By T. D. KILVERT-JONES
T.D. Kilvert-Jones, a career British
Army officer and honor graduate of the USMC SAW Course, is the manager of strategy,
policy, and special programs at the Center for Security Strategy and Operation (CSSO),
TECHMATICS, Inc.
America's national security strategy
depends on its ability to project focused military power anywhere in the world both
rapidly and on a sustainable basis. But U.S. armed forces are gradually losing access to
the overseas facilities that have traditionally made such a capability possible for U.S.
ground-based forces. Deployments also are being conducted into areas where the
infrastructure cannot sustain the needs of military or even humanitarian operations.
Alternative solutions are now being considered.
One alternative highly attractive to some
of the Pentagon's contingency planners is the Joint Mobile Offshore Base (JMOB). The JMOB
is envisioned as a man-made, movable, multipurpose, sea-based logistics facility. Such a
joint platform, if acquired, could ensure the availability of an operational base during
future contingency operations, and facilitate U.S. joint and combined (allied) military
effectiveness well into the next century.
Adapting to the New
Environment
Today's global security environment
suggests that U.S. forces will be increasingly involved in what Rudyard Kipling called the
"savage wars of peace" rather than in the more familiar scenario of some future
Desert Storm. Regardless of the contingency, the effective sustainment of forward-deployed
forces, and the provision of an expeditionary surge capacity, remain key U.S. priorities
as the world enters a more uncertain century. U.S. logistic support systems also will have
to be capable of providing a flexible response, as commitments continue to grow and
outstrip the capacity of contemporary sea-based support architectures. As the U.S. Marine
Corps pointed out (in its 1998 Concept and Issues booklet): "Our enemies will
not allow us to fight the 'Son of Desert Storm' but will try [to] draw us into a fight on
their own terms, more resembling the 'Stepchild of Chechnya.' ... it [will be] an
environment born of change and adaptability."
Those potential enemies clearly are
continuing to learn and adapt. The nation's naval and military leaders are in agreement
that the United States also must develop new capabilities to ensure that the concepts
enunciated in Joint Vision 2010 can be logistically supported and sustained, to the
extent that force, or at least the threat of force, can be applied in a timely, effective
manner. To that end, new concepts must be tested--and, where applicable, acquired--in
order to maintain an effective forward presence.
Mission Needs and
Capability
In September 1995, a Mission Need
Statement (MNS) was developed, in response to the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) for
fiscal years 19972001, for a Mobile Offshore Base (MOB) that would be able to fill the
operational and sustainment needs of forward-deployed forces. The MNS, endorsed and signed
by four Army and Marine Corps four-star officers, including Marine Commandant Gen. Charles
C. Krulak, stated that an operational MOB would give U.S. forces "an opportunity to
improve current capability to deploy and operate forward in support of a full range of
military operations at a lower cost and effectively utilizing a smaller force."
The DPG also set forth the mission
requirements for which an MOB concept would be ideally suited: (a) the maintenance of
continuous overseas presence; and (b) theater access complementary to, or independent of,
allied or coalition support and infrastructure. The MOB also would provide C4I (command,
control, communications, computer, and intelligence) support to a Joint Task Force, house
depot-maintenance and other support facilities required by tactical aviation, facilitate
SOF (special operations forces) missions, and serve as a logistics base for U.S. and
allied air and sea transports (including the C-17).
To meet these demanding requirements,
which normally are associated with substantial (and vulnerable) land bases and depots, the
MOB would have to be large enough to act as a transportation node for the inter- and the
intratheater movement of supplies, equipment and military personnel. To design and build
such a sea-based facility would be a major challenge--but it is not beyond the
capabilities of U.S. maritime engineers.
Overseas Land Bases: A
Critical Vulnerability
Each of the U.S. military services has a
critical requirement for access to foreign bases. The Air Force requires a full complex of
airstrips and support facilities, for example, to operate its tactical aircraft either in,
or within range of, regions of concern to the United States overseas. The Army also is
heavily dependent on forward-deployed equipment and logistic assets. Its prepositioned
sets of brigade-sized equipment stocks are its top sustainment priority, but those sets
that are prepositioned on land are dependent on host-nation support, need around-the-clock
protection, and require significant maintenance, particularly if stored outside.
Land-based stockpiles also may be thousands of miles from the combat scene in times of
future crises.
Even the Navy, accustomed to operating
independently of land bases for long periods of time, requires a support infrastructure to
resupply, repair, and rearm its surface and undersea combatants. Host-nation support,
however--that for the Navy as for the other services--is usually expensive, occasionally
unreliable, and sometimes too distant from the area of crisis.
