| By TOM PHILPOTT
Warning to mariners: If an American warship approaches,
get out of the way. It is overworked, possibly undermanned, and almost certainly in a
hurry.
Last February, two aircraft carrier
battle groups (CVBGs), headed by the nuclear-powered carriers USS Nimitz and USS George
Washington, patrolled the Persian Gulf, keeping Iraq from violating the U.N.
"no-fly zone," protecting U-2 surveillance aircraft--which Saddam Hussein had
threatened to shoot down--and preparing to strike Iraqi targets if U.N. weapon inspectors
were not allowed to resume their work. It was a typical deployment in the post-Cold War
era--and was repeated in November.
But it was the Nimitz CVBG's race
to get to the Gulf that perhaps better captures the Navy's frenetic pace as commitments
grow and the size of the fleet continues to fall.
Nimitz and six escort ships were
in Hong Kong in October 1997 when ordered to steam to the Gulf at "best speed."
Forest fires in Indonesia had left a thick haze across the Strait of Malacca, 500 miles of
bustling sea lanes "like Interstate 95 for ships," said Rear Adm. John P.
Nathman, then the battle group commander.
Days before, with no U.S. carrier in the
Gulf, Iraqi jets had violated the no-fly zone below Baghdad by chasing Iranian warplanes.
So Nimitz now sped through the strait like a police cruiser after a bank robber,
sirens blaring.
"Nimitz was going 30 knots
the whole time," said Nathman. "With smoke and haze from the fires, visibility
was a quarter mile at best. We had [other mariners] yelling, 'Hey Americans! You ... '
Giving us a hard time. We're saying, 'See ya. We gotta go.' The whole battle group's that
way. ... We're ducking a lot of folks. ... High speed, little visibility on a ship 95,000
tons, hauling butt. ... Forty hours through a tremendous amount of traffic.
"It says an awful lot about how
really good we are sometimes," Nathman said.
It says an awful lot, too, about how
stretched the Navy and its 12 "flattops" have become as operational
contingencies sprout up like weeds, and the only weed-control trucks are flying the Stars
and Stripes.
Problems and Pitfalls
But 1998 was not just another busy year
for U.S. forces. Several disturbing trends emerged. In late September, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee to warn the nation that
readiness is dropping. If projected budgets are not raised, if contingency operations do
not slow, if pay and retirement benefits do not improve, if the economy stays robust, then
the U.S. military could return to the "hollow force" era of the late
1970s--within five years, the Joint Chiefs testified.
Adm. Jay L. Johnson, chief of naval
operations, presented a partial list of Navy woes:
- Some degradation in deployed readiness due
to personnel shortages, with 15,000 at-sea billets, mostly junior enlisted, now vacant.
- A deeper erosion of readiness with
nondeployed ships and aircraft. Carrier air wings have hit their lowest level of
preparedness in a decade.
- Aircraft mishaps nearly doubled in 1998,
probably due to the reduced training time available for squadrons ashore (grounded for
lack of spare parts, or because there is not enough fuel to meet flying-hour goals).
- Navy funds to upgrade weapons systems and
equipment have fallen more than 50 percent since 1990. Aging equipment requires more
frequent repairs, causing longer work days for Sailors and strained maintenance
budgets--which, in turn, raises the risk of mishaps.
- The maintenance backlog at Navy bases and
facilities is now estimated at $2.5 billion and will surpass $4 billion in three years.
- Shipbuilding budgets allow construction of
only 6-7 ships a year--not enough to sustain the 305-ship fleet mandated by the 1997
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The Navy needs 8-10 new ships a year to stay above the
QDR requirement.
- Navy missed its recruiting goal for 1998
by about 7,200 recruits. Prospects for meeting future goals are dim, particularly if the
economy stays strong.
- Enlisted retention is 6-8 percentage
points below requirements; competition from private industry is particularly fierce for
skilled technicians in mid-career.
- Mid-level officer retention is down not
only among pilots but also among submarine, surface, and special warfare officers.
- Reform initiatives endorsed by the QDR
have so far failed to produce the cost savings projected--and which are urgently needed to
fill widening Navy budget gaps.
