agreements (IA) or memorandums of understanding (MOUs) in which each of
several countries agree to help fund the effort and/or provide other support or resources.
Following are some recent examples of such programs:
- The NULKA shipboard missile decoy system
developed in cooperation with Australia; NULKA is designed to combat cruise missiles;
- The NATO Evolved Seasparrow Missile
(ESSM), developed with 13 other nations;
- The Multifunction Information Distribution
System (MIDS), with France, Germany, and Italy;
- The Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM), with
Germany--for ship self-defense against the air and cruise missile threat;
- The Joint Strike Fighter (a joint
Navy/USAF program), with the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, and Canada; and
- The AV-8B Harrier II Plus, with Italy and
Spain.
The total foreign contribution to DON in
cooperative R&D alone since 1987 is valued at $1.5 billion, with another $400 million
added through joint U.S. programs in which DON participates with one or more other U.S.
services. Improving the DON success rate in cooperative programs is a top Navy IPO
priority. Engaging potential partners in early and frequent design consultation and
negotiation meetings is critical to the design and production success of complex
interoperable systems.
The Direct Approach
Yet another option for foreign
governments to meet their defense needs is through the negotiated purchase of U.S. weapon
systems directly from the manufacturer. This type of weapon system procurement, known as
direct commercial sales, or DCS, is largely outside DON's control. All DCS contract terms,
which include system specifications, are resolved between the contracting parties.
Essentially, there is no opportunity for DOD or the Navy to influence the potential
interoperability of systems when foreign governments choose to acquire such weapons
systems through DCS.
To complete such a sale, however, the
manufacturer must first obtain a license to export the system or technology, and that may
require an exception to national-disclosure policy determination. The Navy's only official
way to monitor DCS and learn of potential system compatibility issues before a sale is
completed is through the licensing or "Exception to National Disclosure Policy"
(ENDP) process. The process is complex, and requires a balancing of issues and policy, one
case at a time. An ENDP can become the focus of properly competing perspectives of U.S.
industry and the various departments and agencies of the U.S. government. Navy IPO
sometimes must choose, therefore, between full interoperability and its technology
security responsibilities. Regardless, the Navy IPO, through its reengineering and
reinvention efforts, is seeking to streamline its processes so that it can share important
technologies with allies, and friends, as appropriate.
Synergistic Dual-Approach
Benefits
When U.S. international partners seek to
meet their legitimate defense needs, innovative approaches are sometimes needed to avoid
saying "No." Particularly important are creative ways to capture the advantages
of both DCS and the more traditional security-assistance programs. The Enhanced Foreign
Military Sales Concept or FMS++ is one example of how aggressive partnering with industry,
friends, and allies can combine the advantages of both approaches. Industry excels at
marketing, marketing research, production R&D, and other activities related to sales,
and frequently can respond more quickly than DON can to specific customer requests. FMS
programs, on the other hand, often are more stable, offer "cradle-to-grave"
support, and are backed by the U.S. government.
In volatile economic conditions, such as
the current difficulties in Asia, a contract between governments can be essential for a
program's survival--contract "stretch-out" is almost always preferable to
default. These efforts are relatively new, however, and still developing. In 1997, a
Navy/industry team was a close second among a large field in Australia's
Within-Visual-Range Air-to-Air Missile (WVRAAM) competition. Although the U.S. team--which
proposed an AIM-9X Evolved Sidewinder--failed, by teaming with industry and using a
combination of security-assistance and cooperative program tools, it became very
competitive within a short time. That effort will serve as a useful model for future IPO
teaming programs.
The Navy itself has been affected by the
overall downturn in and consolidation of the worldwide defense industry. To survive and to
meet the nation's essential defense requirements, the U.S. defense industry has leveraged
economy of scale by shifting to commercial products, when and where appropriate. Over the
last decade, the defense industry went through a critical restructuring, and instituted
new teaming and partnering processes. It also invested heavily in information technology
(IT) to take advantage of the efficiencies that IT brings to the workplace.
Meanwhile, the Navy has started its own
restructuring process, with advanced cutting-edge technology the principal focus. Because
FMS is the Navy's primary funding source for international programs, DON's IPO leadership
has strived to reinvent and improve the department's FMS processes and address any
perceived "market losses." By learning from industry, by leveraging, and by
improving its own already successful international programs--and engaging international
partners early and often--the Navy can preserve its ability to influence the defense
choices made by those partners. It also can, as a hugely important collateral benefit,
preserve the ability to build effective coalitions.
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