An operational JMOB also will meet the
needs of the so-called "National Fleet" envisioned by the Navy and Coast Guard,
and also will enhance the Coast Guard's ability to conduct a range of long-duration tasks
such as embargo operations and other missions requiring a continuous presence on distant
stations--where the JMOB would be able to maintain security and release carrier battle
groups for more essential power-protection operations.
Terrorism: The New
Reality
Overseas bases are now constantly at risk
in any case. The threat to them can vary country by country and region by region, and can
range from political manipulation and civil unrest to physical attack. Today, terrorism,
the proliferation of cruise and ballistic missiles, and the threat posed by other forms of
asymmetrical attack are all major concerns for commanders of fixed bases overseas.
Repeated attacks on major U.S. facilities
overseas underscore the inherent vulnerability of land-based installations. Great risks
are inevitable when a nation's armed forces, or other vital assets, are geographically
concentrated but lacking their own effective integral protection.
Less obvious but frequently more
debilitating threats are the political and diplomatic constraints imposed by the
inherently changeable governments of the host nations themselves. No base or port access
agreement can provide guaranteed availability, guaranteed security, and/or guaranteed
affordability for even a short time, much less "in perpetuity." In May 1997 the
National Defense Panel (NDP) recognized this reality of the post-Cold War era and said so
in these blunt terms: "U.S. forces' long-term access to forward bases, to include air
bases, ports, and logistic facilities, cannot be assumed."
The NDP perhaps had in mind an incident
in 1995 when the Italian government denied landing access at Aviano to U.S. F-117 stealth
fighter-bombers intended to take part in attacks on Serb targets in the former republic of
Yugoslavia. The Kuwaiti, Saudi Arabian, and Jordanian governments imposed similar
constraints on land-based allied aircraft selected for operations against Iraq in both
1997 and 1998. As a result, U.S. sea-based assets had to be used to carry out many of the
strikes against Iraqi targets. Today the Air Force continues to face the problem of
obtaining overflight rights and other clearances in the Gulf region, and must expect
future restrictions on its air operations.
The JMOB Alternative
Over-dependence on foreign land bases
clearly could become a critical vulnerability for future expeditionary forces. The
assumption that such bases will be available for either offensive operations or supporting
tasks ignores the reality of national and regional sensitivities. Even when operations are
targeted against pariah regimes such as Saddam Hussein's Iraqi government, host nations in
Southwest Asia may be more likely to err in favor of caution, with an eye on their own
long-term regional relationships, rather than accede to the needs and short-term policy
goals of a distant superpower.
In the absence of an alternative
operational support structure, the traditional logistic footprint ashore will become
increasingly vulnerable to hostile military, political, and terrorist actions. Using a
JMOB for over-the-horizon, offshore basing of supplies and personnel would reduce the need
for land bases and neutralize many of the threats against the current inventory of
vulnerable forward-deployed facilities. The JMOB would, in short, support the U.S.
forward-presence strategy while denying the enemy an opportunity to disrupt a critical
line of operations.
The Ultimate Sea-Base
The JMOB would not replace any system or
force structure in the current inventory. It is designed to serve an entirely new purpose:
ensuring the early availability of a base at sea that could support all components of a
joint force and also be capable of meeting the criteria laid down in the 1997 Sea-Based
Logistics concept paper and the original 1995 MOB Requirement Statement. JMOB--the
ultimate sea-base--offers capabilities that would be critical to implementation of the
Marine Corps' operational maneuver from the sea (OMFTS) concept. Its mobility would give
the Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF) and Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) the freedom
of maneuver they need, allowing them to plan and act according to tactical and operational
situations without the need to build up, and protect, a substantial footprint ashore. Its
capability for selective offloading--the key to sea-based support--would permit both
in-stride sustainment and "just-in-time" support of the MAGTF. Finally, the JMOB
would offer a place to reconstitute the MAGTF and perform maintenance on its equipment, in
preparation for the next mission assigned.
The JMOB would not have the
warfighting features, or capabilities, of a surface combatant or aircraft carrier. Rather,
it would provide many of the support functions of a permanent land base such as Diego
Garcia, or King Khalid City--from maintenance to medical services, and from command and
control to communications--in a mobile, secure, and modular facility afloat. It would be
able to operate as a single structure, or be broken down into a number of varying
individual and functional modules, or single-base units (SBUs), that are the building
blocks of the JMOB.
Industry Approaches
At least three engineering
teams--Bechtel, Norway's Kvaerner ASA Lysaker, and McDermott Inc.--are actively developing
designs for a future JMOB. Kvaerner, the Oslo-based maritime technology arm of the
Anglo-Norwegian international engineering and construction group, has proposed a facility
known as "SeaBase." Its design is based on three semisubmersible platforms that
can be linked by two semibuoyant flexible bridges.