"We can't sustain the Navy with the
budgets we have," Johnson concluded. "Our Sailors are counting on us to do
something now." The CNO estimated that his service needs $6 billion more per year,
plus whatever funds are required to raise pay significantly and reform the
"Redux" retirement plan. That plan, worth 25 percent less than the retirement
plan it replaced, applies to anyone who first entered the military after 31 July 1986. The
Joint Chiefs argue that Redux is driving skilled career personnel from service.
Fixing retirement, said Johnson, is the
Navy's top near-term priority. Fixing shipbuilding is the chief long-term goal.
Hectic Pace of Operations
Keeping two carriers in the Gulf for six
months "showed us how fragile the system has become," Johnson said. "We did
it, [and] we're proud of it, but the ripple effect is profound."
The Navy has a role in almost every major
U.S. military operation, and there were 15 such operations in just the first half of 1998,
Johnson said. "We knew '98 would be a challenge for us," he told Sea Power.
"It was more challenging than we thought."
So far, operational and personnel tempo
promises to Sailors have been kept. Still, they are spending more time at sea. The optempo
rule says that Sailors must get 12 months in homeport for every six months deployed. The
trouble is, said Vice Adm. Conrad C. Lautenbacher Jr., deputy chief of naval operations
for resources, warfare requirements, and assessments, the Navy was able until recently to
achieve a better turnaround ratio than the 2-to-1 ratio postulated--18 months at home for
every six months gone was common. But not anymore. "We don't have 600 ships. We have
337," said Lautenbacher. The ships still must patrol the same hubs of instability in
the Mediterranean, Southwest and Southeast Asia, and the Western Pacific. Ships are more
capable today, but their numbers continue to fall--and "numbers still count,"
said Lautenbacher.
"It puts a real premium on every
unit being ready to do its part," he said. Five years ago about 42 percent of the
Navy's ships were underway at any time, either deployed or on training operations. That
figure is close to 55 percent now and threatens to break a key optempo goal--namely, that
ships not spend more than half of any five-year period at sea.
The percentage of ships on six-month
deployment also has risen, from just over 20 percent in 1993 to more than 30 percent now.
"That's a Navy running at full bore," said Lautenbacher. "There's no more
slack. We're deploying ships and squadrons about as fast as we can without breaking either
people, parts, or training."
Vice Adm. Daniel T. Oliver, chief of
naval personnel, said that about 140 Sailors a month are "cross-decked" from one
ship returning from deployment to another where their skills are needed. The number of
cross-decked Sailors has not changed in several years, he said, but as ship numbers fall
the relative size of the problem increases.
"Although we are programming to fill
90 percent of [crew] requirements at sea, we have not gotten 90 percent of the
people," said Oliver. Less than half of the Navy's ships have the highest personnel
readiness rating of C-1--which means that 90 percent or more of authorized billets are
filled.
Rear Adm. Michael G. Mullen, director of
surface warfare, commanded the George Washington battle group until last April. "The
demands we're placing on our people are, in my 30-year experience, at an all-time
high," he said.
Once deployed, ships spend more time
underway, less time in liberty ports. The underway percentage is now 85 to 90, up from the
70s a few years ago. "There's an impact there," said CNO Johnson. "When we
go to sea we expect to work hard. But 'Join the Navy, See the World' means some quality
port visits and downtime. We've had a challenge keeping [that promise]. ... In-port time
is very limited."
Navy leaders agree that deployed
readiness remains quite high despite personnel shortages. "Every time we were asked
to pull the trigger, we pulled the trigger, and very precisely," said Johnson. He
lauded the "crispness" of the Navy's response to an array of contingencies,
ranging from armed showdowns in the Gulf to Navy divers recovering remains from the
SwissAir crash off Nova Scotia, to naval construction battalions clearing debris and
repairing roads in the aftermath of Hurricane Georges in the Caribbean.
Nondeployed Forces Pay
the Penalty
But the price of deployed readiness is
paid by Sailors and units left behind. "Nondeployed readiness has sunk too low,"
said Lautenbacher. "We're all getting a little nervous."
Readiness always drops when ships
and aircraft return from overseas deployments. Crews take leave or transfer. Equipment
goes into overhaul. Readiness slips into what Navy calls "the bathtub." But the
bathtub has gotten too deep in the last couple of years, said Vice Adm. Thomas B. Fargo,
deputy CNO for plans, policy, and operations. "The bottoms are lower, down in the C-3
to C-4 range. And the sides of the bathtubs are steeper. The effort to get back up on the
step to deploy is tougher," Fargo said.
