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By
ERNEST BLAZAR
Ernest Blazar
is a senior fellow at the Lexington Institute, a nonprofit public-policy
think tank in Arlington, Va.
When the Los
Angeles-class nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) USS Miami
departed her homeport of Groton, Conn., in November 1998 for an extended
deployment, no one on board knew the ship would be making submarine
history.
Within weeks of
sailing, she participated in Operation Desert Fox by launching Tomahawk
land-attack missiles against targets in Iraq. Later, just a few weeks
before the end of her deployment, the Miami launched additional
Tomahawks from the Adriatic Sea against targets in Serbia during Operation
Allied Force. Not since World War II, it is believed, had an American
submarine launched weapons in two different theaters during the same
deployment.
The Miami
feat underscores two salient points: the usefulness of submarines for
land-attack missions; and the unique suitability of the Tomahawk
land-attack missile to serve as "the tip of the spear" on such
missions
This combination
is receiving extra attention in Washington as the nation's
decision-makers--in the Pentagon, in Congress, and in the White
House--seek to determine whether, and how, the number and scope of SSN/Tomahawk
missions can be significantly expanded. More specifically, Congress is
examining a proposal calling for the reconfiguration of four Ohio-class
nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) into SSGNs
(nuclear-powered guided-missile submarines) capable of carrying literally
scores of Tomahawks and/or other conventional weapons.
The proposal was
developed as an opportunity to take advantage of the requirement that four
Ohio-class SSBNs will have to be decommissioned if and when Russia
ratifies the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II). Under START II,
which limits the number of nuclear warheads possessed by either of the
signatories, the United States could have only 14 Trident SSBNs
operational. The other four would have to be scrapped--or, conceivably,
could be reconfigured for other uses.
Refueling
and Ratification
Proponents of the
SSGN option say that modifying the four excess Ohios to carry Tomahawks
would be the fastest and lowest-cost way to build up the Navy's
power-projection capabilities for the littoral conflicts of the 21st
century.
Current Navy
plans, which are conditioned on ratification of START II, call for the Ohio
and Florida to begin the decommissioning process on 1 October 2002,
with the Michigan and Georgia following one year later, on 1
October 2003.
Congress told the
Navy last year to study the SSGN proposal and report back to Congress by
15 April 1999. The Navy report has not yet been released, but Secretary of
the Navy Richard Danzig described the proposal (during testimony before
Congress on 3 March) as "a very attractive idea."
Several members
of Congress and a number of independent defense analysts also have
endorsed the SSGN concept. Before the concept can be transformed into
reality, though, there are several nettlesome arms-control issues that
first must be resolved.
The Ohio-class
Trident SSBNs have served as the sea leg of the nation's nuclear
"triad" for many years. Each Trident submarine carries 24
Trident missiles ready for launch against targets thousands of miles away.
Under the START II treaty, each missile can carry up to eight warheads,
but no more.
The overall limit
on warheads dictated by START II mandates that the United States will have
to reduce the size of its SSBN force by four boats. All four of those
scheduled to be taken out of service have many years of useful life
remaining (although each would need a refueling of its nuclear power
plant).
START II has long
awaited ratification by Moscow, and is not considered by the Duma to be a
high priority. Meanwhile, Congress has told the Navy that, until Russia
signs, the four boats should not be removed from SSBN service.
An additional
complication: If the treaty is ratified by both countries and the four
Ohios are converted for Tomahawk use, it is possible that the nuclear
warheads the boats would otherwise carry might still be counted against
the limits postulated by START II, just as though the boats were still
fitted with Trident missiles. In arms-control circles the term
"phantom warheads" has been coined to describe that possibility.
A
Practical Precedent
There is a
practical working precedent for converting SSBNs to SSGNs: Other SSBNs
have been converted for tactical uses. Two have been used as "moored
training ships," for example, and two others--USS Kamehameha
and USS James K. Polk--were converted to SSNs fitted with dry-deck
shelters to work with special operations forces.
If the four
Ohio-class SSBNs are converted, the United States probably would not be
able (because of the phantom warhead problem) to field the maximum number
of sea-based warheads permitted under START II. If Congress and the
president agree, however, that there still would be sufficient nuclear
overkill in the U.S. inventory, the issue would probably be academic, and
conversion of the four boats to an SSGN configuration could proceed.
It has been
estimated that the nuclear refueling and conversion of each Ohio would
cost about $500 million. Some of the refueling components already have
been bought and paid for, though, because of the Congressional requirement
that the Navy take no steps to remove the boats from active service.
Failure to prepare for a refueling prior to ratification of START II would
be considered a violation of that mandate.
With some of the
costs already paid, conversion of the Ohios to SSGNs would be, in the
words of Sen. Robert G. Torricelli (D-N.J.), "an inexpensive way of
adding a new dimension to U.S. warfighting capabilities."