Like the Kvaerner option, the Bechtel
proposal consists of three units. However, its design concept relies on a complex
positioning technology to hold the three modules in the same positions relative to one
another without connectors or bridges.
McDermott's design concept consists of
five independent semisubmersible modules that can be connected by innovative locking
mechanisms to form a complete, fully functional, 5,000-foot JMOB. The McDermott design has
undergone extensive evaluation by the Naval Surface Warfare Center under the sponsorship
of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Office of Naval Research.
Senior leaders of the U.S. expeditionary
warfare community continue to make positive public pronouncements in support of the
program. In November 1998, for example, retired Marine Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper observed
that, "as overseas bases are cut and forces come back to the United States, the only
forces that will be relevant are those that are forward-deployed or can move quickly
overseas." Marine Commandant Krulak also stated (in September 1998) that, in his
opinion, the JMOB would be "far more than a facilitator to ... OMFTS." It would
be, rather, he said, the "key to effective presence in a chaotic world."
Sustaining Forward
Deployment And Military Responsiveness
Sustainability is formally defined within
NATO as "the ability of a force to maintain the necessary level of combat power for
the duration required to achieve its objectives." In reality, of course, the
sustainment of a joint or even multinational force is one of the most complex challenges
facing theater commanders in chief (CINCs). During the four days of Operation Desert Fox
in December 1998, the U.S. Navy launched more TLAMs (Tomahawk land-attack missiles) than
had been fired during the entire 1991 Gulf War. Replenishing the Navy's stocks of
sea-based Tomahawks--which have been the preferred U.S. weapon of response in recent times
of crisis--requires the availability of either a destroyer tender or of a pier or
barge-based crane operating within a secure and sheltered anchorage. The Mk41 vertical
launch system's built-in handling crane cannot support the heavier Tomahawk, thus denying
CINCs the flexibility provided by underway replenishment. Indeed, at-sea missile-handling
cranes are not funded in future construction programs, beginning with the Flight IIA
Arleigh Burke-class Aegis guided-missile destroyers. Without a fully stocked tender on
hand, the Navy's surface combatants will have to return to port to reload their launchers.
With only a limited number of
vertical-launch systems available it is clear that the readiness of those launchers might
become a critical issue. Using the JMOB as a resupply and rearmament base would meet the
precision strike replenishment requirement laid down in Joint Vision 2010. No
longer would vertical-launch systems face the prospect of "running dry" and
having to return to out-of-theater port facilities to rearm.
Correctly configured, the JMOB would be
able to conduct both "sea-base-to-ship" and "ship-to-objective"
replenishments in-theater, well beyond the attack range of most adversaries.
Because the JMOB will be modular in
construction, it could be assembled as necessary into the size and configuration
appropriate to meet the needs of any specific mission. Its modular construction will allow
for the adaptive packaging of combat and combat service support elements. It would thereby
offer the CINC what its supporters describe as "a vast array of force choices,
functions, and operations on a floating surface that is neither an island nor a ship, yet
is large enough to act as a forward operating base or an intermediate support base."
The JMOB design would also provide expeditionary forces with a fully interoperable joint
or combined operations platform.
The Great Enabler
The operational JMOB could be assigned
many important and unique missions to support the doctrinal concepts set forth in Joint
Vision 2010: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and
focused logistics. It also could support operations other than war and carry out a number
of special tasks for the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Drug Enforcement
Agency.
The individual SBUs that make up the JMOB
can be deployed independently without the need to couple all modules for the full-up
system before operations can commence. Even a staged acquisition of the JMOB would provide
a low-risk but flexible enhancement to U.S. combat capabilities in an unstable and
constantly changing global security environment.
If an acquisition decision is made in the
near future, by 20102015 the JMOB would be the largest floating structure ever built.
Its mobility and ability to operate at great distances from land would shorten the
logistics lines and enhance the combat readiness and operational mobility of U.S. forces
engaged ashore almost anywhere in the world. Such enhancements may prove to be decisive
enablers in the conflicts of the 21st century.
As the U.S. joint-service community and
America's allies refine their military joint-expeditionary concepts and doctrinal
developments, the need for effective, adaptable sea basing becomes readily apparent. The
JMOB will alleviate many of the current vulnerable dependencies on land bases. And,
although it could not totally replace all shore-based support facilities, it will reduce
the military logistics footprint ashore to an absolute minimum. It also will allow the
selective outload of supplies to troops ashore, thereby avoiding the all-too-familiar
oversupply of unnecessary items into the forward areas.
The vital sustainment capability provided
by JMOB will, in short, be flexible, strategically mobile, relatively secure, highly
efficient, and cost-effective. This package of dynamic capabilities will enhance
interservice operations synergistically by main-taining the fundamental relevance of joint
expeditionary forces well into the next century. |