With a smaller fleet, and still falling,
the Navy can no longer allow a ship or aircraft squadron to spend an extra two or three
months in port for more training or for unanticipated repairs.
"There's no replacement," said
Lautenbacher. "So you end up working them harder. ... The pressure is on. Sailors are
scrambling. Officers are pushing. The system is on them to ensure they make their next
deployment because there aren't any spares. That's what you're seeing in terms of pace of
operations."
A deeper "bathtub" also affects
"surge capability" in times of war or other crises, said Fargo. "Those
folks are going to be in a lower state of readiness when you sound the alarm." To
reduce the workload, Johnson in October ordered fleets to cut interdeployment training
cycles by 25 percent.
"We add inspections, new
requirements, all the stuff guys like me levy on the fleet to help them do their jobs. One
day we asked ourselves, 'When's the last time we took something off?' And we had a hell of
a time answering that question," Johnson said.
Expanding Threat
Environment
On 7 August, terrorists bombed U.S.
embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing more than 200 people and
injuring thousands. Twelve Americans, including three service members, died.
Less than two weeks later, the United
States struck back with cruise missile attacks on terrorist training camps in Afghanistan
and a chemical factory in Sudan, part of the terrorism infrastructure of Osama bin Laden,
a dissident Saudi millionaire who wants the United States out of all Muslim nations. The
strikes against bin Laden, said Mullen, were "a real sea change" in the U.S.
response to terrorism. "More active, more aggressive, more offensive."
To keep terrorists in the dark, the
Defense Department refused to release information on the operation--including whether
surface ships, submarines, or aircraft launched the missiles. That was fine with Johnson.
"This is asymmetric warfare, and we've got to be very careful, and perhaps not as
forthcoming on personnel details as we had been in the past," he said.
To reduce the biological threat to U.S.
service members from regimes like Saddam Hussein's, the military last year began mandatory
anthrax vaccinations of the entire force. Threats against the United States turned
"more diverse, more unpredictable" in 1998, said Johnson. The Office of Naval
Intelligence (ONI) recently changed its focus, from countries that might intend to harm
the United States to sources of the greatest threats against U.S. maritime systems. The
results were surprising, said Paul Lowell, deputy director of naval intelligence. The Navy
found that only 12 nations conduct a full range of naval research, development, testing,
and evaluation. Ten are allies. The other two, Russia and China, are "not high on
anybody's threat list," said Earl E. Sheck, an assistant director in ONI. But those
12 nations supply the vast majority of weapon systems that one day could be used against
the U.S. Navy.
"There are almost no controls on
exports or proliferation of any of that technology," said Sheck. "There is some
in the missile community but almost anything else, any state-of-art weapon system, is
available to anybody who has the money. You can literally buy a Navy if you want to
today."
Often enough, governments are not
in control. "It's not the German government doing submarine development. It's
industries within Germany. That's why this whole idea of looking at countries anymore is
losing its focus. We really need to focus on naval-related industry worldwide and see what
it's producing," Sheck said.
Russian technology, for example, has
allowed the People's Republic of China to skip a generation in its development of nuclear
submarines. Russia's willingness to sell submarine quieting technology to several
countries, including Iran and China, has made the submarines of those countries more
difficult to track.
But purchasing nations are not wedded to
a particular supplier. They might buy quieting technology from Russia but advanced
communications gear from any of several Western nations. Assessing the overall capability
of such hybrid systems is a challenge. Analysts had an easier time of it when the Soviet
Union supplied almost all weapons to potential adversaries. Capabilities were known and
easier to counter.
Today, the Navy might not know what it
will face in a conflict--unless naval intelligence can stay on top of such information.
"It might have been okay 15 years ago to understand the general characteristics of a
cruise missile. How fast, how big, how far could it fly, what fire control system launched
it. Then you could engage it," said Sheck. "That whole countermeasure,
counter-countermeasure issue today requires really precise knowledge."
Progress and Setbacks
The U.S. Navy made several strides in
1998 to keep its technological edge, but there were problems as well. IT-21 (Information
Technology for the 21st Century) systems were installed on some ships based in Japan and
some in the Atlantic Fleet. But the installations "were a little rough," said
Vice Adm. John T. Natter, director in OPNAV of Space, Information Warfare, Command and
Control.