Most of the
conversion work would be focused on modifying the Trident tubes to carry
Tomahawk missiles. The converted boomers also could carry a number of
other missiles, such as the LASM (land-attack Standard missile) and/or the
NTACMS, a naval version of the Army's advanced tactical missile system (ATACMS),
which carries a large and variable payload of submunitions.
A
Long Way From Polaris
The converted
Ohios also would be fitted with specialized tactical navigation gear
common to the Navy's Los Angeles-class SSNs and/or more modern variants
planned for the Virginia-class SSNs. The special navigational equipment
would be needed to allow the new SSGNs to operate both close to shore and
within a battle group--to carry out a spectrum of missions far different
from the traditional "go and hide" strategic-deterrence mission
of America's SSBNs since deployment of the first Polaris boat.
If outfitted for
a strike mission, the Ohio-class SSGNs could carry as many as 154
Tomahawks, according to studies now underway--which show that each Trident
missile tube could be fitted with a canister large enough to accommodate
six or seven Tomahawks.
Only 22 of the 24
missile tubes on the converted Ohios would be modified to receive the new
canisters, the Navy said. Because the SSGNs also could be used for the
covert insertion and withdrawal of SEAL commandos, two tubes on each of
the four boats would be permanently closed to accommodate a fitting for
SEAL delivery craft.
If the mission
were to require it, each of the converted SSGNs could carry as many as 102
SEALs and their gear--but at the cost of additional Tomahawk tubes. The
worst-case situation would still permit 98 Tomahawks per SSGN.
The Trident SSBNs
are more than large enough to carry all of the gear needed by the SEAL
teams embarked, and could even be fitted with a hyperbaric chamber (to
recompress divers) and a so-called "hot tub"--designed not for
rest and relaxation, but to help restore the body temperatures of divers,
SEALs, and other personnel suffering from prolonged exposure to cold
water.
A
Blue and Gold Presence
To ensure that
the maximum and most cost-effective use will be made of the four SSGNs,
the Navy already is evaluating ways to prolong their time on station.
Drawing a lesson from the strategic-deterrent SSBN force, planners
envision the possibility of developing a "Blue and Gold"
rotational crew plan similar to the one used by the boomers for several
decades. Keeping the ships on station and rotating the crews, the Navy
says, would permit a near continuous SSGN presence in two theaters
simultaneously.
The continued
presence of an SSGN, and of its formidable arsenal of Tomahawks (and
perhaps other missiles as well), would go a long way toward satisfying the
requirements of the regional CINCs (commanders in chief) that a certain
number of Tomahawks remain in-theater at all times. (The exact number is
classified, but varies somewhat from region to region.)
The continued
in-theater availability of a Tomahawk-laden SSGN would have the added
advantage of providing relief for Tomahawk-equipped cruisers or
destroyers, allowing them to be diverted to other missions in the same
theater, or to respond to emerging crises in another region. This
possibility is particularly attractive to Navy planners seeking to make
best use of the dwindling number of surface combatants now in the active
fleet. With the Navy's active inventory scheduled to drop to just over 300
ships--and probably below that number, under current shipbuilding
projections--the most critical requirements of the regional CINCs will be
impossible to meet, because there simply will not be enough ships to carry
out all of the missions assigned. "At some point," Vice Adm.
Edmund P. Giambastiani Jr., commander of the Atlantic Fleet's Submarine
Force, told Congress on 13 April, "quantity becomes its own
quality."
Current
operational demands have imposed particularly difficult burdens on the
submarine force. "The intelligence requirements today have doubled,
while the number of SSNs available has been cut by almost 50
percent," Giambastiani told Congress. "With those types of
requirements we have this inextricable press to do additional
things." Left unstated was the suggestion that the in-theater
availability of one or more SSGNs would free not only surface ships, but
SSNs as well, for other urgent missions.
An
Angry Ripple
Should the
Tomahawks carried by the converted Ohios ever have to be fired in anger,
all 154 carried by each SSGN could be ripple-fired in an estimated six
minutes. Such a massive strike in so short a time would allow the firing
submarine to quickly, quietly, and safely withdraw from the launching area
within a matter of minutes.
A
submarine-launched attack of that dimension offers two main advantages.
First, because of its stealth, a submarine can penetrate and launch a
surprise attack from waters well within an enemy's warning perimeter. With
no advance warning--such as would be provided by an influx of surface
ships and/or by incoming Navy or Air Force aircraft--large numbers of
enemy targets could be hit, and destroyed, before they could be hidden,
dispersed, or emptied. Using submarines for the first-strike mission would
preclude the need for a much more overt buildup of U.S. forces in-theater
that would warn an enemy that an attack is possible at any time.
Second,
submarines are less vulnerable to attack (and to counterattack) than are
surface ships and land bases.
Conversion
proponents say that modifying the four Ohios to an SSGN configuration
would be the lowest-cost, maximum-payoff way to quickly expand the
Navy's--and the nation's--power-projection capabilities. The proposed SSGN
conversions would complement, not compete with, other Navy and Air Force
power-projection assets and could either remain on station overseas or be
quickly deployed to an area of sudden crisis.
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