IT-21 is a group of systems--data and
voice transmission, video teleconferencing, still-picture transfer--that a command and its
subordinate commands can use to more rapidly communicate intentions, intelligence,
decisions, and plans. "If you can gather intelligence, discern what it provides, lay
out a plan, direct execution--all of it faster than the enemy--then you get him on the
run," said Natter.
But in 1998, he said, the Navy saw
"some of the downside of not having IT-21 in place for your entire force. Because
you're only as fast as your slowest moving subunit." The Navy wants the systems
installed as quickly as possible throughout the fleet, but the pace of progress will
depend on funding. Lautenbacher said that IT-21 Navywide is unlikely until 2008.
Another IT-21 hurdle is what to do about
allies who are not included in the network. "They are very concerned [about] their
ability to stay up with us in this communication round," said Natter. "We are
working to better wire them into the IT-21 scheme. But it's going to be difficult. We've
got security issues, they've got their own security issues with other contingency
partners, and there's [also] the cost."
The Navy also had problems in 1998 with
the much-touted Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC)--which will allow the realtime
sharing between platforms of sensor and targeting information to produce the most
effective firing solution against incoming missiles or aircraft.
"We experienced a fairly serious
interoperability problem between CEC and the Aegis weapons system," said Mullen.
"We've added a tremendous amount of capability to both programs over time.
Integrating them has turned out to be more of a challenge than we realized."
Mullen said the problem will take "a
couple of years" to solve. But he also sees a silver lining in the CEC setback.
"It's indicative of the kinds of interoperability problems all the services are going
to have to solve, long term," he said. "So we hope solving this is a model for
the future."
Natter's top priority for 1999 is
addressing the Year 2000 (Y2K) problem. Most computer chips, from those found in
sophisticated weapon systems to dining-hall refrigeration systems, have been programmed
with only two digits representing any given year. The fear now is that at the stroke of
midnight on 31 December 1999 those systems will read the new year, "00," as the
year 1900 and either shut down or begin punching out incorrect data.
In 1998, the Navy began committing
resources to the problem in earnest. Natter takes it very seriously, calling Y2K the
"approaching brick wall." At risk is the proper operation of ships, aircraft,
submarines, and "a myriad of systems throughout our shore infrastructure,"
Natter said. There is no "magic solution," he added, just "a lot of dog
work by engineers, scientists, and electronic folks."
The Navy will protect first its records,
then operational platform systems, and finally the systems that feed or support
operational units. "I'm confident we're addressing the problem," said Natter.
"Could we have started earlier? Yes. Would it have helped? We're doing almost as much
as humanly possible and can't afford to do anything less."
Shortfalls in
Modernization
Despite the QDR's admonition that the
Navy should stop raiding its weapon-modernization accounts to cover short-term readiness
needs, the practice continued in 1998, Johnson conceded. The Navy just does not have money
enough to train its people, respond to contingencies, and still protect the funds needed
for ship and aircraft recapitalization.
The Navy needs to decommission 30 more
ships to reach the QDR goal of 305. But if shipbuilding budgets do not increase, Johnson
said, the Navy will be "on a pathway that takes us well below 300 ships."
The budgets currently projected, said
Lautenbacher, will see the Navy "fall into the 270-ship range in the early part of
the next century." That might be avoided by keeping some ships beyond their
recommended service lives--but maintenance costs would then rise, he said. He compared the
shipbuilding account to a "frontier town" movie set. "Open the door and
what's behind it? A bunch of sticks holding up this wonderful facade. Looks great, but
you've got to start filling in the modernization accounts."
Lean budgets are impacting equipment
upgrades as well. "We're down to 40 percent of what we used to do [in equipment
modifications]," said Lautenbacher. "That's been a heavy loss to us. ... We're
effectively aging our equipment faster than we have done in previous years."
Surface Fleet
Modernization
The surface Navy wants to modernize its
current ships and buy new ones. The fiscal year 1999 budget includes $2.7 billion to build
three more Burke-class destroyers. By 2000, the fleet will be down to 116 surface
combatants, the QDR target. "A number below that would concern me greatly," said
Mullen.
The FY 1999 budget also authorizes $88.5
million in research and development (R&D) for the final Nimitz-class carrier, CVN 77,
and $110 million in R&D for the follow-on "CVX" carrier. In October, the
Defense Acquisition Board approved the Navy's request that the CVX be a large-deck
ship--big enough to accommodate 75 aircraft--and nuclear-powered as well.
Given the current demands on the Navy's
already undersized fleet, nothing else made sense, suggested Adm. Frank Bowman, director
of naval nuclear propulsion. The Navy's ability to "answer the bell" today,
Bowman said, is made possible primarily because nuclear power provides unprecedented
endurance and multimission capabilities to carriers and submarines. The Navy will continue
to need the most "robust platforms" it can build, he said.
In the first several decades following
World War II, Bowman pointed out, the United States built 176 air bases overseas. U.S.
forces have access today to only 24 of them. That is another argument for large-deck
nuclear-powered carriers, he said. Nuclear power does cost more, said Bowman. "But
we're building a warship, not investing in a savings bond."
The higher cost, he continued, buys
"the mobility, flexibility, and endurance [needed] to scamper from one part of the
world to another, unsupported logistically, without having to set up the supply train in
front or in back, even able to fuel escorts as you go."
Congress authorized another $85 million
in the FY 1999 budget to continue development of the DD-21 Land- Attack Destroyer. Two
teams of contractors, led by Bath Iron Works and Lockheed Martin, continued to work
through 1998 on their competing designs for DD-21, which is scheduled to join the fleet in
2008.
The Navy plans four upgrades to its Aegis
cruisers, inserting the systems needed for land-attack capability, area air defense, and
theater ballistic missile defense--as well as "Smart Ship" improvements designed
to boost operating efficiencies and cut crew size. The current plan, said Mullen, is to
convert 12 of the fleet's 24 Aegis cruisers through 2004. Finding the money will be a
challenge, he said, but if the cruisers are not modernized they will become obsolete. He
noted that seven Spruance-class destroyers are now being decommissioned because years ago
they had not been backfitted with vertical-launch missile systems.
There were encouraging advances in naval
surface fire support in 1998, particularly with the successful firing of a new five-inch
gun--projected to be installed on 49 surface combatants starting in 2001. The new gun will
be able to use current five-inch rounds as well as new long-range rounds that will be
effective out to 63 miles.
The Navy also tested a Land-Attack
Standard Missile last year that could strike well beyond 5-inch gun range--with greater
speed and for less cost than a cruise missile.
Finally, the Navy approved development of
a "tactical" cruise missile for use in both surface ships and submarines that
could enter production by 2003. It would be able to loiter over targets, send back
battle-damage information, and be retargeted in flight.
Advances in Naval
Aviation
Congress also approved the purchase of 30
more F/A-18E/F Super Hornet strike aircraft in 1999 to help replace the retired A-6
Intruder and the aging fleet of F-14 Tomcats. Another $478 million was authorized for Navy
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) development in 1999. JSF is the next-generation combat aircraft
and will feature a common airframe and structural components in Navy, Marine Corps, and
Air Force variants.
The EA-6B Prowler, which jams enemy radar
and communications to protect U.S. ships and aircraft, will receive $100 million in
modifications to counter a new family of target-acquisition radars. Prowlers carry out the
radar-jamming mission for all of the nation's armed services. But there are not enough of
them, said Lautenbacher. "That community is working very hard," he said.
The readiness of nondeployed aircraft
squadrons has been hit even harder than that of surface ships. "Right now we don't
have quite enough airframes," said Nathman. Tight budgets produced part shortages,
which in turn slowed maintenance, which in turn reduced aircraft availability. Pilots have
had delays in training between deployments, making it more difficult to prepare for their
next deployment. And it shows. "They don't compete particularly well," said
Nathman.
CNO Johnson is worried that the training
deficiencies have been a factor in the increase in aircraft accident rates. In 1998, the
rate climbed from 1.7 accidents per 100,000 flying hours to 2.5 accidents. On a percentage
basis, that jump looks alarming--almost 50 percent. But Nathman points out that the 1.7
rate in 1997 was the best in naval aviation history. For the decade, the rate has been
almost flat: about three accidents per 100,000 hours. Viewed in that context, a 2.5 rate
does not look too bad. But it was 12 more accidents than happened a year earlier.
"The CNO is concerned that if you
don't make the investment in your folks, but still put them in the same high-pressure
operational context--deployed, flying off of aircraft carriers day and night, no matter
what the weather, over real bad-guy territory ... you increase their risk," Nathman
said.
Cannibalization rates--removing parts
from one aircraft to repair another--are too high among nondeployed squadrons, Nathman
said. "It impacts our training rates, our ability to support flying hours for young
pilots." The communities hit hardest are the S-3 Viking surveillance aircraft and
F-14 fighters.
Faced with tough choices, the Navy
underfunded its aircraft maintenance and flying-hour accounts for several years. "In
a way we bought our own problem," Nathman said. Those accounts are now fully funded,
but a turnaround will take time. "I'm sitting here telling you from a Washington,
D.C., perspective how we're going to get better," Nathman said. "But tomorrow
you can go to several S-3 or E-2 or EA-6B squadrons that don't have enough airplanes. It's
all aggravated by the inability to make those investments we knew we needed to make but
didn't have the money. The trade we're making now is pulling money out of modernization to
pay for near-term readiness. And that's a concern."
Pilot retention still is declining, but
the Navy problem is not as severe as that experienced by the Air Force. The retention
bonus "take rate" is a disappointing 35 percent--the Navy's goal is 50 percent.
Many of the pilots and aviation technicians departing say pay is too low.
"They joined the service to serve
their country," said Nathman. "But you ought to be able to compete with someone
next door who doesn't have the risk, who doesn't have to deploy. That's why the chiefs are
going after the Redux retirement issue and the pay gap."
In April, construction began on the first
of the Navy's new attack submarines, or NSSNs. In October, the first NSSN was named the Virginia,
and Congress authorized $2 billion to build the second ship in the class.
The fleet now has 65 nuclear-powered
attack submarines (SSNs), with 16 forward-deployed. The total number will drop sharply, to
50 SSNs by 2003. By then perhaps as few as 10 attack submarines at a time will be on
patrol. Bowman said that that would create a shortage, and that worries the warfighting
CINCs. A new study on submarines, being conducted by the Joint Chiefs and due out in March
1999, is expected to set a higher requirement.
Even if it does, though, too few
submarines are now in production to stop the slide--and the service life of attack
submarines, given the stress on hulls of multiple dives and ascents, usually cannot be
extended, Bowman said.
There is a good chance that the Navy may
even slip below 50 SSNs. The only way to avoid doing so, said Rear Adm. Malcolm Fages,
director of submarine warfare for OPNAV, is to build two to three Virginia-class boats per
year starting about 2005. With the Navy expecting to have to pay for the CVX, several new
types of aircraft, a new logistics ship, and other platforms and systems during the same
time frame, Fages said, "I don't know how we're going to get there."
In October, the Electric Boat Division of
General Dynamics in Connecticut and Newport News Shipbuilding in Virginia signed the
first-ever teaming arrangement to build submarines. The deal covers the first four
Virginia-class boats.
The Navy plans to backfit more advanced,
off-the-shelf sonar systems into its newer Los Angeles-class submarines--i.e., those
expected to still be operating in 15 years. The new systems will have 200 times more
processing power than the current Los Angeles-class sonars. The upgrade is funded in the
Navy's current FYDP (future-years defense plan). In 1998, systems required for the first
phase of a four-phase upgrade were installed for testing aboard two submarines. If all
goes well, the Navy will do the same with Los Angeles-class combat fire control systems
and radio rooms. "Basically," said Fages, "we see ... [this] as a very
viable way to reduce life-cycle costs on our submarines."
Bowman noted that a Defense Science Board
study on future submarine design calls the nuclear attack submarine "a crown jewel in
the nation's arsenal"--and agrees with Bowman that, "we need more [SSNs], not
fewer."
It might surprise some, said Bowman, that
he agrees with the report's conclusion that, if resources are constrained, R&D money
should be applied to improving the "front end" of the submarine--new weapon
payloads, new sensors, towed-array and other sonars, improved computer processing--rather
than the "back end," the reactor and propulsion system. "I endorse
that," Bowman said.
The same study supports Navy plans to
convert some Trident ballistic missile submarines into SSGN models that would be able to
store and launch six to seven cruise missiles in 22 of the 24 missile tubes on each boat.
Congress asked for a study in 1999 on the viability of the SSGN concept. Bowman said the
idea sounds good, but pointed out that SSBNs also can be converted into other kinds of
platforms. "I worry that we not get too enamored with that initial idea," he
said.
If DOD and Congress approve the idea, one
or more SSBNs could be converted to SSGNs by about 2005. Next year the Navy will have to
decide how to divide its 14 remaining Trident submarines between the Atlantic and Pacific.
One encouraging note: Nondeployed
readiness has not fallen as far in the submarine force as it has in the surface fleet,
Bowman said. When dealing with nuclear reactor safety, the Navy just cannot allow it.
Amphibious Forces
Maintain Busy Schedule
Congress authorized $638 million in the
FY 1999 budget for advance procurement of the second of the new San Antonio (LPD 17) class
of amphibious transport dock ships. The nation's lawmakers refused, however, to approve
Navy plans to conduct a service life extension program (SLEP) on the first of the
Tarawa-class amphibious assault ships (LHAs). Each SLEP would have cost $1 billion, and
the LHAs would lose both storage and deck space, limiting their ability to haul such
littoral warfare equipment as the LCACs and the Marine Corps' new tiltrotor V-22 Osprey
aircraft. Congress approved spending $50 million instead on long-lead material for an
eighth Wasp-class amphibious assault ship (LHD).
The current 43-ship amphibious force is
slated to fall to 36 ships as the Navy completes a shift to a dozen three-ship amphibious
ready groups. ARGs now have five or six ships.
Whether three ships or five, they stay
busy. In 1998, the Navy's ARGs participated in contingencies, large and small, all over
the globe, checking aggression, evacuating Americans from danger, and providing disaster
relief in areas devastated by hurricanes or flooding.
"The carrier battle group is big and
sexy with airplanes off the deck. Everybody loves it. I'm a pilot; I do too," said
Maj. Gen. Dennis T. Krupp, director of the expeditionary warfare division in OPNAV.
"But ARGs show the flag all over the world and [mean so much] to the little person in
a country that needs help, whether it's saving his life in a hostile fire situation or
because there's been a flood.
"That little guy doesn't know
whether that Marine comes from an amphibious ready group or from a carrier. But he knows
he came from the sea and helped him."
ARGs now pack equipment and supplies in
anticipation that the group might have to split during any given deployment to conduct
separate missions simultaneously. Like carrier battle groups, Krupp said, ARGs are smaller
than before, but busier than ever.
CNO Johnson announced in 1998 that the
Navy hopes to upgrade all of its ships by 2006 with an "organic" mine
countermeasure capability--most likely in the form of unmanned underwater vehicles that
detect and destroy mines in the littoral.
"Right now, the battle group
commander who comes up against a minefield has no capability," said Krupp. Two
minehunting ships are now based in the Persian Gulf. But if ships confront mines elsewhere
in the world, it could take weeks to get the minehunters or minesweepers needed to the
scene.
The Challenge Ahead
Although buffeted by readiness
challenges, the sea services also find considerable excitement as they approach the final
years of the 20th century. The importance of carrier battle groups and expeditionary
forces has never been clearer, said Nathman. Warfighting commanders in chief, in
particular, recognize this strategic reality as they grow increasingly frustrated in
seeking diplomatic approval to stage operations from bases outside the United States.
"This is our era," Krupp said.
"Nobody else can do what we do--move ships that have planes on them, naval guns, and
Marines; do missions from humanitarian relief up to high-intensity conflict, on any
platform. That's one heck of a capability. And we don't have to ask 'Mother, may I?'"
But CNO Johnson said that America's
Sailors still need a "clear signal" in the year 2000 budget that pay and
retirement will improve, and that they will have the equipment they need to do their jobs.
"This is the time to do it," he said. Otherwise, the decline in readiness will
accelerate.
TOM PHILPOTT, a freelance
journalist, has spent more than 20 years covering the U.S. military as a reporter and
editor, including more than six years as editor of Navy Times. His articles have
appeared in the Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, The Washingtonian
Magazine, and Readers Digest. In May 1994 he began syndicating a weekly news
column, Military Update, which now appears in 50 daily newspapers that strive to
keep military readers informed.
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